Social capital The problems:

8 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 A new way ahead

The aim of this research was to analyse whether livelihood improvement initiatives address the needs and constraints of poor fisher households in selected coastal communities in West Sumatra. In general, initiatives have failed to improve livelihoods and reduce poverty and this has been evidenced by increasing numbers of poor fishing households from statistics, failing fishermen’s groups and the creation of a new program GPEMP to remedy this situation. The central message of this thesis is that livelihood interventions have failed because they have focused on physical capital and have not addressed the multi-dimensional components of the contemporary poverty paradigm Béné, 2003. This chapter presents a way ahead that tackles these shortcomings and provides specific recommendations to improve future implementation. This section has been split according to the six capital components that have been the core methodological framework of this research. For each capital component, a concise summary is given of the problem and referenced to where this was identified in the research. Specific solutions are given as to how to overcome this problem to ensure future implementation is more effective. A summary of the conclusions is also provided Table 8.1

8.1.1 Social capital The problems:

Dysfunctional fisher groups this problem discussed in section 7.3.2 - Air Manis as an example, Table 5.5 ‘community cohesion and trust’. Based on the principle that fishers as individual actors are strengthened by working together, current government policy is to only provide aid to fishers when they are formed into groups. However this research demonstrates most groups fail to be sustainable and do not build social capital. Moreover these groups have been established for small boat owners only and do not help labourers. Nepotism and the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ section 4.3.3 and 5.3.1, Table 5.5 ‘leadership’, section 6.3.2 financial field, section 6.3.6 social field. Many of the poorest fishers in the highly fishing dependent sub-districts e.g. Sei Beremas are migrant workers. They come seeking a brighter future and immediately are disadvantaged compared to locals because they incur expenses such as renting a house. Commonly deemed as outsiders, they do not have the social security networks and trust-based relationships that locals have. Even in places where there are few ‘outsiders’, there tends to be a division between those who are related to leadership and those who are not with the relations being allocated aid more quickly than the others. The solutions: Are groups always the way forward? Fishers working together in Kerala, India Kurien, 1993 is a powerful example of what can be achieved by collaboration. Yet every context is different, and by having a policy in place of only giving aid to groups, many fishers who are not part of groups are being overlooked. Without the institutional support and finances available to ensure that every single fisher can be part of a fisher group, a whole section of poor fishers are being marginalized by not being part of a group. The recent G-PEMP program understands this shortcoming and has attempted to address it by giving to the poorest individuals regardless of whether they are in a group or not. However this does not go far enough either because having received the initial injection of aid, fishers still lack social capital to build on this. What is needed is a longer term commitment to put the institutional support in place to either help people individually or as part of a group, and not only to drop some aid and move on. Clear, agreed upon data and independent evaluation . On the one hand, aid given on a ’case-by-case’ basis has the potential to help the most needy but on the other it provides flexibility that can be unfairly misused. Repeatedly in this research, genuinely poor households who were registered as very poor in the data were not receiving assistance when others who were less poor were getting support. To combat this, all government agencie s need to ‘sign-off’ the poverty data. It is inefficient for agencies to be using different sources of data, or not using any data at all. Every family who receives assistance must be registered as poor and that registration needs to happen through cooperation between a local leader and an independent outsider. There needs to be a transparent trail so that an independent evaluator can enter a village and meet with those who received aid and ensure that they should have got it, they received it in full and to see whether the aid is being used appropriately. There is currently too much ambiguity in the system, too much scope for misappropriation of funds and not enough accountability. Extension officers andor change agents. In two of the successful examples of groups in West Sumatra section 5.3.2, institutional support and an external change agent were key components of success. These external change agents need to be actively mobilised as they have a high human resource capacity and a commitment to help the poor. However, such people may not be available in every context. In contrast, employed extension officers must be available in every fishing community see section 8.1.6 below for a further discussion of this. Evidence based assistance coupled with education about the long term benefits of groups. On too many occasions groups are formed to get aid and then when the aid is given, it is shared out and the group disbands. Groups must demonstrate that they are committed to the long term and they should be evaluated before they receive aid. Some of the tests to prove that a group is worthy to receive aid could include; meeting together monthly, a weekly savings scheme and recording of catch landings over a period of six months. If they can demonstrate a well functioning group over six months they should receive an initial small loan with the promise of more assistance if that loan is repaid. By giving incrementally, the donor maintains some control over the funds and leaves the onus on the group to continue to operate well. Finally, there needs to be better dissemination of the success of groups and the eff ect it is having on fishers’ livelihoods so that fishers really believe in the power of the group and have a desire to make it succeed. Capital Problem Proposed solutions Social Dysfunctional fisher groups Corruption, nepotism and inequality Ongoing support for groupsindividuals by institutions through extension officers or other change agents. Well functioning groups are rewarded with government assistance. Clear, agreed upon data that prioritises who should receive help and independent evaluation of how the money was spent. Natural Declining resources Lack of monitoring and evaluation Inadequate conservation measures Use fisher groups to collect fisheries data. Disseminate monitoring results and explain the implications if stocks are declining. Involve fishers in co-management conservation measures i.e MPAs. Human Low skills, few alternatives and lack of vision Character and behaviour Positive examples to demonstrate a way ahead. Extension officers and change agents with a long term commitment. Making the most of the window of opportunity when fisher families have lower expenditure. Education, both formal and informal. Pro-poor pilot projects that people can see work well. Financial Poor access to credit coupled with fluctuating income Lack of direction about how to invest money wisely Creative solutions formed by the community. Funds targeted at non-fishing livelihood development. Physical Physical capital built without strengthening other capital Physical capital needs to be appropriate for labourers Physical capital is given without consideration of other capital constraints. Clearer definition of what is success and monitoringevaluation of programs to establish if program is successful. Targeting labourers with the right kind of capital, especially to develop alternative livelihoods. Institutional Culture of distrust between institutions Many poor fishers are institutionally isolated Institutions lack human resource problem solving capacity and a commitment to the long term Under-resourced extension officers Better acceptance of poverty statistics between agencies. Extension officers recognised as the frontline in poverty alleviation. Long-term institutional commitment, even if that means prioritising poorer areas over others and not sharing government aid evenly. Table 8.1: Summary of problems and proposed solutions in livelihood improvement programs.

8.1.2 Natural capital The problems: