Beyond Cognitive Framing Processes: Anger Mediates the Effects of Responsibility Framing on the Preference for Punitive Measures
Journal of Communication ISSN 0021-9916
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Beyond Cognitive Framing Processes: Anger
Mediates the Effects of Responsibility
Framing on the Preference for Punitive
Measures
Rinaldo Kühne1 , Patrick Weber2 , & Katharina Sommer3
1 Amsterdam School of Communication Research, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
2 Institute of Communication Science, University of Hohenheim, Stuttgart, Germany
3 Institute of Mass Communication and Media Research, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
A new stream of research indicates that framing effects are based on emotional as well
as cognitive processes. However, it is not entirely clear whether emotions mediate framing effects and what the moderators of emotional mediation processes are. To address
these questions, we conducted an experiment in which the framing of responsibility for a
social problem was manipulated (ambivalent vs. high-responsibility frame). We find that
the high-responsibility frame increased the preference for punitive measures by increasing
responsibility beliefs and eliciting anger. Furthermore, we find that trait anger moderates
the framing effect on anger and that responsibility beliefs are positively associated with
anger intensity. The significance of these findings for framing research and suggestions for
future studies are discussed.
Keywords: Framing Effects, Policy Preferences, Indirect Effects, Cognitive Mediation
Processes, Emotional Mediation Processes.
doi:10.1111/jcom.12151
A plethora of studies have investigated the effects of news frames on policy preferences. These studies demonstrate that frames can have significant effects on media
users’ opinions. At the same time, the number of studies that investigate the processes that underlie the effects of news frames has steadily increased. Still, a comprehensive picture of the psychological mechanisms that produce framing effects is
far-off. Accordingly, it has been proposed that the psychological mechanisms of framing effects must be further investigated (Lecheler, Schuck, & de Vreese, 2013; Slothuus,
2008). Further research on these psychological mechanisms is necessary because, as
Berger, Roloff, and Roskos-Ewoldsen (2010) note, “[i]t is one thing to identify the
Corresponding author: Rinaldo Kühne; e-mail: R.J.Kuhne@uva.nl
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effects of various news story frames, but it is quite another to explain why the observed
framing effects occur” (p. 10). According to Berger et al. (2010), a theory of framing
effects requires a clear understanding of the processes that produce these effects. Only
by knowing these psychological mechanisms can we explain and accurately predict
the effects of news frames.
Following this suggestion, we take a closer look at the mediating processes that
underlie framing effects on policy preferences. More precisely, we focus on the role of
emotions, which has rarely been investigated in framing effects research. Following
the seminal work of Nabi (2003) and Gross (2008), we propose that cognitions and
emotions mediate the effects of news frames on policy preferences. Furthermore, we
postulate that emotional mediation processes are influenced by specific moderators.
Below, we first discuss the concept of emphasis framing and then explain how frames
can elicit emotions and how emotions influence opinions. We then review the literature about emotional framing effects. Based on this review, we formulate hypotheses
about the cognitive and emotional effects of news frames. We then describe the design
and results of an experiment in which we tested our theoretical assumptions. In the
final section, we discuss our findings and directions for future research.
Emphasis framing of political news
Different conceptualizations of news framing exist (Entman, Matthes, & Pellicano,
2009). An established line of research investigates the effects of emphasis framing (also
called issue framing) on policy preferences (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Lecheler & de
Vreese, 2012; Slothuus, 2008). Emphasis framing consists in increasing or decreasing
the salience of particular issue aspects in political news (Druckman, 2001; Entman
et al., 2009). The effects of emphasis framing on policy preferences are mostly investigated by presenting participants in an experiment with frames that focus on different
issue aspects. These studies have demonstrated that selecting certain issue aspects in
political news can lead individuals to focus on the respective aspects when forming
an attitude. For instance, Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) found that participants
in an experiment focused on the right of free speech or on the argument of public
order when forming an opinion about public rallies, depending on which considerations were focused on in a news program they had watched before. However, it is
important to note that this empirical approach to framing effects has been criticized.
Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009) argue that the original conceptualization of framing
effects is that presentational differences of the same information affect opinion formation. Accordingly, emphasis framing studies should investigate how differences in the
accentuation of the same issue aspect or the same considerations influence attitudes. It
has been proposed that framing devices, such as lexical features (particularly in headings, subheadings, and leads), quotes, and exemplars (Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Tankard,
2001) can be used to differentially accentuate a particular issue aspect or consideration. In line with this research, the present study investigates the effects of differences
in the accentuation of personal responsibility—indicated by differences in the causal
language used in the headings, subheadings, and the lead of a news article, the use of
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quotes from responsible actors, and the use of exemplars of responsible actors—on
the preference for punitive policies.
Applying emotion theory to framing effects
Effects of news framing on policy preferences are mostly explained through cognitive mechanisms. In fact, it is proposed that frames exert their influence on policy
preferences by affecting cognitive beliefs (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012; Nelson et al.,
1997; Price & Tewksbury, 1997; Slothuus, 2008). Although cognitive framing processes are well corroborated, a number of studies have demonstrated that the effects
of news frames on policy preferences cannot be fully explained by cognitive processes
(Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012; Slothuus, 2008). These studies indicate that additional
mediators of framing effects exist. More important, appraisal theories of emotion
(Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 2001; Scherer, 2001) indicate that certain news frames may
also elicit emotional responses, such as anger, fear, or sadness. According to these theories, emotions result from cognitive evaluations of events. Individuals are assumed
to continuously assess their environment and, in doing so, conduct a series of characteristic appraisals. Appraisals are regarded as evaluative cognitions or beliefs that
not only reflect the properties of an event, but also indicate how the event is relevant to the individual’s needs and preferences (Frijda & Mesquita, 2000; Lazarus,
1991; Smith & Kirby, 2000). Although each appraisal theory proposes a specific set
of relevant appraisals, most appraisal theories agree that the appraisals of valence,
certainty, controllability, and responsibility are central to the process of emotion elicitation (Roseman, 2001; Scherer, 2001). Specific emotions, such as anger, fear, or sadness, result from specific configurations of cognitive appraisals. For instance, anger is
elicited when an event is appraised as negative, certain, controllable, and caused by a
specific actor.
Several researchers have suggested that appraisal theories of emotion are useful to
explain how news frames elicit emotions (Aarøe, 2011; Gross, 2008; Kim & Cameron,
2011; Nabi, 2003). They propose that by selecting and accentuating certain aspects of
an issue, news frames suggest certain appraisals or evaluative beliefs that may result
in emotional responses. This line of reasoning indicates that cognitive framing processes can elicit emotional responses: If a news frame produces certain evaluative
beliefs about an issue, then emotional responses can result. Note that this perspective also suggests that emotions are the product of more or less active and conscious
evaluation processes because emotions are assumed to be produced by evaluative
beliefs. However, emotion theory suggests that active and conscious evaluations are no
requirement for emotional responses to occur. Rather, appraisal theory suggests that
appraisals can also be automatic and unconscious (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987; Smith
& Kirby, 2000) and that emotions can thus precede conscious thoughts (LeDoux,
1999; Zajonc, 1984). Emotions can be automatically elicited through schematic processes which are based on the activation of emotional schemata, that is, schemata
that comprise information about events that previously elicited emotions and about
the emotional experiences associated with these events (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987).
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Thus, when news frames select and accentuate aspects of an issue that are related to
emotionally charged schemata and attitudes, this can cause the automatic activation
of emotions without a conscious effort by the recipient (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987;
Smith & Kirby, 2000).
So far, we have discussed two different paths by which news frames can elicit emotions. However, for emotions to be mediators of framing effects on policy preferences,
they must also feed into judgment processes. Empirically, it is well established that
emotions exert a strong influence on judgments (see for an overview Lerner & Keltner, 2000) and, as Nabi (2003) notes, it is thus plausible to assume that emotions are
functionally equivalent to frame adoption. Emotion theory postulates that “the core
of an emotion is the readiness to act and the prompting of plans” (Oatley & Jenkins,
1996, p. 96). Emotions are assumed to support an individual’s adaptation to his or her
environment by quickly signaling to the individual what a situation is about and what
actions are necessary to resolve the situation (Lazarus, 1991; Lerner & Keltner, 2000).
Accordingly, theoretical approaches such as the affect infusion model (Forgas, 1995)
and the affect as information approach (Schwarz, 1990) postulate that emotions entail
an evaluative meaning that influences judgments and decisions. For instance, anger
signals to individuals that an actor is responsible for a negative event and that the actor
must be punished. Accordingly, anger has been shown to increase the preference for
punitive measures (Nabi, 2003; Nerb & Spada, 2001).
Finally, it should be noted that the emotional processes that were just discussed
are influenced by specific moderators. As the emotion research has identified many
different moderators, it is not possible to discuss them all, but they generally belong to
two classes. On the one hand, there are moderators that influence how strong the emotional responses to a stimulus are. For instance, personality traits such as trait anger
and trait anxiety influence the intensity of anger and fear responses (Lerner & Keltner,
2000). On the other hand, there are moderators of emotional influences on judgments.
For instance, affective orientation, that is, an individual’s tendency to actively consider their emotions in making judgments, should support emotional influences on
judgments. Both types of moderators are likely to influence the strength of emotional
mediation processes in framing effects.
Altogether, emotion research thus indicates that it is plausible to assume that framing effects are mediated by cognitive beliefs and emotions and that these processes
are influenced by emotion-related moderators. In the Results section, we review the
empirical evidence for these assumptions.
The evidence for emotional mediation processes in framing effects
The previous section demonstrated that it is plausible to assume that emotions are
mediators of framing effects on opinion formation. However, research on emotional
framing effects is still sparse. A series of studies corroborates the assumption that news
frames can elicit emotions by selecting certain issue aspects. In an experiment, Kim
and Cameron (2011) manipulated the framing of an article about a cell-phone battery explosion accident. They found that the frame that focused on the producer’s
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intentional wrongdoing produced more anger, whereas the frame that focused on the
victims of the accident elicited more sadness. Igartua, Moral-Toranzo, and Fernández
(2011) presented an experiment’s participants with two different frames about immigration: One frame focused on the economic contributions of immigrants, and the
other frame focused on immigrant crime. They found that the economic contribution frame elicited more positive emotions. In contrast, the criminality frame elicited
stronger negative emotions. Similar findings were obtained in studies about the effects
of frames that emphasize gains or losses. For example, Shen and Dillard (2007) found
that gain-frames produced more positive and less negative emotions in comparison
to loss-frames.
In the studies discussed so far, the framing manipulations consisted of presenting participants with news articles that focused on different issue aspects. Studies
on episodic and thematic framing indicate that exemplars can be used to accentuate individual responsibility and individual suffering (see Iyengar, 1991), which can
also influence emotional responses. For instance, Aarøe (2011) investigated the influence of thematic and episodic news frames about an immigration act on emotions.
She found that episodic frames, highlighting an individual immigrant’s situation, produced stronger feelings of anger, disgust, pity, and compassion than a thematic frame
that presented statistical information about immigration. Aarøe’s experiment shows
that framing an issue through the use of exemplars can increase emotional responses.
Although most of the studies discussed so far included measures of the participants’ attitudes toward the issue of the framed messages, it must be emphasized that
none of the studies investigated whether the emotional responses mediated the framing effect on participants’ attitudes. Only a few framing studies have actually tested
emotional mediation processes. Gross (2008) presented an experiment’s participants
with an article arguing against mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses. She
found that episodic frames that focused on a convicted woman’s situation elicited
more sympathy and pity than the thematic frame, which provided details about sentencing guidelines and statistical information. More importantly, Gross demonstrated
that empathy, a measure that combined sympathy and pity, mediated the effects of
episodic frames on participants’ attitudes toward mandatory minimum sentences: The
episodic frames increased opposition to mandatory minimum sentences by eliciting
empathy. Thus, the use of exemplars initiated an emotional mediation process. Major
(2011) conducted an experiment with a 2 (thematic vs. episodic framing) × 2 (gain
vs. loss framing) factorial design. She found that gain-framed articles about a health
issue elicited more happiness and less anger, sadness, and guilt than a loss-framed
article. However, there were no systematic effects of episodic and thematic frames
on emotional responses. Apparently, the selection of certain considerations affected
emotional responses, whereas the use of exemplars did not. Major also investigated
whether emotional responses mediated the framing effects on attributions of responsibility for health problems. However, only one indirect effect was significant: The loss
framing increased attributions of societal responsibility by producing a greater magnitude of guilt. Finally, Lecheler et al. (2013) conducted an experiment in which they
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investigated how frames influence opinion formation through the selection of issue
aspects. They presented participants with news frames that either focused on positive or negative economic consequences of the enlargement of the European Union
(EU). They demonstrated that the positive frame increased support for EU enlargement by eliciting more enthusiasm. In contrast, the negative frames decreased support
by eliciting more anger.
No framing study has yet investigated the conditions that influence emotional
mediation processes. A few framing studies indicate that moderators, such as prior
attitudes (Igartua et al., 2011) and political ideology (Gross & D’Ambrosio, 2004),
influence recipients’ emotional responses to news frames. For instance, Igartua et al.
(2011) found that their experiment’s criminality frame induced more negative emotions when the immigrants were identified as Moroccan than when they were identified as Latin American. Apparently, prior attitudes toward Moroccans were more
negative, which, in turn, supported more intense negative emotional reactions. These
findings support the notion that emotional framing processes are influenced by specific moderators.
The review suggests that the empirical evidence for emotional mediation is still
sparse in framing research. In particular, the interplay between cognition and emotion in framing effects has not been empirically investigated yet. However, it should
be noted that other branches of research have provided insights into the interplay of
emotion and cognition in judgment formation. Research on judgments of responsibility has shown that cognitive attributions affect emotional responses and attitudes.
More precisely, whether individuals hold an actor responsible or not for a negative
event affects their anger response, which, in turn, predicts the evaluation of the actor
(Betancourt & Blair, 1992; see also Weiner, 1995). Similar results were obtained by
Russell and Giner-Sorolla (2011), who investigated emotional influences on moral
judgments. Their findings suggest that the depiction of an immoral behavior had
an indirect effect on the moral evaluation of the behavior. The depiction influenced
appraisals of intentionality, abnormality, and harm, the appraisals elicited anger, and
anger supported the judgment that the behavior was immoral. Accordingly, Horberg,
Oveis, and Keltner (2011) conclude in their review on the role of emotions in moral
judgments that emotions arise from cognitive appraisals, and, in turn, have specific
effects on moral judgments. Overall, these findings corroborate the notion that cognitive evaluations can precede emotions in judgment processes.
In summary, initial findings indicate that emotions may indeed mediate the effects
of news frames on attitudes. Still, we are far from having a comprehensive understanding of emotional mediation processes. First, to our knowledge, no framing study has
simultaneously tested the cognitive and emotional mediation processes in a single
experiment. Accordingly, the relationship between cognitions and emotions has not
been investigated in framing research. Second, framing research has yet to investigate
the moderators of emotional mediation processes. Thus, in the present study, we not
only model cognitive and emotional mediation processes but also test whether the
emotional mediation process was moderated.
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Cognitive and emotional effects of responsibility framing
As Cappella and Jamieson (1997) note, “it makes little sense to conduct expensive
research into news frames that are infrequent, insufficiently described, or not a consistent component of the news environment” (p. 57). Because various researchers have
pointed out that the framing of responsibility is a core function of media frames (Entman, 1993; Iyengar, 1991; Valkenburg, Semetko, & de Vreese, 1999), we investigate
the cognitive and emotional effects of changes in the framing of responsibility of
social groups. We assume that a frame which accentuates responsibility, that is, which
presents an issue in such a way as to attribute personal responsibility for causing a
problem to a social group, will increase the preference for punitive measures in comparison to an ambivalent frame that does not accentuate a group’s responsibility for
causing a problem (H1).
To explain this effect, we propose that news frames can initiate cognitive and
emotional processes. First, news frames should promote beliefs that are consistent
with the frame’s perspective on an issue (Nelson et al., 1997; Price & Tewksbury,
1997). More precisely, we assume that a responsibility frame, accentuating that a
problem was caused by the reckless behavior of a social group, will promote the belief
that this group is responsible (H2). By promoting this belief, the high-responsibility
frame should also elicit anger because appraisals of personal responsibility are the
main determinant of anger responses (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 2001; Scherer, 2001).
Empirically, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that individuals experience stronger
anger when they attribute responsibility to an individual or a group (Betancourt &
Blair, 1992; Nerb & Spada, 2001; Weiner, 1995). Thus, hypothesis 3 posits that the
belief that adolescents are responsible has a positive effect on anger. In addition,
because news frames can have a direct effect on emotion through automatic and
unconscious processes, we assume that the framing of responsibility has a positive
direct effect on anger (H4).
Furthermore, we assume that there are interindividual differences concerning
the strength of emotional processes. Given that we investigate how the framing of
responsibility elicits anger, we propose that recipients’ trait anger is an important
moderator. Trait anger is defined as “the disposition to perceive a wide range of
situations as annoying or frustrating, and the tendency to respond to such situations with more frequent elevations in state anger” (Spielberger, 1988, p. 1). Thus,
we assume that high-trait-anger individuals will experience more intense anger in
response to the high-responsibility frame than low-trait-anger individuals. In line
with the assumption that anger can be elicited by two different processes, we propose
that trait anger increases the anger response by supporting the interpretation that
adolescents are responsible (Spielberger, 1988; see also Kuppens & Tong, 2010).
Thus, we propose that trait anger moderates the framing effect on the belief about
responsibility (H5a). Moreover, trait anger should increase the anger response by
amplifying the direct framing effect on anger (H5b). High-trait-anger individuals
should have more anger-related schemata that can be automatically activated by
a stimulus (see Leventhal & Scherer, 1987). In a nutshell, trait anger is assumed
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to increase anger by facilitating automatic anger responses and the generation of
anger-related cognitions.
Once triggered by a news frame, beliefs and emotions influence judgments. Individuals who believe that a specific group is responsible are more likely to favor punitive
measures (H6). Based on the work by Lazarus (1991), Lerner and Keltner (2000), and
Nerb and Spada (2001), we also postulate that anger motivates individuals to punish
the culprits and thus increases the preference for punitive measures (H7).
In summary, we propose three different mediation processes. First, there exists
a cognitive mediation process. The framing of responsibility increases the belief that
adolescents are responsible, which, in turn, increases the preference for punitive measures. Second, there exists an emotional mediation process. The framing of responsibility elicits more anger, which then increases the preference for punitive measures.
Third, there exists a three-step mediation process in which cognitions and emotions
interact. The framing of responsibility increases the belief that adolescents are responsible, this belief increases anger, and anger increases the preference for punitive measures. Finally, both mediation processes in which anger is involved are assumed to be
moderated by trait anger.
Method
Design and participants
To test the hypotheses, we conducted an online experiment. The study employed a
between-subjects experimental design in which the framing of a news article about
youth violence was manipulated. In total, 155 participants were exposed to one of
two versions of a news article (ambivalent frame vs. high-responsibility frame).1 The
second, quasi-experimental factor was the participants’ trait anger. Participants were
undergraduate students at the large university in Switzerland; 70% were female, and
the average age was 23.8 years. All participants were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions. Five participants were removed from the sample because they
clicked through the survey and did not fill in the survey seriously.
Procedure
The stimulus materials and the survey were presented online to the participants. The
participants were instructed that they should first read a news article about a current
issue and then answer questions about the article. Participants were then presented
with one of two news articles about youth violence that were framed differently. After
reading the stimulus, the survey was administered.
Stimulus materials
We created two versions of a news article about juvenile violence (ambivalent frame
vs. high-responsibility frame). The goal was to produce two news frames that provide the same substantial information (see Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009) about youth
violence and only differ in their emphasis of adolescents’ responsibility. For this purpose, we used the model by Weiner (1995), which suggests that human causation and
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intentionality are two main determinants of responsibility judgments. Accordingly,
perceptions of high human causation and high intentionality should promote judgments of high-responsibility. To translate this rationale into two differently framed
versions of a news article, we built on the work by Tankard (2001) and Pan and Kosicki
(1993), who propose that journalists construct frames by using framing devices such
as lexical features in headings and leads, quotes, and exemplars. Accordingly, two
frame versions were produced that are identical in structure and provide the same
basic information about the problem, but vary with regard to headings, subheadings,
leads, quotes, and exemplars. Both versions begin with a headline and a short lead and
consist of four paragraphs that are separated by three subtitles. Following an identical introductory paragraph, both versions provide the same description of national
statistics about adolescent violent crime that show an increasing crime rate. In each
version, the third paragraph describes the current characteristics of youth violence
from the perspective of a public prosecutor in juvenile court. Both versions end with
an identical paragraph reporting that the government is currently reviewing appropriate measures to address the problem of youth violence. To manipulate the framing
of the article, the headline and the lead of the article and the subtitle and content of
the third paragraph were varied.
Specifically, the high-responsibility frame emphasizes human causation by highlighting the juvenile originators of violence. The headline of this version is “The
propensity to violence of young people increases,” whereas the ambivalent version’s
headline is “Federal council reacts to rising youth violence.” Similarly, the manipulated subtitle in the high-responsibility frame version is “Ruthless behavior of young
offenders.” The respective subtitle in the ambivalent frame version is “Victims and
offenders.” To highlight human causation in the high-responsibility frame, an exemplar juvenile culprit who testifies in juvenile court appears in the third paragraph.
Altogether, adolescents—and only adolescents—are held accountable for the general
development in the high-responsibility frame version, whereas human causation is
not specifically emphasized in the ambivalent version. Both versions do not mention
any other causes of youth violence, such as situational or social causes.
Moreover, the two frames differentially emphasize the intentionality of young
offenders. Both versions of the article state that the offenders are aware of the negative consequences for their victims, but do not care about the consequences. This
information is emphasized in the high-responsibility frame version by including the
adjective “reckless” in the manipulated subtitle and the following sentence in the
lead: “In particular, recklessness by young offenders has raised concerns.” To further
emphasize that young offenders exercise violence intentionally, the description of the
public prosecutor in the high-responsibility frame version’s third paragraph states
that “exerting violence gives them a feeling of power” and that violence serves as a way
to gain standing within the peer group and demonstrate superiority. Additionally,
the young culprit justifies his crimes by referring to the “law of the jungle.” Thus,
no mitigating circumstances (e.g., violence as learned behavior within the family)
or higher moral goals that could alleviate moral responsibility are given. Altogether,
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by emphasizing human causation and intentionality, the high-responsibility frame
places a stronger emphasis on adolescents’ responsibility in causing the problem of
youth violence than the ambivalent frame (Weiner, 1995).
Measures
The survey measured the participants’ emotional responses, their beliefs about youth
violence, their preference for punitive measures, and covariates. All measures are
based on 7-point rating scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). All items
for all assessments in the questionnaire were in German.
Mediators
Participants were first asked to report their emotional responses to the news article.
Anger (e.g., “I felt angry,” α = 0.85) was measured with three items. Because we propose that a high-responsibility frame only produces anger and no other emotions, we
also measured fear and sadness to corroborate this assumption. The emotions were
selected because the description of violent criminals might also elicit fear and because
the mention of victims might also elicit sadness (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2001). Fear
was measured with three items (e.g., “I felt anxious,” α = 0.89). Sadness was measured
with two items because one indicator was removed due to low internal consistency
(e.g., “I experienced pity,” α = 0.78). Then, the participants were asked to report their
beliefs about youth violence. Because Weiner (1995) posits that responsibility judgments incorporate assessments of human causation and intentionality (see also the
description of the stimulus materials), we formulated indicators that represent these
aspects. The resulting measurement instrument for the belief that adolescents are
responsible consists of five items (e.g., “Aggressive adolescents are the main cause
of violence in public places,” “Violent adolescents solely bear the responsibility for
their actions,” α = 0.72). Thus, three emotional indices were formed: an anger index
(3 items, M = 4.17, SD = 1.62), a fear index (3 items, M = 4.22, SD = 1.47), and a sadness index (2 items, M = 3.54, SD = 1.60). Furthermore, an index for the belief that
adolescents are responsible (5 items, M = 4.66, SD = 1.07) was formed.
Moderator
We adapted items from Spielberger’s (1988) instrument that measures an individual’s
general propensity to respond to various situations with anger. The items were altered
to reflect an individual’s propensity to experience anger when exposed to political
news. We modified the original measure of trait anger because we needed a measure
that is more closely linked to media use processes. Three items were constructed to
assess trait anger (α = 0.83). The items were “Political news often makes me angry,”
“Frequently, news reports depict persons whose behavior makes me angry,” and
“When there are reports about injustice, I often get very angry.” These items were
combined into a measure of trait anger (M = 4.08, SD = 1.42). Note that the index
for trait anger was mean-centered to facilitate the interpretation of results (see next
section).
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Dependent variable
The preference for punitive measures was assessed with three items (e.g., “Adolescents
must be severely punished for violent acts,” α = 0.80). These items were also summarized to form an index (M = 3.90, SD = 1.37).
Covariates
We measured the participants’ left-right orientation with one item (1 = left, 7 = right;
M = 3.29, SD = 1.42) because a right-wing orientation has been shown to increase
the preference for punitive policies (Skitka & Tetlock, 1993). We also measured how
participants evaluated the news article’s quality with three items (e.g., “The article is
professionally made,” α = 0.81) to rule out the possibility that potential differences
in the two articles’ quality would promote differences in the preference for punitive
measures. Based on these items an index was formed (M = 4.83, SD = 1.17).
Results
First, we conducted a series of preliminary analyses of variance (ANOVAs), with
frame type (ambivalent vs. high-responsibility) as the independent variable and the
emotional responses as dependent variables, to investigate the emotional effects of
the framing manipulation.2 The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 1.
As predicted, the framing of responsibility only influenced the anger response
(F(1, 148) = 14.68, p < .001), but neither fear (F(1, 148) = 1.42, p = .24) nor sadness
(F(1, 148) = .05, p = .83). The high-responsibility frame produced more anger
(M = 4.51, SD = 1.59) in comparison to the ambivalent frame (M = 3.47, SD = 1.48).
Thus, fear and sadness were not included in the subsequent analyses.
Second, we tested whether the high-responsibility frame increased the preference
for punitive measures (H1). We conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
with the frame type (ambivalent vs. high-responsibility) as the independent variable,
the preference for punitive measures as the dependent variable, and the political
orientation and article quality evaluation as the covariates. The analysis showed a
significant effect of the frame type on policy preferences (F(1, 145) = 3.99, p < .05).
Participants who read the high-responsibility frame were more in favor of punitive
measures (M = 4.05, SD = 1.35) than those who read the ambivalent frame (M = 3.63,
SD = 1.39). Thus, hypothesis 1 is corroborated.
Third, we investigated the mediation processes that produced the framing effect
on the preference for punitive measures, that is, we estimated the proposed moderated mediation model. The model was tested with Mplus 6 and maximum likelihood
estimation. In the model, the following variables were included: The frame type (i.e.,
the experimental manipulation) was entered as the independent variable; the anger
response and the cognitive belief that adolescents are responsible were entered as
mediators; as it was assumed that cognitive beliefs produce emotions, a path from
the belief that adolescents are responsible to anger was included; the preference for
punitive measures was entered as the dependent variable, which was predicted by cognitive beliefs and anger. Furthermore, trait anger was included as a moderator of the
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Table 1 Emotions in the Ambivalent and the High-Responsibility Frame Conditiona
Frame Type
Anger
M
(SD)
Fear
M
(SD)
Sadness
M
(SD)
a Means
Ambivalent (n = 49)
High-Responsibility (n = 101)
3.47
(1.48)
4.51
(1.59)
4.02
(1.51)
4.32
(1.44)
3.5
(1.80)
3.56
(1.50)
and standard deviations are depicted.
Figure 1 Moderated Mediation Model of Emotional and Cognitive Framing Effects. Unstandardized regression coefficients are depicted. ns p > .10, * p < .05, *** p < .001. The effects of trait
anger on beliefs and anger and the effects of political orientation and article quality evaluation
on beliefs, anger, and preference for punitive measures were estimated but are not depicted in
the figure.
two paths from the frame type to cognitive beliefs and anger.3 Finally, political orientation and article quality evaluation were included as covariates. Fit indices show that
the model has a good fit to the data: χ2 (3) = 2.70; p = .44, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00,
SRMR = .02. The estimated model is depicted in Figure 1.
Hypothesis 2 posits that the high-responsibility frame increases the belief that
adolescents are responsible for violence. The results show that the high-responsibility
frame increased the participants’ belief that adolescents are responsible (b = 0.38,
SE = 0.19, p < .05). Thus, we accept the hypothesis. Hypothesis 3 predicts that the
belief that adolescents are responsible increases the anger response. The hypothesis
is also corroborated. The stronger the belief that adolescents are responsible, the
more anger is elicited (b = 0.24, SE = 0.12, p < .05). These findings indicate that
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news frames can indeed elicit emotions by influencing cognitive beliefs. Hypothesis
4 predicts that news frames can also directly elicit emotional responses. We find
that participants exposed to the high-responsibility frame felt more anger than
participants exposed to the ambivalent frame (b = 0.86, SE = 0.23, p < .001). This
corroborates hypothesis 4.
Furthermore, we hypothesized that the elicitation of anger is moderated by trait
anger. Hypothesis 5a posits that the positive effect of the high-responsibility frame
on the belief that adolescents are responsible increases with trait anger. However, we
find no significant interaction on cognitive beliefs (b = −0.08, SE = 0.15, p = .59).4
Hypothesis 5b posits that trait anger moderates the effect of the frame manipulation
on the anger response. This assumption is corroborated (b = 0.39, SE = 0.18 p < .05).
Because trait anger was mean-centered, the significant effect of the frame manipulation on anger, which we have reported above, can be interpreted as the average framing
effect on anger (across all values of trait anger). On average, the high-responsibility
frame elicits more anger than the ambivalent frame. The significant positive interaction indicates that the particular effect of the frame manipulation depends on the
recipients’ trait anger; the positive effect of the frame type on anger increases with trait
anger. This finding corroborates hypothesis 5b.
Although we have no theoretical expectations about the direct effects of trait anger
on the mediating variables, trait anger was included as an independent variable to
correctly specify the model (see Hayes, 2013). There was a significant effect of trait
anger on the belief that adolescents are responsible (b = 0.28, SE = 0.13, p < .05) but
no effect on anger (b = 0.06, SE = 0.16, p = .71). However, note that these coefficients
are difficult to interpret because interaction terms between frame type and trait anger
are included in the model and because frame type was not mean-centered (which is
not sensible when a variable is dichotomous). Because we have no hypotheses about
the direct effects of trait anger, we do not further explore these effects.
We now turn to the mediators’ effects on the dependent variable, that is, the
preference for punitive measures. According to hypothesis 6, participants that hold
adolescents responsible for violence are more in favor of punitive measures. We find
that the belief that adolescents are responsible indeed increases the preference for
punitive measures (b = 0.38, SE = 0.09, p < .001), which corroborates hypothesis 6.
Hypothesis 7, regarding the influence of anger, is also corroborated. Participants’
anger response was positively associated with the preference for punitive measures
(b = 0.25, SE = 0.07, p < .001).
Thus far, the findings indicate that there are multiple mediation processes at work
that produce the framing effect on the preference for punitive measures. However,
as the current methods literature suggests, researchers should not base inferences
about indirect effects on separate tests of the constituent paths. Rather, indirect effects
should be quantified and explicitly tested for their significance (Hayes, 2013). Mplus
provides explicit tests of specific mediation processes in a path model, which are based
on bootstrapped and bias-corrected confidence intervals (Muthén & Muthén, 2012).
Thus, we tested the indirect effects using the bootstrap procedure to estimate 95%
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Table 2 Conditional Indirect Framing Effect on the Preference for Punitive Measures
Through Angera
Value of Trait Anger
−1 standard deviation (= −1.42)
Mean (= 0.00)
+1 standard deviation (= +1.42)
Indirect Effect
Through Anger on
Policy Preference
95% BiasCorrected CI
b = 0.08
b = 0.21
b = 0.35
−0.08 to 0.32
0.07 to 0.43
0.14 to 0.65
a Unstandardized regression coefficients are depicted. Lower and upper bounds of bootstrapped
(5000 samples) and bias-corrected confidence intervals are depicted.
bias-corrected confidence intervals (95% bc CI).5 Note that a confidence interval indicates a significant effect when zero does not lie between the lower and the upper bound
of the interval.
First, the significant effect of the frame manipulation on cognitive beliefs (H2)
and the significant effect of cognitive beliefs on the preference for punitive measures
(H6) indicate that a cognitive mediation process is at work. Testing this indirect effect
yields a significant result (b = 0.14; 95% bc CI: 0.02 to 0.34). Thus, the framing of
responsibility increased the preference for punitive measures by increasing the belief
that adolescents are responsible. Second, the significant paths from the frame manipulation to the cognitive beliefs (H2), from cognitive beliefs to anger (H3), and from
anger to the preference for punitive measures (H7) suggest a three-step mediation
process. The test of this indirect effect also shows a significant result (b = 0.02; 95% bc
CI: 0.00 to 0.09). Thus, the framing of responsibility has a positive effect on the preference for punitive measures, which is mediated by beliefs about responsibility and
anger. Third, the significant paths from the frame manipulation to anger (H4) and
from anger to the preference for punitive measures (H7) indicate that anger mediates
the framing effect on the preference for punitive measures. Moreover, the significant
interaction between the frame manipulation and trait anger (H5b) suggests that the
strength of this indirect effect depends on individuals’ propensity to experience anger.
To test these assumptions, we estimated the indirect framing effect through anger on
the preference for punitive measures for three different values of the moderator (see
Hayes, 2013). More precisely, we estimated the indirect framing effect when the moderator is equal to the mean as well as plus and minus one standard deviation from the
mean. Table 2 summarizes the results of this final analysis.
We find that the indirect framing effect through anger increases with trait anger. At
low levels of trait anger (−1 standard deviation), anger does not mediate the framing
effect on the preference for punitive measures. However, when trait anger is average or
high, anger mediates the framing effect on the preference for punitive measures. Thus,
there exists a conditional indirect effect through anger that depends on the recipients’
trait anger.
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Finally, we inspected the (residual) direct effect of frame type on the preference
for punitive measures by adding this path to the model. The model shows that there
is no direct framing effect when the cognitive and emotional mediation processes are
controlled (b = 0.05, SE = 0.18, p = .27). This finding indicates that the cognitive and
emotional mediators that were considered are able to explain virtually the entire effect
of frame manipulation on the preference for punitive measures.
Discussion
This study demonstrated that a high-responsibility frame’s effect on the preference for
punitive measures was mediated by cognitive beliefs about responsibility and anger.
More important, we found that the high-responsibility frame had a direct and an indirect effect on anger. The frame indirectly elicited anger by increasing the belief that
adolescents are responsible. Furthermore, the strength of the direct framing effect on
anger was dependent on recipients’ trait anger: The framing of responsibility had a
stronger effect on anger for high-trait-anger individuals and, thus, anger was a more
important mediator for these individuals. The findings corroborate the assumption
that classical approaches, which explain framing effects through cognitive mechanisms, should be expanded to include emotional processes.
However, some limitations must be considered. First, this study investigated the
emotional effects of a specific type of frame: the high-responsibility frame. Our findings show that anger is an important mediator of this frame type. Of course, one
cannot infer from this finding that emotions are always important mediators of framing effects. Appraisal theories suggest that emotions are elicited when certain combinations of appraisals are activated by a stimulus (Roseman, 2001; Scherer, 2001).
Accordingly, emotional elicitation depends on the frame’s specific content and focus
(or rather the recipient’s interpretation of the frame’s content and focus). There may be
some frames that activate such appraisal patterns, thus eliciting emotions, and there
may be other frames that do not activate such appraisals, thus not eliciting emotions.
Furthermore, it is plausible to assume that other frames can also produce different
emotional responses, such as sadness, fear, or disgust. Future studies should investigate whether the effects of other frame types (e.g., human impact frames or morality
frames) are based on cognitive processes, emotional processes, or both. These studies
should also examine whether emotional influences support or compromise reasonable judgments. Answering these questions is important because knowledge about
emotional processes and effects is required to evaluate certain frame usage in news
reports and decide whether their usage is problematic.
Second, our findings suggest that the framing effect on anger was on average
stronger than the effect on the cognitive belief that adolescents are responsible. This
raises a question about why the effect on cognitive beliefs was weaker. One explanation is that the framing manipulation was relatively subtle. The basic facts were
the same in both framing conditions (i.e., the crime rate is rising, many adolescents
are violent), and the frames only differed in the accentuation of certain information,
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which might have led to similar beliefs about adolescents’ responsibility. Because we
found strong framing effects on anger, this argument implies that subtle changes in
the emphasis of specific aspects of an issue can alter attitudes by eliciting emotions,
without substantially affecting one’s beliefs about the issue. Another explanation
for the weaker effect may be that most participants already had solid beliefs about
youth violence because youth violence is a media topic. This explanation implies
that appealing to emotions might be an efficient persuasion strategy when individuals already have solid beliefs about an issue. This assumption is in line with
th
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Beyond Cognitive Framing Processes: Anger
Mediates the Effects of Responsibility
Framing on the Preference for Punitive
Measures
Rinaldo Kühne1 , Patrick Weber2 , & Katharina Sommer3
1 Amsterdam School of Communication Research, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
2 Institute of Communication Science, University of Hohenheim, Stuttgart, Germany
3 Institute of Mass Communication and Media Research, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
A new stream of research indicates that framing effects are based on emotional as well
as cognitive processes. However, it is not entirely clear whether emotions mediate framing effects and what the moderators of emotional mediation processes are. To address
these questions, we conducted an experiment in which the framing of responsibility for a
social problem was manipulated (ambivalent vs. high-responsibility frame). We find that
the high-responsibility frame increased the preference for punitive measures by increasing
responsibility beliefs and eliciting anger. Furthermore, we find that trait anger moderates
the framing effect on anger and that responsibility beliefs are positively associated with
anger intensity. The significance of these findings for framing research and suggestions for
future studies are discussed.
Keywords: Framing Effects, Policy Preferences, Indirect Effects, Cognitive Mediation
Processes, Emotional Mediation Processes.
doi:10.1111/jcom.12151
A plethora of studies have investigated the effects of news frames on policy preferences. These studies demonstrate that frames can have significant effects on media
users’ opinions. At the same time, the number of studies that investigate the processes that underlie the effects of news frames has steadily increased. Still, a comprehensive picture of the psychological mechanisms that produce framing effects is
far-off. Accordingly, it has been proposed that the psychological mechanisms of framing effects must be further investigated (Lecheler, Schuck, & de Vreese, 2013; Slothuus,
2008). Further research on these psychological mechanisms is necessary because, as
Berger, Roloff, and Roskos-Ewoldsen (2010) note, “[i]t is one thing to identify the
Corresponding author: Rinaldo Kühne; e-mail: R.J.Kuhne@uva.nl
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effects of various news story frames, but it is quite another to explain why the observed
framing effects occur” (p. 10). According to Berger et al. (2010), a theory of framing
effects requires a clear understanding of the processes that produce these effects. Only
by knowing these psychological mechanisms can we explain and accurately predict
the effects of news frames.
Following this suggestion, we take a closer look at the mediating processes that
underlie framing effects on policy preferences. More precisely, we focus on the role of
emotions, which has rarely been investigated in framing effects research. Following
the seminal work of Nabi (2003) and Gross (2008), we propose that cognitions and
emotions mediate the effects of news frames on policy preferences. Furthermore, we
postulate that emotional mediation processes are influenced by specific moderators.
Below, we first discuss the concept of emphasis framing and then explain how frames
can elicit emotions and how emotions influence opinions. We then review the literature about emotional framing effects. Based on this review, we formulate hypotheses
about the cognitive and emotional effects of news frames. We then describe the design
and results of an experiment in which we tested our theoretical assumptions. In the
final section, we discuss our findings and directions for future research.
Emphasis framing of political news
Different conceptualizations of news framing exist (Entman, Matthes, & Pellicano,
2009). An established line of research investigates the effects of emphasis framing (also
called issue framing) on policy preferences (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Lecheler & de
Vreese, 2012; Slothuus, 2008). Emphasis framing consists in increasing or decreasing
the salience of particular issue aspects in political news (Druckman, 2001; Entman
et al., 2009). The effects of emphasis framing on policy preferences are mostly investigated by presenting participants in an experiment with frames that focus on different
issue aspects. These studies have demonstrated that selecting certain issue aspects in
political news can lead individuals to focus on the respective aspects when forming
an attitude. For instance, Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) found that participants
in an experiment focused on the right of free speech or on the argument of public
order when forming an opinion about public rallies, depending on which considerations were focused on in a news program they had watched before. However, it is
important to note that this empirical approach to framing effects has been criticized.
Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009) argue that the original conceptualization of framing
effects is that presentational differences of the same information affect opinion formation. Accordingly, emphasis framing studies should investigate how differences in the
accentuation of the same issue aspect or the same considerations influence attitudes. It
has been proposed that framing devices, such as lexical features (particularly in headings, subheadings, and leads), quotes, and exemplars (Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Tankard,
2001) can be used to differentially accentuate a particular issue aspect or consideration. In line with this research, the present study investigates the effects of differences
in the accentuation of personal responsibility—indicated by differences in the causal
language used in the headings, subheadings, and the lead of a news article, the use of
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quotes from responsible actors, and the use of exemplars of responsible actors—on
the preference for punitive policies.
Applying emotion theory to framing effects
Effects of news framing on policy preferences are mostly explained through cognitive mechanisms. In fact, it is proposed that frames exert their influence on policy
preferences by affecting cognitive beliefs (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012; Nelson et al.,
1997; Price & Tewksbury, 1997; Slothuus, 2008). Although cognitive framing processes are well corroborated, a number of studies have demonstrated that the effects
of news frames on policy preferences cannot be fully explained by cognitive processes
(Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012; Slothuus, 2008). These studies indicate that additional
mediators of framing effects exist. More important, appraisal theories of emotion
(Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 2001; Scherer, 2001) indicate that certain news frames may
also elicit emotional responses, such as anger, fear, or sadness. According to these theories, emotions result from cognitive evaluations of events. Individuals are assumed
to continuously assess their environment and, in doing so, conduct a series of characteristic appraisals. Appraisals are regarded as evaluative cognitions or beliefs that
not only reflect the properties of an event, but also indicate how the event is relevant to the individual’s needs and preferences (Frijda & Mesquita, 2000; Lazarus,
1991; Smith & Kirby, 2000). Although each appraisal theory proposes a specific set
of relevant appraisals, most appraisal theories agree that the appraisals of valence,
certainty, controllability, and responsibility are central to the process of emotion elicitation (Roseman, 2001; Scherer, 2001). Specific emotions, such as anger, fear, or sadness, result from specific configurations of cognitive appraisals. For instance, anger is
elicited when an event is appraised as negative, certain, controllable, and caused by a
specific actor.
Several researchers have suggested that appraisal theories of emotion are useful to
explain how news frames elicit emotions (Aarøe, 2011; Gross, 2008; Kim & Cameron,
2011; Nabi, 2003). They propose that by selecting and accentuating certain aspects of
an issue, news frames suggest certain appraisals or evaluative beliefs that may result
in emotional responses. This line of reasoning indicates that cognitive framing processes can elicit emotional responses: If a news frame produces certain evaluative
beliefs about an issue, then emotional responses can result. Note that this perspective also suggests that emotions are the product of more or less active and conscious
evaluation processes because emotions are assumed to be produced by evaluative
beliefs. However, emotion theory suggests that active and conscious evaluations are no
requirement for emotional responses to occur. Rather, appraisal theory suggests that
appraisals can also be automatic and unconscious (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987; Smith
& Kirby, 2000) and that emotions can thus precede conscious thoughts (LeDoux,
1999; Zajonc, 1984). Emotions can be automatically elicited through schematic processes which are based on the activation of emotional schemata, that is, schemata
that comprise information about events that previously elicited emotions and about
the emotional experiences associated with these events (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987).
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Thus, when news frames select and accentuate aspects of an issue that are related to
emotionally charged schemata and attitudes, this can cause the automatic activation
of emotions without a conscious effort by the recipient (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987;
Smith & Kirby, 2000).
So far, we have discussed two different paths by which news frames can elicit emotions. However, for emotions to be mediators of framing effects on policy preferences,
they must also feed into judgment processes. Empirically, it is well established that
emotions exert a strong influence on judgments (see for an overview Lerner & Keltner, 2000) and, as Nabi (2003) notes, it is thus plausible to assume that emotions are
functionally equivalent to frame adoption. Emotion theory postulates that “the core
of an emotion is the readiness to act and the prompting of plans” (Oatley & Jenkins,
1996, p. 96). Emotions are assumed to support an individual’s adaptation to his or her
environment by quickly signaling to the individual what a situation is about and what
actions are necessary to resolve the situation (Lazarus, 1991; Lerner & Keltner, 2000).
Accordingly, theoretical approaches such as the affect infusion model (Forgas, 1995)
and the affect as information approach (Schwarz, 1990) postulate that emotions entail
an evaluative meaning that influences judgments and decisions. For instance, anger
signals to individuals that an actor is responsible for a negative event and that the actor
must be punished. Accordingly, anger has been shown to increase the preference for
punitive measures (Nabi, 2003; Nerb & Spada, 2001).
Finally, it should be noted that the emotional processes that were just discussed
are influenced by specific moderators. As the emotion research has identified many
different moderators, it is not possible to discuss them all, but they generally belong to
two classes. On the one hand, there are moderators that influence how strong the emotional responses to a stimulus are. For instance, personality traits such as trait anger
and trait anxiety influence the intensity of anger and fear responses (Lerner & Keltner,
2000). On the other hand, there are moderators of emotional influences on judgments.
For instance, affective orientation, that is, an individual’s tendency to actively consider their emotions in making judgments, should support emotional influences on
judgments. Both types of moderators are likely to influence the strength of emotional
mediation processes in framing effects.
Altogether, emotion research thus indicates that it is plausible to assume that framing effects are mediated by cognitive beliefs and emotions and that these processes
are influenced by emotion-related moderators. In the Results section, we review the
empirical evidence for these assumptions.
The evidence for emotional mediation processes in framing effects
The previous section demonstrated that it is plausible to assume that emotions are
mediators of framing effects on opinion formation. However, research on emotional
framing effects is still sparse. A series of studies corroborates the assumption that news
frames can elicit emotions by selecting certain issue aspects. In an experiment, Kim
and Cameron (2011) manipulated the framing of an article about a cell-phone battery explosion accident. They found that the frame that focused on the producer’s
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intentional wrongdoing produced more anger, whereas the frame that focused on the
victims of the accident elicited more sadness. Igartua, Moral-Toranzo, and Fernández
(2011) presented an experiment’s participants with two different frames about immigration: One frame focused on the economic contributions of immigrants, and the
other frame focused on immigrant crime. They found that the economic contribution frame elicited more positive emotions. In contrast, the criminality frame elicited
stronger negative emotions. Similar findings were obtained in studies about the effects
of frames that emphasize gains or losses. For example, Shen and Dillard (2007) found
that gain-frames produced more positive and less negative emotions in comparison
to loss-frames.
In the studies discussed so far, the framing manipulations consisted of presenting participants with news articles that focused on different issue aspects. Studies
on episodic and thematic framing indicate that exemplars can be used to accentuate individual responsibility and individual suffering (see Iyengar, 1991), which can
also influence emotional responses. For instance, Aarøe (2011) investigated the influence of thematic and episodic news frames about an immigration act on emotions.
She found that episodic frames, highlighting an individual immigrant’s situation, produced stronger feelings of anger, disgust, pity, and compassion than a thematic frame
that presented statistical information about immigration. Aarøe’s experiment shows
that framing an issue through the use of exemplars can increase emotional responses.
Although most of the studies discussed so far included measures of the participants’ attitudes toward the issue of the framed messages, it must be emphasized that
none of the studies investigated whether the emotional responses mediated the framing effect on participants’ attitudes. Only a few framing studies have actually tested
emotional mediation processes. Gross (2008) presented an experiment’s participants
with an article arguing against mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses. She
found that episodic frames that focused on a convicted woman’s situation elicited
more sympathy and pity than the thematic frame, which provided details about sentencing guidelines and statistical information. More importantly, Gross demonstrated
that empathy, a measure that combined sympathy and pity, mediated the effects of
episodic frames on participants’ attitudes toward mandatory minimum sentences: The
episodic frames increased opposition to mandatory minimum sentences by eliciting
empathy. Thus, the use of exemplars initiated an emotional mediation process. Major
(2011) conducted an experiment with a 2 (thematic vs. episodic framing) × 2 (gain
vs. loss framing) factorial design. She found that gain-framed articles about a health
issue elicited more happiness and less anger, sadness, and guilt than a loss-framed
article. However, there were no systematic effects of episodic and thematic frames
on emotional responses. Apparently, the selection of certain considerations affected
emotional responses, whereas the use of exemplars did not. Major also investigated
whether emotional responses mediated the framing effects on attributions of responsibility for health problems. However, only one indirect effect was significant: The loss
framing increased attributions of societal responsibility by producing a greater magnitude of guilt. Finally, Lecheler et al. (2013) conducted an experiment in which they
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investigated how frames influence opinion formation through the selection of issue
aspects. They presented participants with news frames that either focused on positive or negative economic consequences of the enlargement of the European Union
(EU). They demonstrated that the positive frame increased support for EU enlargement by eliciting more enthusiasm. In contrast, the negative frames decreased support
by eliciting more anger.
No framing study has yet investigated the conditions that influence emotional
mediation processes. A few framing studies indicate that moderators, such as prior
attitudes (Igartua et al., 2011) and political ideology (Gross & D’Ambrosio, 2004),
influence recipients’ emotional responses to news frames. For instance, Igartua et al.
(2011) found that their experiment’s criminality frame induced more negative emotions when the immigrants were identified as Moroccan than when they were identified as Latin American. Apparently, prior attitudes toward Moroccans were more
negative, which, in turn, supported more intense negative emotional reactions. These
findings support the notion that emotional framing processes are influenced by specific moderators.
The review suggests that the empirical evidence for emotional mediation is still
sparse in framing research. In particular, the interplay between cognition and emotion in framing effects has not been empirically investigated yet. However, it should
be noted that other branches of research have provided insights into the interplay of
emotion and cognition in judgment formation. Research on judgments of responsibility has shown that cognitive attributions affect emotional responses and attitudes.
More precisely, whether individuals hold an actor responsible or not for a negative
event affects their anger response, which, in turn, predicts the evaluation of the actor
(Betancourt & Blair, 1992; see also Weiner, 1995). Similar results were obtained by
Russell and Giner-Sorolla (2011), who investigated emotional influences on moral
judgments. Their findings suggest that the depiction of an immoral behavior had
an indirect effect on the moral evaluation of the behavior. The depiction influenced
appraisals of intentionality, abnormality, and harm, the appraisals elicited anger, and
anger supported the judgment that the behavior was immoral. Accordingly, Horberg,
Oveis, and Keltner (2011) conclude in their review on the role of emotions in moral
judgments that emotions arise from cognitive appraisals, and, in turn, have specific
effects on moral judgments. Overall, these findings corroborate the notion that cognitive evaluations can precede emotions in judgment processes.
In summary, initial findings indicate that emotions may indeed mediate the effects
of news frames on attitudes. Still, we are far from having a comprehensive understanding of emotional mediation processes. First, to our knowledge, no framing study has
simultaneously tested the cognitive and emotional mediation processes in a single
experiment. Accordingly, the relationship between cognitions and emotions has not
been investigated in framing research. Second, framing research has yet to investigate
the moderators of emotional mediation processes. Thus, in the present study, we not
only model cognitive and emotional mediation processes but also test whether the
emotional mediation process was moderated.
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Cognitive and emotional effects of responsibility framing
As Cappella and Jamieson (1997) note, “it makes little sense to conduct expensive
research into news frames that are infrequent, insufficiently described, or not a consistent component of the news environment” (p. 57). Because various researchers have
pointed out that the framing of responsibility is a core function of media frames (Entman, 1993; Iyengar, 1991; Valkenburg, Semetko, & de Vreese, 1999), we investigate
the cognitive and emotional effects of changes in the framing of responsibility of
social groups. We assume that a frame which accentuates responsibility, that is, which
presents an issue in such a way as to attribute personal responsibility for causing a
problem to a social group, will increase the preference for punitive measures in comparison to an ambivalent frame that does not accentuate a group’s responsibility for
causing a problem (H1).
To explain this effect, we propose that news frames can initiate cognitive and
emotional processes. First, news frames should promote beliefs that are consistent
with the frame’s perspective on an issue (Nelson et al., 1997; Price & Tewksbury,
1997). More precisely, we assume that a responsibility frame, accentuating that a
problem was caused by the reckless behavior of a social group, will promote the belief
that this group is responsible (H2). By promoting this belief, the high-responsibility
frame should also elicit anger because appraisals of personal responsibility are the
main determinant of anger responses (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 2001; Scherer, 2001).
Empirically, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that individuals experience stronger
anger when they attribute responsibility to an individual or a group (Betancourt &
Blair, 1992; Nerb & Spada, 2001; Weiner, 1995). Thus, hypothesis 3 posits that the
belief that adolescents are responsible has a positive effect on anger. In addition,
because news frames can have a direct effect on emotion through automatic and
unconscious processes, we assume that the framing of responsibility has a positive
direct effect on anger (H4).
Furthermore, we assume that there are interindividual differences concerning
the strength of emotional processes. Given that we investigate how the framing of
responsibility elicits anger, we propose that recipients’ trait anger is an important
moderator. Trait anger is defined as “the disposition to perceive a wide range of
situations as annoying or frustrating, and the tendency to respond to such situations with more frequent elevations in state anger” (Spielberger, 1988, p. 1). Thus,
we assume that high-trait-anger individuals will experience more intense anger in
response to the high-responsibility frame than low-trait-anger individuals. In line
with the assumption that anger can be elicited by two different processes, we propose
that trait anger increases the anger response by supporting the interpretation that
adolescents are responsible (Spielberger, 1988; see also Kuppens & Tong, 2010).
Thus, we propose that trait anger moderates the framing effect on the belief about
responsibility (H5a). Moreover, trait anger should increase the anger response by
amplifying the direct framing effect on anger (H5b). High-trait-anger individuals
should have more anger-related schemata that can be automatically activated by
a stimulus (see Leventhal & Scherer, 1987). In a nutshell, trait anger is assumed
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to increase anger by facilitating automatic anger responses and the generation of
anger-related cognitions.
Once triggered by a news frame, beliefs and emotions influence judgments. Individuals who believe that a specific group is responsible are more likely to favor punitive
measures (H6). Based on the work by Lazarus (1991), Lerner and Keltner (2000), and
Nerb and Spada (2001), we also postulate that anger motivates individuals to punish
the culprits and thus increases the preference for punitive measures (H7).
In summary, we propose three different mediation processes. First, there exists
a cognitive mediation process. The framing of responsibility increases the belief that
adolescents are responsible, which, in turn, increases the preference for punitive measures. Second, there exists an emotional mediation process. The framing of responsibility elicits more anger, which then increases the preference for punitive measures.
Third, there exists a three-step mediation process in which cognitions and emotions
interact. The framing of responsibility increases the belief that adolescents are responsible, this belief increases anger, and anger increases the preference for punitive measures. Finally, both mediation processes in which anger is involved are assumed to be
moderated by trait anger.
Method
Design and participants
To test the hypotheses, we conducted an online experiment. The study employed a
between-subjects experimental design in which the framing of a news article about
youth violence was manipulated. In total, 155 participants were exposed to one of
two versions of a news article (ambivalent frame vs. high-responsibility frame).1 The
second, quasi-experimental factor was the participants’ trait anger. Participants were
undergraduate students at the large university in Switzerland; 70% were female, and
the average age was 23.8 years. All participants were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions. Five participants were removed from the sample because they
clicked through the survey and did not fill in the survey seriously.
Procedure
The stimulus materials and the survey were presented online to the participants. The
participants were instructed that they should first read a news article about a current
issue and then answer questions about the article. Participants were then presented
with one of two news articles about youth violence that were framed differently. After
reading the stimulus, the survey was administered.
Stimulus materials
We created two versions of a news article about juvenile violence (ambivalent frame
vs. high-responsibility frame). The goal was to produce two news frames that provide the same substantial information (see Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009) about youth
violence and only differ in their emphasis of adolescents’ responsibility. For this purpose, we used the model by Weiner (1995), which suggests that human causation and
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intentionality are two main determinants of responsibility judgments. Accordingly,
perceptions of high human causation and high intentionality should promote judgments of high-responsibility. To translate this rationale into two differently framed
versions of a news article, we built on the work by Tankard (2001) and Pan and Kosicki
(1993), who propose that journalists construct frames by using framing devices such
as lexical features in headings and leads, quotes, and exemplars. Accordingly, two
frame versions were produced that are identical in structure and provide the same
basic information about the problem, but vary with regard to headings, subheadings,
leads, quotes, and exemplars. Both versions begin with a headline and a short lead and
consist of four paragraphs that are separated by three subtitles. Following an identical introductory paragraph, both versions provide the same description of national
statistics about adolescent violent crime that show an increasing crime rate. In each
version, the third paragraph describes the current characteristics of youth violence
from the perspective of a public prosecutor in juvenile court. Both versions end with
an identical paragraph reporting that the government is currently reviewing appropriate measures to address the problem of youth violence. To manipulate the framing
of the article, the headline and the lead of the article and the subtitle and content of
the third paragraph were varied.
Specifically, the high-responsibility frame emphasizes human causation by highlighting the juvenile originators of violence. The headline of this version is “The
propensity to violence of young people increases,” whereas the ambivalent version’s
headline is “Federal council reacts to rising youth violence.” Similarly, the manipulated subtitle in the high-responsibility frame version is “Ruthless behavior of young
offenders.” The respective subtitle in the ambivalent frame version is “Victims and
offenders.” To highlight human causation in the high-responsibility frame, an exemplar juvenile culprit who testifies in juvenile court appears in the third paragraph.
Altogether, adolescents—and only adolescents—are held accountable for the general
development in the high-responsibility frame version, whereas human causation is
not specifically emphasized in the ambivalent version. Both versions do not mention
any other causes of youth violence, such as situational or social causes.
Moreover, the two frames differentially emphasize the intentionality of young
offenders. Both versions of the article state that the offenders are aware of the negative consequences for their victims, but do not care about the consequences. This
information is emphasized in the high-responsibility frame version by including the
adjective “reckless” in the manipulated subtitle and the following sentence in the
lead: “In particular, recklessness by young offenders has raised concerns.” To further
emphasize that young offenders exercise violence intentionally, the description of the
public prosecutor in the high-responsibility frame version’s third paragraph states
that “exerting violence gives them a feeling of power” and that violence serves as a way
to gain standing within the peer group and demonstrate superiority. Additionally,
the young culprit justifies his crimes by referring to the “law of the jungle.” Thus,
no mitigating circumstances (e.g., violence as learned behavior within the family)
or higher moral goals that could alleviate moral responsibility are given. Altogether,
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R. Kühne et al.
by emphasizing human causation and intentionality, the high-responsibility frame
places a stronger emphasis on adolescents’ responsibility in causing the problem of
youth violence than the ambivalent frame (Weiner, 1995).
Measures
The survey measured the participants’ emotional responses, their beliefs about youth
violence, their preference for punitive measures, and covariates. All measures are
based on 7-point rating scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). All items
for all assessments in the questionnaire were in German.
Mediators
Participants were first asked to report their emotional responses to the news article.
Anger (e.g., “I felt angry,” α = 0.85) was measured with three items. Because we propose that a high-responsibility frame only produces anger and no other emotions, we
also measured fear and sadness to corroborate this assumption. The emotions were
selected because the description of violent criminals might also elicit fear and because
the mention of victims might also elicit sadness (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2001). Fear
was measured with three items (e.g., “I felt anxious,” α = 0.89). Sadness was measured
with two items because one indicator was removed due to low internal consistency
(e.g., “I experienced pity,” α = 0.78). Then, the participants were asked to report their
beliefs about youth violence. Because Weiner (1995) posits that responsibility judgments incorporate assessments of human causation and intentionality (see also the
description of the stimulus materials), we formulated indicators that represent these
aspects. The resulting measurement instrument for the belief that adolescents are
responsible consists of five items (e.g., “Aggressive adolescents are the main cause
of violence in public places,” “Violent adolescents solely bear the responsibility for
their actions,” α = 0.72). Thus, three emotional indices were formed: an anger index
(3 items, M = 4.17, SD = 1.62), a fear index (3 items, M = 4.22, SD = 1.47), and a sadness index (2 items, M = 3.54, SD = 1.60). Furthermore, an index for the belief that
adolescents are responsible (5 items, M = 4.66, SD = 1.07) was formed.
Moderator
We adapted items from Spielberger’s (1988) instrument that measures an individual’s
general propensity to respond to various situations with anger. The items were altered
to reflect an individual’s propensity to experience anger when exposed to political
news. We modified the original measure of trait anger because we needed a measure
that is more closely linked to media use processes. Three items were constructed to
assess trait anger (α = 0.83). The items were “Political news often makes me angry,”
“Frequently, news reports depict persons whose behavior makes me angry,” and
“When there are reports about injustice, I often get very angry.” These items were
combined into a measure of trait anger (M = 4.08, SD = 1.42). Note that the index
for trait anger was mean-centered to facilitate the interpretation of results (see next
section).
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Dependent variable
The preference for punitive measures was assessed with three items (e.g., “Adolescents
must be severely punished for violent acts,” α = 0.80). These items were also summarized to form an index (M = 3.90, SD = 1.37).
Covariates
We measured the participants’ left-right orientation with one item (1 = left, 7 = right;
M = 3.29, SD = 1.42) because a right-wing orientation has been shown to increase
the preference for punitive policies (Skitka & Tetlock, 1993). We also measured how
participants evaluated the news article’s quality with three items (e.g., “The article is
professionally made,” α = 0.81) to rule out the possibility that potential differences
in the two articles’ quality would promote differences in the preference for punitive
measures. Based on these items an index was formed (M = 4.83, SD = 1.17).
Results
First, we conducted a series of preliminary analyses of variance (ANOVAs), with
frame type (ambivalent vs. high-responsibility) as the independent variable and the
emotional responses as dependent variables, to investigate the emotional effects of
the framing manipulation.2 The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 1.
As predicted, the framing of responsibility only influenced the anger response
(F(1, 148) = 14.68, p < .001), but neither fear (F(1, 148) = 1.42, p = .24) nor sadness
(F(1, 148) = .05, p = .83). The high-responsibility frame produced more anger
(M = 4.51, SD = 1.59) in comparison to the ambivalent frame (M = 3.47, SD = 1.48).
Thus, fear and sadness were not included in the subsequent analyses.
Second, we tested whether the high-responsibility frame increased the preference
for punitive measures (H1). We conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
with the frame type (ambivalent vs. high-responsibility) as the independent variable,
the preference for punitive measures as the dependent variable, and the political
orientation and article quality evaluation as the covariates. The analysis showed a
significant effect of the frame type on policy preferences (F(1, 145) = 3.99, p < .05).
Participants who read the high-responsibility frame were more in favor of punitive
measures (M = 4.05, SD = 1.35) than those who read the ambivalent frame (M = 3.63,
SD = 1.39). Thus, hypothesis 1 is corroborated.
Third, we investigated the mediation processes that produced the framing effect
on the preference for punitive measures, that is, we estimated the proposed moderated mediation model. The model was tested with Mplus 6 and maximum likelihood
estimation. In the model, the following variables were included: The frame type (i.e.,
the experimental manipulation) was entered as the independent variable; the anger
response and the cognitive belief that adolescents are responsible were entered as
mediators; as it was assumed that cognitive beliefs produce emotions, a path from
the belief that adolescents are responsible to anger was included; the preference for
punitive measures was entered as the dependent variable, which was predicted by cognitive beliefs and anger. Furthermore, trait anger was included as a moderator of the
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Table 1 Emotions in the Ambivalent and the High-Responsibility Frame Conditiona
Frame Type
Anger
M
(SD)
Fear
M
(SD)
Sadness
M
(SD)
a Means
Ambivalent (n = 49)
High-Responsibility (n = 101)
3.47
(1.48)
4.51
(1.59)
4.02
(1.51)
4.32
(1.44)
3.5
(1.80)
3.56
(1.50)
and standard deviations are depicted.
Figure 1 Moderated Mediation Model of Emotional and Cognitive Framing Effects. Unstandardized regression coefficients are depicted. ns p > .10, * p < .05, *** p < .001. The effects of trait
anger on beliefs and anger and the effects of political orientation and article quality evaluation
on beliefs, anger, and preference for punitive measures were estimated but are not depicted in
the figure.
two paths from the frame type to cognitive beliefs and anger.3 Finally, political orientation and article quality evaluation were included as covariates. Fit indices show that
the model has a good fit to the data: χ2 (3) = 2.70; p = .44, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00,
SRMR = .02. The estimated model is depicted in Figure 1.
Hypothesis 2 posits that the high-responsibility frame increases the belief that
adolescents are responsible for violence. The results show that the high-responsibility
frame increased the participants’ belief that adolescents are responsible (b = 0.38,
SE = 0.19, p < .05). Thus, we accept the hypothesis. Hypothesis 3 predicts that the
belief that adolescents are responsible increases the anger response. The hypothesis
is also corroborated. The stronger the belief that adolescents are responsible, the
more anger is elicited (b = 0.24, SE = 0.12, p < .05). These findings indicate that
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news frames can indeed elicit emotions by influencing cognitive beliefs. Hypothesis
4 predicts that news frames can also directly elicit emotional responses. We find
that participants exposed to the high-responsibility frame felt more anger than
participants exposed to the ambivalent frame (b = 0.86, SE = 0.23, p < .001). This
corroborates hypothesis 4.
Furthermore, we hypothesized that the elicitation of anger is moderated by trait
anger. Hypothesis 5a posits that the positive effect of the high-responsibility frame
on the belief that adolescents are responsible increases with trait anger. However, we
find no significant interaction on cognitive beliefs (b = −0.08, SE = 0.15, p = .59).4
Hypothesis 5b posits that trait anger moderates the effect of the frame manipulation
on the anger response. This assumption is corroborated (b = 0.39, SE = 0.18 p < .05).
Because trait anger was mean-centered, the significant effect of the frame manipulation on anger, which we have reported above, can be interpreted as the average framing
effect on anger (across all values of trait anger). On average, the high-responsibility
frame elicits more anger than the ambivalent frame. The significant positive interaction indicates that the particular effect of the frame manipulation depends on the
recipients’ trait anger; the positive effect of the frame type on anger increases with trait
anger. This finding corroborates hypothesis 5b.
Although we have no theoretical expectations about the direct effects of trait anger
on the mediating variables, trait anger was included as an independent variable to
correctly specify the model (see Hayes, 2013). There was a significant effect of trait
anger on the belief that adolescents are responsible (b = 0.28, SE = 0.13, p < .05) but
no effect on anger (b = 0.06, SE = 0.16, p = .71). However, note that these coefficients
are difficult to interpret because interaction terms between frame type and trait anger
are included in the model and because frame type was not mean-centered (which is
not sensible when a variable is dichotomous). Because we have no hypotheses about
the direct effects of trait anger, we do not further explore these effects.
We now turn to the mediators’ effects on the dependent variable, that is, the
preference for punitive measures. According to hypothesis 6, participants that hold
adolescents responsible for violence are more in favor of punitive measures. We find
that the belief that adolescents are responsible indeed increases the preference for
punitive measures (b = 0.38, SE = 0.09, p < .001), which corroborates hypothesis 6.
Hypothesis 7, regarding the influence of anger, is also corroborated. Participants’
anger response was positively associated with the preference for punitive measures
(b = 0.25, SE = 0.07, p < .001).
Thus far, the findings indicate that there are multiple mediation processes at work
that produce the framing effect on the preference for punitive measures. However,
as the current methods literature suggests, researchers should not base inferences
about indirect effects on separate tests of the constituent paths. Rather, indirect effects
should be quantified and explicitly tested for their significance (Hayes, 2013). Mplus
provides explicit tests of specific mediation processes in a path model, which are based
on bootstrapped and bias-corrected confidence intervals (Muthén & Muthén, 2012).
Thus, we tested the indirect effects using the bootstrap procedure to estimate 95%
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Table 2 Conditional Indirect Framing Effect on the Preference for Punitive Measures
Through Angera
Value of Trait Anger
−1 standard deviation (= −1.42)
Mean (= 0.00)
+1 standard deviation (= +1.42)
Indirect Effect
Through Anger on
Policy Preference
95% BiasCorrected CI
b = 0.08
b = 0.21
b = 0.35
−0.08 to 0.32
0.07 to 0.43
0.14 to 0.65
a Unstandardized regression coefficients are depicted. Lower and upper bounds of bootstrapped
(5000 samples) and bias-corrected confidence intervals are depicted.
bias-corrected confidence intervals (95% bc CI).5 Note that a confidence interval indicates a significant effect when zero does not lie between the lower and the upper bound
of the interval.
First, the significant effect of the frame manipulation on cognitive beliefs (H2)
and the significant effect of cognitive beliefs on the preference for punitive measures
(H6) indicate that a cognitive mediation process is at work. Testing this indirect effect
yields a significant result (b = 0.14; 95% bc CI: 0.02 to 0.34). Thus, the framing of
responsibility increased the preference for punitive measures by increasing the belief
that adolescents are responsible. Second, the significant paths from the frame manipulation to the cognitive beliefs (H2), from cognitive beliefs to anger (H3), and from
anger to the preference for punitive measures (H7) suggest a three-step mediation
process. The test of this indirect effect also shows a significant result (b = 0.02; 95% bc
CI: 0.00 to 0.09). Thus, the framing of responsibility has a positive effect on the preference for punitive measures, which is mediated by beliefs about responsibility and
anger. Third, the significant paths from the frame manipulation to anger (H4) and
from anger to the preference for punitive measures (H7) indicate that anger mediates
the framing effect on the preference for punitive measures. Moreover, the significant
interaction between the frame manipulation and trait anger (H5b) suggests that the
strength of this indirect effect depends on individuals’ propensity to experience anger.
To test these assumptions, we estimated the indirect framing effect through anger on
the preference for punitive measures for three different values of the moderator (see
Hayes, 2013). More precisely, we estimated the indirect framing effect when the moderator is equal to the mean as well as plus and minus one standard deviation from the
mean. Table 2 summarizes the results of this final analysis.
We find that the indirect framing effect through anger increases with trait anger. At
low levels of trait anger (−1 standard deviation), anger does not mediate the framing
effect on the preference for punitive measures. However, when trait anger is average or
high, anger mediates the framing effect on the preference for punitive measures. Thus,
there exists a conditional indirect effect through anger that depends on the recipients’
trait anger.
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Finally, we inspected the (residual) direct effect of frame type on the preference
for punitive measures by adding this path to the model. The model shows that there
is no direct framing effect when the cognitive and emotional mediation processes are
controlled (b = 0.05, SE = 0.18, p = .27). This finding indicates that the cognitive and
emotional mediators that were considered are able to explain virtually the entire effect
of frame manipulation on the preference for punitive measures.
Discussion
This study demonstrated that a high-responsibility frame’s effect on the preference for
punitive measures was mediated by cognitive beliefs about responsibility and anger.
More important, we found that the high-responsibility frame had a direct and an indirect effect on anger. The frame indirectly elicited anger by increasing the belief that
adolescents are responsible. Furthermore, the strength of the direct framing effect on
anger was dependent on recipients’ trait anger: The framing of responsibility had a
stronger effect on anger for high-trait-anger individuals and, thus, anger was a more
important mediator for these individuals. The findings corroborate the assumption
that classical approaches, which explain framing effects through cognitive mechanisms, should be expanded to include emotional processes.
However, some limitations must be considered. First, this study investigated the
emotional effects of a specific type of frame: the high-responsibility frame. Our findings show that anger is an important mediator of this frame type. Of course, one
cannot infer from this finding that emotions are always important mediators of framing effects. Appraisal theories suggest that emotions are elicited when certain combinations of appraisals are activated by a stimulus (Roseman, 2001; Scherer, 2001).
Accordingly, emotional elicitation depends on the frame’s specific content and focus
(or rather the recipient’s interpretation of the frame’s content and focus). There may be
some frames that activate such appraisal patterns, thus eliciting emotions, and there
may be other frames that do not activate such appraisals, thus not eliciting emotions.
Furthermore, it is plausible to assume that other frames can also produce different
emotional responses, such as sadness, fear, or disgust. Future studies should investigate whether the effects of other frame types (e.g., human impact frames or morality
frames) are based on cognitive processes, emotional processes, or both. These studies
should also examine whether emotional influences support or compromise reasonable judgments. Answering these questions is important because knowledge about
emotional processes and effects is required to evaluate certain frame usage in news
reports and decide whether their usage is problematic.
Second, our findings suggest that the framing effect on anger was on average
stronger than the effect on the cognitive belief that adolescents are responsible. This
raises a question about why the effect on cognitive beliefs was weaker. One explanation is that the framing manipulation was relatively subtle. The basic facts were
the same in both framing conditions (i.e., the crime rate is rising, many adolescents
are violent), and the frames only differed in the accentuation of certain information,
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which might have led to similar beliefs about adolescents’ responsibility. Because we
found strong framing effects on anger, this argument implies that subtle changes in
the emphasis of specific aspects of an issue can alter attitudes by eliciting emotions,
without substantially affecting one’s beliefs about the issue. Another explanation
for the weaker effect may be that most participants already had solid beliefs about
youth violence because youth violence is a media topic. This explanation implies
that appealing to emotions might be an efficient persuasion strategy when individuals already have solid beliefs about an issue. This assumption is in line with
th