Accounting Theory Research regulation an

Regulation as accounting theory and the implications
for the public interest
Michael Gaffikin, PhD
Abstract
An examination of regulation in accounting reveals two instances of circular reasoning.
First, advocates of a free market argue against any state intervention yet history shows
that it is state intervention that has been necessary to preserve the free market. Secondly,
regulation is often seen as a substitute for theory yet successful and effective regulation
needs to be based on sound theoretical grounds. This paper examines both these
situations, historically and conceptually. It shows that the arguments for free, unfettered
financial markets are based on faulty epistemological grounds, contain many paradoxes
and are driven by neoliberal ideology rather than sound theory. Whatever the reasons
given for the need of regulation it inevitably involves some notion of societal benefit - it
is usually designed in the public interest, a notoriously difficult notion that has absorbed
the minds of great western thinkers for many centuries. Therefore, debates on accounting
regulation need to be in the context of broad sociological arguments on the constitution of
the public interest. That is, it must go beyond the technical and narrowly defined
economic considerations. Theory and regulation are inextricably linked. This theory
needs to be more than conventional, mainstream economic theory but include an
awareness of political and social theories of fairness and justice for all.
Keywords

Regulation, theory, neoliberal ideology, free markets, public interest.
Introduction
It is widely believed that a purpose of accounting is the provision of information to
facilitate business and commercial decision making. However, it also serves to determine
the accountability of those entities that are granted the privilege of controlling and using
an economy's scarce resources. Thus, it would not be overly idealistic to hold the view
that accounting fulfils an important role in an economy or society: it is designed to serve
the public interest. As such, ensuring that the public interest is served involves political
considerations, notably the extent to which the State should intervene in the everyday
affairs of its citizens to regulate their activities.
However, any discussion of the public interest is difficult because the sheer scope of
the subject opens up a wide range of possible interpretations. Broadly speaking, it has
absorbed great minds of the Western philosophical tradition from Classical Greek
scholars such as Socrates to contemporary philosophical commentators including
Foucault, Habermas, Rawls, Mouffe and very many more. Implicit in the Greek
philosophers' search for meaning and knowledge was the determination of the “good
citizen”; one who led a good life and contributed to society (or the public interest). In his
later work, Foucault was absorbed with the notion of governmentality or what enabled
the state to direct the activities of its citizens (to which he applied the term biopower).
Habermas devoted considerable energy to examining the democratic processes which

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Reclaiming Accounting’s Lost Identity
enable the public to direct the formulation of political policies that serve the public interest (through what he referred to as
the public sphere). Rawls sought to introduce a theory of justice that people would accept as the basis for regulating the
conduct of society. Mouffe (with Laclau) challenged the notions of both Rawls and Habermas and introduced a radical
understanding of democracy which acknowledges the need to resolve (or understand) multiple conflicts or interests that
exist within society thus making the public interest much more difficult to define. These are only a few of the scholars, who,
throughout the development of western thought, have been concerned with how society is (or should be) regulated to serve
its broader interests - the public interest.
When the discussion is qualified with the adjective “accounting”, many people believe it becomes more manageable.
However, despite limiting the range of the discussion, elements of the more general discussion still underpin the arguments
and assumptions employed. Unfortunately, this fact is usually ignored by many (such as most accounting textbook authors)
who provide a rather simplistic analysis of the reasons for (or not) accounting (or economic) regulation. The discussion in
this essay may be seen to be similarly simplistic in that the emphasis will be on a fairly conventional descriptive analysis.
The intention is to show how what was once considered the domain of that referred to as accounting theory has, in many
respects, been “replaced” by concerns with issues of accounting regulation. Nevertheless, it is also intended to draw
attention to the fact that this discussion still involves an appreciation of the “broader” background issues - contextualisation.
Thus, this paper provides a general overview of regulation and accounting and some of the arguments provided by
researchers with different ontological persuasions. It does this in the context of the need for an awareness of what is claimed

to be “in the public interest”.
Accounting Theory
The twentieth century was a period in which there was at first a growing interest in determining a theoretical basis for
accounting and then a falling away of such an interest. There were times when most university programs included courses in
accounting theory yet by the end of the century, in many countries, such courses were becoming a rarity. Evidence for this is
in the growth of accounting theory textbooks in the first few decades of the second half of the century but by the end of the
century there were far fewer. This history is well documented and probably well known to most. The first book (in English)
to have the title of accounting theory was by Paton (1922) and from that time there were several other scholars who
produced monographs directed to a theoretical understanding of accounting. In the United States 1 the Stock Market Crash of
1929 led to pressure on the accounting profession to take more responsibility for the principles on which accounting
reporting information was based and that resulted in an upsurge in how such principles could be derived. Professional and
academic bodies set up committees to seek the underlying theoretical framework on which such principles could be
established. This search took various forms but dominated accounting thought for most of the rest on the century, as is well
known2. The point to note, however, is that it was believed that there was a theoretical basis for subsequent regulation:
accounting theory preceded accounting regulation.
1 In the Anglophone world (and probably beyond) most developments in accounting thought took place in the USA with
similar discussions and debates in other nations taking place later.
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Gaffikan Regulation as Accounting Theory

Accounting research in the first decades of the second half of the twentieth century took two general forms. One, the
more “academic”, was the genuine search for a theory of accounting. Some scholars believed if such a general theory could
be established it would obviate the need for regulation. The second form comprised that promoted by professional bodies
and was a continuation of the search for a conceptual basis on which to establish accounting regulation (see Zeff, 1999).
Starting in the early 1970s there was a shift in interest by many of those involved with the first form of accounting
research. The research focus was narrowed to only those aspects that could be observed in financial securities markets. As it
grew, the focus was narrowed even further and the concerns researchers addressed were methodological rather than
substantive issues – trivial problems of practice were being addressed by increasingly sophisticated mathematical and
statistical analytical techniques in the researchers’ misguided belief that they were engaging in truly scientific research.
Significantly, this was associated with a commitment to a particular ideology - a belief in the omnipotence of markets in
resolving economic (and many other) questions. Such commitment eschewed the need for any state intervention regulation.
The (Economic) Market Ideology
The nineteenth century is generally regarded as that in which there was the first full flowering of modern capitalism.
There was a strongly held belief that governments had no need to intervene in the day to day operation of economic affairs it was an era of laissez-faire - the market would operate to efficiently allocate scarce resources. The public interest would be
served by the unfettered workings of the market. At the turn of the twentieth century such a position was held to be
consistent with the (mis)interpretations of the influential social Darwinists (cf. Hofstadter, 1955). To them Darwin's view of
the world provided the ultimate rationalisation of the world as it was and should be (eg. racially pure). This was especially
how British “sociologist”, Herbert Spencer, who had coined the phrase “survival of the fittest”, one time staff member of the
Economist, justified his fanatical support of laissez-faire-ism (cf Hofstadter, 1955).
The belief in the need for unregulated markets for the survival of capitalism was reinforced a few decades later by two

thinkers who emerged after World War II from the ultra-conservative Austrian society and settled in the US. The first was
one-time aristocrat Joseph Schumpeter, an opponent of Keynesian interventionism that had dominated economic thinking
after the Great Depression on both sides of the Atlantic. Although not completely opposed to economic planning he believed
free markets were necessary to enable a class-oriented capitalism to be able to operate effectively. The second thinker was
Frederich von Hayek who, unlike Schumpeter, was completely opposed to any form of economic planning. Perhaps
understandably, (given the situation from where they had come) both Schumpeter and Hayek argued in favour of “freedom”.
To Hayek this freedom was inextricably linked to the market. At the risk of oversimplifying, both were very conservative
thinkers. That is, central to both was some concept of historical social order linked to class systems which had to be
preserved in order for capitalism to survive: class was a constant. To argue for freedom necessitates some notion of justice
2 For example, Zeff has researched, published and lectured extensively on the development of accounting standards (and continues to)
and is probably the leading authority on the subject; see, for example, his paper “Some Junctures in the Evolution in the Establishing
Accounting Principles in the USA: 1917-1972” (1984) which is just one of many of his papers on this theme.
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Reclaiming Accounting’s Lost Identity
which has implications for the public interest. It would seem that their conservatism would determine their notion of just
what the public interest was/is. Hayek closely linked (social) freedom to economic freedom hence he opposed any form of
economic planning which, of course, implies regulation.
Hayek worked at the University of Chicago and although never a part of the Department of Economics he greatly
influenced one of its most famous members - Milton Friedman. One of Friedman's main contentions was that the term

liberalism had been corrupted during the twentieth century. Its original (nineteenth century) meaning referred to economic
liberalism, a belief in free trade and free markets (cf, Friedman, 1962). Therefore, Friedman, yet another conservative, set
about restoring what he saw as its original meaning. He also argued that true freedom could only exist with a return to a true
market economy and real freedom could only exist so long as people were economically free (1962, 156; but compare this
with what Klein, 2008, argues). Although not an advocate of absolute economic freedom, Friedman believed in minimal
state intervention in the economy and his ideas became strongly associated with what is popularly referred to as
neoliberalism1 and economic neoclassical price theory. His ideas helped shape the political policies (unregulated market
reform) of Thatcher in the UK (e.g. the transfer of public enterprises to friendly private business interests) and Reagan in the
United States (e.g. reduced taxes for the rich). Both political leaders found the ideas of Hayek and Friedman extremely
persuasive and the policies they pursued closely followed their philosophical predilections (see Klein, 2008). As Funnell has
noted, to them:
Freeing individuals from the cloying interference and paternalism of government, contend Friedman and Hayek,
is the only means to gain access to all the possible benefits which naturally flow from individual free will (2001,
13).
Friedman's ideas also greatly influenced those associated with the accounting department of the University of Chicago.
They, in turn, have greatly shaped the direction of accounting research, initially in the United States but later their approach
flowed to most Western and Eastern countries. A fundamental tenet of their work is an attachment to the efficient market
hypothesis (EMH). Thus, they retain an unflinching confidence in the market's ability to resolve all issues - the "market"
(the idea) generally but specifically the stock market. Therefore, following their Chicago gurus, they initially believed the
need for intervention (regulation) was largely unnecessary. Their work, most often referred to as positive research, over time

has had to broaden its base assumptions to try and explain constant, often spectacular corporate failures and scandals as well
as general economic failures. Unethical and fraudulent corporate governance and consequent government intervention has
greatly diminished the credibility of some of their fundamental behavioural assumptions most notably that the market did
not adjust to eradicate (correct) such aberrations. Consequently, some researchers have incorporated regulation in their areas
of study and have attempted to produce a positive theory of regulation. Such work contains all the defects of attempts to
develop positivist theorising most especially its reductionism. The language, for example includes expressions such as
earning quality and truthfulness (see, for example, Wagenhofer, 2011), value laden normative statements which positive
theories were to totally eschew. Another interesting development has been the efforts by positive theorists to be included on
1 The meaning and history of the term is discussed by Harvey (2007); another excellent discussion is by Funnell et al (2009).
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Gaffikan Regulation as Accounting Theory
regulatory bodies; no doubt, ironically, to attempt to influence regulatory outcomes. One could be excused for seeing these
(and other) developments as logically inconsistent with fundamental assumptions of positive theorising! Perhaps such a
conclusion is rather naïve given that there has been a lengthy but recent positive tradition of research into accounting
(standard setting) research (see Bertomeu and Magee, 2011).
Conventional Reasoning for Regulation
Accounting and accountants are now subject to a wide range of forms of regulation. There are laws governing the
operation of corporations many of which involve the disclosure of financial information. In addition, there are taxation laws
and laws affecting the creation and operation of professional associations, which, in turn impose regulations on their

members. Regulations, therefore, are very much part of modern everyday life despite the disagreement on the extent to
which regulation should intervene in the “free” exchange of goods and ideas.
As stated at the start of the paper, any debate on the extent to which governments should be involved in the day to day
operation of society is extremely complex and has been debated throughout history. Underlying regulation are theories of
the state, politics and ideology. If it is designed for the public interest, how is the public interest determined? For example,
we talk of liberal democracies as an ideal form of society. However, as argued by Friedman, liberalism is a doctrine or
ideology which emphasises the maximisation of individual liberties against the encroachment of the state. This invokes
questions of the determination of just what individual freedoms mean and has implications of power – who dec ides what
freedoms are possible?1
Baldwin and Cave (1999) argue that there are a number of reasons for regulation. One of the best known forms of
regulation was exercised by US government over the potential growth of monopolies at the turn of the twentieth century –
the anti-trust legislation (for example the Sherman and the Clayton Acts). Where monopolies exist it is considered that there
has been a market failure because competition does not exist. Therefore, it can be inferred from this that regulation is
associated with preserving competition. Thus, it is associated with the ideology of the efficacy of markets and competition,
hallmarks of capitalism. Sometimes “natural monopolies” arise where there are economies of scale that ensure the market is
served at the least cost (for example, many utilities such as water, gas or electricity suppliers) in which case regulation is
designed to maintain fair trading.
Regulation is considered desirable where there are “windfall profits” – where, through some fortuitous event, a firm is
able to make above “normal” profits. For example, suppliers of equipment to aid search and recovery where there has been
a natural disaster (which seems to be happening more regularly these days!). Because of the urgent need – the immediate

demand – suppliers may attempt to charge higher than normal prices and thus generate above normal profits. Similarly, in
the past, many costs that are related to certain productive activities were excluded such that the “true” cost was not
1 Power is a well debated notion. Some excellent examples (besides Foucault) of works examining power are those by Clegg, (1989),
Hindess (1996) and Laclau (1993) but there are many more. In her book, Klein (2008) has shown the rather tragic examples of where
Friedmanite ideology was pursued to extremes such as in Pinochet's Chile and later and more extremely in Argentina where extreme
military power was employed to enforce the “freedom” of markets!
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Reclaiming Accounting’s Lost Identity
recognised. These costs were defined as externalities because they were not included. Of particular relevance in recent times
are the costs of avoiding pollution, for example, discharge into the river system the cost for which had to be borne by
societies at large. In any discussion of environmental or social responsibility externalities are of considerable importance.
A significant problem that was central to much of the neo-empirical and positive accounting research is the need for
regulation arising from information inadequacies leading to information asymmetries. It has been often claimed that a major
objective of accounting is to provide information to interested parties who may not have access to complete (or the
necessary) information to make economic decisions – they are at an information disadvantage so there is information
asymmetry. Such research has been directed to determining the possible need for regulation in the form of accounting
standards to address the problem.
Regulation is sometimes necessary to ensure that “profit skimming” does not occur. This is when a supplier will only
supply the customers where it leads to the greatest profit returns and ignore supply to others. Similarly, where there is seen

to be anti-competitive and predatory pricing regulation is used as a preventative measure and outlaws such activities.
Microsoft was accused of this type of behaviour (source codes for the windows platform and more recently of colluding
with others to control market share) in the USA and the government brought law suits to overcome it.
From the perspective of consumers there are instances of what is colloquially known as the “free rider effect”. This is
the situation in which some consumers benefit from a service without paying for it at the expense of other consumer who do
pay for the service. A physical example is where a business opens next to a large public car park and therefore avoids the
cost of providing car parking to potential customers. This may sometimes serve as a disincentive for the producers of the
service so governments will intervene and levy a tax on the service. However, the term is often used in the context of
securities markets in respect of the amount of disclosure of financial information a firm must make. If regulations insist on a
high level of disclosure, it is argued, some parties will benefit from the disclosure without having to bear the cost of
providing the information. A similar situation is referred to as moral hazard where consumers not paying for a service or
product over-consume without regard to the costs being borne by others. This is a problem in the insurance industry where it
is often claimed that some people make excessive claims against their policies whilst others make few or no claims.
Insurance is based on the idea of pooling the costs of bearing risk such that all participants benefit so when some make
excessive claims they may be benefiting more than others1.
Regulation is also necessary in the rationalisation and coordination of economic activity so as to organise behaviour or
industries in an efficient manner. An example is the marketing of many primary products through a central marketing
agency, such as (in Australia and other primary producer countries) the wool board or the marketing of fish or meat. There is
similar reasoning where some central planning is necessary. Once again this is important when considering environmental
impacts of activities where some people are required to bear more costs than others. In order to have an equitable outcome ,

regulation can be designed to balance the costs borne by different sectors. For example, preserving forests may lead to
timber sectors bearing a cost of a loss of jobs or firm closures so regulation is needed to ensure a fair and equitable outcome
in that such costs are borne by the broader society (which benefits from the preservation of the forests).
1 But there is always the possibility that they are suffering more than others!
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Gaffikan Regulation as Accounting Theory
In some countries there are or have been shortages of some goods and services so that rationing (limits to the amount of
goods or service permitted to be purchase by each consumer) has been necessary, for example, in a wartime economy. In
these situations it has been believed that regulations rather than market forces enable a more just distribution. For example,
a shortage of petrol could disadvantage those furthest from its supply (say rural consumers). A purely market driven reaction
by suppliers would be to minimise transport costs and sell to those nearer the production in the confidence that all of the
product will be sold anyway (very similar to profit skimming). Regulation can be used to ensure that there is a fairer
distribution of petrol.
The above are some reasons for the necessity of regulation. In reality there may be a combination of many of the above
reasons that leads to regulation. As indicated, regulation can be negative in that it prevents or restricts some behaviour or it
may be positive in that it serves to encourage or facilitate activity.
Theories of regulation
The most often reason given for the need of regulation is expressed in terms of market failure 1. Consequently a main
advantage claimed for regulation has been the protection of the public interest against such market failure. Markets are
claimed to have “failed” when they are not economically efficient. The notion of efficiency was formalised by an Italian
economist and sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto, after which the concept is named. Pareto efficiency (sometime wrongly referred
to as Pareto optimality) is used by economists to define the efficient organisation of the economy. Pareto efficiency refers to
the allocation of resources such that someone can be made better off while no one else is made worse off. Hence there has
been an efficient means of production and distribution of resources. When this does not happen, there has been market
failure. Economist, Kenneth Arrow says that:
Market failure occurs frequently when the pursuit of private interests deflects the efficient use of society's
resources and the equitable distribution of the goods that result (quoted in Funnell et al, 2009, 44).
Not all agree. Friedman argued that the Great Crash of 1929 was not a failure of the [stock market] but the result of
incompetent Government intervention (1962, 156).
A common, but philosophically flawed (see Gaffikin, 2008), distinction is very frequently made by many people
between positive accounting theory (PAT) and what they call normative accounting theory. In discussing market failure and
regulation, a similar distinction is made by some. That is, there are analyses of regulation that are derived from positive
economics and some from normative assumptions. These are described as theories of regulation. All can be viewed as some
type of interest theory – primarily public or private but with “in-between” types.
Public Interest Theories
1 For example, see Uche (2001).
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Reclaiming Accounting’s Lost Identity
Advocates of the public interest theories of regulation see its purpose as achieving certain publicly desired results which,
if left to the market, would not be obtained; hence the public interest. The regulation is provided in response to the demand
from the public for corrections to inefficient and inequitable markets. Thus, regulation is pursued for public, as opposed to
private, interest related objectives. This was the dominant view of regulation until the 1960s and still retains many
adherents. As indicated above, determining what is the public interest is complex. It is a normative question and advocates
of positive theorising would, therefore, object to this approach on the basis that they believe it is not possible to determine
an objective aim for regulation; there is no basis for objectively identifying the public interest. Bertomeu and Magee
distinguish between regulators and accounting standard setters, the former being institutions, and argue that the regulator
responds to “pressures” and responds in accordance with what they determine to be a majority of “interested parties”, viz
investors: “the regulation will always evolve to the investor-preferred regulation if the preferences of the standard-setter
coincide with those of diversified investors” (2011, 4).
Ironically, there are other charges laid at the feet of the public interest approach. These include attention being directed
to the regulators themselves. Is it possible for them to act in a disinterested manner? Are they sufficiently competent? As
might be expected, such critics suggest there may be questions of the reward structure for regulators (being insufficient),
their career structure and training may be inadequate. In addition it is often argued that the public interest approach
underestimates the effects of economic and political power influences on regulation. It is not surprising that these charges
emerge from neoliberal advocates.
Interest Group Theories
An extension of the public interest theory is the interest group theory approach. Thus, regulation is viewed as the
products of relationships among different groups and between such groups and the state. Advocates differ from the above
described public interest theorists in that they believe regulation is more competition for power rather than solely for the
public interest. Baldwin and Cave (1999, 21) suggest a range of interest group theories from open minded pluralism to
corporatism. The former see competing groups struggling for political power with the winners using their power to shape
the form of regulation. On the other hand, corporatists emphasise the extent to which successful groups enter into
partnership with the state to produce “regulatory regimes that exclude non-participating interests” (21).
The Economic Theory of Regulation
The public interest theory of regulation is regarded as responding to a weakly defined demand for regulation. The
positive or economic theory of regulation was introduced by Stigler in articles in 1964 and 1971. It was later extended by
one of his students, Peltzman (1979), and has greatly influenced (neoliberal) thinking on regulation theories. With many
slight variations in interpretation, this type of theory goes under a variety of names with the seemingly preferred one being
capture theory or ‘‘regulatory capture’’, to the extent that an interest group may affect the actions of the regulator.
Emerging from Chicago, it is seen as a positive (economic) theory in which Stigler attempted to provide a theoretical
foundation for an earlier notion of political theory that regulatory agencies are captured by producers. As a positive theory it
assumes that regulators (political actors) are utility maximisers. Although the utility is not specified, it would seem to mean
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Gaffikan Regulation as Accounting Theory
securing and maintaining political power (Majone, 1996, 31). In order to do this, they need votes and money, resources able
to be provided by groups positively affected by regulatory decisions. Thus, the regulators have been “captured” by such
(special) interest groups who “seek to expropriate wealth or income. Income may take various forms, including a direct
subsidy of money, restrictions on the entry to an industry of new rivals, suppression of substitute and competitive products,
encouragement of complementary products, and price fixing” (Stigler, 1971, 3-7).
This approach to regulation is consistent with public choice theory which stresses the extent to which governmental
behaviour is understood by envisioning all actors as rational individual maximisers of their own welfare. Analysis is
directed to the competing preferences of the individuals involved – how they get around regulatory goals in order to further
their own goals. Consequently private interests (of the majority of economic agents involved; cf. Wagenhofer, 2011, 233)
are served rather than the public interest. Public choice theory reconciles political and economic questions. It relies on the
neo-classical economic assumption of rational choice (self interest) to predict the behaviour of politicians (the regulators) –
politicians only enact those policies that ensure their re-election which, as described above, will direct them to those with
the resources to further this aim.
The economic theory approach to regulation has encountered many problems for which it has been unable to provide
solutions. For example, when a theory meets problems for which it has no response, theorists add “extensions” or ad hoc
hypotheses in an attempt to save the underlying theory. Stigler’s theory did not explain the phenomenon of crosssubsidisation – where the economic benefits of regulation extend from the intended group to other groups of producers and
consumers. His student, Pelztman attempted to extend the original analysis but he also failed to provide convincing
conclusions to critics. However, another Chicago colleague, Gary Becker, reached a more acceptable explanation but he did
so by combining elements of the economic theory and the public interest theory! 1 Another major problem of economic
theories is that they are unable to explain regulation – that is, there is no converse of their explanation for regulation.
Majone (1996) concludes that “positive and normative theories of regulation should be viewed as complementary rather
that mutually exclusive” (1996, p 34). However, neither include an explanation for the institutional framework of regulation.
2
Institutions were regarded as “black boxes” from which regulation emerged.
Institutional Theories
A group of regulation theorists who reject the rational actor model have argued that the institutional structure and
arrangements as well as the social processes shape regulation and therefore need to be understood. There is much more than
individuals’ preferences that drive regulation and that is the organisational and social setting from which the regulation
emerges..
1 See Majone (1996, 32-34) for a fuller explanation. Baldwin and Cave (1999, 24-25) describe other instances such as the work of
Bernstein’s “life-cycle” theory which, interestingly, also encompasses both economic and public interest theories.
2 Perhaps this is why Bertomeu and Magee suggest that "developing a more complete theory of regulated disclosure requires us to
examine the regulatory institutions and the constraints present in the environment in which they operate" (2011, 1).
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Reclaiming Accounting’s Lost Identity
Regulation is thus seen as shaped not so much by notions of the public interest or competitive bargaining
between different private interests but by institutional arrangements and rule (legal and other). (Baldwin & Cave,
1996, 27)
Institutional theorists (often called new institutionalists) come from a wide variety of disciplines with a wide range of
political and social predilections but all share a disbelief in atomistic accounts of regulation, that is, those explanations that
focus on the individual. One form of institutional theory in the socio-legal literature draws on agency theory. The principals
are the elected officials who then have to ensure that their “agents”, the bureaucrats, design regulations that preserve the
thrust of the original policy position. That is, that there is no bureaucratic drift. As with the agency theory in PAT (positive
accounting theory), there is an information asymmetry in favour of the agents so the elected officials need to first design
procedures that reduce the informational disadvantages faced by the politicians and, second, (so they can) ensure there are
sufficient “dependable” administrators involved in the design of the regulation (cf. Baldwin and Cave, 1996, 28, who
describe the work on this undertaken by McCubbins, Noll and Weingast; or see Majone, 1999, 35-37, for a discussion of
other agency approaches to institutional theories of regulation and some of the difficulties involved).
Institutional theorists in political science have concentrated on the way that “political structures, institutions, and
decision-making processes shape political outcomes” (Baldwin and Cave, 29). Institutional organisational theorists have
focussed on organisational structures and processes. Yet other institutional theorists question the assumption of conflict
between public authorities and private interests (such as the agency theorists believe) and concentrate on the interrelation
between public and private interests and the ever-changing character of these relationships.
The Political-Economic Theories
Most, but not all, of the above theoretical approaches have had a tacit assumption of a capitalist system based,
sometimes loosely, on a neo-classical economics. There are some “radical” theories which reject the neo-classical
assumption and some of these are discussed by Tinker (1984). Capitalism is a social system in which there is interplay
between the political and economic realms. In neo-classical theory it is assumed that the political realm is shaped by
economic interests. Employing the work of Lindblom, Tinker argues that there are many social inequalities among social
classes which arise from the degree of access to and use of property and reliance on the market place. Regulation is
necessary to move towards balancing some of the inequalities and, in effect, ensure the survival of capitalism. Such
regulation serves “to protect the general or collective interests of capital and the requirements of the capital accumulation
process” (Tinker, 66). Tinker contends that the neo-classical economic framework is inadequate to characterise the need for
regulation. Such economics is reductionist in that its advocates hold it is universalistic – it applies in all places at al times.
However, Tinker, claims, there are many other social factors that need to be included in any analysis of regulation.
The analysis of regulation by Puxty et al. (1987) can also be labelled as taking a political-economic approach although it
is different from Tinkers. Their approach is more specifically directed to the how and why of accounting regulation and they
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Gaffikan Regulation as Accounting Theory
discuss this in respect of four countries, viz, the then Federal Republic of Germany, the UK, Sweden, and the USA, all of
which are described as advanced capitalist countries. Despite the similarities in the countries discussed, they note that
regulation will be shaped “according to the contrasting histories, cultures and paths of development of different nation
states” (275). Thus, their analysis also rejects the reductionism of the neo-classical economic approaches. They build their
argument from the work of Streeck and Schmitter who see that regulation emerges from the interplay of the three principles
of social order – market, state and community. The original authors’ analysis sees regulation as part of a “composite order in
which (there is) a delicate balance between three formally incompatible, yet substantially interdependent, guiding principles
of coordination and allocation” (Puxty et al, 277). Therefore, what is important to note is that regulation is viewed as going
much beyond the purely economic (as in the neo-classical approaches) and will reflect broader cultural and societal values.
Moran concurs, and suggests that:
... making sense of that grand phrase ‘the political economy of regulation’ – involves close attention to
territorial patterns of regulation, since states inhabit a world of territory. Making sense of the political
economy of regulation involves making sense of national patterns of regulation. (2010, 223)
It is important to understand the different approaches to regulation. Traditionally, discussions of regulation in accounting
texts have merely mentioned the private and public interests theories in the context of accounting standards. However,
regulation extends well beyond standard setting and has implications for how professions are organised, how they operate
and what broader social expectations there of them. For example, the nature of the regulatory framework will affect
perceptions of social responsibilities and ethical behaviour but the implications of regulation extend beyond those discussed
above. As alluded to at the start, there are implications of power and dominant ideologies that shape that power and
consequent economic activity within a society; what represents the public interest? For example, what are the societal
expectations of the governance of the major institutions of economic activity – corporations? Why are there spectacular
corporate failures? How is it that corporations can shape the economic activity within a state?
In the Public Interest?
The right choice of regulatory strategies by regulators will avoid debates over the need for the regulation if the relevant
objectives could be achieved in ways other than the particular regulation. Thus, there are a number of basic strategies that
regulators may employ and Baldwin and Cave (1996) describe several. These include authoritarian (command and control),
self-regulation, and incentive based regulation; these are just a few.
It is often claimed that regulation is used to direct society’s action in a way considered the best for that society. Just how
this “best” is determined will involve many deep questions of power and ideology. As alluded to earlier, champions of
market power and minimal regulation, Schumpeter and Hayek, had lived in "unusual times" - overly regulated fascist states
and the immenent threat of Stalinism. It would be simplistic to argue that this determined their belief systems but it would
probably have been one of many contributing factors. Societies are affected by joint experiences and expectations but
individuals are shaped by their ontological predilections - their individual world view. Most neoliberals ontologically
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Reclaiming Accounting’s Lost Identity
privilege the individual over any notion of society1. Thus, individual freedom takes precedence over any societal benefit and
this is a view strongly held by Friedman. Intuitively, any positive (theory) notion of public interest would seem to be ex-post
rationalisation and paradoxical.
On a more pragmatic level, “To decide whether a system of regulation is good, acceptable, or in need of reform it is
necessary to be clear about the benchmarks that are relevant to such an evaluation” (Baldwin and Cave, 1996, 76). A typical
economists’ reaction would be to associate good regulation with efficiency and wealth maximisation. This does not give any
indication of ethical efficacy nor the appropriateness of the distribution of that wealth. 2 It will be couched in terms of a time
frame such that what may produce maximum wealth in the short term may cause significant environmental damage costs
that have to be borne by those in the long term. Such analyses may rely on artificial and abstract concepts such as utility,
happiness, or justice. The term hegemony refers to power exercised by one social group over another. It is the capacity of a
dominant group to exercise control through the willing acquiescence of others in society to accept subordinate status by
their acceptance of cultural, social and political practices and institutions that are unequal and unjust (cf. Johnston et al,
2000, 332-334). The word was originally used in a more radical sociological critique but now is used to refer to dominant
political and economic interests. Therefore, if wealth distribution is on the basis of wealth maximisation there is a given
distribution pattern which reflects the past and thus reinforces the interests of an economic hegemony. This is part of
capitalism. Even though “All over the world there is a concern that governments are captured by organised business
interests” (Mitchell et al, 2001, 3), capitalism emphasises the hegemony of business interests, and accountants have long
tacitly complied with and reinforced this state of affairs. Some even claim that accountancy associations have “a long
history of opposing reforms, which have sought to make corporations accountable” (Puxty, Sikka and Willmott, 1994,
quoted in Mitchell et al, 2001, 10). This antisocial conduct, Mitchell et al. continue, is “highly visible in relation to auditor
obligations for detecting/reporting fraud”. The authors continue to show how accountants, even those in the largest
multinational accounting firms, have designed tax schemes to enable their business clients avoid paying taxes 3 and also been
complicit in schemes of money laundering.
The “justification” of an even more cynical approach of business to regulation emanates from the University of Chicago
law and economics movement. This is that regulation will only be obeyed when the costs of disobedience exceed the
benefits. Thus, compliance becomes a business decision not a societal decision: it is an application of strict cost-benefit
1 Margaret Thatcher claimed that "there is no such thing as society", Interview 23 September 1987, as quoted by Douglas
Keay, in Woman's Own, 31 October 1987, 8–10.
2 There are several institutions that generate measures for equality of wealth (and income) distributions in different
countries. The most common measure is referred to as the Gini index (or coefficient). The measures seem to vary between
publishing institutions (eg World Bank, CIA, OECD, etc) but one fact that is consistent is that wealth distributions in most
countries are becoming increasingly inequitable with increasing portions of wealth going to fewer people. In some countries
this is chronic (e.g. Chile, Mexico) but the trend is disturbing in most developed and (of course) third world and developing
economies (with little effective regulation).
3 See also, Mitchell, A, P Sikka, J Christenen, P Morris and S Filling (2002).
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Gaffikan Regulation as Accounting Theory
analysis irrespective of the societal implications. There are many instances reported in the daily media of business interests
ignoring environmental, health and safety, employment, and other regulations knowing their non-compliance will attract a
fine which they seem content to bear. The fine simply becomes a cost of production which can later be transferred to the
consumer! It is this type of thinking that led to such spectacular corporate collapses as Enron, World Com, Parmalaat, HIH
and many others (see Clarke, Dean and Oliver, 2003).1
It is for these and other reasons that many commentators argue that regulation cannot be assessed on purely economic
grounds. Tinker argues that the current economic hegemony - neo-classical economics – cannot fully resolve issues relating
to regulation.
. .the inability of the economic-finance literature to say anything definitive about the appropriate form of
accounting regulation highlights the need to augment neo-classical economic analysis with sociopolitical
considerations (1984, 55)
That is, there are much wider social implications of regulation which neo-classical economics simply ignores (cannot
answer according to its theoretical percepts).
Similarly, Puxty et al. have turned to broader theories of the state in order to assess the accounting regulation in their
four country case study because
The institutions and process of accounting regulation in different nation-states cannot be understood
independently of the historical and political-economic contexts of their emergence and development (1987, 275)
Not all agreed with the position of Schumpeter and Hayek and writing at the same time (as their early books) Karl
Mannheim took the opposite position
All of us know by now that from this war there is no way back to a laissez-faire order of society, that war as such
is the maker of a silent revolution by preparing the road to a new type of planned order. (1943, 38)
Later, many others, including economist J. K. Galbraith (e.g. 1967) and social commentator Daniel Bell (e.g. 1976) (but
there were many others), expressed alternative views on the free market question. A common, major part of the arguments
of Galbraith and Bell was that traditional capitalism had changed, a point that neo-classical economists seemed loathe to
acknowledge but others agreed:
. . . the market economy becomes an utterly inadequate instrument for utilising the available resources. The
medium-sized private enterprises and free trade, the basis for the gigantic development of men’s (sic) productive
forces in the 19th Century, are being gradually destroyed by the offspring of liberalism, private monopolies and
government interference. Concentration of economic activity in giant enterprises, with its consequences of rigid
prices, self-financing, and ever growing concentration, government control of the credit system and foreign trade,

1 Certainly not all business acts this way – consider this statement on page 4 in the 2004 HSBC Corporate Social Responsibility Report:
While our strategy involves growing revenues by meeting customer needs, our goal is not, and never has been, profit at any cost. We know
that tomorrow’s success depends on the trust we build today.
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Reclaiming Accounting’s Lost Identity
quasi-monopoly positions of trade unions with the ensuing rigidity of the labor market, large scale unemployment of
labor and capital, and enormous government expenses to care for the unemployed, are as many symptoms for the
decline of the market system.” (Pollock, 1989, 97)
Pollock was writing in the late 1980s, obviously well before the recent global financial crisis (GFC) which further
illustrated the failure of market capitalism. He was not opposed to capitalism or the market system. Nor was the economist
Amartya Sen who was opposed to “Today’s prejudices” (in favour of the pure market mechanism) which, he argued,
“certainly need to be carefully investigated” and “partly rejected”. He argued that the “present economic crisis (that is, the
GFC) is partly generated by a huge overestimation of the wisdom of market processes” (2009, 4). Both commentators were
arguing for a more critical engagement with the current economic thinking.
Accounting thought was long ago seduced by the discipline of economics - definitely since the time of Canning (late
1920s and 1930s) but probably long before. It has often been regarded as a sub-discipline of economics, its applied arm,
where the actual numbers are allocated. Consequently, economic theories have dominated accounting research and theory 1
and no more so than in positive accounting (PAT). Hence, neoliberal or neo-classical economic ideologies have been freely
adopted by accounting commentators and any notion of accounting serving as a report on stewardship or general
accountability has been rejected in place of an emphasis of supplying information for economic (accounting) decision
making. In a sense, accounting as an independent discipline has ceased to exist. Mainstream economic thinking on market
capitalism and regulation, therefore, have uncritically dominated mainstream accounting thought.
Nevertheless, there have been debates on accounting and the public interest. For ex