Managing Internal Conflicts Dominance of
496
V I C T O R D. C I I A
~
~ ~ ~ o nf a l~det, lal. d1998.
, Executive Suiiriirr~ryo j t l ~ eReport o/tlze Coiiirr~issiorrto Assess
tile Bcr/lislic Missile 7'\1reot to the Utriled Slntcs. Washil~gton,D.C.: USGPO.
Itussett, Bruce. 1989. "The Real Decline in Nuclear Hegemony." In Ernst-Otto Czempiel
clrrd Tlreoreiiccll Clrallei~ges.Lexington, Mass.:
a n d James Rosenau, eds., Global Cl~ai~ges
Heath.
Sagan, Scott. 1994. T11e Liii~itso j Sajety: Orgatzizatiotrs, Accideirts, a i ~ dNuclear Weapons.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
.
1996-97. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" li~teri~nlioi~nl
Security 21(3)
(Winter): 54-86.
,
and Kenneth Waltz. 1995. The Spread ojNuclear Weapotrs: A Dcbnte. New York:
Norton.
sands, Amy. n.d. Tlie Noirprol~erotioti Kegiines a1 Risk. CNS Occasional Paper 3. Monterey, Calif., Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Scheinman, Lawrence. n.d. "Challenges in South Asia to Nonproliferation Regimes." CNS
Occasional Paper 3. Monterey, Calif., Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Schelling, Thomas. 1960. Tlie Slrotegy 01Coiiflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press.
Sin&, Jaswant. 1998."Against Nuclear Apartheid." Foreigt~Affoirs 77(5) (Sept./Oct.): 41-52.
Snyder, Glenn. 1965. "The Balance of Power and Balance of Terror." In Paul Seabury, ed.,
Tile Balar,ce ojpolver. San Francisco: Chandler.
Stokes, Mark. ~yyy.Cliii~a'sStralegic Moderi~izntiotz: Iiirplicatiotrs lor tlie Ui~itedStates.
carlisle, PA. U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute.
Talbott, strobe. 1999. "Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia." Forcigir Afirirs 88(2)
(Mar./A[x.): 110-22.
Tannenwald, Nina. 1999. "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States %id the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use." Ii~teri~ntioifal
Orgni~izntioti53(3) (Summer): 433-68.
TracIltenberg, Marc. 1985. "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis." 1,lternatioilal Security lo(1) (Summer): 137-63.
Urayama, Kori J. 2000. "Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense." Asiarr S i r n ~ ~ ~
40(4): 599-621.
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Tlieory ojltrtert~atiotialPolitics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
Wheeler, Nicholas J. 1990. "The Dual Imperative of Britain's Nuclear Deterrent: The Soviet Threat, Alliance Politics, and Arms Control." In Mark Hoffman, ed., UK Arms
Colztrol in tlre 1~90's.New York: Manchester University Press.
Wilkening, Dean. 2000. Ballistic-Missile Delence atid Strategic Stability. Adelphi Paper 334.
London: IISS.
Yasmeen, Samina. 1999. "Pakistan's Nuclear Tests: Domestic Debate and International
Journal o~lt~ternatiotralA/jnirs
53(1):43-56.
~ ~ t e r ~ i n a n tAttstraliatz
s."
Managing Internal Conflicts
Dotninance of the State
i-
r
ARUN R. SWAMY A N D JOHN GEKSHMAN
i
Within months of declaring a "war against global terrorism," U.S. President
George W. Bush found his administration engaged in trying to prevent a convenjI tional war between two states armed with nuclear weapons, both of which oste11-F sibly supported Anlerican goals. A suicide attack by Islainic militai~tsagainst the
Indian parliament in New Delhi, which followed a n earlier attack o n the legislative asseinbly of the Indian state of J a m m u and Kashmir, brought India to the
brink o f war with Pakistan, the United States' principal ally against tlie Taliban
regime i n Afghanistan.
It has become c o m m o n wisdom to suggest that internal conflicts now pose the
gravest consequences for international security, and many have even argued for a
new n o r m of "justifiable intervention" b y external powers in civil wars. O n the
surface, the connection between the insurgency in Indian-held Kashmir a n d India's dispute with Pakistan over the status of Kashmir is a paradigmatic instance
of this position. However, Kashmir is i n many ways a departure from the norm,
at least in Asia, except in demonstrating the obstacles to actually engaging in such
intervention. In Asia, the trend is in the opposite direction from that suggested by
common wisdom: the heyday for external intervention i n internal conflict was
during the Cold War. Since then Asian states have tended more toward mutual
acknowledgment of territorial sovereignty. The shift in the priorities of the major
western powers since September 11, 2001, will only strengthen this trend.
The central argument of this chapter is that in Asia the onus of managing internal conflict is o n the states suffering conflict themselves. While external actors
affected by these conflicts might press for policies that reduce their intensity, the
j
49 8
SWAMY AND GERSITMAN
policies will have to be consistent with the goals of the states suffering the internal conflict tl~emselves.And the success of the policies in turn depends 011 taking
illto account the dynamic nature of the internal conflicts. Asian states are among
the most militarized in the world, and most control the principal, if not the sole,
means of cvelcion within their territories, making armed intervention a costly
proposition. Maintaining and consolidating control over their territories remains
the primary goal of these states, so that their willingness to adopt new management strategies will be conditioned by how they perceive these policies as likely
to affect domestic control and stability. At least irl the area of managing inter~ial
conflicts, then, Asia is unlikely to move toward a ~lornlative-contractualorder as
defined by Mutl~iahAlagappa in this volume, or if it does, such an order will be
limited to defining states' reciprocal obligations in the area of preventing terrorism.
The chapter develops this argument in three sections. The first fleshes out the
reasons why management of internal conflict is left to states by examirlillg how
three types of internal conflict-over national unity, national identity, artd regime identity-interact with the regional environment. The second analyzes the
overlapping sources of these conflicts in socioeconomic change and state policy.
The third then identifies management strategies consistent with the sources identified. While the argument is made with illustrations from many cases in Asia and
beyond, each section also includes relevant material on thre-se
studies, each
drawn from a different subregion of Asia and representing a different type of
conflict. The cases have been chosen for their potential regional impact and in
some particulars may represent exceptions to the general pattern. They are India's insurgency in Kashmir, Indonesia's struggle with Islamism, and China's response to its democratization challenge.
TABLE
14.1
Seprlrrilist Corlflicls ill the Asia Pacijic
Clrirui
T'ibet
India (passive)
Kaslimir
Punj,111 (S~klisi
111(lirl
Pakistan. China, U.S., U N
Pakistan, espatriates
Northeast (several)
Da~~glatlesli,
13urriia, China
East 'l'imor
West 1';ipua
Aceli
Australia, UN
Auatralii~,I'apua New C;uinea
Centre lor t
V I C T O R D. C I I A
~
~ ~ ~ o nf a l~det, lal. d1998.
, Executive Suiiriirr~ryo j t l ~ eReport o/tlze Coiiirr~issiorrto Assess
tile Bcr/lislic Missile 7'\1reot to the Utriled Slntcs. Washil~gton,D.C.: USGPO.
Itussett, Bruce. 1989. "The Real Decline in Nuclear Hegemony." In Ernst-Otto Czempiel
clrrd Tlreoreiiccll Clrallei~ges.Lexington, Mass.:
a n d James Rosenau, eds., Global Cl~ai~ges
Heath.
Sagan, Scott. 1994. T11e Liii~itso j Sajety: Orgatzizatiotrs, Accideirts, a i ~ dNuclear Weapons.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
.
1996-97. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" li~teri~nlioi~nl
Security 21(3)
(Winter): 54-86.
,
and Kenneth Waltz. 1995. The Spread ojNuclear Weapotrs: A Dcbnte. New York:
Norton.
sands, Amy. n.d. Tlie Noirprol~erotioti Kegiines a1 Risk. CNS Occasional Paper 3. Monterey, Calif., Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Scheinman, Lawrence. n.d. "Challenges in South Asia to Nonproliferation Regimes." CNS
Occasional Paper 3. Monterey, Calif., Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Schelling, Thomas. 1960. Tlie Slrotegy 01Coiiflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press.
Sin&, Jaswant. 1998."Against Nuclear Apartheid." Foreigt~Affoirs 77(5) (Sept./Oct.): 41-52.
Snyder, Glenn. 1965. "The Balance of Power and Balance of Terror." In Paul Seabury, ed.,
Tile Balar,ce ojpolver. San Francisco: Chandler.
Stokes, Mark. ~yyy.Cliii~a'sStralegic Moderi~izntiotz: Iiirplicatiotrs lor tlie Ui~itedStates.
carlisle, PA. U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute.
Talbott, strobe. 1999. "Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia." Forcigir Afirirs 88(2)
(Mar./A[x.): 110-22.
Tannenwald, Nina. 1999. "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States %id the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use." Ii~teri~ntioifal
Orgni~izntioti53(3) (Summer): 433-68.
TracIltenberg, Marc. 1985. "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis." 1,lternatioilal Security lo(1) (Summer): 137-63.
Urayama, Kori J. 2000. "Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense." Asiarr S i r n ~ ~ ~
40(4): 599-621.
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Tlieory ojltrtert~atiotialPolitics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
Wheeler, Nicholas J. 1990. "The Dual Imperative of Britain's Nuclear Deterrent: The Soviet Threat, Alliance Politics, and Arms Control." In Mark Hoffman, ed., UK Arms
Colztrol in tlre 1~90's.New York: Manchester University Press.
Wilkening, Dean. 2000. Ballistic-Missile Delence atid Strategic Stability. Adelphi Paper 334.
London: IISS.
Yasmeen, Samina. 1999. "Pakistan's Nuclear Tests: Domestic Debate and International
Journal o~lt~ternatiotralA/jnirs
53(1):43-56.
~ ~ t e r ~ i n a n tAttstraliatz
s."
Managing Internal Conflicts
Dotninance of the State
i-
r
ARUN R. SWAMY A N D JOHN GEKSHMAN
i
Within months of declaring a "war against global terrorism," U.S. President
George W. Bush found his administration engaged in trying to prevent a convenjI tional war between two states armed with nuclear weapons, both of which oste11-F sibly supported Anlerican goals. A suicide attack by Islainic militai~tsagainst the
Indian parliament in New Delhi, which followed a n earlier attack o n the legislative asseinbly of the Indian state of J a m m u and Kashmir, brought India to the
brink o f war with Pakistan, the United States' principal ally against tlie Taliban
regime i n Afghanistan.
It has become c o m m o n wisdom to suggest that internal conflicts now pose the
gravest consequences for international security, and many have even argued for a
new n o r m of "justifiable intervention" b y external powers in civil wars. O n the
surface, the connection between the insurgency in Indian-held Kashmir a n d India's dispute with Pakistan over the status of Kashmir is a paradigmatic instance
of this position. However, Kashmir is i n many ways a departure from the norm,
at least in Asia, except in demonstrating the obstacles to actually engaging in such
intervention. In Asia, the trend is in the opposite direction from that suggested by
common wisdom: the heyday for external intervention i n internal conflict was
during the Cold War. Since then Asian states have tended more toward mutual
acknowledgment of territorial sovereignty. The shift in the priorities of the major
western powers since September 11, 2001, will only strengthen this trend.
The central argument of this chapter is that in Asia the onus of managing internal conflict is o n the states suffering conflict themselves. While external actors
affected by these conflicts might press for policies that reduce their intensity, the
j
49 8
SWAMY AND GERSITMAN
policies will have to be consistent with the goals of the states suffering the internal conflict tl~emselves.And the success of the policies in turn depends 011 taking
illto account the dynamic nature of the internal conflicts. Asian states are among
the most militarized in the world, and most control the principal, if not the sole,
means of cvelcion within their territories, making armed intervention a costly
proposition. Maintaining and consolidating control over their territories remains
the primary goal of these states, so that their willingness to adopt new management strategies will be conditioned by how they perceive these policies as likely
to affect domestic control and stability. At least irl the area of managing inter~ial
conflicts, then, Asia is unlikely to move toward a ~lornlative-contractualorder as
defined by Mutl~iahAlagappa in this volume, or if it does, such an order will be
limited to defining states' reciprocal obligations in the area of preventing terrorism.
The chapter develops this argument in three sections. The first fleshes out the
reasons why management of internal conflict is left to states by examirlillg how
three types of internal conflict-over national unity, national identity, artd regime identity-interact with the regional environment. The second analyzes the
overlapping sources of these conflicts in socioeconomic change and state policy.
The third then identifies management strategies consistent with the sources identified. While the argument is made with illustrations from many cases in Asia and
beyond, each section also includes relevant material on thre-se
studies, each
drawn from a different subregion of Asia and representing a different type of
conflict. The cases have been chosen for their potential regional impact and in
some particulars may represent exceptions to the general pattern. They are India's insurgency in Kashmir, Indonesia's struggle with Islamism, and China's response to its democratization challenge.
TABLE
14.1
Seprlrrilist Corlflicls ill the Asia Pacijic
Clrirui
T'ibet
India (passive)
Kaslimir
Punj,111 (S~klisi
111(lirl
Pakistan. China, U.S., U N
Pakistan, espatriates
Northeast (several)
Da~~glatlesli,
13urriia, China
East 'l'imor
West 1';ipua
Aceli
Australia, UN
Auatralii~,I'apua New C;uinea
Centre lor t