Contoh Jurnal Internasional Gratis | Makalah Dan Jurnal Gratis Aj
J Coast Conserv
DOI 10.1007/s11852-013-0298-4
An analysis of coastal land conflict in the North of Jakarta
coastal area: (A general algebraic modelling system approach)
Rudianto & Andi Gusti Tantu
Received: 2 August 2013 / Accepted: 15 October 2013
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
Abstract This research was motivated by a never-ending
questions, which arose in coastal land use conflict especially
in Indonesian and generally in developing countries. Policy
makers and others stakeholders both in central and local
governments concerned with resolution conflict occurred in
coastal areas. Squatters, who live and built houses in illegal
land, were forced to move out to theirs origin home lands.
Such conflicts occurred again and again without clear solution
among parties involved. Such conflict shows that both
squatters and land owners have no benefits in their conflict.
Such condition could decrease their economic productivity.
As a consequence the economic performance of coastal area
become declining. The aim of this research is to analyse
coastal land use conflict between squatters and land owners.
It includes to formulate conflict resolution based on land
optimation. To solve the coastal land conflicts, an economics
approach is needed with assumption that conflict is a concept.
As a concept, conflict could be measured by using economic
variables called benefits and costs to be taken into account.
GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System) is a computer
language which permit formulating economic equilibrium
models as systems of nonlinear equations. In this research
GAMS was used to calculate the value of land rents. The
results of GAMS operation produces that the coastal land area
should be maintained, expanded and added of Squatters.
Keyword General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) .
Coastal land conflict analysis . Resolution conflict
Rudianto
Faculty of Fishery and Marine Science, University of Brawijaya,
Malang 65145, Indonesia
e-mail: rudiantoita@gmail.com
A. G. Tantu (*)
Fishery Departement, Faculty of Agriculture, 45 University of
Makassar, Makassar 90145, Indonesia
e-mail: agustitantu@yahoo.com
Introduction
Coasts are indeed unique places, especially in places which
combine freshwater and salt water in coastal estuaries. Coasts
create some of the most productive and richest habitat on
earth. Furthermore, most coasts are assets of incalculable
value, and they are important part of the national heritage
and have a very real economic value. Coastal lands are very
valuable and greatly attractive in many other ways. They are
used for port and harbor facilities, settlements, as well as
recreation. All of which capture the large monetary benefits
associated with waterborne commerce. Coastal lands are
appropriate locations for industrial processes which require
water cooling, such as power generation plants. Squatters have
also built their houses on the land owned by the state in swamp
areas.
As a result, conflicts among users mainly related with
competition for ocean or coastal space are common
(Choudury and Junaid 2000). In fact, competition over coastal
lands are occured in north Jakarta. The municipalities of north
Jakarta cover 7,133.51 km2 which consists of 6,994.4 km2 of
vast ocean and only 154.11 km2 of land areas (The North
Jakarta Local Government 2001). In addition, land owners
have no clear land boundaries in the coastal area, and the type
of land use conflict is varied.
Sjafi (2008) reported that one type of coastal land use
conflict concerns conflict over ownership involving land
owners with illegal settlers. Therefore, research is needed to
find out how the use of coastal land could be managed
properly. In order to avoid unclear and change land use
function, it is necessary to use land more efficient.
In addition, land use conflict occurs because it is
assumed that there is not enough land to all of the
multipurpose activities which people want to do on the
land. However, Conning et al. (2001) proposed that coastal
land conflict could be reduced by maximizing the use of
coastal land.
Rudianto, A.G. Tantu
Squatters are used as a research object, because there are
often conflict in the north Jakarta area, especially in the area of
coastal land, between squatters and security forces of north
Jakarta municipalities. Squatters settlement spread along north
Jakarta. They illegally occupy land owned by the state or by
private citizens. There are 3 characteristics of squatters which
will be considered in this research. Firstly, the research will
consider physical problems. Squatters settlements occupy
illegal coastal land with minimum social infrastructure
services, such as water supply, sanitation, electricity, road,
drainage, and health centers. Secondly, there are social issues.
Squatters have minimum income, as they work as labour or
perform other work in the informal sector. Thirdly, there are
legal problems as they have built their houses without legal
ownership of the land. Finally,
Accordingly, squatters illegally occupy coastal lands which
stretch along the north Jakarta coastal land areas, including
riverbanks, coastal land reclamation areas, railway banks or
land owned by Indonesian railway enterprises; Thus, squatters
are interesting phenomenon, because they are related with the
urbanization process which is increasing yearly.
The conflict solution will be used game theory. Game
theory is a mathematical approach for formulating competitive
and conflict situations among stakeholders with varied
interests to achieve equilibrium (Rasmusen 1989). The type
of conflict is varied, like conflict related with the disturbance
of livelihoods, disturbance of their places to move to other
places.
To optimize coastal land use will implement GAMS model
for formulating, solving and analysing nonlinear complementary
problems to study this issue. GAMS is a fortran based
programme designed for linear programming, non linear,
dynamic, as well as mixed-integer programming. Application
model of GAMS as systems of nonlinear equations,
complementary problems or variational inequalities will be used
to analyse conflict resolution between squatter and land owner
which may be the government or a private citizen or company
(Rutherford and Thomas 1995).
In order to solve such conflicts, the land owners and
squatters need negotiation based on mutual benefits. They
try to achieve pareto optimal, which each actors must agrees
with each solution offers by themselves. To formulate conflict
solution, it is referred to objective function by raised some
questions as follows (King 2001): (a) how to formulate policy
with or without squatters in coastal area owned by private or
government; (b). how to utilize coastal land by private or
government owner to conserve or rehabilitate land for
protection area. Therefore, to answer two questions above, it
is necessary to calculate total economiv value (TEV) by
divided between benefits and costs in which lands are
occupied by squatters (Max 2002).
In order to formulate coastal land use policy to optimize
land, the mathematic equation could be stated as follows
(Rasmusen 1989):
rffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
X X X
Max
c−fXabaj x PXabaj Cabg
b
a
Constraint:
Where:
a: type of user; b: type of industry; Aj : area in which
activity occurs, Lj : extens, X: output of resources (benefits),
P: price, C: Cost, N: number of population.
X*P: total acceptance and X*C : total cost.
The second steps, GAMS will be used to breakdown above
equations. In order to do that, there are four steps that it should
be taken into considerations (Fauzi 2000). First, GAMS will
identify which coastal lands are categorised efficient and
inefficient, so regression analysis is needed with the two curve
shapes which is drawn variable cost for law enforcement and
order with unit Rp per year. It draws exponential function and
land value which is occupied by squatters with unit Rp per
square meter. It based on analysis from logarithmic function.
Second, it is necessary to draw efficient production
boundaries called land rent frontier. Third, it is needed to
Table 1 Samples location in North Jakarta
Materials and methods
There are two steps to solve conflicts. The first step is used the
deterministic approach which is called nash bargaining
solution (Rasmusen 1989). The objective of nash bargaining
solution is to analyse the differences interest between land
owners and squatters. The interest of squatters are to use
coastal land which is owned by private or by government to
build non and semi permanent houses, while private or gove
rnment lands owned has interest to use their property for other
purposes. The sources of conflicts are derived from difference
perception between land owners and squatters in coastal land
use planning (Rober and Alder 1999).
No
Region
Village
Sample Size
1
2
3
Kamal muara
Kapuk Muara
Pluit
Kampong Baru
River bank angke
Pantai indah kapuk
30
30
30
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Ancol
Pengasinan
Penjaringan
Tanjung Priok
Tugu Selatan
Kalibaru
Cilincing
Marunda
Walang Village
Muara angke
Pluit reservoir
Pela-pela
Red-land
River bank
Kampung sawah
Kampong Bambu Kuning
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
Conflict in the North of Jakarta
Table 2 The relationship between ECS and land value
No
Axis X
Axis Y
Equator
1
ECS Rp. 250 million/year
Land Value (Rp/m2)
2
ECS with Rp. 350 million/year
Land Value (Rp/m2)
3
ECS Rp. 250 million/year
Land Value (Rp/m2) with assumed
increase 10 % (Rp/m2)
4
The cost of law and other (BP) total
Rp. 350 million million/year Overlay 1–4
Land Value (Rp/m2) with assumed
increase 10 % (Rp/m2)
1. Y=82454 e 3E-8x (exponential)
2. Y=149035 Ln(x)-2E +06 (logarithmic)
1. Y=82473 e 2E-8X (exponential)
2. Y=149398 Ln(x)-2E+06 (logarithmic)
1. Y=90721 e 3E-8x (exponential)
2. Y=164338 Ln(x)-3E+06 (logarithmic)
1. Y=90721 e 3E-8x (exponential)
2. Y=164338 Ln(x)-3E+06 (logarithmic)
calculate rent optimal in each sample coastal land use. Then, it
is needed to formulate nash equilibrium equation, which is
stated as follows:
In order to select sample areas for this research, the
calculation number of respondents is decided 330 squatters
and the samples location can be seen in following Table 1.
P
Results and discussion
P
Where:
wL–rL
c0I
P0 h0
Benefit for squatter
wage minus land rent
Benefit for land owner
Production cost
Economic Revenue
Finally, the formulation of conflict resolution is implemented
by using GAMS.
Fig. 1 Map of Western Jakarta
To point out which 11 samples location is categorized winwin, win-lose, lose-win and lose-lose, various regression
analysis is needed to create action to manage conflict. There
are 4 regressions types to stimulate frontier curve coastal land
used. They area: (a). Execution Cost for Squatter (ECS)
variable and land value; (b). ECS with land rent; (c). ECS with
interest land and (d). Population density with land value and
land rent as well as building density with land value and land
rent. In other to give some figures regarding four variables
mentioned, some examples given as follows. Figure below
shows regression analysis for curve between cost for law and
order with rent value. According to Blair (1991) rent value is
the benefit for land and it is decided by the relationship
between supply and demand. Table 2 below shows various
equation Figs. 1, 2 and 3.
Table 3 above indicates that area of Pluit 2 and Marunda are
categorized into win-win solution. It means that there is an
interest balance between squatters and land owners. In the
Rudianto, A.G. Tantu
Fig. 2 Rent Optimal Value in Squatter Coastal Land Area and the
Average Rate of Rent Optimal
theory of nash equilibria such win-win condition is the main
objectives to be achieved by each stakeholders. Therefore,
land conflict between squatter and land owners could be
avoided. To comprehend consistency between the various
ECS and land value analysis, it is needed simulation by
increasing ECS become Rp. 350 million per year. Such
various simulation will give detail information whether there
are location change in win win area namely Pluit 2 and
Marunda. Table 4 shows the summary of four equations as
states above in which Pluit 2 and marunda are still consistence
as win-win area.
In above table, it can be stated that Pluit 2 and Marunda can
achieve nash equilibrium. whereas, the remaining area is
included as win-lose and lose-lose area. The function of
edgeworth box is to make differentiation which land efficient
and inefficient, edgeworth box show below that Marunda and
Pluit 2 are pareto optimal.
The further question how squatter is efficient toward land
rent frontier, it is necessary to make some regressions
simulation analysis as shown Table 5 below.
It showed that efficient area is kapuk muara. Whereas area
above land frontier like Kalibaru and Penjaringan are assessed
unattainable. Area below land frontier is assessed unefficient.
To know which area is categorized “rent optimal”, it is needed
justification as shown Table 6.
Rent optimal value shows that value RO for North Jakarta
Rp. 106.984/m2/year. Whereas maximum value the figure is
Rp. 3.940.000/m2/year.If we observe between rent to be paid by
Squatter with optimal rent value indicated the big differences. It
means that land occupied by squatter is inefficient. From 11
sample location, the average of rent optimal value for north
Jakarta is indicated value Rp. 1.369.279/m2/year. The figure
below give information that optimal rent value is Pluit 2 with
location in Kampong Pengasinan Muara Angke. Rationally
value α (Rent differential) under 1.
After analysed the interaction among variables with
various curve as shown above, resolution conflict should be
approached by game theory. Game theory is mathematical
approach to formulate competitive situation and conflict
among stakeholders. How to create win-win solution between
squatters and land owners.
In order to operationalize concept resolution with GAMS,
resolution concept will be approached with two approaches
namely market perfectness and government interventions
(Fauzi 2000). The first approach is from market perfectness.
In this approach squatters must move location to other sides
by receiving compensation from land owners or government
build new apartements for squatters. From government sides,
they have opportunity to make clear the boundary of their own
lands as well as construct some infrastructures for control
flooding, roads, water supply and sanitation. The government
also supply some compensation to squatters to move other
places or come back to squatters village. From private point of
view, they are also to make clear the boundary of their lands
and give compensation to squatters. To make easily
calculation, private will give.
The second approach is from government intervention.
Firstly, from squatters point of compensation as same as the
Fig. 3 Preparation of the model
based on the relationship
squatters occupying government
land and private
Land is assessed by using
survey price and rent
Land is assessed with
market price
Group of Squatter
Government Land
Land is assessed with
market price and there is
compensation Rp. 5 million
Group of Squatter
Private Land
Land is assessed with
market price with
compensation Rp. 1 million
Land is assessed with
market price with
compensation Rp. 1 million
and Squatter spend their
money Rp. 200.000,-
Conflict in the North of Jakarta
Table 3 Squatter location inside and outside Nash Equilibrium Curve
with ECS Rp. 250 million with Land Value
No Squatter
location
ECS
Land Value Category
(Rp 000) (Rp.000)
Win-win Win-lose Lose-lose
1
Kamal Muara 21,000
180
V
2
Kapuk Muara 22,000
200
V
3
Pluit 1
14,000
55
4
Pluit 2
26,000
175
5
Penjaringan
25,000
210
6
7
Ancol
18,000
120
V
Table 5 Land use value (efficient) with land rent frontier
No Axis X
Axis Y
1.
Population density in
person er m2
Land Value (Rp/m2) Y=−7497.6 Ln
(x)+148307
2.
Population density in
person per m2
Land rent (Rp/m2)
3.
Rent value in Rp/m2
8
Tanjung Priok 12,000
130
9
Tugu Selatan
16,000
140
V
10 Kali Baru
55,000
320
V
11
Cilincing
18,000
150
V
12 Marunda
23,000
155
Building density in unit per m
5
Buidling density in unit per m2 Land rent (Rp/m2)
6
Rent value in Rp/m2
government compensation. view that they should be given
simetry information related with land squatters occupy
including relocation plans (or transmigration programs) or
going back to village program. The government will give land
price based on rational calculation on local tax object sale
price. The governments tasks after squatters left their illegal
land is to maintain and rehabilitate environment and make
buffer zone. Moreover, private role is also to give information
openly to squatters and give compensations to them
individually or as a groups.
To formulate optimal solution by using GAMS, it is designed
10 models with various assumptions (Rutherford and Thomas
1995). Model 1 is discussed assessment land by using survey
price; Model 2 is discussed assessment land by using market
Y=339.2 Ln
(x)+37436
Land Value (Rp/m2) Land Rent
Frontier
V
V
Land Value (Rp/m2) Y=23460 Ln
(x)+173805
4.
V
Y=3033.1 Ln
(x)+42142
Land Value (Rp/m2) Line frontier
2
V
V
Equation
price; model 3 is discussed assessment land by using market
price and squatter received compensastion Rp. 5 million.
Model 4 is discussed with assumptions squatters received
compensation Rp. 5 million. Model 5 is discussed assessment
land by using market price and Squatters received
compensation Rp. 1 million and they spend their money Rp.
200.000. Model 6 is discussed conflict optimal solution in
land owned by private by assumption that price decision is
based on survey price. Model 7 is discussed conflict optimal
solution in land owned by private by assumption that price
decision is based on market price. Model 8 is discussed
conflict optimal solution in land owned by private by
assumption that squatters received compensation from private
Rp. 5 million per households. Model 9 is discussed conflict
optimal solution in land owned by private by assumption that
squatters received compensation from private Rp. 1 million
per households. Model 10 is discussed assessment land by
using market price and squatters received compensation Rp. 1
million and they spend their money estimated Rp. 200.000,-.
Table 4 Summary in various equation simulation between ECS and
squatter land rent
Table 6 Calculation for optimal rent (RO) value
No Equation Stimulation
Output
Location
a. Win-Win area: Pluit2 and Marunda;
Kamal Muara
25.000
35.000 0.714 180.000
18.10
1.041.872
y=36137 ln(x)–574432
b. Win-Lose area: Pluit 1 and Ancol;
Kapuk Muara
45.700
95.000 0.481 200.000
18.23
1.754.239
y=15492 e2E-8x
y=36040 ln (x)-584927
(ECS increased 28,6 %)
c. Lose-Lose area: Kamal muara, kapuk
muara, Penjaringan, Tanjung Priok,
Tugu selatan, Kali baru, Cilincing.
Pluit 1
12.400
55.000
20.39
Pluit 2
36.250
45.000 0.806 175.000
9.61
Penjaringan
47.844
62.000 0.772 210.000
13.45
Ancol
24.000
33.000 0.632 120.000
11.22
1.
2.
3.
y=15431e 3E-8x
y=90721 e 3E-8x
y=164338 ln (x)-3E+06
(Squatter land rent will be
increased 10 %)
4.
NS-nsq
Cx
130.000 0.095
NL
LT
RO
106.984
1.354.340
2.179.176
850.672
Tanjung Priok 32.800
55.000 0.596 130.000
6.94
538.130
Tugu Selatan
21.000
90.000 0.233 140.000
13.03
425.720
Kali Baru
75.000
120.000 0.625 320.000
19.70
y=164338 ln (x)-3
(ECS is increased 28,6 %,
whereas
Cilincing
28.200
50.000 0.564 150.000
6.87
Marunda
33.000
50.000 0.660 155.000
22.38
squatter land rent will be
increased 10 %)
Source: From Calculation
y=90721 e 2E-8x
E+06
5.
NS-sq
Overlay for all simulation
3.940.000
581.284
2.289.403
NS-sq squatter rent value (Rp/m2 ); NS-nsq non squatter rent value (Rp/
m2 ); Cx rent differential calculation from NS-sq/NS-nsq; NL land value;
LT Time Squatter Living (year); RO Rent Optimal (Rp/m2 /year)
Rudianto, A.G. Tantu
Conclusion
References
The study shows that Pluit 2 and Marunda is categorized winwin, whereas Pluit 1 and Ancol is assessed win-lose, and the rest
Kamal Muara, Kapuk Muara, penjaringan, Tugu Selatan,
Kalibaru, Cilincing is assessed lose-lose. Such results is used as
input by Government and local private to formulate Public policy
to reduce conflict. Pluit 2 can increase squatter 534 household
and Marunda can increase 7.813 household. In area squatter must
move out as follows: Kapuk muara (418 households),
Penjaringan (2334 housedhold), Pluit (440 household), Ancol
(114 household), Priok (174 household), Tugu Selatan
(67 household). Public policy program should be prepared by
Jakarta government include: (a). program to move squatter back
to their origin village; (b). empowerment program for squatter by
giving them training, supply credit and strengthen of capital for
micro, small and medium business; (c) land consolidation to
improve environment; (d). building flats planning for squatters.
Blair JP (1991) Urban and regional economics. The Book Press Inc, USA
Choudury, Junaid K (2000) Sustainable management of coastal mangrove
forest devepopment and social need. In: Mangrove and Other
Coastal Forest http://www.eepsea.org/publications/research, pp.
267–286.
Conning J, James H, Robiuson A (2001) Cond reform and the political
organization of agriculture. Paper presented for seminar London
school of economics, London
Fauzi A (2000) Economic valuation of coastal verouvres. Paper presented in
the Training Management for Coastal Area and Small Island the
Cooperation Project between IPB-New Guinea University of
Technology, Bogor
King W (2001) Strategy and conflict. An introductory sketch of gaml theory
Max P (2002) Value conflict and kind the planning: An example at rural/
urban interface. Center for the environment ruval sociology
department. Corvell university. USA
Rasmusen E (1989) Games and information an introduction to game
theory. Cambridge University Press, UK
Rober K, Alder J (1999) Coastal planning and management, E&FN Span.
An imprint of Rouhedge, USA
Rutherford, Thomas F (1995) Extension of GAMS for complementary
problems avising. Applied Journal of Economic Dynamics and
control 19:1299–1324
Sjafi E (2008) The space use analysis of manado bay coastal zone, North
Sulawesi. PKSPL-IPB. 241 hal
The North Jakarta Local Government (2001) The report of government
development North Jakarta Subdistrict
Acknowledgments The corresponding author are gratefully to thank
mayor of North Jakarta Goverrment to give permission for local survey. I
also would like to thank Professor Dr. Ir. Akhmad Fauzi whose help me to
introduce and teach me about GAMS
DOI 10.1007/s11852-013-0298-4
An analysis of coastal land conflict in the North of Jakarta
coastal area: (A general algebraic modelling system approach)
Rudianto & Andi Gusti Tantu
Received: 2 August 2013 / Accepted: 15 October 2013
# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
Abstract This research was motivated by a never-ending
questions, which arose in coastal land use conflict especially
in Indonesian and generally in developing countries. Policy
makers and others stakeholders both in central and local
governments concerned with resolution conflict occurred in
coastal areas. Squatters, who live and built houses in illegal
land, were forced to move out to theirs origin home lands.
Such conflicts occurred again and again without clear solution
among parties involved. Such conflict shows that both
squatters and land owners have no benefits in their conflict.
Such condition could decrease their economic productivity.
As a consequence the economic performance of coastal area
become declining. The aim of this research is to analyse
coastal land use conflict between squatters and land owners.
It includes to formulate conflict resolution based on land
optimation. To solve the coastal land conflicts, an economics
approach is needed with assumption that conflict is a concept.
As a concept, conflict could be measured by using economic
variables called benefits and costs to be taken into account.
GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System) is a computer
language which permit formulating economic equilibrium
models as systems of nonlinear equations. In this research
GAMS was used to calculate the value of land rents. The
results of GAMS operation produces that the coastal land area
should be maintained, expanded and added of Squatters.
Keyword General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) .
Coastal land conflict analysis . Resolution conflict
Rudianto
Faculty of Fishery and Marine Science, University of Brawijaya,
Malang 65145, Indonesia
e-mail: rudiantoita@gmail.com
A. G. Tantu (*)
Fishery Departement, Faculty of Agriculture, 45 University of
Makassar, Makassar 90145, Indonesia
e-mail: agustitantu@yahoo.com
Introduction
Coasts are indeed unique places, especially in places which
combine freshwater and salt water in coastal estuaries. Coasts
create some of the most productive and richest habitat on
earth. Furthermore, most coasts are assets of incalculable
value, and they are important part of the national heritage
and have a very real economic value. Coastal lands are very
valuable and greatly attractive in many other ways. They are
used for port and harbor facilities, settlements, as well as
recreation. All of which capture the large monetary benefits
associated with waterborne commerce. Coastal lands are
appropriate locations for industrial processes which require
water cooling, such as power generation plants. Squatters have
also built their houses on the land owned by the state in swamp
areas.
As a result, conflicts among users mainly related with
competition for ocean or coastal space are common
(Choudury and Junaid 2000). In fact, competition over coastal
lands are occured in north Jakarta. The municipalities of north
Jakarta cover 7,133.51 km2 which consists of 6,994.4 km2 of
vast ocean and only 154.11 km2 of land areas (The North
Jakarta Local Government 2001). In addition, land owners
have no clear land boundaries in the coastal area, and the type
of land use conflict is varied.
Sjafi (2008) reported that one type of coastal land use
conflict concerns conflict over ownership involving land
owners with illegal settlers. Therefore, research is needed to
find out how the use of coastal land could be managed
properly. In order to avoid unclear and change land use
function, it is necessary to use land more efficient.
In addition, land use conflict occurs because it is
assumed that there is not enough land to all of the
multipurpose activities which people want to do on the
land. However, Conning et al. (2001) proposed that coastal
land conflict could be reduced by maximizing the use of
coastal land.
Rudianto, A.G. Tantu
Squatters are used as a research object, because there are
often conflict in the north Jakarta area, especially in the area of
coastal land, between squatters and security forces of north
Jakarta municipalities. Squatters settlement spread along north
Jakarta. They illegally occupy land owned by the state or by
private citizens. There are 3 characteristics of squatters which
will be considered in this research. Firstly, the research will
consider physical problems. Squatters settlements occupy
illegal coastal land with minimum social infrastructure
services, such as water supply, sanitation, electricity, road,
drainage, and health centers. Secondly, there are social issues.
Squatters have minimum income, as they work as labour or
perform other work in the informal sector. Thirdly, there are
legal problems as they have built their houses without legal
ownership of the land. Finally,
Accordingly, squatters illegally occupy coastal lands which
stretch along the north Jakarta coastal land areas, including
riverbanks, coastal land reclamation areas, railway banks or
land owned by Indonesian railway enterprises; Thus, squatters
are interesting phenomenon, because they are related with the
urbanization process which is increasing yearly.
The conflict solution will be used game theory. Game
theory is a mathematical approach for formulating competitive
and conflict situations among stakeholders with varied
interests to achieve equilibrium (Rasmusen 1989). The type
of conflict is varied, like conflict related with the disturbance
of livelihoods, disturbance of their places to move to other
places.
To optimize coastal land use will implement GAMS model
for formulating, solving and analysing nonlinear complementary
problems to study this issue. GAMS is a fortran based
programme designed for linear programming, non linear,
dynamic, as well as mixed-integer programming. Application
model of GAMS as systems of nonlinear equations,
complementary problems or variational inequalities will be used
to analyse conflict resolution between squatter and land owner
which may be the government or a private citizen or company
(Rutherford and Thomas 1995).
In order to solve such conflicts, the land owners and
squatters need negotiation based on mutual benefits. They
try to achieve pareto optimal, which each actors must agrees
with each solution offers by themselves. To formulate conflict
solution, it is referred to objective function by raised some
questions as follows (King 2001): (a) how to formulate policy
with or without squatters in coastal area owned by private or
government; (b). how to utilize coastal land by private or
government owner to conserve or rehabilitate land for
protection area. Therefore, to answer two questions above, it
is necessary to calculate total economiv value (TEV) by
divided between benefits and costs in which lands are
occupied by squatters (Max 2002).
In order to formulate coastal land use policy to optimize
land, the mathematic equation could be stated as follows
(Rasmusen 1989):
rffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
X X X
Max
c−fXabaj x PXabaj Cabg
b
a
Constraint:
Where:
a: type of user; b: type of industry; Aj : area in which
activity occurs, Lj : extens, X: output of resources (benefits),
P: price, C: Cost, N: number of population.
X*P: total acceptance and X*C : total cost.
The second steps, GAMS will be used to breakdown above
equations. In order to do that, there are four steps that it should
be taken into considerations (Fauzi 2000). First, GAMS will
identify which coastal lands are categorised efficient and
inefficient, so regression analysis is needed with the two curve
shapes which is drawn variable cost for law enforcement and
order with unit Rp per year. It draws exponential function and
land value which is occupied by squatters with unit Rp per
square meter. It based on analysis from logarithmic function.
Second, it is necessary to draw efficient production
boundaries called land rent frontier. Third, it is needed to
Table 1 Samples location in North Jakarta
Materials and methods
There are two steps to solve conflicts. The first step is used the
deterministic approach which is called nash bargaining
solution (Rasmusen 1989). The objective of nash bargaining
solution is to analyse the differences interest between land
owners and squatters. The interest of squatters are to use
coastal land which is owned by private or by government to
build non and semi permanent houses, while private or gove
rnment lands owned has interest to use their property for other
purposes. The sources of conflicts are derived from difference
perception between land owners and squatters in coastal land
use planning (Rober and Alder 1999).
No
Region
Village
Sample Size
1
2
3
Kamal muara
Kapuk Muara
Pluit
Kampong Baru
River bank angke
Pantai indah kapuk
30
30
30
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Ancol
Pengasinan
Penjaringan
Tanjung Priok
Tugu Selatan
Kalibaru
Cilincing
Marunda
Walang Village
Muara angke
Pluit reservoir
Pela-pela
Red-land
River bank
Kampung sawah
Kampong Bambu Kuning
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
Conflict in the North of Jakarta
Table 2 The relationship between ECS and land value
No
Axis X
Axis Y
Equator
1
ECS Rp. 250 million/year
Land Value (Rp/m2)
2
ECS with Rp. 350 million/year
Land Value (Rp/m2)
3
ECS Rp. 250 million/year
Land Value (Rp/m2) with assumed
increase 10 % (Rp/m2)
4
The cost of law and other (BP) total
Rp. 350 million million/year Overlay 1–4
Land Value (Rp/m2) with assumed
increase 10 % (Rp/m2)
1. Y=82454 e 3E-8x (exponential)
2. Y=149035 Ln(x)-2E +06 (logarithmic)
1. Y=82473 e 2E-8X (exponential)
2. Y=149398 Ln(x)-2E+06 (logarithmic)
1. Y=90721 e 3E-8x (exponential)
2. Y=164338 Ln(x)-3E+06 (logarithmic)
1. Y=90721 e 3E-8x (exponential)
2. Y=164338 Ln(x)-3E+06 (logarithmic)
calculate rent optimal in each sample coastal land use. Then, it
is needed to formulate nash equilibrium equation, which is
stated as follows:
In order to select sample areas for this research, the
calculation number of respondents is decided 330 squatters
and the samples location can be seen in following Table 1.
P
Results and discussion
P
Where:
wL–rL
c0I
P0 h0
Benefit for squatter
wage minus land rent
Benefit for land owner
Production cost
Economic Revenue
Finally, the formulation of conflict resolution is implemented
by using GAMS.
Fig. 1 Map of Western Jakarta
To point out which 11 samples location is categorized winwin, win-lose, lose-win and lose-lose, various regression
analysis is needed to create action to manage conflict. There
are 4 regressions types to stimulate frontier curve coastal land
used. They area: (a). Execution Cost for Squatter (ECS)
variable and land value; (b). ECS with land rent; (c). ECS with
interest land and (d). Population density with land value and
land rent as well as building density with land value and land
rent. In other to give some figures regarding four variables
mentioned, some examples given as follows. Figure below
shows regression analysis for curve between cost for law and
order with rent value. According to Blair (1991) rent value is
the benefit for land and it is decided by the relationship
between supply and demand. Table 2 below shows various
equation Figs. 1, 2 and 3.
Table 3 above indicates that area of Pluit 2 and Marunda are
categorized into win-win solution. It means that there is an
interest balance between squatters and land owners. In the
Rudianto, A.G. Tantu
Fig. 2 Rent Optimal Value in Squatter Coastal Land Area and the
Average Rate of Rent Optimal
theory of nash equilibria such win-win condition is the main
objectives to be achieved by each stakeholders. Therefore,
land conflict between squatter and land owners could be
avoided. To comprehend consistency between the various
ECS and land value analysis, it is needed simulation by
increasing ECS become Rp. 350 million per year. Such
various simulation will give detail information whether there
are location change in win win area namely Pluit 2 and
Marunda. Table 4 shows the summary of four equations as
states above in which Pluit 2 and marunda are still consistence
as win-win area.
In above table, it can be stated that Pluit 2 and Marunda can
achieve nash equilibrium. whereas, the remaining area is
included as win-lose and lose-lose area. The function of
edgeworth box is to make differentiation which land efficient
and inefficient, edgeworth box show below that Marunda and
Pluit 2 are pareto optimal.
The further question how squatter is efficient toward land
rent frontier, it is necessary to make some regressions
simulation analysis as shown Table 5 below.
It showed that efficient area is kapuk muara. Whereas area
above land frontier like Kalibaru and Penjaringan are assessed
unattainable. Area below land frontier is assessed unefficient.
To know which area is categorized “rent optimal”, it is needed
justification as shown Table 6.
Rent optimal value shows that value RO for North Jakarta
Rp. 106.984/m2/year. Whereas maximum value the figure is
Rp. 3.940.000/m2/year.If we observe between rent to be paid by
Squatter with optimal rent value indicated the big differences. It
means that land occupied by squatter is inefficient. From 11
sample location, the average of rent optimal value for north
Jakarta is indicated value Rp. 1.369.279/m2/year. The figure
below give information that optimal rent value is Pluit 2 with
location in Kampong Pengasinan Muara Angke. Rationally
value α (Rent differential) under 1.
After analysed the interaction among variables with
various curve as shown above, resolution conflict should be
approached by game theory. Game theory is mathematical
approach to formulate competitive situation and conflict
among stakeholders. How to create win-win solution between
squatters and land owners.
In order to operationalize concept resolution with GAMS,
resolution concept will be approached with two approaches
namely market perfectness and government interventions
(Fauzi 2000). The first approach is from market perfectness.
In this approach squatters must move location to other sides
by receiving compensation from land owners or government
build new apartements for squatters. From government sides,
they have opportunity to make clear the boundary of their own
lands as well as construct some infrastructures for control
flooding, roads, water supply and sanitation. The government
also supply some compensation to squatters to move other
places or come back to squatters village. From private point of
view, they are also to make clear the boundary of their lands
and give compensation to squatters. To make easily
calculation, private will give.
The second approach is from government intervention.
Firstly, from squatters point of compensation as same as the
Fig. 3 Preparation of the model
based on the relationship
squatters occupying government
land and private
Land is assessed by using
survey price and rent
Land is assessed with
market price
Group of Squatter
Government Land
Land is assessed with
market price and there is
compensation Rp. 5 million
Group of Squatter
Private Land
Land is assessed with
market price with
compensation Rp. 1 million
Land is assessed with
market price with
compensation Rp. 1 million
and Squatter spend their
money Rp. 200.000,-
Conflict in the North of Jakarta
Table 3 Squatter location inside and outside Nash Equilibrium Curve
with ECS Rp. 250 million with Land Value
No Squatter
location
ECS
Land Value Category
(Rp 000) (Rp.000)
Win-win Win-lose Lose-lose
1
Kamal Muara 21,000
180
V
2
Kapuk Muara 22,000
200
V
3
Pluit 1
14,000
55
4
Pluit 2
26,000
175
5
Penjaringan
25,000
210
6
7
Ancol
18,000
120
V
Table 5 Land use value (efficient) with land rent frontier
No Axis X
Axis Y
1.
Population density in
person er m2
Land Value (Rp/m2) Y=−7497.6 Ln
(x)+148307
2.
Population density in
person per m2
Land rent (Rp/m2)
3.
Rent value in Rp/m2
8
Tanjung Priok 12,000
130
9
Tugu Selatan
16,000
140
V
10 Kali Baru
55,000
320
V
11
Cilincing
18,000
150
V
12 Marunda
23,000
155
Building density in unit per m
5
Buidling density in unit per m2 Land rent (Rp/m2)
6
Rent value in Rp/m2
government compensation. view that they should be given
simetry information related with land squatters occupy
including relocation plans (or transmigration programs) or
going back to village program. The government will give land
price based on rational calculation on local tax object sale
price. The governments tasks after squatters left their illegal
land is to maintain and rehabilitate environment and make
buffer zone. Moreover, private role is also to give information
openly to squatters and give compensations to them
individually or as a groups.
To formulate optimal solution by using GAMS, it is designed
10 models with various assumptions (Rutherford and Thomas
1995). Model 1 is discussed assessment land by using survey
price; Model 2 is discussed assessment land by using market
Y=339.2 Ln
(x)+37436
Land Value (Rp/m2) Land Rent
Frontier
V
V
Land Value (Rp/m2) Y=23460 Ln
(x)+173805
4.
V
Y=3033.1 Ln
(x)+42142
Land Value (Rp/m2) Line frontier
2
V
V
Equation
price; model 3 is discussed assessment land by using market
price and squatter received compensastion Rp. 5 million.
Model 4 is discussed with assumptions squatters received
compensation Rp. 5 million. Model 5 is discussed assessment
land by using market price and Squatters received
compensation Rp. 1 million and they spend their money Rp.
200.000. Model 6 is discussed conflict optimal solution in
land owned by private by assumption that price decision is
based on survey price. Model 7 is discussed conflict optimal
solution in land owned by private by assumption that price
decision is based on market price. Model 8 is discussed
conflict optimal solution in land owned by private by
assumption that squatters received compensation from private
Rp. 5 million per households. Model 9 is discussed conflict
optimal solution in land owned by private by assumption that
squatters received compensation from private Rp. 1 million
per households. Model 10 is discussed assessment land by
using market price and squatters received compensation Rp. 1
million and they spend their money estimated Rp. 200.000,-.
Table 4 Summary in various equation simulation between ECS and
squatter land rent
Table 6 Calculation for optimal rent (RO) value
No Equation Stimulation
Output
Location
a. Win-Win area: Pluit2 and Marunda;
Kamal Muara
25.000
35.000 0.714 180.000
18.10
1.041.872
y=36137 ln(x)–574432
b. Win-Lose area: Pluit 1 and Ancol;
Kapuk Muara
45.700
95.000 0.481 200.000
18.23
1.754.239
y=15492 e2E-8x
y=36040 ln (x)-584927
(ECS increased 28,6 %)
c. Lose-Lose area: Kamal muara, kapuk
muara, Penjaringan, Tanjung Priok,
Tugu selatan, Kali baru, Cilincing.
Pluit 1
12.400
55.000
20.39
Pluit 2
36.250
45.000 0.806 175.000
9.61
Penjaringan
47.844
62.000 0.772 210.000
13.45
Ancol
24.000
33.000 0.632 120.000
11.22
1.
2.
3.
y=15431e 3E-8x
y=90721 e 3E-8x
y=164338 ln (x)-3E+06
(Squatter land rent will be
increased 10 %)
4.
NS-nsq
Cx
130.000 0.095
NL
LT
RO
106.984
1.354.340
2.179.176
850.672
Tanjung Priok 32.800
55.000 0.596 130.000
6.94
538.130
Tugu Selatan
21.000
90.000 0.233 140.000
13.03
425.720
Kali Baru
75.000
120.000 0.625 320.000
19.70
y=164338 ln (x)-3
(ECS is increased 28,6 %,
whereas
Cilincing
28.200
50.000 0.564 150.000
6.87
Marunda
33.000
50.000 0.660 155.000
22.38
squatter land rent will be
increased 10 %)
Source: From Calculation
y=90721 e 2E-8x
E+06
5.
NS-sq
Overlay for all simulation
3.940.000
581.284
2.289.403
NS-sq squatter rent value (Rp/m2 ); NS-nsq non squatter rent value (Rp/
m2 ); Cx rent differential calculation from NS-sq/NS-nsq; NL land value;
LT Time Squatter Living (year); RO Rent Optimal (Rp/m2 /year)
Rudianto, A.G. Tantu
Conclusion
References
The study shows that Pluit 2 and Marunda is categorized winwin, whereas Pluit 1 and Ancol is assessed win-lose, and the rest
Kamal Muara, Kapuk Muara, penjaringan, Tugu Selatan,
Kalibaru, Cilincing is assessed lose-lose. Such results is used as
input by Government and local private to formulate Public policy
to reduce conflict. Pluit 2 can increase squatter 534 household
and Marunda can increase 7.813 household. In area squatter must
move out as follows: Kapuk muara (418 households),
Penjaringan (2334 housedhold), Pluit (440 household), Ancol
(114 household), Priok (174 household), Tugu Selatan
(67 household). Public policy program should be prepared by
Jakarta government include: (a). program to move squatter back
to their origin village; (b). empowerment program for squatter by
giving them training, supply credit and strengthen of capital for
micro, small and medium business; (c) land consolidation to
improve environment; (d). building flats planning for squatters.
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Acknowledgments The corresponding author are gratefully to thank
mayor of North Jakarta Goverrment to give permission for local survey. I
also would like to thank Professor Dr. Ir. Akhmad Fauzi whose help me to
introduce and teach me about GAMS