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Exhibit 14: CEPAC Auction Results for Faria Lima and Agua Espraida UOs
Year Faria Lima UO
Agua Espraiada UO Ofered
No. CEPACs
Sold R
Price R
Revenue R
Ofered No.
CEPACs Sold
R Price
R Revenue
R
2004 -Public
-Private 90,000
- 9,091
24,991 1,100
1,100 10,000,100
27,490,100 100,000
70,000 100,000
16,899 300
310 30,000,000
5,238,690
2005 -Public
-Private
n.o.
-
n.o.
9,778
n.o.
1,100
n.o.
10,755,800 56,500
n.o.
56,500
n.o.
371
n.o.
20,961,500
n.o.
2006 -Public
-Private 10,000
- 2,729
6,241 1,100
1,100 3,001,900
6,865,100 180,000
- 152,969
22,657 370
371 56,598,530
8,405,747
2007 -Public1
-Public2 -Public3
-Private 156,730
n.o. n.o.
- 156,730
n.o. n.o.
72,942 1,240
n.o. n.o.
1,240 194,345,200
n.o. n.o.
90,448,080 50,000
100,000 167,781
- 50,000
100,000 158,773
77,330 411
411 411
411 20,550,000
41,100,000 65,255,703
31,782,630
2008 -Public1
-Public2 -Private
83,788
n.o.
- 83,788
n.o.
2,500 1,538
n.o.
1,725 128,865,944
n.o.
4,312,500 186,740
650,000 -
186,740 379,650
36,113 1,100
535 411
205,414,000 203,112,750
14,842,443
2009 -Public1
-Public2 -Public3
-Private
100,000 30,000
120,000
n.o.
55,612 1,521
120,000
n.o.
1,700 1,715
2,100
n.o.
94,540,400 2,608,515
252,000,000
n.o.
73,500 175,000
n.o. n.o.
73,500 72,270
n.o. n.o.
616 700
n.o. n.o.
45,239,250 50,589,000
n.o. n.o.
Total
545,923 825,233,639
1,483,401 799,090,243
n.o.: not ofered.
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housing linked to each CEPAC auction. Banco do Brasil and Caixa Economia Federal,
the two largest federal banks in Brazil, were in charge of preparing and executing the
auctions. Because CEPAC was a new inancial instrument, the involvement of these two
federal institutions made the auctions more reliable and credible in the marketplace.
For cities that are interested in exploring CEPAC as a potential funding instrument,
the actual CEPAC bond experience from Faria Lima and Agua Espraiada UOs could
be useful. As shown in Exhibit 14, for example, the success of CEPAC auctions
varied widely in issues sold in comparison to issues ofered. The timing of the auctions
and the amount auctioned have strategic signiicance and a close examination of
real estate market conditions is important to extract the maximum value from each
auction. In the irst 5 years, the management of the CEPAC auctions did not appear to
have been following a general strategic plan as shown, for example, by an excessive
amount of bonds in the 2004 Faria Lima auctions or by too few in the 2008 auctions
for both UOs. Although the initial prices for CEPAC were ixed by law for each auction,
the prices also varied widely according to the supply and demand at the time
of the auctions. These variations were due to reasons that ranged from initial
market adjustments to a new product to luctuations in the real estate business
cycle.
4.2 Crowdfunding: Small Projects and P3 Equity Capital
