ProdukHukum Pendidikan
International Hydrological Programme
Groundwater As a Key for Adaptation to Changing Climate and Society
The 20th IHP Training Course
2010/11/9 14:00‐16:30 Nagoya University
Institutional Responses to Groundwater Problems
‐The Cases for Public Regulation on Groundwater‐
Takahiro Endo
endo@envr.tsukuba.ac.jp
Environmental Diplomatic Leader Program,
Graduate School of Life and Environmental Sciences,
University of Tsukuba
Hydrological cycle and water management
(Source: USGS)
◆ What is “Integrated Water Resource Management” ?
Management that pays attention to …...
connection between surface and
ground water / quantity and quality
connection between water resource and
other resources
connection between water and other sectoral
policies( ex. Energy, agriculture)
coordination of various stakeholders’interests
Mitchell 1990:1‐2, Grigg 1999:528, Babel 2005:575, Mitchel 2005:1336
Q: Why do we need to impose public regulation on groundwater?
The aims of lecture
1, The nature of environmental problems
2, Theoretical framework to analyze efficient use of water
resources
3, Reasons why public regulation on groundwater are necessary
3‐1: Land subsidence
3‐2: A conflict between surface water users
and groundwater users
3‐3: Groundwater banking
1, The Nature of environmental problems
Q1, Why do we need to protect environment ? (Rationale)
1, Nature is valuable in itself. (Nature has an intrinsic value.)
2, Protecting nature will improve human‐being welfare.
Environmental problems will decrease human‐welfare.
(Nature has an instrumental value.)
Eco‐system service
Provisioning
・Food
・Freshwater
・Wood and Fiber
etc.
Regulating
・Climate Regulation
・Flood Regulation
・Disease Regulation
・Water Purification etc.
Cultural
・Aesthetic
・Spiritual
・Educational
・Recreational etc.
Supporting
・Nutrient Cycling
・Soil Formation
・Primary Production etc.
Millenium Eco‐system Assessment. Ch.1, p.28.
5
Q2, How can we protect environment ?
Scarcity of Resources
Institution
Human nature
1. selfish
2. Limited altruism
3. Limited understanding
and will
Appropriate use of
natural resources
Environmental policy = not to change human nature itself, but to
make the most of selfish mind so as to promote environmental
protection. A problem of institutional design
individual and group(1)
http://www.nttdocomo.co.jp/product/foma/style/l04b/index.html
http://ilgiornalieri.blogspot.com/2009/02/
mandeville‐la‐favola‐delle‐api‐vizi.html
B. Mandeville “Private vice, public virtue”
http://www.greekshares.com/capitalism.php
A.Smith “Invisible hand”
individual and group(2)
Rich grassland
sheep pasturage
additional pasturage by other fellows
Over‐grazing
・The price of sheep／vegetation／precipitation etc.
・A tool for understanding of the basic structure of
environmental problems A tale of “Tragedy of Commons”
What’s the difference?
Sphere where self‐
interest works in a
positive way.
Individual rationality
＝ Social rationality
Cell‐phone
Pencil
Car
Jeans
Ice cream
Sphere where self‐
interest works in a
negative way.
Individual rationality
≠ Social rationality
Grassland
River
Groundwater
Air
Classification of goods and services
Excludability
Private goods
・Cable TV
・Ice‐cream
・uncongested freeway
・Cloth
・Toilet in private house
Public goods
Commons
・national security
・Migrant fish/bird
・Prevention of infectious
disease
・Grassland
・biodiversity
・Public toilet
・water
Non‐rivalness
Environmental problem：
accumulation of negative impacts
Public toilet /grassland / water
Individual A’s use may produce negative spillovers.
・Toilet：A dirty toilet makes the next user feel bad.
・Grassland：An additional new sheep decreases grass available to
existing sheep.
・Aral sea：Upstream diversion decreases water available to
downstream users etc.
Natural resource uses without limitation
accumulation of the same kind of negative spillovers
＝Excessive use of resources Environmental problems
What should be done?
grassland / water etc.
grassland / water etc.
No self‐responsibility, “nuisance”
“negative spillover effect”
If s/he uses less, the damage will
disappear.
・If I stop groundwater pumping, somebody
else will capture groundwater instead of me.
・If everyone except for me stops
groundwater pumping, my use will give little
impact on volume of groundwater.
Even if people share a common benefit, they can not always achieve it voluntarily.
：Social Dilemma, Collective Action Problem
“Everybody’s business is nobody’s business”
The need for public regulation
Olson 1965, Dawes 1975
Institutional response
grassland / water etc.
No self‐responsibility, “nuisance”
“negative spillover effect”
grassland / water etc.
If each one has to pay for damages
to others, s/he will use less.
★ The rule of irresponsibility must be changed.
the system that makes a resource user realize
“negative spill over effect” and burden the cost.
Moral, Custom, Law =Institution
dilemma
A solution for social
2, Theoretical framework: groundwater pumping
Marginal cost
Total cost
Total benefit
Pumping
volume
Pumping
volume
Pumping
volume
Marginal benefit
Pumping
volume
Groundwater pumping: private decision
Total cost
Total benefit
TC
TB
Pumping
volume
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
MC
MB
v1
Pumping
volume
Groundwater pumping: private decision
Total cost
Total benefit
TC
TB
Pumping
volume
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
Private decision leads to
excessive pumping.
How can we move v1 to v*?
SMC
PMC
DWL
Negative spillover
MB
V*
v1
Pumping
volume
= How can we fill the gap
between PMC and SMC?
Groundwater pumping: private decision
Total cost
Total benefit
TC
TB
Pumping
volume
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
SMC
PMC
DWL
Negative spillover
MB
V*
v1
Pumping
volume
1, Land subsidence
problem due to
excessive
groundwater
pumping
2, A conflict between
surface water users
and groundwater
users
3, Environmental
services of
groundwater
3‐1: Land subsidence
Seoul
Osaka
Tokyo
1930’s ～
Taipei
Bangkok
Manila
Osaka information center on urban civil
engineering
Present
1960’s ～
Jakarta
The mechanism of land subsidence
The causes of land subsidence
1, Natural compaction
2, Groundwater pumping
Osaka information center on urban civil
engineering
Osaka in 1958
Jakarta in 2009
Land subsidence recorded on a well (Koiwa, Tokyo)
Ground Level in 1938
30cm
5cm
8cm
5cm
4cm
3cm
1.5cm
4cm
1963
1964
1965
1967
:
:
C
A
C
B
A
B
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
SMC
PMC
DWL
Cost
Benefit
Negative spillover
MB
A’s calculation
V*
Cost
v1
Pumping
volume
Benefit
Cost
Cost
Calculation from
social viewpoint
A well‐owner does not always take account of
external cost to other well‐owners.
The pumping volume may be optimal for A, but it is
excessive for society as a whole.
C
A
C
B
A
B
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
SMC
PMC
DWL
Cost
Benefit
Negative spillover
MB
A’s calculation
V*
Cost
v1
Pumping
volume
Benefit
Cost
Cost
Calculation from
social viewpoint
*Can we give well‐owners incentive to compensate B and C
without public regulation on groundwater?
Land subsidence in Bangkok
Osaka
Seoul
Tokyo
Taipei
AYUTTHAYA
Bangkok
Manila
PATHUM THANI
1960’s ～
NAKHON PATHOM
NONTHABURI
BANGKOK
Jakarta
SAMUT PRAKAN
SAMUTSAKHON
GULF OF THAILAND
0
10 km
Land subsidence in Bangkok
・Comprehensive survey on
groundwater during 1978～1981
Land subsidence was observed
in eastern and south‐eastern
Bangkok
Concern for higher flood risk
led to land subsidence
management policy
Ramnarong 1999:54 Buapeng 2006:4
3
0.1M m
10万㎥/日
1977 Groundwater Act
30
25
Estimated volume of pumping
実際の揚水量推計値
揚水許可量
1983 Mitigation of the GW
Crisis and Land Subsidence in
Bangkok
20
15
10
Permitted volume of pumping
Construction of waterworks
5
0
1978
1985 Groundwater Charge +
2004 Groundwater
Preservation Charge
80
82
84
1985
86
88
87
90
89
92
91
94
93
96
95
98 2000
97
99
02
01
04
03
0
‐10
‐20
‐30
‐40
‐50
‐60
cm
観測地A
イ発電公社
Observation site 1
Observation site 2
観測地B
ュラロンコン大学商業会計学部
Source: Department of Groundwater Resources, Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment
06
05
Groundwater Areas in 1977
1977 Groundwater Act
・ Regulation on groundwater pumping in Bangkok and
adjacent Provinces
・The only legal constraint against private pumping
・Permit‐based system in “Groundwater Areas”
・ New wells were prohibited where public water
supply had been available
・A system of groundwater charged was admitted
Ramnarong 1999:55‐56, Das Gupta and Babel 2005:459
1983 Mitigation Plan
・Long term plan from 1983‐2000
・Designation of “Critical Zone”
the target area for GW pumping reduction
・Gradual reduction of pumping by MWA
Critical Zones in 1983
Critical Zones in 1995
Ramnarong 1999:55, 57 Buapeng 2006:5
Ramnarong 1999:56, IGES 2006:75, Buapeng 2006:5 を基に作成
Construction of waterworks
0.1M m3 /day
60
50
40
30
20
Sam Lae pumping station
at Chap Phraya River
10
0
Year
1978 81
84
87
90
93
96
99
02
05
Estimated volume of groundwater pumping
Source: (Endo forthcoming)
Permitted volume of groundwater pumping
Water supply by Metropolitan Waterworks Authority
Groundwater pumping by Metropolitan Waterworks Authority
MWA(Metropolitan Waterworks Authority)
: State enterprise whose function is to provide industrial and domestic water
supply in Bangkok and the adjacent areas.
1985 Groundwater Charge System
0.1M㎥/day
Baht/㎥
12
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
15.81
10
8
Samut Prakan
6
Nonthaburi
4
Bangkok
2
0
1985
90
95
Groundwater Conservation Charge
2000
05
Total Groundwater Fee
Source: (Endo forthcoming)
Is groundwater charge system really working?
GW pumping in July,2004: 1290㎥
August, 2004: 2480㎥
September, 2004: 1138㎥
Data collected at Santi Asok temple 65/1 Soi Nawamin 44, Klongkum, Buenkum,
Bangkok, 10240
Bill :41718 Bahts
41718 Bahts÷ 1290 2480 1138 ㎥
＝41718 Bahts÷4908㎥
＝8.5 Bahts/㎥
Lessons and recommendations for policy makers
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
SMC
PMC
DWL
Negative spillover
MB
V*
v1
Pumping
volume
1, The necessity of government intervention
・It is hard for private company to move v1 to v* due to social dilemma.
2, Groundwater pricing system works with conditions.
・Groundwater Charge works only when alternative sources of water supply exists.
( Users has no choice but to keep using groundwater without alternative sources. )
Lessons and recommendations for policy
makers
4, Importance of adaptive management
・Areas of land subsidence move. Therefore, restriction area
should be modified regularly in accordance with monitoring
data. Monitoring is extremely important.
5, Gradual expansion of regulation worked in both cases.
・If it is hard to restrict all the groundwater pumping at
one time, restriction on new wells should be considered
first.
6, Preparing alternative sources of water supply is the most
effective resolution against land subsidence problem.
・ Alternative sources of water supply includes not only
surface water, but also recycled water, desalinated water.
・Subsidy system may be necessary for making the price of
industrial water cheaper.
3‐2 A conflict between surface water users
and groundwater users
A
Negative impacts from upstream
users to downstream users
Cost
B
Diversion of a unit of water
Cost
Benefit
Cost
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
C
SMC
DWL
A’s calculation
PMC
Negative spillover
Cost
Benefit
Cost
Cost
Calculation from
social viewpoint
MB
Diversion
V*
v1
An Upstream diverter does not always take account of
external cost to downstream users.
The diversion may be optimal for A, but it is excessive for
society as a whole.
A
Cost
B
Diversion of a unit of water
Cost
Benefit
Cost
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
C
SMC
PMC
DWL
A’s calculation
Negative spillover
Cost
MB
Benefit
Cost
Cost
Calculation from
social viewpoint
Diversion
V*
v1
*Can we give A incentive to compensate B and C where there is
no public regulation on groundwater?
A boundary between surface and ground water
in Japanese legal system
1868～1896
・Flood control as a priority issue
・Water allocation rule with less importance
1896：The (Old) River Law
・Centralized management of rivers
・Subsidy from national government
・The main concern : Flood control
3 1964： The River Law
・Economic development after WWII
： The necessity of water allocation rule
in addition to flood control policy
4 1997： Amendments on The River Law
・Environmental factors
* Surface water is subject to public regulation: public water
Groundwater as “private water”
◆1896/3/27 Supreme Court Decision
・Right of use groundwater belongs to the ownership of land.
・A landowner can make free use of groundwater that lies below
its land.
◆Civil Code§207：Subject to limitations by laws and ordinances,
the ownership of land extends both above and below its surface
Groundwater use based on land ownership
=A theory of private water
Ogawa1998：313 Ogawa 2003:15‐16
Saijo city, Ehime, Japan
Saijo City
・Population: 58110 (2000)
・Average precipitation
1413mm 1909~2001
・Kamo River
Catchment area:229 km2
Class‐B River)
(Saijo City 1984:505,Saijo City 2003：19
Kamo River : A losing stream
5.5 km
Groundwater with long history
伊予国地理図志稿
弘法水 Kou‐bou water
西條誌稿本 巻の三 西条市・愛媛大作成CD‐ROM
Area without waterworks
(population: about 40,000)
An impact of the legal boundary
西条市
地下水涵養に
悪影響？
A Water Conflict Between Saijo and
Matsuyama
2006 A water diversion plan for
Matsuyama city
Saijo Government opposed this plan with
松山市
anxiety that the plan may affect
groundwater recharge in Saijo Area.
Matsuyama
Saijo Government is worried about
黒瀬 ム 西条工水
negative externality on groundwater.
What is problem?
西条市
地下水涵養に
悪影響？
松山市
Matsuyama
黒瀬 ム 西条工水
Case 1 : Saijo city governmet has a
water right and takes water for
various uses from Kamo River.
Case 2: Saijo city residents pumps up
groundwater and use it for various
uses.
Hard and Soft Measures for Conflict Prevention
B: Late comer
Matsuyama
Quantitative / Qualitative
Nuisance
A：Existing water
right holder
Saijo)
1, The River Law §23：Permitted water right system
Free access is not allowed.
2, The River Law §38‐43：Water Conciliation
A late comer is required to get consent from
concerned river users and compensate them
for losses caused by the planned diversion.
3, Dam
A late comer is usually required to make
a dam not to injure senior water rights.
4, The River Law §53: Drought Conciliation
In drought, concerned river users are supposed
to make negotiations to settle water allocation.
A
Concerned River Users are………
Those who get permissions on
the River Law §23‐29
Fishermen
Groundwater users outside of a
river channel are not included.
Groundwater = Private Water
Obligation to
compensate
No obligation to
compensate
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
SMC
Surface water
users
PMC
DWL
Well
Negative spillover
MB
Diversion
Groundwater users
V*
v1
Institutional pitfall
A
B
River Law
: Surface water user
× Surface Water User
Surface Water User
×Groundwater user
D
C
Ground
water
Judicial decisions and civil code:
Groundwater user
×Groundwater user
Implications of Saijo Groundwater Problem
City A /
Country A
Ehime
Matsuyama
Saijo
City B /
Country B
River basin ≠ Administrative unit
A horizontal boundary
Inefficient use of water
Legal status of surface water ≠Legal
status of groundwater
A vertical boundary
The necessity of three dimensional management of water resource
3‐3 Groundwater banking
Groundwater management in Kumamoto
Kumamoto
city
Population
: about 70,000
Shirakawa river
basin
50km
The main
source of
domestic
water supply
: groundwater
1,2
3
4
出典：熊本市資料 熊本市地下水量保全プラン および 熊本の地下水
A
Positive impacts from upstream rice fields
to downstream groundwater users
B
C
Benefit
Production of a unit of rice
Cost
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
Benefit
DWL
PMC
A’s calculation
Cost
SMB
Benefit
Benefit
Positive spillover
PMB
Rice production
Benefit
Calculation from
social viewpoint
v1
V*
An Upstream rice farmer does not always take account of
external benefit to downstream groundwater users.
The production level may be optimal for A, but it is less than
optimum for society as a whole.
A
Positive impacts from upstream rice fields
to downstream groundwater users
B
C
Benefit
Production of a unit of rice
Cost
Benefit
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
DWL
PMC
A’s calculation
SMB
Cost
Positive spillover
Benefit
PMB
Benefit
Benefit
Calculation from
social viewpoint
Rice production
V*
v1
*Can B and C give a rice farmer incentive to recharge
groundwater without public regulation on groundwater?
Groundwater charge system in Kumamoto
A
￥
C
B
X
Benefit
Production of a unit of rice
A case where there is no public regulation on groundwater
No one has incentive to pay A to increase recharge.
(“Everybody’s business is nobody’s business” situation)
A
￥
Subsidy
X
Benefit
Production of a unit of rice
Kumamoto
city
B
C
Artificial groundwater
recharge in Kumamoto
Total area of rice field
used for recharge (ha/month)
Total recharge volume
(×10000m3)
600
1800
1600
500
1400
1200
400
1000
300
800
600
200
400
100
200
0
0
2004
2005
2006
2007
Recharge volume by cooperative farmers
Recharge volume by cooperative business firms
Total area of rice field used for recharge (ha/month)
2008
Year
Conclusion
■Public regulation on groundwater is necessary,
because……..
1, private use of groundwater without
regulation may cause severe land subsidence.
2, it is difficult to solve water conflict between
surface water users and groundwater users.
3, it hinders groundwater banking.
Groundwater As a Key for Adaptation to Changing Climate and Society
The 20th IHP Training Course
2010/11/9 14:00‐16:30 Nagoya University
Institutional Responses to Groundwater Problems
‐The Cases for Public Regulation on Groundwater‐
Takahiro Endo
endo@envr.tsukuba.ac.jp
Environmental Diplomatic Leader Program,
Graduate School of Life and Environmental Sciences,
University of Tsukuba
Hydrological cycle and water management
(Source: USGS)
◆ What is “Integrated Water Resource Management” ?
Management that pays attention to …...
connection between surface and
ground water / quantity and quality
connection between water resource and
other resources
connection between water and other sectoral
policies( ex. Energy, agriculture)
coordination of various stakeholders’interests
Mitchell 1990:1‐2, Grigg 1999:528, Babel 2005:575, Mitchel 2005:1336
Q: Why do we need to impose public regulation on groundwater?
The aims of lecture
1, The nature of environmental problems
2, Theoretical framework to analyze efficient use of water
resources
3, Reasons why public regulation on groundwater are necessary
3‐1: Land subsidence
3‐2: A conflict between surface water users
and groundwater users
3‐3: Groundwater banking
1, The Nature of environmental problems
Q1, Why do we need to protect environment ? (Rationale)
1, Nature is valuable in itself. (Nature has an intrinsic value.)
2, Protecting nature will improve human‐being welfare.
Environmental problems will decrease human‐welfare.
(Nature has an instrumental value.)
Eco‐system service
Provisioning
・Food
・Freshwater
・Wood and Fiber
etc.
Regulating
・Climate Regulation
・Flood Regulation
・Disease Regulation
・Water Purification etc.
Cultural
・Aesthetic
・Spiritual
・Educational
・Recreational etc.
Supporting
・Nutrient Cycling
・Soil Formation
・Primary Production etc.
Millenium Eco‐system Assessment. Ch.1, p.28.
5
Q2, How can we protect environment ?
Scarcity of Resources
Institution
Human nature
1. selfish
2. Limited altruism
3. Limited understanding
and will
Appropriate use of
natural resources
Environmental policy = not to change human nature itself, but to
make the most of selfish mind so as to promote environmental
protection. A problem of institutional design
individual and group(1)
http://www.nttdocomo.co.jp/product/foma/style/l04b/index.html
http://ilgiornalieri.blogspot.com/2009/02/
mandeville‐la‐favola‐delle‐api‐vizi.html
B. Mandeville “Private vice, public virtue”
http://www.greekshares.com/capitalism.php
A.Smith “Invisible hand”
individual and group(2)
Rich grassland
sheep pasturage
additional pasturage by other fellows
Over‐grazing
・The price of sheep／vegetation／precipitation etc.
・A tool for understanding of the basic structure of
environmental problems A tale of “Tragedy of Commons”
What’s the difference?
Sphere where self‐
interest works in a
positive way.
Individual rationality
＝ Social rationality
Cell‐phone
Pencil
Car
Jeans
Ice cream
Sphere where self‐
interest works in a
negative way.
Individual rationality
≠ Social rationality
Grassland
River
Groundwater
Air
Classification of goods and services
Excludability
Private goods
・Cable TV
・Ice‐cream
・uncongested freeway
・Cloth
・Toilet in private house
Public goods
Commons
・national security
・Migrant fish/bird
・Prevention of infectious
disease
・Grassland
・biodiversity
・Public toilet
・water
Non‐rivalness
Environmental problem：
accumulation of negative impacts
Public toilet /grassland / water
Individual A’s use may produce negative spillovers.
・Toilet：A dirty toilet makes the next user feel bad.
・Grassland：An additional new sheep decreases grass available to
existing sheep.
・Aral sea：Upstream diversion decreases water available to
downstream users etc.
Natural resource uses without limitation
accumulation of the same kind of negative spillovers
＝Excessive use of resources Environmental problems
What should be done?
grassland / water etc.
grassland / water etc.
No self‐responsibility, “nuisance”
“negative spillover effect”
If s/he uses less, the damage will
disappear.
・If I stop groundwater pumping, somebody
else will capture groundwater instead of me.
・If everyone except for me stops
groundwater pumping, my use will give little
impact on volume of groundwater.
Even if people share a common benefit, they can not always achieve it voluntarily.
：Social Dilemma, Collective Action Problem
“Everybody’s business is nobody’s business”
The need for public regulation
Olson 1965, Dawes 1975
Institutional response
grassland / water etc.
No self‐responsibility, “nuisance”
“negative spillover effect”
grassland / water etc.
If each one has to pay for damages
to others, s/he will use less.
★ The rule of irresponsibility must be changed.
the system that makes a resource user realize
“negative spill over effect” and burden the cost.
Moral, Custom, Law =Institution
dilemma
A solution for social
2, Theoretical framework: groundwater pumping
Marginal cost
Total cost
Total benefit
Pumping
volume
Pumping
volume
Pumping
volume
Marginal benefit
Pumping
volume
Groundwater pumping: private decision
Total cost
Total benefit
TC
TB
Pumping
volume
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
MC
MB
v1
Pumping
volume
Groundwater pumping: private decision
Total cost
Total benefit
TC
TB
Pumping
volume
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
Private decision leads to
excessive pumping.
How can we move v1 to v*?
SMC
PMC
DWL
Negative spillover
MB
V*
v1
Pumping
volume
= How can we fill the gap
between PMC and SMC?
Groundwater pumping: private decision
Total cost
Total benefit
TC
TB
Pumping
volume
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
SMC
PMC
DWL
Negative spillover
MB
V*
v1
Pumping
volume
1, Land subsidence
problem due to
excessive
groundwater
pumping
2, A conflict between
surface water users
and groundwater
users
3, Environmental
services of
groundwater
3‐1: Land subsidence
Seoul
Osaka
Tokyo
1930’s ～
Taipei
Bangkok
Manila
Osaka information center on urban civil
engineering
Present
1960’s ～
Jakarta
The mechanism of land subsidence
The causes of land subsidence
1, Natural compaction
2, Groundwater pumping
Osaka information center on urban civil
engineering
Osaka in 1958
Jakarta in 2009
Land subsidence recorded on a well (Koiwa, Tokyo)
Ground Level in 1938
30cm
5cm
8cm
5cm
4cm
3cm
1.5cm
4cm
1963
1964
1965
1967
:
:
C
A
C
B
A
B
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
SMC
PMC
DWL
Cost
Benefit
Negative spillover
MB
A’s calculation
V*
Cost
v1
Pumping
volume
Benefit
Cost
Cost
Calculation from
social viewpoint
A well‐owner does not always take account of
external cost to other well‐owners.
The pumping volume may be optimal for A, but it is
excessive for society as a whole.
C
A
C
B
A
B
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
SMC
PMC
DWL
Cost
Benefit
Negative spillover
MB
A’s calculation
V*
Cost
v1
Pumping
volume
Benefit
Cost
Cost
Calculation from
social viewpoint
*Can we give well‐owners incentive to compensate B and C
without public regulation on groundwater?
Land subsidence in Bangkok
Osaka
Seoul
Tokyo
Taipei
AYUTTHAYA
Bangkok
Manila
PATHUM THANI
1960’s ～
NAKHON PATHOM
NONTHABURI
BANGKOK
Jakarta
SAMUT PRAKAN
SAMUTSAKHON
GULF OF THAILAND
0
10 km
Land subsidence in Bangkok
・Comprehensive survey on
groundwater during 1978～1981
Land subsidence was observed
in eastern and south‐eastern
Bangkok
Concern for higher flood risk
led to land subsidence
management policy
Ramnarong 1999:54 Buapeng 2006:4
3
0.1M m
10万㎥/日
1977 Groundwater Act
30
25
Estimated volume of pumping
実際の揚水量推計値
揚水許可量
1983 Mitigation of the GW
Crisis and Land Subsidence in
Bangkok
20
15
10
Permitted volume of pumping
Construction of waterworks
5
0
1978
1985 Groundwater Charge +
2004 Groundwater
Preservation Charge
80
82
84
1985
86
88
87
90
89
92
91
94
93
96
95
98 2000
97
99
02
01
04
03
0
‐10
‐20
‐30
‐40
‐50
‐60
cm
観測地A
イ発電公社
Observation site 1
Observation site 2
観測地B
ュラロンコン大学商業会計学部
Source: Department of Groundwater Resources, Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment
06
05
Groundwater Areas in 1977
1977 Groundwater Act
・ Regulation on groundwater pumping in Bangkok and
adjacent Provinces
・The only legal constraint against private pumping
・Permit‐based system in “Groundwater Areas”
・ New wells were prohibited where public water
supply had been available
・A system of groundwater charged was admitted
Ramnarong 1999:55‐56, Das Gupta and Babel 2005:459
1983 Mitigation Plan
・Long term plan from 1983‐2000
・Designation of “Critical Zone”
the target area for GW pumping reduction
・Gradual reduction of pumping by MWA
Critical Zones in 1983
Critical Zones in 1995
Ramnarong 1999:55, 57 Buapeng 2006:5
Ramnarong 1999:56, IGES 2006:75, Buapeng 2006:5 を基に作成
Construction of waterworks
0.1M m3 /day
60
50
40
30
20
Sam Lae pumping station
at Chap Phraya River
10
0
Year
1978 81
84
87
90
93
96
99
02
05
Estimated volume of groundwater pumping
Source: (Endo forthcoming)
Permitted volume of groundwater pumping
Water supply by Metropolitan Waterworks Authority
Groundwater pumping by Metropolitan Waterworks Authority
MWA(Metropolitan Waterworks Authority)
: State enterprise whose function is to provide industrial and domestic water
supply in Bangkok and the adjacent areas.
1985 Groundwater Charge System
0.1M㎥/day
Baht/㎥
12
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
15.81
10
8
Samut Prakan
6
Nonthaburi
4
Bangkok
2
0
1985
90
95
Groundwater Conservation Charge
2000
05
Total Groundwater Fee
Source: (Endo forthcoming)
Is groundwater charge system really working?
GW pumping in July,2004: 1290㎥
August, 2004: 2480㎥
September, 2004: 1138㎥
Data collected at Santi Asok temple 65/1 Soi Nawamin 44, Klongkum, Buenkum,
Bangkok, 10240
Bill :41718 Bahts
41718 Bahts÷ 1290 2480 1138 ㎥
＝41718 Bahts÷4908㎥
＝8.5 Bahts/㎥
Lessons and recommendations for policy makers
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
SMC
PMC
DWL
Negative spillover
MB
V*
v1
Pumping
volume
1, The necessity of government intervention
・It is hard for private company to move v1 to v* due to social dilemma.
2, Groundwater pricing system works with conditions.
・Groundwater Charge works only when alternative sources of water supply exists.
( Users has no choice but to keep using groundwater without alternative sources. )
Lessons and recommendations for policy
makers
4, Importance of adaptive management
・Areas of land subsidence move. Therefore, restriction area
should be modified regularly in accordance with monitoring
data. Monitoring is extremely important.
5, Gradual expansion of regulation worked in both cases.
・If it is hard to restrict all the groundwater pumping at
one time, restriction on new wells should be considered
first.
6, Preparing alternative sources of water supply is the most
effective resolution against land subsidence problem.
・ Alternative sources of water supply includes not only
surface water, but also recycled water, desalinated water.
・Subsidy system may be necessary for making the price of
industrial water cheaper.
3‐2 A conflict between surface water users
and groundwater users
A
Negative impacts from upstream
users to downstream users
Cost
B
Diversion of a unit of water
Cost
Benefit
Cost
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
C
SMC
DWL
A’s calculation
PMC
Negative spillover
Cost
Benefit
Cost
Cost
Calculation from
social viewpoint
MB
Diversion
V*
v1
An Upstream diverter does not always take account of
external cost to downstream users.
The diversion may be optimal for A, but it is excessive for
society as a whole.
A
Cost
B
Diversion of a unit of water
Cost
Benefit
Cost
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
C
SMC
PMC
DWL
A’s calculation
Negative spillover
Cost
MB
Benefit
Cost
Cost
Calculation from
social viewpoint
Diversion
V*
v1
*Can we give A incentive to compensate B and C where there is
no public regulation on groundwater?
A boundary between surface and ground water
in Japanese legal system
1868～1896
・Flood control as a priority issue
・Water allocation rule with less importance
1896：The (Old) River Law
・Centralized management of rivers
・Subsidy from national government
・The main concern : Flood control
3 1964： The River Law
・Economic development after WWII
： The necessity of water allocation rule
in addition to flood control policy
4 1997： Amendments on The River Law
・Environmental factors
* Surface water is subject to public regulation: public water
Groundwater as “private water”
◆1896/3/27 Supreme Court Decision
・Right of use groundwater belongs to the ownership of land.
・A landowner can make free use of groundwater that lies below
its land.
◆Civil Code§207：Subject to limitations by laws and ordinances,
the ownership of land extends both above and below its surface
Groundwater use based on land ownership
=A theory of private water
Ogawa1998：313 Ogawa 2003:15‐16
Saijo city, Ehime, Japan
Saijo City
・Population: 58110 (2000)
・Average precipitation
1413mm 1909~2001
・Kamo River
Catchment area:229 km2
Class‐B River)
(Saijo City 1984:505,Saijo City 2003：19
Kamo River : A losing stream
5.5 km
Groundwater with long history
伊予国地理図志稿
弘法水 Kou‐bou water
西條誌稿本 巻の三 西条市・愛媛大作成CD‐ROM
Area without waterworks
(population: about 40,000)
An impact of the legal boundary
西条市
地下水涵養に
悪影響？
A Water Conflict Between Saijo and
Matsuyama
2006 A water diversion plan for
Matsuyama city
Saijo Government opposed this plan with
松山市
anxiety that the plan may affect
groundwater recharge in Saijo Area.
Matsuyama
Saijo Government is worried about
黒瀬 ム 西条工水
negative externality on groundwater.
What is problem?
西条市
地下水涵養に
悪影響？
松山市
Matsuyama
黒瀬 ム 西条工水
Case 1 : Saijo city governmet has a
water right and takes water for
various uses from Kamo River.
Case 2: Saijo city residents pumps up
groundwater and use it for various
uses.
Hard and Soft Measures for Conflict Prevention
B: Late comer
Matsuyama
Quantitative / Qualitative
Nuisance
A：Existing water
right holder
Saijo)
1, The River Law §23：Permitted water right system
Free access is not allowed.
2, The River Law §38‐43：Water Conciliation
A late comer is required to get consent from
concerned river users and compensate them
for losses caused by the planned diversion.
3, Dam
A late comer is usually required to make
a dam not to injure senior water rights.
4, The River Law §53: Drought Conciliation
In drought, concerned river users are supposed
to make negotiations to settle water allocation.
A
Concerned River Users are………
Those who get permissions on
the River Law §23‐29
Fishermen
Groundwater users outside of a
river channel are not included.
Groundwater = Private Water
Obligation to
compensate
No obligation to
compensate
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
SMC
Surface water
users
PMC
DWL
Well
Negative spillover
MB
Diversion
Groundwater users
V*
v1
Institutional pitfall
A
B
River Law
: Surface water user
× Surface Water User
Surface Water User
×Groundwater user
D
C
Ground
water
Judicial decisions and civil code:
Groundwater user
×Groundwater user
Implications of Saijo Groundwater Problem
City A /
Country A
Ehime
Matsuyama
Saijo
City B /
Country B
River basin ≠ Administrative unit
A horizontal boundary
Inefficient use of water
Legal status of surface water ≠Legal
status of groundwater
A vertical boundary
The necessity of three dimensional management of water resource
3‐3 Groundwater banking
Groundwater management in Kumamoto
Kumamoto
city
Population
: about 70,000
Shirakawa river
basin
50km
The main
source of
domestic
water supply
: groundwater
1,2
3
4
出典：熊本市資料 熊本市地下水量保全プラン および 熊本の地下水
A
Positive impacts from upstream rice fields
to downstream groundwater users
B
C
Benefit
Production of a unit of rice
Cost
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
Benefit
DWL
PMC
A’s calculation
Cost
SMB
Benefit
Benefit
Positive spillover
PMB
Rice production
Benefit
Calculation from
social viewpoint
v1
V*
An Upstream rice farmer does not always take account of
external benefit to downstream groundwater users.
The production level may be optimal for A, but it is less than
optimum for society as a whole.
A
Positive impacts from upstream rice fields
to downstream groundwater users
B
C
Benefit
Production of a unit of rice
Cost
Benefit
Marginal cost
Marginal benefit
DWL
PMC
A’s calculation
SMB
Cost
Positive spillover
Benefit
PMB
Benefit
Benefit
Calculation from
social viewpoint
Rice production
V*
v1
*Can B and C give a rice farmer incentive to recharge
groundwater without public regulation on groundwater?
Groundwater charge system in Kumamoto
A
￥
C
B
X
Benefit
Production of a unit of rice
A case where there is no public regulation on groundwater
No one has incentive to pay A to increase recharge.
(“Everybody’s business is nobody’s business” situation)
A
￥
Subsidy
X
Benefit
Production of a unit of rice
Kumamoto
city
B
C
Artificial groundwater
recharge in Kumamoto
Total area of rice field
used for recharge (ha/month)
Total recharge volume
(×10000m3)
600
1800
1600
500
1400
1200
400
1000
300
800
600
200
400
100
200
0
0
2004
2005
2006
2007
Recharge volume by cooperative farmers
Recharge volume by cooperative business firms
Total area of rice field used for recharge (ha/month)
2008
Year
Conclusion
■Public regulation on groundwater is necessary,
because……..
1, private use of groundwater without
regulation may cause severe land subsidence.
2, it is difficult to solve water conflict between
surface water users and groundwater users.
3, it hinders groundwater banking.