Results – Indicators of Vulnerability
5.2 Information & technology
As stated by Susandi et al. (2011), almost all inhabitants have access to television. Through this medium influencing stakeholders have the ability to reach almost all inhabitants to warn, instruct or inform them in case of a flood. Furthermore, Kaewkitipong & Chen et al. (2012) show that the use of portable information devices, such as smartphones, are used to remain in contact with family and the As stated by Susandi et al. (2011), almost all inhabitants have access to television. Through this medium influencing stakeholders have the ability to reach almost all inhabitants to warn, instruct or inform them in case of a flood. Furthermore, Kaewkitipong & Chen et al. (2012) show that the use of portable information devices, such as smartphones, are used to remain in contact with family and the
enables a Facebook user to indicate whether they are in the affected area and to mark themselves as ‘safe’ (Waxman, 2015) . In the immediate aftermath of a flood, as Kaewkitipong & Chen et al. (2012) point out in their case study on the 2011 flood in Thailand, inhabitants of the affected area will primarily focus on their own safety and will act to fulfil their own needs, rather than to interact with the community to reassure those needs. The use of technology, such as social media but also satellite images, can also be helpful to locate resources that are needed to increase the recovery of inhabitants, keep the food and water supplies to a maximum and rebuild of the area (Fugate, 2011; Kaewkitipong & Chen et al, 2012).
Even though the information systems that have emerged appear to be applicable during a flood, Susandi et al, (2011) documented that many inhabitants have experienced difficulties in reaching the evacuation place. This can be the result of the many different warning messages that were given, from various sources, which led to uninformed decision making (Taubenbock et al, 2009). One may understand that the uncertainty of the information will increase if there does not exist
a good warning system for hazardous events with high risks, such as a flood. If inhabitants can rely on the information that is given, they will be more prone to react.
5.3 Material resources & infrastructure
The inhabitants of Jakarta Utara have the opportunity to be evacuated to shelter locations (Susandi, 2011; Marchiavelli, 2008), but during the past flood events these opportunities are not taken advantage of when a flood presents is selves, and are only used at the last moment; while this sudden last moment evacuation has led to complicate the operation due the extreme bustle in the narrow road network (Texier, 2008). In addition, a rather paradoxical growth of motorized vehicles has been signalized in the informal communities (Bowo & Koeberle, 2010). Because after the flood event of 2007 the highest growth in motorcycles has been documented, especially in Jakarta Utara. Even though this might seem rather strange, as the evacuation operations of 2007 were problematic; however it could indicate that this growth in vehicles is an adaptive reaction, in order to evacuate quicker and more effectively. However the general conclusion that can be made is that the increasing number of vehicles on the streets of Jakarta is outpacing the development of new roads. The World Bank (2010) speaks its concern about a total gridlock of the city streets as early as 2016.
Due to the rapid urbanization multiple investments have not kept pace with the increasing demand of Jakarta’s population; including basic service deliveries like sewerage systems, clean water
access, road construction and solid waste management. For example rivers and waterways have been sacrificed for economic growth and green areas have been converted to residential areas. These processes are putting pressure on the run-off of water in times of floods. In the meanwhile urban poor communities had to make place and therefore settled notably along polluted riverbanks and waterfronts that become dumpsites of wastes. Wastes in Jakarta’s waterways eventually accumulate in the north coast, where the rivers end (Padawangi, 2012). Strong pollution in the North persists because a city ‐wide solid waste management plan for Jakarta is currently non-existent. Waste collection is largely done by private corporations, excluding the poor who are not able to afford this service (World Bank, 2010). The accumulated waste in combination with blocked drainage and sewage systems created a nightmare for health and environment (Rashid, 1999). Research has turned out that the microbial contamination level in floodwater is greater than in the streams of the Ciliwung River, which indicates a higher health risk during flood events, especially to the people who walk through, and children playing in, floodwater. In addition, due to the lack of access to clean water many people use the floodwaters for washing and other domestic purposes which increased the risk of infection to them. This definitely applies to the urban poor in Utara (Phanuwan, 2006).
Another important material resource that needs to be discussed are the homes of the urban poor. After the flood, many people are temporarily homeless, they had to refuge by other inhabitants or in shelter locations (Marchiavelli, 2008), because their houses were not strong enough to survive the floods. Most of the people try to reinforce their houses and the water sources, because of the (economic) Another important material resource that needs to be discussed are the homes of the urban poor. After the flood, many people are temporarily homeless, they had to refuge by other inhabitants or in shelter locations (Marchiavelli, 2008), because their houses were not strong enough to survive the floods. Most of the people try to reinforce their houses and the water sources, because of the (economic)
5.4 Organization & social capital
Susandi et al. (2011) states that the limited meetings among villagers and the low interest in the (formal) community organizations were part of the situation before the floods of 2007. There was low social coherence among the inhabitants and Susandi et al. (2011) reported that more than halve of the respondents was not able to find help when needed. In combination with the neglecting government, as earlier mentioned, this creates a complex situation in which there is low adaptive capacity to act as
a whole to protect Jakarta and the inhabitants against floods (Taubenbock et al 2011). After the floods, however, there was more involvement in helping other members of community (Susandi et al., 2011), but this involvement was still very low. A strong social capital would be favourable as this induces the willingness to invest in a safer future for not just those individuals, but also the whole community (Wals, 2015). Therefore it would be advisable to improve the social capital and the understanding of the difficulties the inhabitants are facing to stand strong in the preparation and prevention of a flood (Wals, 2015; Schellekens, 2015).
One of the coping mechanisms after the previous floods was the ‘gotong royong’: clean up houses and surrounding together (Marchiavelli, 2008). In order to prevent and be prepared in case of an upcoming flood, the local community organisations have set up a text early warning system (Bowo & Koeberle, 2010). Both of these mechanisms appear to have a small scope, but will improve the overall adaptive capacity of the community and leave room for improvement to achieve adaptive development.
Lack of interaction among community to discuss about flood disaster can have negative influences on disaster relief (Susandi et al. 2011). In the research of Ahmed & Ahmed (1999) analysis of different slums in Dhaka was done. It appeared that the community responses differed within slums due to variations in the level of unity. Community mobilization appeared to be an important factor in the distribution of relief goods and services.
5.5 Political capital + Institutions and entitlements
The government provided temporary shelter locations in schools, mosques etc., during the flood and in the immediate aftermath of the floods. At the moment, the damage of the floods was known, the government provided shelter locations for a longer period of time, (Marchiavelli, 2008). Since the political capital neglects the need of the urban poor for protection against floods, the government is lacking in providing the necessities to prepare the weakest link in society (Schellekens, 2015; Wals, 2015). Surveys have shown inhabitants believe that the construction of a dyke or other defence mechanisms is not their responsibility, but a task of the government (Susandi et al, 2011; Pamunkas, 2012). However, this points back at the neglect of the government.
Moreover, the informal sett lements that forms the biggest part of Jakarta Utara’s accommodations and the housing of the urban poor is not properly documented; there is a lack of official data regarding the number of inhabitants (Schellekens, 2015). Consequently this leads to the inability to estimate the number of resources that is needed and the lack of willingness to interfere with these unofficial residents of Jakarta (Taubenbock et al, 2011).
Local institutions have not enough money and resources to improve the conditions in a sustainable way, while the government this money and resources has.
5.6 Wealth & Financial Capital
As stated before, the amount of well-constructed houses in Jakarta is very low. This is mainly because of the financial capital of the inhabitants in Jakarta Utara. (Bowo & Koeberle, 2010). In Jakarta Utara, the average income is very low, but there is a high number of working family members per household (Susandi at al., 2011). In this families, there is a high child rate among the urban poor, as more children are able to generate more income.
Because of the little financial capital of the inhabitants, they stay at home during flood events to prevent the loss of goods (Texier, 2008). If the economic resources allow the victims of the previous floods, they try to move to safer areas (Susandi et al., 2011).
5.7 Physical
In the case study of Marchiavelli (2008), there is shown that most of the inhabitants of the Eastern & Northern part of Jakarta throw their garbage in the river. This garbage decreases the flow of water by blocking and narrowing the waterways (Texier, 2008), and increases flood risks. For instance, the Angke River used to be 40-60 meters wide, but has shrink over the past years to 5-10 meters due to the dumping of garbage by the people that live alongside the river (Steinberg, 2007).
Due to the lack of economic resources and the ongoing urbanization, the very poorest will built their house on where there is space, with whatever resources they have. This results in very poorly constructed houses on the riverbanks, that are often built on ground where building houses is not allowed. These houses have no construction permit and are illegally built on state property, and very exposed to floods (UNESCO, 1999).
5.8 Data presentation
In a similar table as used by Lemos et al. (2013) the indicators that make up adaptive capacity are visualized and are categorized by the stage in which they come to expression. The indicators are also identified by whether they are part of exposure, vulnerability or adaptive capacity. In this way we create a visualisation of the current disaster management towards floods which makes it easier to detect weaknesses or strengths in the system. Per phase of the disaster cycle we will investigate the opportunities for the community to adapt to the flood and thereby lowering the vulnerability of Jakarta Utara’s urban poor. By strengthening a part of Jakarta’s vulnerability the whole city might benefit
Table 2. Integrated results of the identified indicators of vulnerability. Green represents the exposure, blue the sensitivity and adaptive capacity is given the color orange.
Determinant
Business as Usual
New situation
Human Capital
Little education on
Differences in public
Urban poor think they
Prevent moving to
Attendance of
disaster management
perception about flood
are not valuable enough
other place (Rashid,
education on disaster
(Susandi et al., 2011)
risks (Akmalah &
to be protected
management
Education on disaster
Grigg, 2006).
(Simarmata et al., 2013)
recognized importance
management poorly
Reluctance to move
(Susandi et al., 2011)
adapted (Susandi et al.,
due to value assigned 2011). to community (Padawangi, 2012)
Information &
Access to televisionand Difficulties to reach
Uninformed decision
Technology is used
Enable early warning
Technology
smartphones ( Susandi
evacuation place, due
making (Taubenbock et
for self-fulfilling
system with the use of
et al, 2011;
to poor information
al., 2009) communication
Twitter (Kaewkitipong
Kaewkitipong & Chen
(Susandi et al., 2011)
Inform friends and
(Kaewkitipong &
& Chen et al., 2012)
et al., 2012)
family about current
Chen et al., 2012)
status (Waxman, 2015) Use of social media to allocate resources (Fugate, 2011)
Material,
Missing of interaction
Evacuate to shelter
Move to shelter locations Clear houses and
If economic situation
Resources &
among community to
(Marchiavelli, 2008)
ifnecessary (Susandi et
treat water sources
allows, they build two-
Infrastructure
discuss about flood
Narrow road network
al., 2011; Marchiavelli,
(Sumarmata et al.,
storied houses (Susandi
disaster (Simarmata,
complicates evacuation
et al., 2011)
operations (Texier,
Increased water
Many people are
Number of vehicles
Highest percentage of
have increased after the
inhabitants live in
(Phanuwan, 2006)
homeless, they had to
2007 floods , highest
informalsettlements
refuge by other
growth in motorcycles
(Schellekens, 2015)
inhabitants or in
(Bowo & Koeberle,
Limited access to water
shelter locations
resources (Texier,
(Susandi et al., 2011)
High number of
vehicles might lead to
No waste and sewage
gridlock (World Bank,
treatment system
causing accumulation (Rashid, 1999)
Determinant
New situation Organisation &
Business as Usual
Limited meetings
Evacuate family
Inhabitants cannot find
Low involvement in
The local community