Data The effects of voluntary disclosure and dividend propensity on prices leading earnings

Therefore, we predict that the coefficient on DDivX t3 should be significantly lesser than zero. In other words, the sum of the coefficients on DX t3 , DivX t3 and DDivX t3 should be signifi- cantly less than the sum of the coefficients on DX t3 and DivX t3 . In this case, the inference is that both dividend propensity and voluntary dis- closure are partial substitutes. We treat the issue of which of these four logical possibilities is true as a purely empirical question and offer no prior theoretical predictions as to which of these outcomes is the most likely.

5. Data

To perform our analyses, annual reports in an elec- tronic format are required in order to use QSR N6 software as a text analysis tool. Therefore, our ini- tial sample is limited to all UK non-financial firms on the Dialog database that have at least one an- nual report. Dialog covers large cross-sections of electronic non-financial UK annual reports for the years 1996–2002. So, we limit our study to that sample period. 9 We use book-to-market value as a measure of growth. We measure growth on a year- ly basis. This allows us to examine the effect of disclosure and dividends on share price anticipa- tion of earnings when firms are classified as high- growth or low-growth in a particular time period. We identify high-growth firms as those having below median levels of book-to-market value and low-growth firms as those having above median levels of book-to-market value. The total number of annual reports on Dialog for non-financial firms for the sample period is 8,098. Of those, 7,977 firm-years have matching records in Datastream. We delete 1,312 firm-years obser- vations because of changing year-ends. This leaves 6,665 firm-years. We also delete 2,958 firm-years missing observations. This leaves 3,707 firm-year observations. Finally, we delete outliers defined as observations falling into the top or bottom 1 of the distribution of any of the regression variables. Following Schleicher et al. 2007, we treat the ob- servations of high- and low-growth firms as sepa- rate distributions. Otherwise, an unreasonably large number of high-growth firms’ observations will fall into the top and bottom 1. Deletion of inappro- priate observations and observations with missing data reduces the sample to 3,503 firm-years obser- vations. Of those, 1,770 firm-years are high-growth firms and 1,733 firm-years are low-growth firms. Earnings per share data is calculated by dividing operating income before all exceptional items Worldscope item 01250 by the outstanding num- ber of shares. X t , X t+1 , X t+2 and X t+3 are then defined as the earnings change for the periods t, t+1, t+2 and t+3 deflated by the share price. Both current and future earnings changes are deflated by the share price at the start of the return window for pe- riod t. X t3 is calculated as the aggregated future earnings over the following three years relative to the financial year-end. We collect returns data from Datastream. R t , R t+1 , R t+2 and R t+3 are measured as buy-and-hold returns starting from eight months before the financial year-end to four months after the financial year-end in year t. In the return meas- ures, similar to Hussainey et al. 2003, we incor- porate a four-month lag to ensure that annual reports have been released. R t3 is calculated as the aggregated future returns over the following three years relative to the financial year-end. Earnings yield, EP t–1 , is defined as period t–1’s earnings over price four months after the financial year-end of pe- riod t–1. AG t is the growth rate of total book value of assets for period t Datastream item 392. We collect dividends per share from Worldscope item 05101. 10 The dividends dummy variable, Div, is set equal to one if firms pay dividends in year t and zero otherwise. In addition to the above variables, we use a disclosure dummy variable to examine the effect of disclosure on the returns- earnings association. The disclosure dummy, D, is set equal to one for firms in the top two quartiles of the distributions of disclosure scores and zero otherwise. As mentioned earlier, we identify high- low- growth firms as those having below above median levels of BTMV. BTMV ratio is calculated as the inverse of the market to book value of equi- ty ratio Datastream item: MTBV. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our re- gression variables. Panel A reports the descriptive analysis for the full sample. Panel B C reports the descriptive analysis for dividend non-divi- dend paying firms. Panel D E reports the de- scriptive analysis for high- low- growth firms. Table 1 shows that dividends were paid in 84 =29523503 of the firm years in our sample. 11 44 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 9 Dividends are usually tested over longer sample periods. However, we restrict our analyses to the years in which large numbers of annual reports are available on Dialog. This en- ables us to test the joint effect of disclosure and dividends on prices leading earnings. 10 Worldscope defines dividends per share item 05101 as ‘the total dividends per share declared during the calendar year for U.S. corporations and fiscal year for Non-US corpo- rations. It includes extra dividends declared during the year. Dividends per share are based on the ‘gross’ dividend of a se- curity, before normal withholding tax is deducted at a coun- try’s basic rate, but excluding the special tax credit available in some countries’. 11 The proportion of dividend-paying firms for the overall population of UK firms is 69. This number is calculated by dividing the total number of dividend-paying firms by the total number of firms in the period of 1996–2002. This number is consistent with a recent study by Denis and Osobov 2008 which find that 73 of UK firms pay dividends in the sample period 1996–2002. However, in our sample, the proportion of dividend-paying firms is much higher than the overall popula- tion of dividend-paying firms. This is due to the deletion of in- appropriate observations and observations with missing data in the sample period of 1996–2002. Downloaded by [Universitas Dian Nuswantoro], [Ririh Dian Pratiwi SE Msi] at 20:19 29 September 2013 Vol. 39 No. 1. 2009 45 Table 1 Descriptive statistics Variable Mean Median OBS Panel A: Full sample R t 0.089 0.038 3503 X t 0.007 0.008 3503 X t3 0.006 0.005 3503 R t3 0.295 0.222 3503 AG t 0.173 0.078 3503 EP t–1 0.091 0.093 3503 Disclosure = Low 1.7 2 1674 Disclosure = High 7.2 6 1829 Panel B: Dividend-paying firms R t 0.116 0.065 2952 X t 0.006 0.008 2952 X t3 –0.002 0.003 2952 R t3 0.301 0.237 2952 AG t 0.171 0.085 2952 EP t–1 0.119 0.102 2952 Disclosure = Low 1.8 2 1297 Disclosure = High 7.4 6 1655 Panel C: Non-dividend-paying firms R t –0.055 –0.187 551 X t 0.017 0.001 551 X t3 0.050 0.024 551 R t3 0.267 0.082 551 AG t 0.184 0.015 551 EP t–1 –0.058 –0.020 551 Disclosure = Low 1.4 1 377 Disclosure = High 6.1 5 174 Panel D: High-growth firms R t 0.089 0.033 1770 X t 0.007 0.008 1770 X t3 0.002 0.003 1770 R t3 0.234 0.166 1770 AG t 0.220 0.114 1770 EP t–1 0.073 0.079 1770 Disclosure = Low 1.7 2 828 Disclosure = High 7.3 6 942 Panel E: Low-growth firms R t 0.089 0.043 1733 X t 0.008 0.007 1733 X t3 0.010 0.007 1733 R t3 0.358 0.284 1733 AG t 0.124 0.050 1733 EP t–1 0.110 0.116 1733 Disclosure = Low 1.7 2 846 Disclosure = High 7.1 6 887 Downloaded by [Universitas Dian Nuswantoro], [Ririh Dian Pratiwi SE Msi] at 20:19 29 September 2013 46 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH Table 1 Descriptive statistics continued Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. Panel A reports the descriptive analysis for the full sample. Panel B C reports the descriptive analysis for dividend non-dividend paying firms. Panel D E reports the descriptive analysis for high- low- growth firms. Returns, R t , is calculated as buy-and-hold returns from eight months be- fore the financial year-end to four months after the financial year-end. R t3 is the aggregated three years future returns. The earnings variable, X t , is defined as earnings change per share deflated by the share price four months after the end of the financial year t–1. X t3 is the aggregated three years future earnings change. Earnings measure is the Worldscope item 01250 which is operating income before all exceptional items. EP t–1 is defined as period t–1’s earnings over price four months after the financial year-end of period t–1. AG t is the growth rate of total book value of assets for period t Datastream item 392. Firm-years with a disclosure score on top bot- tom 50 of the distribution of disclosure scores are defined as high- low- disclosure firm-year. Dividend non-dividend paying firms are those paying not paying dividends at the current year. Dividends measure is dividends per share, Worldscope item 05101. High-growth firms are defined as those having below median lev- els of BTMV, while low-growth firms are defined as those having above median levels of BTMV. BTMV ratio is calculated as the inverse of the market-to-book value of equity ratio Datastream item MTBV. Panels B and C of Table 1 show that the median re- turn in period t is positive for dividend-paying firms, whilst it is negative for non-dividend-pay- ing firms. The median current and future earnings change is positive for both dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms. Panels B and C of Table 1 also show that divi- dend-paying firms, on average, have slightly higher mean and median levels of voluntary dis- closure than non-dividend-paying firms. 56 of dividend-paying firms are in the category of high- disclosure firms compared to 32 of non-divi- dend-paying firms. 12 The table shows a material difference in the disclosure scores between firms in high- and low-disclosure categories for both dividend and non-dividend-paying firms. The mean disclosure score ranges from 6.1 to 7.4 for- ward-looking earnings sentences for firms in the high-disclosure category; whilst the mean disclo- sure score ranges from 1.4 to 1.8 forward-looking earnings sentences for firms in the low-disclosure category. The differences in means between high- and low-disclosure scores are statistically signifi- cant at the 1 level not reported in Table 1. Panels D and E of Table 1 show that the median disclosure scores for the high- and low-disclosure groups is quite similar across high- and low- growth firms. The median disclosure score is six forward-looking earnings sentences for firms in the high-disclosure category; whilst it is two for- ward-looking earnings sentences for firms in the low-disclosure category. In addition, the differ- ences in means between high- and low-disclosure scores are statistically significant at the 1 level not reported in Table 1. Panels D and E also show that the median return in period t for high- growth firms 3.3 is slightly lower than that for low-growth firms 4.3. The median current and future earnings change is positive for both high- and low-growth firms. Finally, the median future earnings changes of low-growth firms are higher than those of high-growth firms.

6. Main empirical results