The Obligatory (Wajib, Fard)

I.1 The Obligatory (Wajib, Fard)

For the majority of ulema, wajib and fard are synonymous, and both convey an imperative and binding demand of the Lawgiver addressed to the mukallaf in respect of doing something. Acting upon something wajib leads to reward, while omitting it leads to punishment in this world or in the hereafter. The Hanafis have, however, drawn a distinction between wajib and fard. An act is thus obligatory in the first degree, that is, fard, when the command to do it is conveyed in a clear and definitive text of the Qur'an or Sunnah. But if the command to do something is established in a speculative (zanni) authority, such as an Ahad Hadith, the act would be obligatory in the second degree (wajib). The obligatory commands to perform the salah, the hajj, and to obey one's parents are thus classified under fard, as they are each established in a definitive text of the Quran. But the obligation to recite sura al-Fatihah in salah, or to perform salat al-witr, that is, the three units of prayers which conclude the late evening prayers (salat al-'isha'), are on the other hand classified under wajib, as they are both established in the authority of Hadith whose authenticity is not completely free of doubt. A Muslim is bound to do acts which are obligatory either in the first or in the second degree; if he does them, he secures reward and spiritual merit, but if he willfully neglects them, he makes himself liable to punishment. The difference between the two classes of obligations, according to the vast majority of the jurists, including the Hanafis, is that the person who refuses to believe in the binding nature of a command which is established by definitive proof becomes an unbeliever, but not if he disputes the authority of an obligatory command of the second degree, although he becomes a transgressor. Thus to neglect one's

obligation to support one's wife, children and poor parents amounts to a sin but not to infidelity. [7. Abu 'Id,

Mabahith, p. 63; Qasim, Usul, p. 216; Abdur Rahim, Jurisprudence, p. 197.]

Another consequence of the distinction between fard and wajib is that when the former is neglected in an act required by the Shari'ah, the act as a whole becomes null and void (batil). If. for example, a person leaves out the bowing (ruku`) or prostration (sajdah) in obligatory prayers, the whole of the prayer becomes null and void. But if he leaves out the recitation of al-Fatihah, the salah is basically valid, albeit deficient. This is the Hanafi view, but according to the majority the salah is null and void in both cases. However, the difference between the Hanafis and the majority in this respect is regarded as one of form rather than substance, in that the consequences of their disagreement are on the whole

negligible. [8. Abu Zahrah, Usul, pp. 23-24; Abu `Id, Mabahith, p. 63.] Al-Ghazali is representative of the majority opinion, including that of the Shafi'is, when he writes: `As far as we are concerned, there is no difference

between fard and wajib; the two terms are synonymous. According to the Hanafis, fard is based on definitive authority but wajib is founded in speculative proof. Once again, we do not deny the division of wajib into definitive and speculative (maqtu' wa-maznun) and there is no objection to the rise of

different expressions once their meaning is clear.' [9. Ghazali, Mustasfa, I. 42.]

Wajib is sub-divided into at least three varieties, the first of which is the division of wajib into personal ('ayni) and collective (kafa'i). Wajib `ayni is addressed to every individual sui juris and cannot, in principle, be performed for or on behalf of another person. Examples of wajib (or fard) 'ayni are salah, hajj, zakah, fulfillment of contract and obedience to one's parents. Wajib kafa'i consists of obligations that are addressed to the community as a whole. If only some members of the community perform them, the law is satisfied and the rest of the community is absolved of it. For example, the duty to participate in jihad (holy struggle), funeral prayers, the hisbah, (promotion of good and prevention of evil), building hospitals, extinguishing fires, giving testimony and serving as a judge, etc., are all collective obligations of the community, and are thus wajib (or fard) kafa'i. Thus when a person dies leaving no property to meet the cost of his burial, it is the wajib kafa'i of the community to provide it and to give him a decent burial. Only some members of the community may actually contribute toward the costs, but the duty is nevertheless discharged from the whole of the community. The merit (thawab), however, only attaches to those who have actually taken part in discharging the wajib kafa'i duty.

The collective obligation sometimes changes into a personal obligation. This is, for example, the case with regard to jihad, which is a wajib kafa'i, although when the enemy attacks and besieges a locality it becomes the personal duty of every resident to defend it. Similarly, when there is only one mujtahid in a

city, it becomes his personal duty to carry out ijtihad. [10. Khallaf, 'Ilm, p. 109; Qasim, Usul, p.218; Abu 'Id, Mabahith, p.69.]

Wajib is also divided into wajib muwaqqat, that is, wajib which is contingent on a time-limit and wajib mutlaq, that is, 'absolute wajib', which is free of such a limitation. Fasting and the obligatory salah are examples of contingent wajib, as they must each be observed within specified time limits. But performing the hajj or the payment of an expiation (kaffarah) are not subject to such restrictions and are therefore absolute wajib. Provided that one performs the hajj once during one's lifetime and pays the

kaffarah at any time before one dies, the duty is discharged. [11. The Mu'tazilah have held the view that a flexibility of this kind

no necessary contradiction in dividing the wajib into wajib muwaqqat and wajib mutlaq. For details see Ghazali, Mustasfa, I, 43-44.] Furthermore, the absolute wajib is called absolute because there is no time-limit on its performance and it may be

fulfilled every time whenever the occasion arises. This is, for example, the case regarding one's duty to obey one's parents, or the obligation to carry out hisbah, namely, to promote good and to prevent of evil as and when the occasion arises.

A consequence of this division is that wajib muwaqqat materialises only when the time is due for it; it may neither be hastened nor delayed, but within the given time limits the mukallaf has a measure of flexibility. Furthermore, to fulfill a contingent wajib it is necessary that the mukallaf have the intention

(niyyah) specifically to discharge it. [12. Khudari, Usul, p.33; Khallaf, `Ilm, p. 108.]

Lastly, the wajib is divided into quantified wajib (wajib muhaddad) and unquantified wajib (wajib ghayr muhaddad). An example of the former is salah, zakah, payment of the price (thaman) by the purchaser in a sale transaction, and payment of rent in accordance with the terms of a tenancy agreement, all of which are quantified. Similarly, enforcement of the prescribed penalties (hudud) falls under the rubric of wajib muhaddad in the sense that the hadd penalties are all specified in terms of quantity. The unquantified wajib may be illustrated by reference to one's duty to support one's close relatives, charity to the poor, feeding the hungry, paying a dower, (mahr) to one's wife, the length of standing (qiyam), bowing and prostration in salah, wiping the head in ablution (wudu') and quantifying the ta'zir penalties for offences which are punishable but in regard to which the Lawgiver has not quantified the punishment. (It is for the judge to quantify the punishment in light of the individual circumstances of the offender and the offence.) Consequently, the mukallaf, be it the individual believer, the qadi or the imam, enjoys the flexibility to determine the quantitative aspect of the

unquantified wajib himself. [13. Ghazali, Mustasfa, I, 47; Khallaf, 'Ilm, p. 110; Abu Zahrah, Usul, p. 35; Khudari, Usul, p. 42.]

A consequence of this division is that if the quantified wajib is not discharged within the given time- limit, it constitutes a liability on the person (dhimmah) of the individual, as in the case of unpaid zakah or an unpaid debt. Failure to discharge a wajib ghayr muhaddad, on the other hand, does not result in a personal liability.

A question arises with regard to the value of the excessive portion in the supererogation of quantified wajib. The question is whether an over-fulfillment of this type becomes a part of the wajib itself. There are two main views on this, one of which maintains that excessive performance in quantified wajib also becomes a part of the wajib. But the preferred view is that any addition to the minimal requirement becomes mandub only. For no punishment can be imposed for a failure to perform anything in addition to the minimum required. [14. Ghazali, Mustasfa, I, 47.]

It would be inaccurate to say that a means to a wajib is also a wajib, or that a necessary ingredient of wajib is also wajib in every case. For such a view would tend to ignore the personal capacity of the mukallaf especially if the latter is unable to do what is required to be done: in the event, for example, when the Friday congregational prayer cannot be held for lack of a large number of people in a locality. It would be more accurate to say that when the means to wajib consist of an act which is within the

capacity of the mukallaf then that act is also wajib. [15. Ghazali, Mustasfa,, I, 46; Abu Zahrah, Usul, p. 23.]

The distinction between wajib and mandub is, broadly speaking, based on the idea that ignoring the wajib entails punishment (`iqab) while ignoring the mandub does not. The distinction between haram and makruh is based on a similar criterion: if doing something is punishable, it is haram, otherwise it is makruh. This is generally correct, but one must add the proviso that punishment is not a necessary requirement of a binding obligation, or wujub. In addition, as Imam Ghazali points out, the element of punishment, whether in this world or in the hereafter, is not a certainty. Whereas in its positive sense the wajib is normally enforceable in this world and might also lead to a tangible advantage or reward, the spiritual punishment for its neglect is, however, awaited and postponed to the hereafter. Hence the invocation of punishment is not a necessary requirement of wajib. When God Almighty renders an act obligatory upon people without mentioning a punishment for its omission, the act which is so demanded

is still wajib. [16. Ghazali, Mustasfa, I, 42.]