defendant’s sister brought two women to the house to train the victims on how to have sexual relations and they demonstrated various positions.
On 21 November 2006, on the ifth day of being exploited at the bar, the bar was raided by Malaysian immigration oficials. The victims and the defendant were arrested and taken
irst to a detention cell and then to a detention facility where they were kept for one month and seventeen days. Eventually the victims and the defendant were deported back to the
Philippines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, they were immediately interviewed and the defendant was arrested on the same day.
The kinds of evidence submitted in this case by the prosecution included: 1. Testimonial evidence
a Victim testimony: Testimony was heard from the two victims. b
Law enforcement testimony: Testimony was heard from two law enforcement oficers who testiied about the arrest of the defendant, identiied the defendant
in court, and helped lay the foundation for certain pieces of documentary evidence.
2. Documentary evidence a Fraudulent documents used to create fake passports for the victims, such as a
voter’s afidavit, clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation, an authen- ticated copy of a Certiicate of Live Birth, Baptismal Certiicate and school
identiication card.
b The fake Philippine passport obtained by Victim M on the basis of these
documents. c
The boat ticket for the trip to Malaysia for Victim M issued in the name on the fake passport and the stamp evidencing entry into Malaysia on page 4 of
the fake passport.
d A two-page letter given to Victim M by the defendant while she was in jail in Malaysia requesting her to sign it. The letter purported to be from the victim,
was addressed to her parents and stated that she was ine, when in fact she was in jail. She refused to sign and her refusal angered the defendant.
e Documents obtained by Victim J in order to secure a passport and the passport she used.
f Victim J’s boat ticket and evidence that she did not pay for the ticket. 3. Real evidence:
A spaghetti-strapped maroon blouse that Victim J was forced to wear by the defendant when she worked in the bar in Malaysia.
The evidence presented by the defence included the testimony of the defendant as well as an individual in the same situation as Victims M and J. In its presentation of the facts, the
court notes that the similarly situated individual did not ile a case against the defendant because “she did not like the hassle of doing so”.
646
646
People v. Anos, promulgated by a Regional Trial Court branch 12, Zamboanga City, year 2011. The case is available in the UNODC Human Traficking Case Law Database UNODC Case No. PHL051.
The court strongly relied on the victims’ testimony and the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution to ind that “there can be no iota of a doubt” that the elements required
to support a traficking in persons conviction exist in this case. When evaluating the evidence presented by the defence the court found that the “detailed, direct and straightforward tes-
timonies” by Victims M and J overwhelmed the defence. In fact the testimonies of the defendant and the similarly situated individual, “actually even corroborated” material points
in the prosecution’s case.
Core issues raised in the case included: There were seemingly important weaknesses in the mosaic of evidence in this case which
might have conceivably led the court to acquit the defendant, though these are not explicitly addressed by the court. However, they did not preclude a conviction:
1. Relatively short duration: The victims were held for ive days before they were apprehended by immigration oficials. While the court does not comment on the
duration of the abuse, it inds this situation to be a “classic case of traficking in persons”
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so that the limited duration of the abuse did not seem to be a factor in the court’s decision.
2. Victims’ illegal actions: The factual background of the case mentions that both victims took part in producing and using fraudulent passports. While it is true that
this issue is not explicitly addressed by the court, the conviction, despite the illegal activity of the victims, shows that the court did not impugn the victims’ credibility
on this basis alone.
3. Victim’s ability to say “no” with impunity: The court does not address the victim’s refusal to provide sexual services as a fact which weakens its inding of traficking in
persons, but rather only as the factual background of the case. The court inds that the defendant used fraud to convince the victims to agree to go to Malaysia for
employment and that the real purpose for the recruitment, transport, transfer, receipt, and harbouring of the victims was for the purpose of prostitution andor sexual
exploitation which was suficient to support a conviction.
While the court does not address this issue, the facts cited by it, clarify that though Victim M refused to engage in sexual relations with impunity and was not physically
forced to do so, this freedom did not extend to freedom to work or live elsewhere. Moreover, she still continued working for the defendant by sitting with customers at
the tables in the bar. Perhaps this factual background helps to explain the conviction.
Thus the strengths in the mosaic of evidence, mentioned in the factual background of the case, seem to have contributed to the conviction, including the threats of the defendant,
his deception, the restriction of freedom in that the victims were required to work and live on the premises with no freedom to work or live elsewhere, and the vulnerabilities of the
victims their illegal status, low socio-economic situation and unfamiliarity with the language and culture.
647
Ibid.
5.7 Ranya Boonmee Thailand
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This case is of particular importance because it highlights various issues explored in this Case Digest by illustrating how two courts can evaluate the same evidence in different ways.
Thus, while the trial court convicted, the court of appeals reversed on the basis of the same mosaic of evidence which included: vulnerabilities women migrant workers without legal
status, threats, restriction of freedom, isolation, low pay, exploitative work conditions and, in particular, the long hours of work. Weaknesses in the mosaic of evidence included: incon-
sistent testimony of the victims and testimony of similarly situated migrant workers who worked in the same workplace and were not victimized. A particularly dificult evidential
problem was the victims’ seeming consent to their situation.
Among the kinds of evidence submitted were the testimony of the alleged victims, of migrant workers who worked in the same factory, of law enforcement and social workers who par-
ticipated in the raid, which rescued the alleged victims and of defendants, and “real evidence”, which included photographs of the workplace, including the dormitory which housed the
victims inside the factory walls.
The defendants were charged with conspiring to conine other persons, depriving them from liberty and forcing them to do any act for the doer; and accepting and retaining workers
illegally, including those under the age of 18 and 15 years old for the purposes of enslave- ment, compelling them to work in slavery-like practices. While they were convicted by the
trial court, they were exonerated by the court of appeals.
On 16 September 2006, migrant workers without legal status were found in a shrimp- processing factory in Thailand. More than 300 workers were found working in the factory
and 66 out of these workers were identiied during the investigation as victims of traficking in persons. In the trial, 14 alleged victims, whose testimony was inconsistent, were witnesses
in court, whereas 22 migrant workers testiied as the defendants’ witnesses that they had not undergone dificult conditions in the factory.
The majority of the alleged victims were women; only three were men. The prosecution attempted to prove that the victims were forced to live on site in the factory compound; that
they were required to work long hours and that they were not compensated appropriately. The prosecution also attempted to prove that they were threatened with punishment if they
did not work. However, there were other migrant workers at the factory who testiied that they were not forced to live on site and that they could leave the factory after work.
Kinds of evidence in this case included: 1. Testimony of victims, characterized by inconsistencies and nonetheless considered
credible by the trial court, but non-credible by the court of appeals. 2. Testimony of law enforcement and social workers who participated in the raid on
the premises and testiied about the appearance of the site and some of whom testiied about the physical appearance of the victims.
648
The trial court citation is Ranya Boonmee, Kaew Kongmuang and Manus Boonmee, Case No. 20132552, Criminal Court of Bangkok, 9 December 2010, Thailand. The Appeals case citation is Appeals Court black case
number 17042554 and red case number 40972556, 6 March 2013. Information about this case was obtained from the UNODC Human Traficking Case Law Database UNODC Case No. THA001 and a Thai expert.
3. Testimony of similarly situated workers who testiied they had not been exploited, forced to live on site or prohibited from leaving after work.
4. Photographs of the premises showing that the factory was surrounded by a 16-foot- high, barbed wire capped wall. The photos also showed the housing in which the
victims lived and that this housing was inside the wall of the compound. This case is of particular interest because it highlights typical issues in cases of traficking
by means of different assessments of the evidence by the trial court and the court of appeals. These revolve around the following weaknesses in the mosaic of evidence:
1. Testimony of other similarly situated workers: A central weakness in the mosaic of evi- dence concerned similarly situated workers who testiied that they were not exploited,
were not forced to live on site and could leave the factory after work. The trial court did not view these testimonies as central in discounting the prosecution’s case in
view of the alleged victims’ testimonies and the photographs adduced by the prosecu- tion. However, the court of appeals did view these testimonies as strong evidence
militating against conviction. 2. Inconsistencies in alleged victim testimony: The testimony of the alleged victims included
some inconsistencies. The trial court did not consider that these inconsistencies impugned the credibility of the alleged victims, because the core of the alleged
victims’ testimonies was consistent and because the inconsistencies could be explained in light of the long delay between the rescue and the court hearing. In addition,
there was also support in the form of photographic evidence and testimony of police and social workers. However, the court of appeals viewed the inconsistencies as
impugning the credibility of the victims, especially in view of the testimony of similarly situated workers.
3. Alleged victim consent to their situation: In its exoneration of the defendants, the court of appeals relied heavily on the seeming consent of the alleged victims to their situ-
ation and on the innocent behaviour of the defendants. Thus, the court stressed that the alleged victims had voluntarily crossed the border into Thailand in order to work;
that there was no indication of unwillingness to work during the police raid on the premises; that it was agreed that the defendants pay transportation costs from the
alleged victims’ villages which would then be deducted from the victims’ wages; that there was no restriction of freedom on the alleged victims’ freedom beyond what was
done in the case of other workers and that the motivations of the defendants were innocent in this regard see next subsection.
4. Restrictions of freedom or innocent caution: Whereas the trial court considered the alleged victims’ residence within the walls of the factory and prohibition to exit
after work hours to be a restriction of freedom, the court of appeals found innocent explanations for this. For example, the defendants provided accommodation to all
workers, and not only to the victims, not for the purpose of restricting freedom, but merely for convenience, as the nature of work required the workers to stay in
the factory many hours; the defendants did not allow the alleged victims to leave the factory because they feared they would be arrested by police due to their illegal
status. In addition, it was pointed out that the defendants did occasionally allow the alleged victims and other workers to leave the factory to visit temples and go
to hospitals.
