Vol.2 No.1 Februari 2012
ISSN: 2301-4717
Volume 2, Nomor 1, Februari 2012
Jurnal
Akuntansi
dan Keuangan
1
The Relation of Corporate Governance to Firm Performance and
Management Compensation as Mediating Variable
Endang Surasetyo Ningsih, Wida Fadhlia dan Rahmawaty
11
Akuntabilitas sebagai Alat Pengukuran Kinerja Pemerintah Daerah
Yusri Hazmi, Faisal dan Zuarni
17
Keputusan Perusahaan Melakukan Share Repurchase:
Free Cash Flow Hypothesis ataukah Signaling Theory
Eddy Suranta, Pratana Puspa Midiastuty dan R. Ryan Mulya Wijaya
Pengaruh Rasio Analisis Fundamental Terhadap Return Saham:
Perbedaan Pengaruh Antara Saham Syariah dan Non Syariah
Dedy Oktri Hadi Saputra dan Rini Indriani
31
49
Pengaruh Kualitas Pelayanan Terhadap Kepuasan Pasien dan Dampaknya
pada Proitabilitas (Pemulihan Pembiayaan) Rumah Sakit di Kota Bengkulu
Silke Wulandari dan Fachruzzaman
69
Analisis Potensi Keuangan Daerah Pemerintah Kota Lhokseumawe
dalam Pelaksanaan Otonomi dan Desentralisasi Daerah
M. Haykal
89
Pengaruh Kepemilikan Manajerial, Komite Audit, Leverage, dan
Umur Perusahaan Terhadap Pengungkapan Modal Intelektual
Syawal Harianto
JURUSAN AKUNTANSI
Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Malikussaleh
Jurnal Akuntansi
dan Keuangan
ISSN: 2301-4717
VOLUME 2, NOMOR 1, FEBRUARI 2012
HALAMAN 1 – 101
Terbit 2 kali dalam setahun pada setiap bulan Februari dan Agustus, berisi tulisan yang diangkat dari hasil-hasil penelitian maupun pemikiran bidang akuntansi dan atau keuangan
yang relevan bagi pengembangan profesi dan praktek akuntansi di Indonesia
EDITORS
M. Haykal (Chief of Editor)
Hilmi (Managing Editor)
Muammar Khaddai, Amru Usman
Hendra Raza, Mursyidah
Rita Mutia, Naz’aina
Iswadi, Yurina
REVIEWERS
Ade Fatma Lubis
Universitas Sumatera Utara
Adi Zakaria Afif
Universitas Indonesia
Erlina
Universitas Sumatera Utara
Fachruzzaman
Universitas Bengkulu
Julli Mursyida
Universitas Malikussaleh
Islahuddin
Universitas Syiah Kuala
Kamil Md. Idris
School of Accountancy UUM-Malaysia
Murhaban
Universitas Malikussaleh
Rini Indriani
Universitas Bengkulu
Syukri Abdullah
Universitas Syiah Kuala
TB. Ismail
Universitas Tirtayasa
Wahyuddin
Universitas Malikussaleh
Zaafri Husodo
Universitas Indonesia
EDITORIAL SECRETARY
Rayyan Firdaus
Harry Hassan Masyarafah
Kusnandar Zainuddin
EDITORIAL OFFICE
Gedung Jurusan Akuntansi FE-Unimal
Kampus Bukit Indah, Lhokseumawe
Telp/Fax. 0645-40210/0645-40211
Email: jak@fe-unimal.org
JURNAL AKUNTANSI DAN KEUANGAN diterbitkan sejak Februari 2011
Oleh Jurusan Akuntansi FE-Unimal
Redaksi menerima sumbangan tulisan yang belum pernah diterbitkan dalam media lain.
Naskah diketik rapi sesuai kebijakan editorial (lihat dihalaman belakang jurnal)
di atas kertas HVS A4 spasi ganda dengan jumlah 30 – 40 halaman.
Naskah yang masuk akan dievaluasi dan disunting untuk keseragaman format.
Daftar Isi
The Relation of Corporate Governance to Firm Performance and
Management Compensation as Mediating Variable
Endang Surasetyo Ningsih, Wida Fadhlia dan Rahmawaty
1-10
Akuntabilitas sebagai Alat Pengukuran Kinerja Pemerintah Daerah
Yusri Hazmi, Faisal dan Zuarni
11-16
Keputusan Perusahaan Melakukan Share Repurchase:
Free Cash Flow Hypothesis ataukah Signaling Theory
Eddy Suranta, Pratana Puspa Midiastuty dan R. Ryan Mulya Wijaya
17-29
Pengaruh Rasio Analisis Fundamental Terhadap Return Saham:
Perbedaan Pengaruh Antara Saham Syariah dan Non Syariah
Dedy Oktri Hadi Saputra dan Rini Indriani
31-47
Pengaruh Kualitas Pelayanan Terhadap Kepuasan Pasien dan Dampaknya
pada Proitabilitas (Pemulihan Pembiayaan) Rumah Sakit di Kota Bengkulu
Silke Wulandari dan Fachruzzaman
49-68
Analisis Potensi Keuangan Daerah Pemerintah Kota Lhokseumawe
dalam Pelaksanaan Otonomi dan Desentralisasi Daerah
M. Haykal
69-88
Pengaruh Kepemilikan Manajerial, Komite Audit, Leverage, dan
Umur Perusahaan Terhadap Pengungkapan Modal Intelektual
Syawal Harianto
89-101
JurNAl2,AKuNtANsi
dAN2012
KeuANgAN
Volume
Nomor 1, Februari
issN: 2301-4717
Jurnal Akuntansi
Keuangan
Volume
2, Nomor dan
1, Februari
2012
p 1-10
THE RELATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
TO FIRM PERFORMANCE AND MANAGEMENT
COMPENSATION AS MEDIATING VARIABLE
eNdANg surAsetyo NiNgsih1, WidA FAdhliA1 dAN rAhmAWAty1
1
Dosen Pada Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Syiah Kuala
The objective of this research is to investigate inluence of corporate governance to
management compensation and subsequent irm performance. This study uses data from
manufacture companies that listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange for the inancial reporting in 2003
– 2005 periods. The sample consists of 198 observations over a three-year period for 66 publicly
traded irms. The mechanism of corporate governance is to be proxy by managerial ownership
and number of commissioner proportion board. Management compensation is measured
using sum of remuneration that reported in audited inancial reporting. Firm performance
is to be proxy by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) after compensation is
awarded. The result was showed that managerial ownership and number of commissioner
proportion board giving signiicant positive impact to management compensation. Even
though, managerial ownership as one of mechanism of corporate governance has negative
coeficient to management compensation. This study was ind that corporate governance and
management compensation was not impact to subsequent irm performance. This result was
indicated that compensation did not designed optimally and corporate governance did not
work effectively.
Keywords: corporate governance, management compensation, subsequent irm
performance
BACKGROUND
the indonesian for Corporate governance
(IICG) together with SWA Magazine were
leading a rate survey to companies applying
good corporate governance (GCG) for corporate
governance perception index 2005 (CGPI). Good
corporate governance (GCG) application success
in a company could not be separated from
the stakeholders’ role, especially the primary
ones such as the employees and managers. The
stakeholders were motivated to work actively
and cooperate with the company to increase the
performance, job opportunity and the company
continually. This closely related to the employees
and managers and might created balanced value
between the company owner and the stakeholders.
The company would professionally give some
kinds of compensation based on their performance
and integrity. The torch participant number in the
last 5 active years would create a question; if the
good corporate governance (GCG) application in
the company value creation had no relation with
optimal compensation value?
Indonesian monetary crisis directly affected
in conviction and inancial crisis in trading world.
The inancial crisis was once caused by the less
transparency and accountability, and this made
the information manipulation possibly done by a
company. Later, this created a good arrangement
concept known as good corporate governance
(GCG) mechanism. The important matter often
become a debate in corporate governance was the
chosen compensation contract. The main point
of the debate was the existence and function
of the remuneration committee. According to
the corporate governance and corporate ethics
published by the BUMN State Ministry ofice
in 1999, a duty of the remuneration committee
function was to examine and recommend the
remuneration system changes of the management,
commissaries, and employees in order to show
the relationship between the irm performance
target achievement and accepted compensation
rate. Later, the decrease of the torch participant
number annually would also create a question,
ENdANG SURASETyO NINGSIh, WIdA...
whether the decision to apply the corporate
governance and optimal compensation were not
closely related to the company occupation in the
following year?
Eisenhardt (1989) stated three assumptions
related to the agency theory as the based theory
in the owner and management contract. They
were: (1) human nature behavior generally
put personal importance above the others’
(self interest); (2) man basically had limited
imagination to the future perception (bounded
rationality) and (3) man always avoided the risk
over him though there were others to sacriice
(risk averse). Gibbon and Murphy (1992)
showed that the optimal compensation contract
was an incentive combination implicitly related
to the compensation contract which was capable
to motivate and give direction to the company
manager to a maximal company occupation.
Some people realized the importance of the
application of the good corporate governance
(GCG) principal convinced to be able to create
conducive condition and irm base to perform
the company operational right, eficient, and
proitable; to increase and create balanced value
between the shareholders and stakeholders. This
study was attractive because of several reasons.
First, indonesian economic condition disturbed
by a multidimensional crisis, made the good
governance reading more become a benchmark
in recovered and stability in the economic
condition especially in corporation management.
Second, the good corporate governance (GCG)
pressuring was more aimed to protect the
minority stockholders’ right and importance. In
the other side, the good corporate governance
(GCG) application success could not be separated
from all company stakeholders’ role, so that the
compensation to the achievement was needed to
increase the conviction and also the company
value and a value creation to the shareholders.
Third, this study was a reaction to the surveyed
year by year member decrease phenomenon.
The research was aimed to investigate if there
was a positive relationship in the good corporate
governance (GCG) application to the management
compensation. More over, this research wanted
to investigate if there were a relationship between
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
the good corporate governance (GCG) application
and the management compensation to the next
company occupation.
OVERVIEw OF THEORETICAL
Agency relationship perspective was a
base used to view corporate governance. The
main point of the agency relationship was the
existence of the separation between the owned
(in principal / investor side) and control (in agent
/ manager side). Investor had their expectation to
earn return from their invested money. Therefore,
a good contract between the investor and the
management was a contract which was able to
explain detail speciications should be performed
by the manager in managing the investor’s fund,
and speciication related to the return distribution
between the manager and the investor. Agency
relationship was a contract between the principal
and agent developed by Jensen and Meckling
(1976); and Fama and Jensen (1983).
Agency relationship was emphasized to
overcome two main problems occasionally
appear in the agency relationship. According
to Eisenhardt (1989), the irst problem was
a problem appeared when: (a) the desire and
purpose of the principal and agent were opposite
and (b) it was a hard or expensive to the principal
to verify the agent real tasks. The problem appears
when the principal could not verify the agent real
tasks precisely. The second problem was the risk
sharing problem appeared when the principal and
agent had different action preference caused by
their different preference toward the risks.
Shleiver and Vishny (1997) stated that the
corporate governance concept based on the
agency theory was expected to be functioned as
the tools to solve all agency problems and also
give the conviction to the investor that they would
gain the appropriate return of the fund invested.
Entity theory viewed the company as an entity
apart from its owner and creditor. The relationship
between the management and the company owner
was a principal-agent relationship paradigm, in
which the company owner as the principal gave
the conviction to the management who gave its
managerial service. Compensation was a human
Volume 2, Nomor 1, Februari 2012
resource management strategy to create a job
harmonious which had different importance for
different person. Some took compensation as
a return from the service given by the human
resources gained as an organization, or a value
addicted by the company to the human resource
competence and ability, or, an appreciation given
by the company to dedicated person (Simamora,
1995).
Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that
compensation was a service value given by
the owner to the management. Compensation
contract showed the service response value given
by the principal to the management. Formally, the
compensation contract was a bundle between the
manager and principal to perform some activities
in the name of the principal, aimed to maximally
the company value in order to increase the
shareholders prosperity at the end. Therefore,
the management compensation contract was
designed to motivate the management to fulill
the job occupation determined previously by the
principal.
Among the mentioned factor to motivate the
creation of the effective company management
creation, the commissaries council (management
structure) was a main factor affected the manager
behavior in the company management. In a
modern corporation, compensation policy was
delegated to the commissaries council. When
the compensation designed optimally, the
compensation contract could be a motivation
tools to maximally all stakeholders’ prosperity.
Jensen (1993) stated that several problems
appeared in the internal mechanism system
(management structure) was started with the
existence of the commissaries council possessing
inal responsibility in the company. The
commissaries council possessed the authority
to make rules to the manager in managing
the company, employing, iring, and creating
compensation policy and also giving some
strategic advices. More number of commissaries
would increase the service and control function
because there were more skilful persons and
more valuable advices in the company strategy
and management. According to Kusumawati and
Riyanto (2005), the relationship between the
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
number of commissaries council member and
the company value were supported by control
and service function perspective given by the
commissaries council. Consultation and advice
given were valuable services to the management
never been given by the market. Their research
also found that the investor’s will to give more
premiums was supported by the service and
control given by the commissaries.
Several researches showed that the council
structure would be able to explain cross-sectional
variation in management compensation. hallock
(1997) in his research on 500 companies in 1992
discovered that the council with interlocking
relationship and council measurement had an
effect to the higher management compensation.
Core, holthausen and Larcker (1999) observed
the compensation rate to 205 companies and
discovered that the council composition variable
(council head variable was CEO, council number,
council came from the internal company, council
came from the external company, council with
interlock relationship, council member with
age above 69, and busy council) had positive
and signiicant relationship to the company
compensation level.
Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (2002) in their
research about compensation determinant in
public companies in the beginning of 1990, stated
that Ceo or also the head of the council, and the
number of the council, had positive relationship
to the compensation. Grinstein and hribar (2004)
stated that CEO would affect the new council
member election process, CEO was also the head
of the council and the number of the council
would signiicantly affect the compensation.
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2006) in their
observation result found that the council structure
was a signiicant determinant to the measure and
structure of the CEO compensation.
h1: there was a positive relationship between the
number of the commissaries and management
compensation.
different importance in a company was caused
by different ownership characteristics, such
as: (1) dispersed ownership. Gilberg and Idson
(1995), husnan (2000) in hastuti (2005) found
ENdANG SURASETyO NINGSIh, WIdA...
that the company with more dispersed ownership
gave more payment to the management compared
to the company with concentrated ownership. In
this type of company ownership we could ind
two categories of stockholders named controlling
interest and minority interest (shareholders). (3)
BUMN ownership.
Core, haolthausen and Larcker (1999) in
their research found that management ownership
structure had a substantive cross-sectional
relationship to the management compensation.
Empiric research led by Xu and Wang (1999)
in hastuti (2005) explained more the research
result as followed: (1) There was signiicantly
a positive relationship between the concentrated
ownership and productivity as a proxy of the
company occupation. (2) The concentrated
ownership affection was stronger for companies
dominated by legal person shareholders
compared to those dominated by company. (3)
The company proitability positively related to
the stock ownership proxy by a legal person but
negatively related to the stock ownership by the
company. (4) Employee productivity tended to
decrease when the stock ownership proportion
by the company was increased. Stock ownership
by legal person shareholders could monitor the
management effectively through the supervision
of the board of directors, the company employee
election and the compensation award to the chief
corporate oficer.
h2: there was a positive relationship between
the ownership structure and management
compensation.
The distinction deinition of good corporate
governance (GCG) did not affect the distinction
of meaning and purpose. Forum for corporate
governance in Indonesia (2001) used the deinition
of Cadbury Committees named: a set of rules
arrange the relationship among the stockholders,
company management (manager), creditor,
government, employee, and other internal and
external interest holder related to their rights and
also responsibilities. In the other word, a system
arranged and controlled the company. More
details, the good corporate governance (GCG)
terminology could be used in order to explain
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
the role and behavior of the direction council,
commissaries council, the company manager and
the stockholders.
Empirically, result of the observation of
corporate governance applied in a company
related to the company occupation was remained
inconsistent. Several others researches showed
that there were no relationship between
the corporate governance and the company
occupation, such as daily and friends (1998) and
CBI survey result, deloitte and Touche (1996),
as copied in darmawati, Khomsiyah and Rahayu
research (2004).
McKinsey research, as copied by Lukuhay
(2002) and Raick (2002), had proved that
investor in the advanced countries willing to give
a quite high premium, nearly take the average of
28% to the company consistently applying the
corporate governance principal. As an addition,
evidences proved that the stocks of the companies
enjoyed the market valuation among 10% to 12%
were founded. Gompers and friends (2003) in
their observation found a positive relationship
between the corporate governance index and
long-term company occupation. darmawati
and friends (2004) in their analysis showed that
corporate governance would statistically and
signiicantly affect the return on equity. This
proved the hypothesis that corporate governance
would affect the company internal occupation.
Klapper and Love (2002) founded the positive
relationship between the corporate governance
and company occupation measured using the
return in assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. Other
important result gained from their observation
was that the corporate governance application in
the company level had more importance in the
development countries that those in the advanced
countries.
This research would use the company speciic
internal mechanism as a proxy from good corporate
governance named the ownership structure and
management structure. Xu and Wang (1999)
successfully proved that the ownership structure
(mix and concentrated) signiicantly affect the
company occupation. demztz and Lehn (1985)
in hastuti (2005) discovered that there was no
signiicant relationship between the concentrated
Volume 2, Nomor 1, Februari 2012
ownership with accounting proit level for 511
largest companies in United States.
holderness and Sheehan (1988) analyzed 144
listed companies in NySE with stocks ownership
more than 50,1% and found that Tobin’s Q
result was higher when the company was
owned by majority stockholders. Tobin’s Q was
signiicantly lower for companies with individual
majority stockholders. McConnell and Servaes
(1990) took samples of more that 1000 companies
discovered that Tobin’s Q positively related to the
stocks ownership proxy by individual investor.
the commissaries council service and control
function as corporate governance mechanism
could be seen as a signal to the investor that the
company had managed as its required (positive
signal). Investors were expected to accept this
signal and willingly paid higher premium for
well-governed companies in Indonesia. Thus, the
good corporate governance (GCG) application
would relate positively with the company
occupation in the investors’ view (Labelle, 2002
in Kusumawati and Riyanto, 2005).
Executive manager skills and ability were
closely related to the inancial performance in an
organization. Therefore, a good understanding
was needed between the executive compensation
level and monetary success measurement. The
stockholders used the company compensation
scheme as a tool to monitor and or to motivate
the manager. Jensen and Murphy (1990) stated
that the stockholders demanded the executive
to act maximally the organization value to the
owner and other stockholders in the company.
the stockholders and other stakeholders needed
to ind out if the executive salary at present
commonly related to the company occupation
and if there was a possibility to motivate the
executive to make some decisions in order to
increase the organization value.
Some researches showed signiicant
relationship among the managerial compensation
and the monetary occupation, the market
occupation and the company measurement.
Leonard
(1990)
tested
the
executive
compensation and organization structure policy
inluence to the company occupation. The
result showed that the companies with long-
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
term incentive plan signiicantly enjoyed larger
return of equity, compared to the companies
without long-term incentive plan. Abowd (1990)
tested the managerial compensation sensitively
to the company occupation in a year positive
relationship with the company occupation in the
following year. The occupation measure based
on the accounting resulted in a weak relationship
while the occupation based on the economy and
market created stronger support.
Ely (1990) analyzed the relationship between
the compensation and occupation of four major
industries (utility, bank, oil and gas, and retail) and
discovered that the Ceo compensation to bank
industry was directly related to the accountant
variable. Shim, Lee and Corrigan (1999)
observed the Ceo compensation determiner in
monetary institute by testing the relationship
between the CEO compensation and occupation
based on the accounting and based on the market.
The result showed that the CEO compensation
would signiicantly and positively related to
the ROA with lower degree and related to the
ROE and market-to-book assets. The company
measurement showed a positive relationship with
Ceo compensation total and cash compensation
(salary and bonus). Magnan and St-Onge (1997)
tested how the relationship between the bank
occupation and executive compensation tended
to be related to the bank occupation in higher
managerial policy context.
h3: there was a positive relationship between
the management compensation and corporate
governance with the following company
occupation.
RESEARCH METHODS
The sample of the observation was taken from
the population based on the purposive sampling.
The ending numbers of the sample were 66
companies and 198 observations. The data used
in this research was second data. The corporate
governance data used was the data of the
ownership structure and commissaries number
taken from monetary report gained from UGM
modal market database. Firm Performance data
was the market and monetary data gained from
ENdANG SURASETyO NINGSIh, WIdA...
Indonesian Capital Market directory 2003-2005.
The company management compensation was the
numeric data of commissaries and management
stated in the annual report of the audit monetary
report note 2003-2005.
Management compensation was a return
of the service given by human resources for
the organization, or value closely put by the
company to the ability and human resources
talent. Management compensation was measured
by the level of remuneration achieved by the
commissaries and management in a year of
observation. The remuneration number listed
covered total salary and bonus achieved.
Corporate governance was a relationship,
system and process pattern led by the company
organs (management, commissaries council,
RUPS) in order to give additional value to the
stockholders as a long term period continuously,
which also considering the other stakeholders
importance based on the governmental rules and
valid norms. Corporate governance was proxy
using the ownership structure variable and the
number of the commissaries.
Firm Performance was a company ability
sketch to produce its proit in the past and could be
projected to the future to see the company ability
to gain more in the present period, so that the
investor might read the part of total proitability
that could be allocated to the stockholders’
hands. In this research, the irm performance was
measured using both the ROA (Net Proit / Total
Assets) and ROE (Net Proit / Total Equity).
The company assets composition was
measured using the ratio between the constant
assets to the total sales (Klapper and Love,
2002). The growth opportunity was proxy used
IOS counted with MV/BV. hartono (2005)
stated that when the MV/BV value was above 1,
the company would be classiied prospected or
developed, oppositely when the MV/BV value
was less than or equal to 1, the company would
be classiied unprospected or undeveloped. The
company measurement was measured from the
natural log of the sales. Incentive was given to the
management based on its capability in increasing
the sales, which was the key to cost the company
activities (Lewellen and huntsman, 1970).
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
DATA ANALYSIS
in order to gain a common sketch of the research
data sample, we could see the research descriptive
statistic as seen in table 2. dependent variable
in model 1 was management compensation in
2004 which showed approximately 9.4372 with
standard deviation of 0.55370. Management
ownership had approximately 47.1855 with
standard deviation of 19.79762. The commissaries
number had approximately 3.9394 with standard
deviation of 1.58725.
dependent variable in model 2 was the
company occupation in 2005 measured using
ROA and ROE with average 0.5462 and 0.9874
with standard deviation of 0.59378 and 0.64947.
2004 management Compensation independent
Variable, the number of commissaries and
management ownership in 2004 had average
9.4372, 3.82 and 46.7400 with standard deviation
of 0.55370, 1.424 and 19.9516.
hypothesis 1 and 2 Test Result showed
number R square of 0.491, meant that 49.1% total
compensation in 2004 could be explained by the
number of commissaries, management ownership,
company measure, growth opportunity, assets
composition, and company occupation measured
by ROA and ROE in 2003, meanwhile the rest
would be explained by other factors outside
the research model. F-stat value of 8.001 with
signiication level of 0.000 which was less than
0.05 indicated that regression model totally
explained the signiicant compensation in 2004.
The commissaries number had coeficient of
0.178 and positive signal 0.000 less than 0.05
meant that greater number of commissaries
council meant greater number of management
compensation. This meant that based on the
sample of the research, the commissaries number
variable positively and signiicantly affected the
management compensation. Therefore, the irst
hypothesis stated that the commissaries number
positively affected the management compensation
was failed to be rejected.
Managerial ownership which had coeficient
of 0.001 and negative sign with signiicantly
0.825 above the average 0.05 meant that the
management ownership based on the research
Volume 2, Nomor 1, Februari 2012
sample was not a variable which was able to
decide the management compensation. Therefore,
the second hypothesis stated that there was a
positive relationship between the managerial
ownership and management compensation was
failed to be supported.
The third hypothesis test result, dependent
variable measured with ROA and ROE in 2005.
In ROA test, the R square number was 0.068
meant that 6.8% ROA in 2005 could be explained
by compensation in 2004, commissaries number,
management ownership, company measure,
growth opportunity and assets composition in
2004, while the others were explained by other
factors outside the research model. F-stat value
was 0.715 with signiicantly level of 0.639 or
greater than 0.05 indicated that the regression
model was not entirely signiicant, and this
condition would statistically explain the ROA in
2005.
R square number of ROE test was 0.168
meant that 16% ROE in 2005 could be explained
by compensation in 2004, number, management
ownership,
company
measure,
growth
opportunity and assets composition in 2004,
while the others were explained by other factors
outside the research model. F-stat value was
1.988 with signiicantly level of 0.082 or greater
than 0.05 indicated that the regression model was
not entirely signiicant, and this condition would
statistically explain the ROE in 2005.
Regression result showed that the
compensation variable, corporate governance
and economic determiner variables of the
company occupation would not statistically
affect the next company occupation. Therefore,
the third hypothesis stated that compensation and
corporate governance had positive relationship
with the company occupation in the following
year could not be supported. This result supported
Core, holthausen, Larcker (1999) research.
The research tested also the company
occupation in 2004. The compensation variable,
corporate governance and economic determiner
variables of the company occupation would not
statistically affect the company occupation in the
year of 2004.
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
DISCUSSION
the commissaries number in this research
was positively related to the management
compensation. This indicated that the
management compensation was able to catch their
duties, authority, and strategic decisions created
by the commissaries council. Viewed from the
perspective of agency, the positive relationship
would show us that the principal and agent
relationship had a contract to bundle the agent to
service based on their knowledge, experiences,
skill and ability. Watts and Zimmerman (1986)
in their positive accounting theory stated that the
owner and management relationship, commonly
hypnotized in bonus plans was a bundle between
the owner and management shaped in a contract.
Walker (1992) stated that compensation was
a strategic key to human resource management
purposed to create job harmony to achieve the
objective and target decided at the irst place.
therefore, the management compensation contract
was designed to motivate the management to
achieve the occupation target decided previously
by the principal.
Ownership structure measured by managerial
ownership negatively related to the management
compensation. This condition showed that the
management compensation was not affected
by the importance of management possesses
company stocks. The entity theory viewed the
company as an entity separated from the owner
and creditor, separated management from the
company owner. This condition showed that there
was a function separation between the managerial
as owner and as agent.
Other condition was the small proportion
of Indonesian managerial ownership. Major
company ownership taken by company or
institution controlling the company management
was a special characteristic of concentrate
ownership (closely head). Gilberg and Idson
(1995), husnan (2000) research in hastuti
(2005) discovered that the company with more
spreading ownership gave greater payment to
the management compared to the company with
more concentrated ownership.
ENdANG SURASETyO NINGSIh, WIdA...
The irm Performance in some researches
showed the existence of positive relationship
with the compensation or corporate governance.
The hypothesis test result of the research showed
different results. Observed from the statistic
descriptive model 2, average roA 2005 from
the research sample company was 0.5462%
possessing positive correlation sign which was not
signiicant to the compensation 2004 and negative
for both measurement of corporate governance.
This condition showed the low ability of the
company to gain proit from the assets utility.
Average ROE in 2005 was 0.9874, possessing
positive correlation sign which was not signiicant
to the compensation 2004 and negative for both
measurement of corporate governance. This also
showed that the ability of the research sample
of company to distribute the gained proit to the
stockholders was low. Therefore, compensation
and corporate governance were explicitly unable
to be reserved for subsequent irm performance.
The result of model 2 was consistent with
several researches showed that there was no
relationship between the corporate governance
and company occupation, such as daily and
friends (1999) result, CBI survey result, deloitte
and Touche (1996) in darmawati, Khomsiyah
and Rahayu (2004).
According to Kakabadse and friends (2001)
in darmawati, Khomsiyah and Rahayu (2004),
the difference result of the researches was caused
by several reasons. There were: 1) decided
perspective theoretic, 2) Research methodology,
3) Occupation measure, and 4) Opinion distinction
towards the council participation in the decision
making.
The research result showed also that the
compensation contract was not yet optimal to be
a motivation to the company occupation in the
following year. Compensation in 2004 which
had positive relationship with the corporate
governance showed that there was no signiicant
relationship with the subsequent irm performance.
Consistent to the research, Core, holthausen,
Larcker (1999) that the compensation component
had negative association was signiicant to the
ownership and council structure variable, the
management council did not actively supervised
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
and this was an opposite interpretation with the
company request of the CEO quality.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this research was to give
evidence that the corporate governance affected
the management compensation and subsequent
irm performance. This research was expected
to be able to answer some research questions
related to the corporate governance, management
compensation and subsequent irm performance.
Based on the research result performed in the
manufacture companies listed in Jakarta stock
Exchange fulilled the sample election criteria,
we could take several conclusions as follow:
1. The result of this research showed that the
commissaries number would positively
and signiicantly affect the management
compensation in 2004. This fact answered
the research question that the corporate
governance application to create the company
value positively related with the management
compensation. This fact showed also that
compensation as a company human resource
strategy gave reward to the service given by
the commissaries council.
2. The result of this research also gave evidence
that the ownership structure measured
by the managerial ownership had no
positive relationship with the managerial
compensation. This condition indicated that
the control function of the ownership structure
did not work effectively yet.
3. The result of this research answered the
research question that the compensation
and corporate governance did not positively
related to the subsequent irm performance.
This condition showed that the compensation
did not design optimally and the corporate
governance did not work effectively.
SUGGESTION
in this research, mistake might happen
eventually and caused the result could not be
generalized. Some limits in this research were:
1. Compensation data was not ready for all
Volume 2, Nomor 1, Februari 2012
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
management in the strategic level that made
this research used remuneration data for all
the commissaries and management council.
2. The samples used were manufacture
companies only, stated the remuneration
number in their inancial report without
differentiate the company participation in the
corporate governance performance survey.
this fact occurred since the research did
not use the perception index of corporate
governance performed by IICG together with
SWA magazine.
The research was expected to give idea to
develop the next researches. Based on the present
existed limits, the following researches might
give several considerations as follow:
1. Surveying the management compensation
to gain the compensation data for each
management level.
2. Made the good corporate governance (GCG)
index in order to explain all good corporate
governance (GCG) variables so that the good
corporate governance (GCG) application
success measure could be more measurable.
REFERENCES
Grinstein, y., dan hribar, P. 2004. CEO
Compensation and Incentives: Evidence
from M&A bonuses. Journal of Financial
Economics 73.
Abowd, J. M. 1990. Does Performance-based
Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate
Governance?. industrial and labor relations
Review, 43.
Chhaochharia, V., and Grinstein, y. 2006. CEO
Compensation and Board Structure. Journal
of Finance. Version 2006.
Core, John E., holthausen, Robert W., and Larcker,
david F. 1999. Corporate Governance,
Chief Executive Oficer Compensation, and
Firm Performance. Journal of Financial
Economics.
Cyert, R., Kang, S., Kumar, P. 2002. Corporate
Governance, Takeovers, and Top Management
Compensation: Theory and Evidence.
Manegement Science 48.
darmawati, deni, Khomsiyah, and Rahayu, Gelar
R. 2004. Hubungan Corporate Governance
dan Kinerja Perusahaan. Seminar Nasional
Akuntansi VII. denpasar – Bali.
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. 1989. Agency Theory:
An Assesment and Review. Academic of
Management Review. Vol. 14.
Ely, Kirsten M. 1991. Interindustry Differences
in the Relation between Compensation and
Firm Performance Variables. Journal of
Accounting Research. Vol 29.
Fama, Eugene F and M. C. Jensen. 1983.
Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal
of Law and Economics. Vol. XXVI.
Gibbons, R., and Muphy, K. J. 1992. Optimal
Incentive Contracts in The Presence of Career
Concern: Theori and Evidence. Journal of
Political Economy.
Gompers, Paul A., Ishii, Joy L., and Metrick
Andrew. 2003. Corporate Governance
and Equity Prices. Quarterly Journal of
Economics.
hallock, K. F. 1997. Reciprocally Interlocking
Boards of directors and Executive
Compensation. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 32.
hartono, Jogiyanto. 2005. Pasar Eisien Secara
Keputusan. Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
Jakarta.
hastuti, dwi., T. 2005. Hubungan antara
Good Corporate Governance dan Struktur
Kepemilikan dengan Kinerja Keuangan.
Simposium Nasional Akuntansi VIII. Solo.
husnan, Suad. 2000. Corporate Governance:
Pengamatan terhadap Sektor Korporat dan
Keuangan. Seminar Sosialisasi Corporate
Governance. UGM. yogayakarta.
holdernest, C. G., and Sheehan, d. P. 1988. The
Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly
Held Corporation: An Exploratory Analysis.
Journal of Financial Economics 3.
0 ENdANG SURASETyO NINGSIh, WIdA...
Jensen, M. C., and Meckling, W. h. 1976. Theory
of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Cost and Ownership Structure. Journal of
Financial Economics 3.
Jensen, M. 1993. The Modern Industrial
Revolution, Exit, and The Failure of Internal
Control Systems. Journal of Finance 48.
Klapper, Leora F. and I. Love. 2002. Corporate
Governance, Investor Protection and
Performamnce in Emerging Markets. World
Bank Working Paper.
Kusumawati, d. W. and Riyanto, B. 2005.
“Corporate Governance dan Kinerja:
Analisis Pengaruh Compliance Reporting
dan Struktur Dewan terhadap Kinerja.”
Simposium Nasional Akuntansi VIII, 248261.
Lawellen, W. G., and huntsman, B. 1970.
Managerial Pay and Corporate Performamnce.
American Economic Review 60.
Leonard, Jonathan S. 1990. Executive Pay and
Firm Performance. Industrial and Labor
Relations Review. Vol. 43.
Lukuhay, Jos. 2002. Tata Pamong dan Nilai
Perusahaan. Warta Ekonomi, No. 21/XIV/2
September.
Magnan, Michel L and Sylvie St-Onge. 1997. Bank
Performance and Executive Compensation: A
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
Managerial Discretion Perspective. Strategic
Management Journal. Vol 18.
McConnel, J. and Servaes, h. 1990. Additional
Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate
Value. Journal of Financial Economics 27.
Raick, Ishack. 2002. Menggugat Fungsi
Komisaris Independen. SWA, No. 15/XVII/15
Juli-7 Agustus.
shim, eunsup “daniel”, John lee, and thomas
Corrigan. 1999. An Empirical Examination of
Top Executive Compensation and Economic
Performamnce in Financial Service Firms.
Advances in Management Accounting. Vol 8.
Shleiver, A. and R. W. Vishny. 1997. A Survey
of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance
52.
Simamora, h. 1995. Manajemen Sumber Daya
Manusia. STIE yKPN. yogyakarta.
Walker, J. W. 1992. Human Resource Strategy.
Mc Graw-hill, Inc. New york.
Watts, R., and J. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive
Accounting Theory. Englewood Cliffs NJ:
Prenctice hall.
Xu, Xiaonian., and Wang, yang. 1999. Ownership
Structure, Corporate Governance: The Cases
of Chinesse Stock Company. Journal of
Financial economics
JurNAl2,AKuNtANsi
dAN2012
KeuANgAN
Volume
Nomor 1, Februari
issN: 2301-4717
Jurnal
Akuntansi
Keuangan
Volume
2, Nomordan
1, Februari
2012
p 11-16
AKUNTABILITAS SEBAGAI ALAT PENGUKURAN
KINERjA PEMERINTAH DAERAH
yUSRI hAZMI1, FAisAl1 dAN ZUARNI1
1
Dosen Tata Niaga Pada Politeknik Negeri Lhokseumawe
This paper attempts to explain the importance of accountability in order to realize good
governance (good governance). Accountability is one essential element in achieving good
governance. As a manifestation of the implementation of APBN / APBd, the government
is obliged to report on achievements that have been implemented, so that people understand
and can assess whether the government has been working according to plan that has been set,
and load the working principles of effective, eficient. Approach to accountability in inancial
management is the embodiment of creating good government. Accountability can be seen from
various perspectives such as: perfective accounting, functional perspective and the perspective
of accountability systems. Some of the techniques developed to strengthen the accountability
system is strongly inluenced by the method that is widely used in accounting, management
and research, such as management by objectives, performance-based budgeting, operations
research and others. Performance measurement can be grouped into three indicators, namely:
(1) Efforts indicator measurement service, (2) indicators measuring service accomplishment,
and (3) indicators that connects between Efforts with accomplishment. In addition it needs to
be delivered is also an additional explanation relating to the reporting of this performance.
Keywords: accountability, performance measurement
LATAR BELAKANG
Tata kelola pemerintahan yang baik (Good
governance) dapat diartikan sebagai suatu
penyelenggaraan pengelolaan pembangunan
yang bertanggung jawab dengan prinsip
demokrasi, eisien, efetiitas dan pencegahan
korupsi baik secara politik maupun administrasi,
menjalanan disiplin anggaran serta penciptaan
legal dan politikal framework bagi tumbuhnya
aktivitas usaha. Terdapat beberapa karateristik
good governance, meliputi: (1). Partisipation, (2)
Rule of law, (3) Responsiveness, (4) Consensus
oreintation, (5) Equity, (6) Eficiency and
Effectiveness, (7) Accountability and (8) Stategic
vision. Ada beberapa kriteria dalam mewujukan
good governance, seperti: keterbukaan (transparency), eisiensi (eficiency), tanggung jawab
(responsibility) dan kewajaran (fairness).
Pemerintah sebagai pelaku utama dalam
pelaksanaan good governance, dituntut dapat
memberikan pertanggungjawaban secara transparan dan akurat. Saat ini akuntabilitas masih
berfokus pada pengelolaan keuangan negara
(APBN) dan daerah (APBd). Untuk mewujudkan
good
governance
diperlukan
reformasi
kelembagaan dan manajemen publik. Reformasi
kelembagaan menyangkut pembenahan seluruh
alat-alat pemerintah di daerah baik struktur
maupun infrastuktur. Sedangkan reformasi
manajemen publik terkait dengan sistem
pengelolaan keuangan pemerintah daerah, yang
meliputi: sistem anggaran, sistem akuntansi,
sistem pemeriksaan dan sistem manajemen
keuangan daerah.
Fenomena yang dapat diamati dalam
perkembangan sektor keuangan publik adalah
semakin menguatnya tuntuan pelaksanaan
akuntabilitas publik oleh organiasi sektor publik
(seperti: pemerintah pusat dan daerah, unit-unit
kerja pemerintah, departemen dan lembagalembaga negara). Tuntutan akuntabilitas sektor
publik terkait dengan perlunya dilakukan
transparansi dan pemberian informasi kepada
publik dalam rangka pemenuhan hak-hak publik.
Akuntabilitas publik adalah kewajiban
pihak pemegang amanah (agent) untuk
memberikan pertanggung jawaban, menyajikan,
melaporkan dan mengungkapan segala ativitas
dan kegiatan yang menjadi tanggung jawabnya
NAMA PENULIS
kepada pihak pemberi amanah (principal) yang
memiliki hak dan kewenangan untuk meminta
pertanggungjawaban tersebut. dalam kontek
pemerintahan, akuntabilitas publik adalah
pemberian informasi dan disclosure atas ativitas
dan kinerja inancial permerintah kepada pihakpihak yang berkepentingan dengan laporan
keuangan tersebut.
Akuntabilitas dapat dipandang dari berbagai
perspektif, baik akuntansi, fungsional, maupun
sistem akuntabilitas. dari perspektif akuntansi,
American Accounting Association menyatakan
bahwa akuntabilitas suatu entitas pemerintahan
dapat dibagi dalam empat kelompok, yaitu
akuntabilitas terhadap:
1. Sumber daya inansial
2. Kepatuhan terhadap aturan hukum dan
kebijaksanaan administratif
3. Eisiensi dan efektiitas suatu kegiatan
4. hasil program dan kegiatan pemerintah yang
tercermin dalam pencapaian tujuan, manfaat
dan efektivitas.
sedangkan dari perspektif fungsional,
akuntabilitas dilihat sebagai suatu tingkatan
dengan lima tahap yang berbeda yang diawali
dari tahap yang lebih banyak membutuhkan
ukuran-ukuran obyektif (legal compliance) ke
tahap yang membutuhkan lebih banyak ukuranukuran subyektif . Tahap-tahap tersebut adalah:
1. Probity and legality accountability, hal ini
menyangkut pertanggungjawaban penggunaan dana sesuai dengan anggaran
yang telah disetujui dan sesuai dengan
peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku
(compliance).
2. Process accountability, dalam hal ini
digunakan proses, prosedur, atau ukuranukuran dalam melaksanakan kegiatan
yang ditentukan (planning, allocating and
managing).
3. Performance accountability, Pada level ini
dilihat apakah kegiatan yang dilakukan sudah
eisien (eficient andeconomy).
4. Program accountability, di sini akan disoroti
penetapan dan pencapaian tujuan yang
telah ditetapkan tersebut (outcomes and
effectiveness).
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
5. Policy accountability, dalam tahap ini
dilakukan pemilihan berbagai kebijakan yang
akan diterapkan atau tidak (value).
dari perspektif sistem akuntabilitas, terdapat
beberapa karakteristik pokok sistem akuntabilitas,
yaitu :
1. Berfokus pada hasil (outcomes)
2. Menggunakan beberapa indikator yang telah
dipilih untuk mengukur kinerja
3. Menghasilkan informasi yang berguna bagi
pengambilan keputusan atas suatu program
atau kebijakan
4. Menghasilkan data secara konsisten dari
waktu ke waktu
5. Melaporkan hasil (outcomes) dan mempublikasikannya secara teratur
Pemerintah wajib memberikan pertanggungjawabannya atas semua aktivitasnya kepada
masyarakat. Seiring dengan meningkatnya
aktivitas pemerintah dan timbul kesadaran yang
luas untuk menciptakan sistem pertanggungjawaban yang lebih komprehensif. Ternyata
dalam pelaksanaannya, keingintahuan masyarakat
tentang akuntabilitas pemerintahan tidak dapat
dipenuhi hanya dengan informasi keuangan
saja. Masyarakat ingin tahu lebih jauh apakah
pemerintah yang dipilihnya telah beroperasi
dengan ekonomis, eisien dan efektif. Beberapa
teknik yang dikembangkan untuk memperkuat
sistem akuntabilitas sangat dipengaruhi oleh
metode yang banyak dipakai dalam akuntansi,
manajemen dan riset, seperti management by
objectives, anggaran kinerja, riset operasi, audit
kepatuhan dan kinerja, akuntansi biaya, analisis
keuangan dan survey yang dilakukan terhadap
masyarakat sendiri.
Pelaporan pengukuran kinerja (performance
measurement) berkaitan dengan proses yang
dinamakan managing for results (pengelolaan
pencapaian). Proses ini timbul dari meningkatnya
tuntutan, yang bahwa manajemen pemerintahan
perlu memakai pendekatan yang sama dengan
manajemen di sektor swasta maupun organisasi
nir laba lainnya. Proses ini merupakan
pendekatan komprehensif untuk memfokuskan
suatu organisasi terhadap misi (mission), sasaran
Volume 2, Nomor 1, Februari 2012
(goals ) dan tujuan (objectives).
Kewajiban
pemerintah
Volume 2, Nomor 1, Februari 2012
Jurnal
Akuntansi
dan Keuangan
1
The Relation of Corporate Governance to Firm Performance and
Management Compensation as Mediating Variable
Endang Surasetyo Ningsih, Wida Fadhlia dan Rahmawaty
11
Akuntabilitas sebagai Alat Pengukuran Kinerja Pemerintah Daerah
Yusri Hazmi, Faisal dan Zuarni
17
Keputusan Perusahaan Melakukan Share Repurchase:
Free Cash Flow Hypothesis ataukah Signaling Theory
Eddy Suranta, Pratana Puspa Midiastuty dan R. Ryan Mulya Wijaya
Pengaruh Rasio Analisis Fundamental Terhadap Return Saham:
Perbedaan Pengaruh Antara Saham Syariah dan Non Syariah
Dedy Oktri Hadi Saputra dan Rini Indriani
31
49
Pengaruh Kualitas Pelayanan Terhadap Kepuasan Pasien dan Dampaknya
pada Proitabilitas (Pemulihan Pembiayaan) Rumah Sakit di Kota Bengkulu
Silke Wulandari dan Fachruzzaman
69
Analisis Potensi Keuangan Daerah Pemerintah Kota Lhokseumawe
dalam Pelaksanaan Otonomi dan Desentralisasi Daerah
M. Haykal
89
Pengaruh Kepemilikan Manajerial, Komite Audit, Leverage, dan
Umur Perusahaan Terhadap Pengungkapan Modal Intelektual
Syawal Harianto
JURUSAN AKUNTANSI
Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Malikussaleh
Jurnal Akuntansi
dan Keuangan
ISSN: 2301-4717
VOLUME 2, NOMOR 1, FEBRUARI 2012
HALAMAN 1 – 101
Terbit 2 kali dalam setahun pada setiap bulan Februari dan Agustus, berisi tulisan yang diangkat dari hasil-hasil penelitian maupun pemikiran bidang akuntansi dan atau keuangan
yang relevan bagi pengembangan profesi dan praktek akuntansi di Indonesia
EDITORS
M. Haykal (Chief of Editor)
Hilmi (Managing Editor)
Muammar Khaddai, Amru Usman
Hendra Raza, Mursyidah
Rita Mutia, Naz’aina
Iswadi, Yurina
REVIEWERS
Ade Fatma Lubis
Universitas Sumatera Utara
Adi Zakaria Afif
Universitas Indonesia
Erlina
Universitas Sumatera Utara
Fachruzzaman
Universitas Bengkulu
Julli Mursyida
Universitas Malikussaleh
Islahuddin
Universitas Syiah Kuala
Kamil Md. Idris
School of Accountancy UUM-Malaysia
Murhaban
Universitas Malikussaleh
Rini Indriani
Universitas Bengkulu
Syukri Abdullah
Universitas Syiah Kuala
TB. Ismail
Universitas Tirtayasa
Wahyuddin
Universitas Malikussaleh
Zaafri Husodo
Universitas Indonesia
EDITORIAL SECRETARY
Rayyan Firdaus
Harry Hassan Masyarafah
Kusnandar Zainuddin
EDITORIAL OFFICE
Gedung Jurusan Akuntansi FE-Unimal
Kampus Bukit Indah, Lhokseumawe
Telp/Fax. 0645-40210/0645-40211
Email: jak@fe-unimal.org
JURNAL AKUNTANSI DAN KEUANGAN diterbitkan sejak Februari 2011
Oleh Jurusan Akuntansi FE-Unimal
Redaksi menerima sumbangan tulisan yang belum pernah diterbitkan dalam media lain.
Naskah diketik rapi sesuai kebijakan editorial (lihat dihalaman belakang jurnal)
di atas kertas HVS A4 spasi ganda dengan jumlah 30 – 40 halaman.
Naskah yang masuk akan dievaluasi dan disunting untuk keseragaman format.
Daftar Isi
The Relation of Corporate Governance to Firm Performance and
Management Compensation as Mediating Variable
Endang Surasetyo Ningsih, Wida Fadhlia dan Rahmawaty
1-10
Akuntabilitas sebagai Alat Pengukuran Kinerja Pemerintah Daerah
Yusri Hazmi, Faisal dan Zuarni
11-16
Keputusan Perusahaan Melakukan Share Repurchase:
Free Cash Flow Hypothesis ataukah Signaling Theory
Eddy Suranta, Pratana Puspa Midiastuty dan R. Ryan Mulya Wijaya
17-29
Pengaruh Rasio Analisis Fundamental Terhadap Return Saham:
Perbedaan Pengaruh Antara Saham Syariah dan Non Syariah
Dedy Oktri Hadi Saputra dan Rini Indriani
31-47
Pengaruh Kualitas Pelayanan Terhadap Kepuasan Pasien dan Dampaknya
pada Proitabilitas (Pemulihan Pembiayaan) Rumah Sakit di Kota Bengkulu
Silke Wulandari dan Fachruzzaman
49-68
Analisis Potensi Keuangan Daerah Pemerintah Kota Lhokseumawe
dalam Pelaksanaan Otonomi dan Desentralisasi Daerah
M. Haykal
69-88
Pengaruh Kepemilikan Manajerial, Komite Audit, Leverage, dan
Umur Perusahaan Terhadap Pengungkapan Modal Intelektual
Syawal Harianto
89-101
JurNAl2,AKuNtANsi
dAN2012
KeuANgAN
Volume
Nomor 1, Februari
issN: 2301-4717
Jurnal Akuntansi
Keuangan
Volume
2, Nomor dan
1, Februari
2012
p 1-10
THE RELATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
TO FIRM PERFORMANCE AND MANAGEMENT
COMPENSATION AS MEDIATING VARIABLE
eNdANg surAsetyo NiNgsih1, WidA FAdhliA1 dAN rAhmAWAty1
1
Dosen Pada Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Syiah Kuala
The objective of this research is to investigate inluence of corporate governance to
management compensation and subsequent irm performance. This study uses data from
manufacture companies that listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange for the inancial reporting in 2003
– 2005 periods. The sample consists of 198 observations over a three-year period for 66 publicly
traded irms. The mechanism of corporate governance is to be proxy by managerial ownership
and number of commissioner proportion board. Management compensation is measured
using sum of remuneration that reported in audited inancial reporting. Firm performance
is to be proxy by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) after compensation is
awarded. The result was showed that managerial ownership and number of commissioner
proportion board giving signiicant positive impact to management compensation. Even
though, managerial ownership as one of mechanism of corporate governance has negative
coeficient to management compensation. This study was ind that corporate governance and
management compensation was not impact to subsequent irm performance. This result was
indicated that compensation did not designed optimally and corporate governance did not
work effectively.
Keywords: corporate governance, management compensation, subsequent irm
performance
BACKGROUND
the indonesian for Corporate governance
(IICG) together with SWA Magazine were
leading a rate survey to companies applying
good corporate governance (GCG) for corporate
governance perception index 2005 (CGPI). Good
corporate governance (GCG) application success
in a company could not be separated from
the stakeholders’ role, especially the primary
ones such as the employees and managers. The
stakeholders were motivated to work actively
and cooperate with the company to increase the
performance, job opportunity and the company
continually. This closely related to the employees
and managers and might created balanced value
between the company owner and the stakeholders.
The company would professionally give some
kinds of compensation based on their performance
and integrity. The torch participant number in the
last 5 active years would create a question; if the
good corporate governance (GCG) application in
the company value creation had no relation with
optimal compensation value?
Indonesian monetary crisis directly affected
in conviction and inancial crisis in trading world.
The inancial crisis was once caused by the less
transparency and accountability, and this made
the information manipulation possibly done by a
company. Later, this created a good arrangement
concept known as good corporate governance
(GCG) mechanism. The important matter often
become a debate in corporate governance was the
chosen compensation contract. The main point
of the debate was the existence and function
of the remuneration committee. According to
the corporate governance and corporate ethics
published by the BUMN State Ministry ofice
in 1999, a duty of the remuneration committee
function was to examine and recommend the
remuneration system changes of the management,
commissaries, and employees in order to show
the relationship between the irm performance
target achievement and accepted compensation
rate. Later, the decrease of the torch participant
number annually would also create a question,
ENdANG SURASETyO NINGSIh, WIdA...
whether the decision to apply the corporate
governance and optimal compensation were not
closely related to the company occupation in the
following year?
Eisenhardt (1989) stated three assumptions
related to the agency theory as the based theory
in the owner and management contract. They
were: (1) human nature behavior generally
put personal importance above the others’
(self interest); (2) man basically had limited
imagination to the future perception (bounded
rationality) and (3) man always avoided the risk
over him though there were others to sacriice
(risk averse). Gibbon and Murphy (1992)
showed that the optimal compensation contract
was an incentive combination implicitly related
to the compensation contract which was capable
to motivate and give direction to the company
manager to a maximal company occupation.
Some people realized the importance of the
application of the good corporate governance
(GCG) principal convinced to be able to create
conducive condition and irm base to perform
the company operational right, eficient, and
proitable; to increase and create balanced value
between the shareholders and stakeholders. This
study was attractive because of several reasons.
First, indonesian economic condition disturbed
by a multidimensional crisis, made the good
governance reading more become a benchmark
in recovered and stability in the economic
condition especially in corporation management.
Second, the good corporate governance (GCG)
pressuring was more aimed to protect the
minority stockholders’ right and importance. In
the other side, the good corporate governance
(GCG) application success could not be separated
from all company stakeholders’ role, so that the
compensation to the achievement was needed to
increase the conviction and also the company
value and a value creation to the shareholders.
Third, this study was a reaction to the surveyed
year by year member decrease phenomenon.
The research was aimed to investigate if there
was a positive relationship in the good corporate
governance (GCG) application to the management
compensation. More over, this research wanted
to investigate if there were a relationship between
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
the good corporate governance (GCG) application
and the management compensation to the next
company occupation.
OVERVIEw OF THEORETICAL
Agency relationship perspective was a
base used to view corporate governance. The
main point of the agency relationship was the
existence of the separation between the owned
(in principal / investor side) and control (in agent
/ manager side). Investor had their expectation to
earn return from their invested money. Therefore,
a good contract between the investor and the
management was a contract which was able to
explain detail speciications should be performed
by the manager in managing the investor’s fund,
and speciication related to the return distribution
between the manager and the investor. Agency
relationship was a contract between the principal
and agent developed by Jensen and Meckling
(1976); and Fama and Jensen (1983).
Agency relationship was emphasized to
overcome two main problems occasionally
appear in the agency relationship. According
to Eisenhardt (1989), the irst problem was
a problem appeared when: (a) the desire and
purpose of the principal and agent were opposite
and (b) it was a hard or expensive to the principal
to verify the agent real tasks. The problem appears
when the principal could not verify the agent real
tasks precisely. The second problem was the risk
sharing problem appeared when the principal and
agent had different action preference caused by
their different preference toward the risks.
Shleiver and Vishny (1997) stated that the
corporate governance concept based on the
agency theory was expected to be functioned as
the tools to solve all agency problems and also
give the conviction to the investor that they would
gain the appropriate return of the fund invested.
Entity theory viewed the company as an entity
apart from its owner and creditor. The relationship
between the management and the company owner
was a principal-agent relationship paradigm, in
which the company owner as the principal gave
the conviction to the management who gave its
managerial service. Compensation was a human
Volume 2, Nomor 1, Februari 2012
resource management strategy to create a job
harmonious which had different importance for
different person. Some took compensation as
a return from the service given by the human
resources gained as an organization, or a value
addicted by the company to the human resource
competence and ability, or, an appreciation given
by the company to dedicated person (Simamora,
1995).
Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that
compensation was a service value given by
the owner to the management. Compensation
contract showed the service response value given
by the principal to the management. Formally, the
compensation contract was a bundle between the
manager and principal to perform some activities
in the name of the principal, aimed to maximally
the company value in order to increase the
shareholders prosperity at the end. Therefore,
the management compensation contract was
designed to motivate the management to fulill
the job occupation determined previously by the
principal.
Among the mentioned factor to motivate the
creation of the effective company management
creation, the commissaries council (management
structure) was a main factor affected the manager
behavior in the company management. In a
modern corporation, compensation policy was
delegated to the commissaries council. When
the compensation designed optimally, the
compensation contract could be a motivation
tools to maximally all stakeholders’ prosperity.
Jensen (1993) stated that several problems
appeared in the internal mechanism system
(management structure) was started with the
existence of the commissaries council possessing
inal responsibility in the company. The
commissaries council possessed the authority
to make rules to the manager in managing
the company, employing, iring, and creating
compensation policy and also giving some
strategic advices. More number of commissaries
would increase the service and control function
because there were more skilful persons and
more valuable advices in the company strategy
and management. According to Kusumawati and
Riyanto (2005), the relationship between the
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
number of commissaries council member and
the company value were supported by control
and service function perspective given by the
commissaries council. Consultation and advice
given were valuable services to the management
never been given by the market. Their research
also found that the investor’s will to give more
premiums was supported by the service and
control given by the commissaries.
Several researches showed that the council
structure would be able to explain cross-sectional
variation in management compensation. hallock
(1997) in his research on 500 companies in 1992
discovered that the council with interlocking
relationship and council measurement had an
effect to the higher management compensation.
Core, holthausen and Larcker (1999) observed
the compensation rate to 205 companies and
discovered that the council composition variable
(council head variable was CEO, council number,
council came from the internal company, council
came from the external company, council with
interlock relationship, council member with
age above 69, and busy council) had positive
and signiicant relationship to the company
compensation level.
Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (2002) in their
research about compensation determinant in
public companies in the beginning of 1990, stated
that Ceo or also the head of the council, and the
number of the council, had positive relationship
to the compensation. Grinstein and hribar (2004)
stated that CEO would affect the new council
member election process, CEO was also the head
of the council and the number of the council
would signiicantly affect the compensation.
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2006) in their
observation result found that the council structure
was a signiicant determinant to the measure and
structure of the CEO compensation.
h1: there was a positive relationship between the
number of the commissaries and management
compensation.
different importance in a company was caused
by different ownership characteristics, such
as: (1) dispersed ownership. Gilberg and Idson
(1995), husnan (2000) in hastuti (2005) found
ENdANG SURASETyO NINGSIh, WIdA...
that the company with more dispersed ownership
gave more payment to the management compared
to the company with concentrated ownership. In
this type of company ownership we could ind
two categories of stockholders named controlling
interest and minority interest (shareholders). (3)
BUMN ownership.
Core, haolthausen and Larcker (1999) in
their research found that management ownership
structure had a substantive cross-sectional
relationship to the management compensation.
Empiric research led by Xu and Wang (1999)
in hastuti (2005) explained more the research
result as followed: (1) There was signiicantly
a positive relationship between the concentrated
ownership and productivity as a proxy of the
company occupation. (2) The concentrated
ownership affection was stronger for companies
dominated by legal person shareholders
compared to those dominated by company. (3)
The company proitability positively related to
the stock ownership proxy by a legal person but
negatively related to the stock ownership by the
company. (4) Employee productivity tended to
decrease when the stock ownership proportion
by the company was increased. Stock ownership
by legal person shareholders could monitor the
management effectively through the supervision
of the board of directors, the company employee
election and the compensation award to the chief
corporate oficer.
h2: there was a positive relationship between
the ownership structure and management
compensation.
The distinction deinition of good corporate
governance (GCG) did not affect the distinction
of meaning and purpose. Forum for corporate
governance in Indonesia (2001) used the deinition
of Cadbury Committees named: a set of rules
arrange the relationship among the stockholders,
company management (manager), creditor,
government, employee, and other internal and
external interest holder related to their rights and
also responsibilities. In the other word, a system
arranged and controlled the company. More
details, the good corporate governance (GCG)
terminology could be used in order to explain
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
the role and behavior of the direction council,
commissaries council, the company manager and
the stockholders.
Empirically, result of the observation of
corporate governance applied in a company
related to the company occupation was remained
inconsistent. Several others researches showed
that there were no relationship between
the corporate governance and the company
occupation, such as daily and friends (1998) and
CBI survey result, deloitte and Touche (1996),
as copied in darmawati, Khomsiyah and Rahayu
research (2004).
McKinsey research, as copied by Lukuhay
(2002) and Raick (2002), had proved that
investor in the advanced countries willing to give
a quite high premium, nearly take the average of
28% to the company consistently applying the
corporate governance principal. As an addition,
evidences proved that the stocks of the companies
enjoyed the market valuation among 10% to 12%
were founded. Gompers and friends (2003) in
their observation found a positive relationship
between the corporate governance index and
long-term company occupation. darmawati
and friends (2004) in their analysis showed that
corporate governance would statistically and
signiicantly affect the return on equity. This
proved the hypothesis that corporate governance
would affect the company internal occupation.
Klapper and Love (2002) founded the positive
relationship between the corporate governance
and company occupation measured using the
return in assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. Other
important result gained from their observation
was that the corporate governance application in
the company level had more importance in the
development countries that those in the advanced
countries.
This research would use the company speciic
internal mechanism as a proxy from good corporate
governance named the ownership structure and
management structure. Xu and Wang (1999)
successfully proved that the ownership structure
(mix and concentrated) signiicantly affect the
company occupation. demztz and Lehn (1985)
in hastuti (2005) discovered that there was no
signiicant relationship between the concentrated
Volume 2, Nomor 1, Februari 2012
ownership with accounting proit level for 511
largest companies in United States.
holderness and Sheehan (1988) analyzed 144
listed companies in NySE with stocks ownership
more than 50,1% and found that Tobin’s Q
result was higher when the company was
owned by majority stockholders. Tobin’s Q was
signiicantly lower for companies with individual
majority stockholders. McConnell and Servaes
(1990) took samples of more that 1000 companies
discovered that Tobin’s Q positively related to the
stocks ownership proxy by individual investor.
the commissaries council service and control
function as corporate governance mechanism
could be seen as a signal to the investor that the
company had managed as its required (positive
signal). Investors were expected to accept this
signal and willingly paid higher premium for
well-governed companies in Indonesia. Thus, the
good corporate governance (GCG) application
would relate positively with the company
occupation in the investors’ view (Labelle, 2002
in Kusumawati and Riyanto, 2005).
Executive manager skills and ability were
closely related to the inancial performance in an
organization. Therefore, a good understanding
was needed between the executive compensation
level and monetary success measurement. The
stockholders used the company compensation
scheme as a tool to monitor and or to motivate
the manager. Jensen and Murphy (1990) stated
that the stockholders demanded the executive
to act maximally the organization value to the
owner and other stockholders in the company.
the stockholders and other stakeholders needed
to ind out if the executive salary at present
commonly related to the company occupation
and if there was a possibility to motivate the
executive to make some decisions in order to
increase the organization value.
Some researches showed signiicant
relationship among the managerial compensation
and the monetary occupation, the market
occupation and the company measurement.
Leonard
(1990)
tested
the
executive
compensation and organization structure policy
inluence to the company occupation. The
result showed that the companies with long-
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
term incentive plan signiicantly enjoyed larger
return of equity, compared to the companies
without long-term incentive plan. Abowd (1990)
tested the managerial compensation sensitively
to the company occupation in a year positive
relationship with the company occupation in the
following year. The occupation measure based
on the accounting resulted in a weak relationship
while the occupation based on the economy and
market created stronger support.
Ely (1990) analyzed the relationship between
the compensation and occupation of four major
industries (utility, bank, oil and gas, and retail) and
discovered that the Ceo compensation to bank
industry was directly related to the accountant
variable. Shim, Lee and Corrigan (1999)
observed the Ceo compensation determiner in
monetary institute by testing the relationship
between the CEO compensation and occupation
based on the accounting and based on the market.
The result showed that the CEO compensation
would signiicantly and positively related to
the ROA with lower degree and related to the
ROE and market-to-book assets. The company
measurement showed a positive relationship with
Ceo compensation total and cash compensation
(salary and bonus). Magnan and St-Onge (1997)
tested how the relationship between the bank
occupation and executive compensation tended
to be related to the bank occupation in higher
managerial policy context.
h3: there was a positive relationship between
the management compensation and corporate
governance with the following company
occupation.
RESEARCH METHODS
The sample of the observation was taken from
the population based on the purposive sampling.
The ending numbers of the sample were 66
companies and 198 observations. The data used
in this research was second data. The corporate
governance data used was the data of the
ownership structure and commissaries number
taken from monetary report gained from UGM
modal market database. Firm Performance data
was the market and monetary data gained from
ENdANG SURASETyO NINGSIh, WIdA...
Indonesian Capital Market directory 2003-2005.
The company management compensation was the
numeric data of commissaries and management
stated in the annual report of the audit monetary
report note 2003-2005.
Management compensation was a return
of the service given by human resources for
the organization, or value closely put by the
company to the ability and human resources
talent. Management compensation was measured
by the level of remuneration achieved by the
commissaries and management in a year of
observation. The remuneration number listed
covered total salary and bonus achieved.
Corporate governance was a relationship,
system and process pattern led by the company
organs (management, commissaries council,
RUPS) in order to give additional value to the
stockholders as a long term period continuously,
which also considering the other stakeholders
importance based on the governmental rules and
valid norms. Corporate governance was proxy
using the ownership structure variable and the
number of the commissaries.
Firm Performance was a company ability
sketch to produce its proit in the past and could be
projected to the future to see the company ability
to gain more in the present period, so that the
investor might read the part of total proitability
that could be allocated to the stockholders’
hands. In this research, the irm performance was
measured using both the ROA (Net Proit / Total
Assets) and ROE (Net Proit / Total Equity).
The company assets composition was
measured using the ratio between the constant
assets to the total sales (Klapper and Love,
2002). The growth opportunity was proxy used
IOS counted with MV/BV. hartono (2005)
stated that when the MV/BV value was above 1,
the company would be classiied prospected or
developed, oppositely when the MV/BV value
was less than or equal to 1, the company would
be classiied unprospected or undeveloped. The
company measurement was measured from the
natural log of the sales. Incentive was given to the
management based on its capability in increasing
the sales, which was the key to cost the company
activities (Lewellen and huntsman, 1970).
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
DATA ANALYSIS
in order to gain a common sketch of the research
data sample, we could see the research descriptive
statistic as seen in table 2. dependent variable
in model 1 was management compensation in
2004 which showed approximately 9.4372 with
standard deviation of 0.55370. Management
ownership had approximately 47.1855 with
standard deviation of 19.79762. The commissaries
number had approximately 3.9394 with standard
deviation of 1.58725.
dependent variable in model 2 was the
company occupation in 2005 measured using
ROA and ROE with average 0.5462 and 0.9874
with standard deviation of 0.59378 and 0.64947.
2004 management Compensation independent
Variable, the number of commissaries and
management ownership in 2004 had average
9.4372, 3.82 and 46.7400 with standard deviation
of 0.55370, 1.424 and 19.9516.
hypothesis 1 and 2 Test Result showed
number R square of 0.491, meant that 49.1% total
compensation in 2004 could be explained by the
number of commissaries, management ownership,
company measure, growth opportunity, assets
composition, and company occupation measured
by ROA and ROE in 2003, meanwhile the rest
would be explained by other factors outside
the research model. F-stat value of 8.001 with
signiication level of 0.000 which was less than
0.05 indicated that regression model totally
explained the signiicant compensation in 2004.
The commissaries number had coeficient of
0.178 and positive signal 0.000 less than 0.05
meant that greater number of commissaries
council meant greater number of management
compensation. This meant that based on the
sample of the research, the commissaries number
variable positively and signiicantly affected the
management compensation. Therefore, the irst
hypothesis stated that the commissaries number
positively affected the management compensation
was failed to be rejected.
Managerial ownership which had coeficient
of 0.001 and negative sign with signiicantly
0.825 above the average 0.05 meant that the
management ownership based on the research
Volume 2, Nomor 1, Februari 2012
sample was not a variable which was able to
decide the management compensation. Therefore,
the second hypothesis stated that there was a
positive relationship between the managerial
ownership and management compensation was
failed to be supported.
The third hypothesis test result, dependent
variable measured with ROA and ROE in 2005.
In ROA test, the R square number was 0.068
meant that 6.8% ROA in 2005 could be explained
by compensation in 2004, commissaries number,
management ownership, company measure,
growth opportunity and assets composition in
2004, while the others were explained by other
factors outside the research model. F-stat value
was 0.715 with signiicantly level of 0.639 or
greater than 0.05 indicated that the regression
model was not entirely signiicant, and this
condition would statistically explain the ROA in
2005.
R square number of ROE test was 0.168
meant that 16% ROE in 2005 could be explained
by compensation in 2004, number, management
ownership,
company
measure,
growth
opportunity and assets composition in 2004,
while the others were explained by other factors
outside the research model. F-stat value was
1.988 with signiicantly level of 0.082 or greater
than 0.05 indicated that the regression model was
not entirely signiicant, and this condition would
statistically explain the ROE in 2005.
Regression result showed that the
compensation variable, corporate governance
and economic determiner variables of the
company occupation would not statistically
affect the next company occupation. Therefore,
the third hypothesis stated that compensation and
corporate governance had positive relationship
with the company occupation in the following
year could not be supported. This result supported
Core, holthausen, Larcker (1999) research.
The research tested also the company
occupation in 2004. The compensation variable,
corporate governance and economic determiner
variables of the company occupation would not
statistically affect the company occupation in the
year of 2004.
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
DISCUSSION
the commissaries number in this research
was positively related to the management
compensation. This indicated that the
management compensation was able to catch their
duties, authority, and strategic decisions created
by the commissaries council. Viewed from the
perspective of agency, the positive relationship
would show us that the principal and agent
relationship had a contract to bundle the agent to
service based on their knowledge, experiences,
skill and ability. Watts and Zimmerman (1986)
in their positive accounting theory stated that the
owner and management relationship, commonly
hypnotized in bonus plans was a bundle between
the owner and management shaped in a contract.
Walker (1992) stated that compensation was
a strategic key to human resource management
purposed to create job harmony to achieve the
objective and target decided at the irst place.
therefore, the management compensation contract
was designed to motivate the management to
achieve the occupation target decided previously
by the principal.
Ownership structure measured by managerial
ownership negatively related to the management
compensation. This condition showed that the
management compensation was not affected
by the importance of management possesses
company stocks. The entity theory viewed the
company as an entity separated from the owner
and creditor, separated management from the
company owner. This condition showed that there
was a function separation between the managerial
as owner and as agent.
Other condition was the small proportion
of Indonesian managerial ownership. Major
company ownership taken by company or
institution controlling the company management
was a special characteristic of concentrate
ownership (closely head). Gilberg and Idson
(1995), husnan (2000) research in hastuti
(2005) discovered that the company with more
spreading ownership gave greater payment to
the management compared to the company with
more concentrated ownership.
ENdANG SURASETyO NINGSIh, WIdA...
The irm Performance in some researches
showed the existence of positive relationship
with the compensation or corporate governance.
The hypothesis test result of the research showed
different results. Observed from the statistic
descriptive model 2, average roA 2005 from
the research sample company was 0.5462%
possessing positive correlation sign which was not
signiicant to the compensation 2004 and negative
for both measurement of corporate governance.
This condition showed the low ability of the
company to gain proit from the assets utility.
Average ROE in 2005 was 0.9874, possessing
positive correlation sign which was not signiicant
to the compensation 2004 and negative for both
measurement of corporate governance. This also
showed that the ability of the research sample
of company to distribute the gained proit to the
stockholders was low. Therefore, compensation
and corporate governance were explicitly unable
to be reserved for subsequent irm performance.
The result of model 2 was consistent with
several researches showed that there was no
relationship between the corporate governance
and company occupation, such as daily and
friends (1999) result, CBI survey result, deloitte
and Touche (1996) in darmawati, Khomsiyah
and Rahayu (2004).
According to Kakabadse and friends (2001)
in darmawati, Khomsiyah and Rahayu (2004),
the difference result of the researches was caused
by several reasons. There were: 1) decided
perspective theoretic, 2) Research methodology,
3) Occupation measure, and 4) Opinion distinction
towards the council participation in the decision
making.
The research result showed also that the
compensation contract was not yet optimal to be
a motivation to the company occupation in the
following year. Compensation in 2004 which
had positive relationship with the corporate
governance showed that there was no signiicant
relationship with the subsequent irm performance.
Consistent to the research, Core, holthausen,
Larcker (1999) that the compensation component
had negative association was signiicant to the
ownership and council structure variable, the
management council did not actively supervised
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
and this was an opposite interpretation with the
company request of the CEO quality.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this research was to give
evidence that the corporate governance affected
the management compensation and subsequent
irm performance. This research was expected
to be able to answer some research questions
related to the corporate governance, management
compensation and subsequent irm performance.
Based on the research result performed in the
manufacture companies listed in Jakarta stock
Exchange fulilled the sample election criteria,
we could take several conclusions as follow:
1. The result of this research showed that the
commissaries number would positively
and signiicantly affect the management
compensation in 2004. This fact answered
the research question that the corporate
governance application to create the company
value positively related with the management
compensation. This fact showed also that
compensation as a company human resource
strategy gave reward to the service given by
the commissaries council.
2. The result of this research also gave evidence
that the ownership structure measured
by the managerial ownership had no
positive relationship with the managerial
compensation. This condition indicated that
the control function of the ownership structure
did not work effectively yet.
3. The result of this research answered the
research question that the compensation
and corporate governance did not positively
related to the subsequent irm performance.
This condition showed that the compensation
did not design optimally and the corporate
governance did not work effectively.
SUGGESTION
in this research, mistake might happen
eventually and caused the result could not be
generalized. Some limits in this research were:
1. Compensation data was not ready for all
Volume 2, Nomor 1, Februari 2012
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
management in the strategic level that made
this research used remuneration data for all
the commissaries and management council.
2. The samples used were manufacture
companies only, stated the remuneration
number in their inancial report without
differentiate the company participation in the
corporate governance performance survey.
this fact occurred since the research did
not use the perception index of corporate
governance performed by IICG together with
SWA magazine.
The research was expected to give idea to
develop the next researches. Based on the present
existed limits, the following researches might
give several considerations as follow:
1. Surveying the management compensation
to gain the compensation data for each
management level.
2. Made the good corporate governance (GCG)
index in order to explain all good corporate
governance (GCG) variables so that the good
corporate governance (GCG) application
success measure could be more measurable.
REFERENCES
Grinstein, y., dan hribar, P. 2004. CEO
Compensation and Incentives: Evidence
from M&A bonuses. Journal of Financial
Economics 73.
Abowd, J. M. 1990. Does Performance-based
Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate
Governance?. industrial and labor relations
Review, 43.
Chhaochharia, V., and Grinstein, y. 2006. CEO
Compensation and Board Structure. Journal
of Finance. Version 2006.
Core, John E., holthausen, Robert W., and Larcker,
david F. 1999. Corporate Governance,
Chief Executive Oficer Compensation, and
Firm Performance. Journal of Financial
Economics.
Cyert, R., Kang, S., Kumar, P. 2002. Corporate
Governance, Takeovers, and Top Management
Compensation: Theory and Evidence.
Manegement Science 48.
darmawati, deni, Khomsiyah, and Rahayu, Gelar
R. 2004. Hubungan Corporate Governance
dan Kinerja Perusahaan. Seminar Nasional
Akuntansi VII. denpasar – Bali.
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. 1989. Agency Theory:
An Assesment and Review. Academic of
Management Review. Vol. 14.
Ely, Kirsten M. 1991. Interindustry Differences
in the Relation between Compensation and
Firm Performance Variables. Journal of
Accounting Research. Vol 29.
Fama, Eugene F and M. C. Jensen. 1983.
Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal
of Law and Economics. Vol. XXVI.
Gibbons, R., and Muphy, K. J. 1992. Optimal
Incentive Contracts in The Presence of Career
Concern: Theori and Evidence. Journal of
Political Economy.
Gompers, Paul A., Ishii, Joy L., and Metrick
Andrew. 2003. Corporate Governance
and Equity Prices. Quarterly Journal of
Economics.
hallock, K. F. 1997. Reciprocally Interlocking
Boards of directors and Executive
Compensation. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 32.
hartono, Jogiyanto. 2005. Pasar Eisien Secara
Keputusan. Gramedia Pustaka Utama.
Jakarta.
hastuti, dwi., T. 2005. Hubungan antara
Good Corporate Governance dan Struktur
Kepemilikan dengan Kinerja Keuangan.
Simposium Nasional Akuntansi VIII. Solo.
husnan, Suad. 2000. Corporate Governance:
Pengamatan terhadap Sektor Korporat dan
Keuangan. Seminar Sosialisasi Corporate
Governance. UGM. yogayakarta.
holdernest, C. G., and Sheehan, d. P. 1988. The
Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly
Held Corporation: An Exploratory Analysis.
Journal of Financial Economics 3.
0 ENdANG SURASETyO NINGSIh, WIdA...
Jensen, M. C., and Meckling, W. h. 1976. Theory
of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Cost and Ownership Structure. Journal of
Financial Economics 3.
Jensen, M. 1993. The Modern Industrial
Revolution, Exit, and The Failure of Internal
Control Systems. Journal of Finance 48.
Klapper, Leora F. and I. Love. 2002. Corporate
Governance, Investor Protection and
Performamnce in Emerging Markets. World
Bank Working Paper.
Kusumawati, d. W. and Riyanto, B. 2005.
“Corporate Governance dan Kinerja:
Analisis Pengaruh Compliance Reporting
dan Struktur Dewan terhadap Kinerja.”
Simposium Nasional Akuntansi VIII, 248261.
Lawellen, W. G., and huntsman, B. 1970.
Managerial Pay and Corporate Performamnce.
American Economic Review 60.
Leonard, Jonathan S. 1990. Executive Pay and
Firm Performance. Industrial and Labor
Relations Review. Vol. 43.
Lukuhay, Jos. 2002. Tata Pamong dan Nilai
Perusahaan. Warta Ekonomi, No. 21/XIV/2
September.
Magnan, Michel L and Sylvie St-Onge. 1997. Bank
Performance and Executive Compensation: A
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
Managerial Discretion Perspective. Strategic
Management Journal. Vol 18.
McConnel, J. and Servaes, h. 1990. Additional
Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate
Value. Journal of Financial Economics 27.
Raick, Ishack. 2002. Menggugat Fungsi
Komisaris Independen. SWA, No. 15/XVII/15
Juli-7 Agustus.
shim, eunsup “daniel”, John lee, and thomas
Corrigan. 1999. An Empirical Examination of
Top Executive Compensation and Economic
Performamnce in Financial Service Firms.
Advances in Management Accounting. Vol 8.
Shleiver, A. and R. W. Vishny. 1997. A Survey
of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance
52.
Simamora, h. 1995. Manajemen Sumber Daya
Manusia. STIE yKPN. yogyakarta.
Walker, J. W. 1992. Human Resource Strategy.
Mc Graw-hill, Inc. New york.
Watts, R., and J. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive
Accounting Theory. Englewood Cliffs NJ:
Prenctice hall.
Xu, Xiaonian., and Wang, yang. 1999. Ownership
Structure, Corporate Governance: The Cases
of Chinesse Stock Company. Journal of
Financial economics
JurNAl2,AKuNtANsi
dAN2012
KeuANgAN
Volume
Nomor 1, Februari
issN: 2301-4717
Jurnal
Akuntansi
Keuangan
Volume
2, Nomordan
1, Februari
2012
p 11-16
AKUNTABILITAS SEBAGAI ALAT PENGUKURAN
KINERjA PEMERINTAH DAERAH
yUSRI hAZMI1, FAisAl1 dAN ZUARNI1
1
Dosen Tata Niaga Pada Politeknik Negeri Lhokseumawe
This paper attempts to explain the importance of accountability in order to realize good
governance (good governance). Accountability is one essential element in achieving good
governance. As a manifestation of the implementation of APBN / APBd, the government
is obliged to report on achievements that have been implemented, so that people understand
and can assess whether the government has been working according to plan that has been set,
and load the working principles of effective, eficient. Approach to accountability in inancial
management is the embodiment of creating good government. Accountability can be seen from
various perspectives such as: perfective accounting, functional perspective and the perspective
of accountability systems. Some of the techniques developed to strengthen the accountability
system is strongly inluenced by the method that is widely used in accounting, management
and research, such as management by objectives, performance-based budgeting, operations
research and others. Performance measurement can be grouped into three indicators, namely:
(1) Efforts indicator measurement service, (2) indicators measuring service accomplishment,
and (3) indicators that connects between Efforts with accomplishment. In addition it needs to
be delivered is also an additional explanation relating to the reporting of this performance.
Keywords: accountability, performance measurement
LATAR BELAKANG
Tata kelola pemerintahan yang baik (Good
governance) dapat diartikan sebagai suatu
penyelenggaraan pengelolaan pembangunan
yang bertanggung jawab dengan prinsip
demokrasi, eisien, efetiitas dan pencegahan
korupsi baik secara politik maupun administrasi,
menjalanan disiplin anggaran serta penciptaan
legal dan politikal framework bagi tumbuhnya
aktivitas usaha. Terdapat beberapa karateristik
good governance, meliputi: (1). Partisipation, (2)
Rule of law, (3) Responsiveness, (4) Consensus
oreintation, (5) Equity, (6) Eficiency and
Effectiveness, (7) Accountability and (8) Stategic
vision. Ada beberapa kriteria dalam mewujukan
good governance, seperti: keterbukaan (transparency), eisiensi (eficiency), tanggung jawab
(responsibility) dan kewajaran (fairness).
Pemerintah sebagai pelaku utama dalam
pelaksanaan good governance, dituntut dapat
memberikan pertanggungjawaban secara transparan dan akurat. Saat ini akuntabilitas masih
berfokus pada pengelolaan keuangan negara
(APBN) dan daerah (APBd). Untuk mewujudkan
good
governance
diperlukan
reformasi
kelembagaan dan manajemen publik. Reformasi
kelembagaan menyangkut pembenahan seluruh
alat-alat pemerintah di daerah baik struktur
maupun infrastuktur. Sedangkan reformasi
manajemen publik terkait dengan sistem
pengelolaan keuangan pemerintah daerah, yang
meliputi: sistem anggaran, sistem akuntansi,
sistem pemeriksaan dan sistem manajemen
keuangan daerah.
Fenomena yang dapat diamati dalam
perkembangan sektor keuangan publik adalah
semakin menguatnya tuntuan pelaksanaan
akuntabilitas publik oleh organiasi sektor publik
(seperti: pemerintah pusat dan daerah, unit-unit
kerja pemerintah, departemen dan lembagalembaga negara). Tuntutan akuntabilitas sektor
publik terkait dengan perlunya dilakukan
transparansi dan pemberian informasi kepada
publik dalam rangka pemenuhan hak-hak publik.
Akuntabilitas publik adalah kewajiban
pihak pemegang amanah (agent) untuk
memberikan pertanggung jawaban, menyajikan,
melaporkan dan mengungkapan segala ativitas
dan kegiatan yang menjadi tanggung jawabnya
NAMA PENULIS
kepada pihak pemberi amanah (principal) yang
memiliki hak dan kewenangan untuk meminta
pertanggungjawaban tersebut. dalam kontek
pemerintahan, akuntabilitas publik adalah
pemberian informasi dan disclosure atas ativitas
dan kinerja inancial permerintah kepada pihakpihak yang berkepentingan dengan laporan
keuangan tersebut.
Akuntabilitas dapat dipandang dari berbagai
perspektif, baik akuntansi, fungsional, maupun
sistem akuntabilitas. dari perspektif akuntansi,
American Accounting Association menyatakan
bahwa akuntabilitas suatu entitas pemerintahan
dapat dibagi dalam empat kelompok, yaitu
akuntabilitas terhadap:
1. Sumber daya inansial
2. Kepatuhan terhadap aturan hukum dan
kebijaksanaan administratif
3. Eisiensi dan efektiitas suatu kegiatan
4. hasil program dan kegiatan pemerintah yang
tercermin dalam pencapaian tujuan, manfaat
dan efektivitas.
sedangkan dari perspektif fungsional,
akuntabilitas dilihat sebagai suatu tingkatan
dengan lima tahap yang berbeda yang diawali
dari tahap yang lebih banyak membutuhkan
ukuran-ukuran obyektif (legal compliance) ke
tahap yang membutuhkan lebih banyak ukuranukuran subyektif . Tahap-tahap tersebut adalah:
1. Probity and legality accountability, hal ini
menyangkut pertanggungjawaban penggunaan dana sesuai dengan anggaran
yang telah disetujui dan sesuai dengan
peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku
(compliance).
2. Process accountability, dalam hal ini
digunakan proses, prosedur, atau ukuranukuran dalam melaksanakan kegiatan
yang ditentukan (planning, allocating and
managing).
3. Performance accountability, Pada level ini
dilihat apakah kegiatan yang dilakukan sudah
eisien (eficient andeconomy).
4. Program accountability, di sini akan disoroti
penetapan dan pencapaian tujuan yang
telah ditetapkan tersebut (outcomes and
effectiveness).
Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan
5. Policy accountability, dalam tahap ini
dilakukan pemilihan berbagai kebijakan yang
akan diterapkan atau tidak (value).
dari perspektif sistem akuntabilitas, terdapat
beberapa karakteristik pokok sistem akuntabilitas,
yaitu :
1. Berfokus pada hasil (outcomes)
2. Menggunakan beberapa indikator yang telah
dipilih untuk mengukur kinerja
3. Menghasilkan informasi yang berguna bagi
pengambilan keputusan atas suatu program
atau kebijakan
4. Menghasilkan data secara konsisten dari
waktu ke waktu
5. Melaporkan hasil (outcomes) dan mempublikasikannya secara teratur
Pemerintah wajib memberikan pertanggungjawabannya atas semua aktivitasnya kepada
masyarakat. Seiring dengan meningkatnya
aktivitas pemerintah dan timbul kesadaran yang
luas untuk menciptakan sistem pertanggungjawaban yang lebih komprehensif. Ternyata
dalam pelaksanaannya, keingintahuan masyarakat
tentang akuntabilitas pemerintahan tidak dapat
dipenuhi hanya dengan informasi keuangan
saja. Masyarakat ingin tahu lebih jauh apakah
pemerintah yang dipilihnya telah beroperasi
dengan ekonomis, eisien dan efektif. Beberapa
teknik yang dikembangkan untuk memperkuat
sistem akuntabilitas sangat dipengaruhi oleh
metode yang banyak dipakai dalam akuntansi,
manajemen dan riset, seperti management by
objectives, anggaran kinerja, riset operasi, audit
kepatuhan dan kinerja, akuntansi biaya, analisis
keuangan dan survey yang dilakukan terhadap
masyarakat sendiri.
Pelaporan pengukuran kinerja (performance
measurement) berkaitan dengan proses yang
dinamakan managing for results (pengelolaan
pencapaian). Proses ini timbul dari meningkatnya
tuntutan, yang bahwa manajemen pemerintahan
perlu memakai pendekatan yang sama dengan
manajemen di sektor swasta maupun organisasi
nir laba lainnya. Proses ini merupakan
pendekatan komprehensif untuk memfokuskan
suatu organisasi terhadap misi (mission), sasaran
Volume 2, Nomor 1, Februari 2012
(goals ) dan tujuan (objectives).
Kewajiban
pemerintah