Forestalling the next epidemic of white
Editorial Conclusion
Forestallingthenextepidemic
ofwhite-collarcrime
Linking policy to theory
peter grabosky, Special Issue Editor
Australian National University
neal shover, Special Issue Editor
U n i v e r s i t y o f Te n n e s s e e
C
rime-as-choicetheoryisusefulnotonlyfororganizingthinkingaboutthecausesof
white-collarcrimeepidemics,butalsofordrawingattentiontopotentiallypromisingwaysofreducingtheoddsofrecurrence.Threetargetareasforpolicyinitiatives
standout:(1)reducingthesupplyoflure,(2)increasingprevailingestimatesofthecredibility
ofexternaloversight,and(3)increasingtheuseofeffectivesystemsofinternaloversightand
self-restraint.Effectivepoliciesaimedatoneormoreofthesepromisetoreduceboththesupply
ofwhite-collarcriminalopportunitiesandthesizeofthepoolofindividualsandorganizations
tempted,ifnotpredisposed,toexploitthem.
Thereiscurrentlyaremarkablyoptimisticconsensusinsomeacademicquartersabout
howtoreducetheharmcausedbyprivilegedpredators.Theheartofitliesinthepresumed
promiseofpluralistic,cooperativeapproaches,andresponsiveregulation.Theseassumptions
highlighttheneedforenhancedprevention,morediverseandmoreeffectiveinternaloversight
andself-monitoring,andmoreeficientandeffectiveexternaloversight.Theyhavegaineduse
throughoutavarietyofregulatoryrealms,manysincetheirearliest,albeitembryonic,formulationnearlythreedecadesago(Braithwaite,1982).Despitevariationonspeciicpoints,taken
togetherthepolicyessaysrelectthis,nowtextbook,treatmentofwhite-collarcrimecontrol.
Theymakesensetheoretically,andweendorsethem.Wedosonotbecausetheyhavearecord
ofdemonstrablesuccessbutprincipallybecausesoleorexcessiverelianceonstateoversightand
threatofcriminalprosecutionisdificult,costly,anduncertain.Still,wearemindful,asothers
shouldbe,thattheonsetoftheGreatRecessionoccurredduringanddespitethetightembrace
Direct correspondence to Peter grabosky, RegNet, Australian National university, Cnr Fellows and garran
Rds, Acton ACt 0200, Australia (e-mail: [email protected]); Neal shover, Department of sociology,
university of tennessee, 905 mcClung tower, Knoxville, tN 37996-0490 (e-mail: [email protected]).
©2010AmericanSocietyofCriminology
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editor ial Conclusion
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ofself-regulation,pluralisticoversight,andnotionsofself-regulatingmarketsbypolicymakers
andmanyacademicians.
lure reduction
Reducingthesupplyoflureisaformidablechallenge.Anincreasingsupplyinevitablyaccompaniesthecomplexityofmodernlife(ShoverandHochstetler,2006).Whencoupledwithweak
oversight,almosteverynewcommodityandgovernmentprogrampresentsopportunitiesfor
criminalexploitationandattractsattentionfrompotentialmalefactors.Absentcredibleoversight,
everynewtaxbecomesanopportunityforevasion.Everynewprogramofpublicexpenditure
isapotentiallureforthosewhowouldappropriatefromitunlawfully.Thisisnolesstrueof
policiesimplementedwiththebestofintentions;programsdesignedtoextendopportunities
forhomeownershiptothosepreviouslyexcludedfromtheresidentialhousingmarkethelped
createthesubprimemortgagedebacle(CollinsandNigro,2010,thisissue).Thechallengeis
toenableuseoflureforlegitimatepurposes,whilereducingitspotentialforuseasaninstrumentortargetforcrime.
Reducinglure,withoutstilingindividualinitiativeandprecludinglegitimateopportunities,iscomplicated.Commandeconomiesandsocialistsystemshavetried,butwithnotable
lackofsuccess.Thesesystems,moreover,tendtocreatesubstantialblackmarketsandoficial
corruption.WhetherthesumptuouslevelsofexecutivecompensationthatprevailintheUnited
Statescanbesigniicantlyreduced,isquestionable.Sotooaretheconsequencesofsuchpolicies
forindividualinitiative.Ifimplemented,theeffectsofsuchrestraintwouldnotseebankers
desertingtheirprofessioninfavorofacademiccareers.
Somelurecanbereducedbytechnology.Thankstotechnologicalinnovation,manyof
thehazardsthatregulationexiststomitigatehavebeensigniicantlyreduced,ifnoteliminated.
Sometraditionalproductsandpractices,alluringbutharmful,arenolongerattractive.Innovationsinpainttechnologyandthedevelopmentoflead-freepetrolhavesigniicantlyreduced
theprevalenceofenvironmentallead.“Greener”productsthatrequirefewerrawmaterialsand
energytoproduce,andwhichgeneratelesswaste,havecontributedtoacleanerplanet(van
ErpandHuisman,2010,thisissue).Theappealofmidnightdumpingistherebysigniicantly
reduced.Satelliteimagingcannowfacilitatemoreeficientagriculturalpractice,includingwater
useandtheapplicationofagriculturalchemicalsandfertilizers.Irresponsibleorillegaluseof
theseisnolongerseenastempting.
Thelurerepresentedbydependentandvulnerablepopulationshasincreasedinsizeand
importanceinthedecadessinceWorldWarII(ShoverandHochstetler,2006).Theyincludea
sizablegroupofthegreedyandgullible.Reducingthesupplyandvulnerabilityofthesepotential
victimsischallenging,butstepstakenintheUnitedStatestocurbcriminaltelemarketerssuggestsitisworthyofattention.Enhancinginancialliteracyamongthegeneralpublicisagood
idea,butgullibilitymaybedeeplyengrainedinthehumanbehavioralrepertoire.Itsupportsa
massiveglobalgamblingindustry.Ponzischemeslikelywillremainwithusforawhile.
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Increasing the credibility of External oversight
Vigilantanddeterminedoversightcanprovidesomeprotectionagainsttheworstexcessesof
capitalism.MostobserversbelievethatweakoversightwastheprincipalcauseoftheGreat
Recession,andthisviewisrepresentedbytheauthorsinthisissue(e.g.,Black,Reichman).
Certainly,anydissentershavebeenconspicuouslysilent.PrudentialregulationinAustralia,
Japan,andFinlandshieldedthoseeconomiesfromthedislocationexperiencedinpartsof
Europe.Enhancingcredibleoversightmightbemoreachievablethanlurereductionasa
meansofreducingtherateofwhite-collarcrime.Anumberofinstitutions—public,private,
andnon-proit—areinapositiontoexercisesurveillanceoverinancialandothercommercial
activities.Whennon-governmentalenergiescanbeharnessedinfurtheranceofpublicpolicy,
ortotheextentthattheycanoperatespontaneouslywithbeneicialeffect,thiscancomplement
oversightbyanoverburdenedstate.
Thecredibilityofexternaloversightisimportantnotonlyforwould-beoffenders,butalso
forthegeneralpublic.Beliefinthefairness,effectiveness,andequityofaregulatorysystem
isessentialtotheverylegitimacyofastate.LeonaHelmsleyoncestated“Wedon’tpaytaxes.
Onlythelittlepeoplepaytaxes.”Totheextentthatcitizensbelievethattaxisoptionalforthe
rich,thetaxsystem,andthestateasawhole,canfallintodisrepute(Levi,2010,thisissue).
TheweakeningoftheGreekstateasaresultofineffectivetaxadministrationbecamestarkly
apparentinApril2010.
Weliveinaworldinwhichsymbolsmatter.Intermsofconventionalcrime,reassuring
statisticsarelessreassuringthanvisible“blueshirts.”Theresponsetosexoffenders(especially
thosewhooffendagainstchildren)inEnglish-speakingdemocraciestendstobevengefuland
unforgiving.Theenactmentofdraconianlegislationinthefaceofpublicanxietyisatimehonoredpoliticalstrategy,andtheimpositionofsavagesentencesservesasimilarfunction.The
150-yearsentenceimposedonBernardMadoffmightnothaverestoredtheinancialwell-being
ofhisvictims,butsomeofthem,andmanymembersofthepublic,feltbetter(Pontelland
Geis,2010,thisissue).Thedeterrentvalueofthisandsimilarsentencesmaybenil,however,
andthecertaintyofdetectionandresponsefromoverseersprobablyhasamoresigniicanteffect(Leighton,2010,thisissue).
Evenarelativelyequitableregulatorysystemcanbediscreditedeasilywhenitisseentobe
administeredheavy-handedly.Whenauthoritiestreatthosesubjecttooversightwithrespect
andfairness,thelattermaybemoreinclinedtomeettheirobligations.Butapersistentpostureofarrogancecanbeoff-puttingandcangiverisetoan“organizedcultureofresistance”
(BardachandKagan,1982).Thiscouldindexpressioninindividual,andstatisticallyrare,
extremeresponse.InFebruary2010,anaggrievedtaxpayerlewalightaircraftintoabuilding
housinganoficeoftheU.S.InternalRevenueServiceinAustin,Texas(Leighton,2010).V.
Braithwaite(2010,thisissue)observestheimportanceofdiscriminatingbetweendegreesof
non-complianceandthenecessityofmobilizingresponsecommensuratewiththedegreeof
transgression.Probablytheoverwhelmingmajorityofoversightpersonneldosoinanycase;
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itisacharacteristicallymoralandorganizationalresponsetomanagingavolumeofworkthat
invariablyexceedsresources.
Globalization,asrelectedintherapidmovementacrossnationalbordersofinance,
commodities,labor,ideas,andviruses(digitalandmicrobial),posessigniicantregulatory
challenges,asitbothcreateslureandinhibitsdevelopmentofcredibleoversight.The“raceto
thebottom”toindderegulatoryhavensindevelopingcountrieshasbecomeafamiliartheme.
Shippingelectronicwastetothethirdworldmayridawealthynationofadisposalproblem,
butinothercases,analogouspracticesmayreturntohauntone.Carbonemissionsgenerated
inapoorcountrycontributetoclimatechangeforeveryone.Theglobalinancialsystemmight
notbetotallyintegrated,butitissuficientlytightlycoupledthataprobleminonenationcould
reverberateelsewhere.Globalinancialmarketssufferedin2008intheaftermathofthesubprimemortgagecrisisintheUnitedStates.Greekinancialwoeswerefeltnotonlythroughout
EuropebutalsoacrosstheAtlantic.Institutionsofexternaloversightmustbeglobal,aswell
aslocal,inscope.
Conidenceintheintegrityofmarketsisessentialtothestabilityandgrowthofinancial
systems.Iftoomanycitizensbelievethattheirmoneywouldbesaferifkepthiddenundera
mattressathomethanifdepositedinabankorinvestedinthestockmarket,theentireeconomy
suffers.Onlythemostnonchalantoflaissez-faireeconomistswouldfavorareturntothelaw
ofthejungle.Mostoftherestofuswouldconcurthatadegreeofcriminalenforcementisan
essentialcomponentofaregulatorysystem.Whatiscontestedisthecontext in which the hard
edgeofthestateisrequired,andthedegreeofseveritythatisappropriate.
Increasing Efective Internal oversight and self-restraint
Itwillbeextremelydificulttoengineerculturalchangetobringaboutgreaterself-restraint
(NguyenandPontell,2010,thisissue).Corporateexecutivesoftenbringasenseofentitlementtothejob(Friedrichs,2010,thisissue),andforsomepeople,enoughisneverenough.
Themarginalsatisfactiontoahighlyingbankerofanadditional2%inbonusontopof$20
millionmightstrikeusmeremortalsasinsigniicant,butanybaseballplayerwouldratherbat
.357than.350.Moreover,incentivesmattertomostpeople,andforbetterorworse,money
isameasureofperformance.Inaddition,shareholdersgenerallyarehappytoacquiescein
lavishrewardstochiefexecutiveswhoaresuccessful.Andwhentimesaredificult,itisalways
temptingtocutcorners.
Moredificulttomeasurethanpersonalwealth,butavaluethatismoreimportantto
many,ispersonalintegrity.Despitetheoldadagethat“niceguysinishlast,”captainsofindustry
oftengotogreatlengthstopromoteanimageofrespectability.Philanthropiclargesseisone
meansofcultivatingsuchanimage,butironically,visiblelargessetendstovarywithpersonal
wealth.Thenofcoursethereisthecynicaluseofphilanthropyforinsuranceagainstregulatory
orlaw-enforcementauthorities.Prominentwhite-collaroffendersoftenlaunttheirgenerosity,
beforeoraftertheirtransgressions.LikeBernieMadoff,someusephilanthropyasameansof
winningthetrustofthosewholaterbecomevictims.
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Crimeandunethicalconductbycorporatepersonneltypicallytakeplaceoutofpublicview,
behindtherespectablefacadeoftheiremployer,anditcanbenearlyimpossibleforoutsidersto
penetratethisorganizationalveil.Thisisonereasonwhywhistleblowersandinformantsrank
amongthemostimportantsourcesofinformationaboutcorporatecrime,illegalities,andunethicalconduct(AssociationofCertiiedFraudExaminers,2010).Whistleblowersareemployees
oflegitimateorganizationswhodivulgetooutsidersknowledgeorsuspicionsofwrongdoing
intheworkplace.Recognizingtheirimportanceasasourceofoversight,vandeBunt(2010,
thisissue)makesencouragementofwhistleblowingacenterpieceofhisproposalsforreducing
corporatewhite-collarcrime.IntheUnitedStates,severalstatesandthefederalgovernment
haveenactedlegislationprovidingemploymentprotectionandmonetaryrewardsforthem.
Thisismeanttospurinsiderswithknowledgeofwrongdoingtocomeforwardandreportto
authoritiesandtodosowithoutfearofreprisals.
Beyond self-regulation and pluralistic oversight
Theabsencethusfarinmostindustriesandbusinessirmsofclearorpersuasiveevidence
oftheeffectivenessofself-regulationandcooperativeapproachestooversightincreasesthe
importanceofexploringadditionalpolicyoptionsgroundedincriminologicaltheory(Laufer,
2010,thisissue).Thedominantparadigmofresponsiveregulationdoesnotprecludeinnovationandindeedinvitescontinuingreform.Recenthistoryhasseensomeisolatedinnovation
inregulatoryreform,someofwhichmightbereplicable.Intheaftermathofabriberyscandal
thatresultedinmarketingoftaintedproducts,theformerheadoftheChinaStateFoodand
DrugAdministration,ZhengXiaoyu,wasexecutedin2007.Nothingcomparablehasoccurred
inanyotherWesternnation.
Perhapsmorefeasibleispublicshaming.Onerecallsthatastheircompanieswerefailing,
chiefexecutivesofthreemajorU.S.automobilemanufacturerslewtoWashingtonintheir
corporatejetstoaskforfederalbailoutfunds.Althoughshamelessbehaviorsuchasthisleads
onetodespairabouttheprospectofgoodcorporatecitizenship,forcefulchastisementisstill
appropriate.ThereceptionthattheautoexecutivesreceivedonCapitolHillwaslessthanwarmly
welcoming,andtheirridiculebythepresswasentirelyitting.Leighton(2010)suggeststhat
theU.S.InternalRevenueServicepublishthenamesofdelinquenttaxpayers.Therewillalways
bewhite-collaroffenderswhoareirredeemablyshameless,butthosecaptainsofindustrywho
dependonamodicumofpoliticalandsocialsupportforthecontinuedviabilityoftheirbusiness
ignorepublicopinionattheirperil.Andnearlyeverybodyvaluesrespect.Thepotentialutilityof
ridiculeasameansofmobilizingpublicindignationis,inourview,worthyoffurtherattention.
Wesaythisdespitethefactthatrefusaltoacknowledgethecriminalityoftheirconductisone
ofthesharpestdistinguishingcharacteristicsofwhite-collarcriminals,onereportedinstudies
usingavarietyofresearchmethodologies(Benson,1985;ShoverandHunter,2010).
Outrightprohibitionofdesignatedproductsandpracticesshouldremainanavailable
option.Inotherareasofcriminology,behaviorsthatappearatirstblushbenign,mightbe
prohibitedbecauseoftheirpotentialformisuse.InAustralia,ordinarycitizensareeffectively
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prohibitedfrompossessingsemi-automaticirearmsoroleoresincapsicumspray.Onecommits
acrimebyproducingdatawiththeintentionthatitbeusedincommittingaseriouscomputer
offense(bycreatingwormsandviruses).Whethercertaintypesofinancialinstrumentscould
besimilarlyprohibitedisaninterestingquestion.IntheUnitedStates,Congresscurrentlyis
debatingapotentialbanonderivativestrading.
Althoughtheremightbeno“magicbullet”intheofing,onecouldtakesomecomfort
inthepotentialfortechnologicaldevelopmentstoenhanceregulatorycapacity,especiallythe
capacityforcredibleguardianshipandoversight(Gibbs,McGarrell,andAxelrod,2010,this
issue).Aswithcomputing,thedecreasingcostandincreasingaccessibilityoftechnologymake
suchenhancedguardianshipincreasinglyfeasible.Satelliteimagingcandetectunauthorizedland
clearingandwaterstorageonindividualfarms.Digitaltechnologycanidentifytheoriginof
everyporkproductproducedintheNetherlands,downtothefarmwheretheanimalwasraised.
Automatedsurveillancemethodscanidentifyanomalouspatternsoftradingonstockmarkets.
Thepaceoftechnologicalchangeisgreatandgrowing.Itissafetoassumethatapplications
unforeseentodaywillincreasethecapacityofregulatoryoversightinyearstocome.
AyresandBraithwaite(1992)observedthatpublicinterestgroupsplayacentralrolein
someregulatorydomains,arolethatcouldeasilybeenhancedandexpanded.Theynotedthat
manycountriesaroundtheworldhaveelectedworkersafetyrepresentativesthatcomplement
stateinspections.Longbeforethewidespreadtake-upofdigitaltechnology,itwasrecognized
thatordinarycitizensareinapositiontoplayasigniicantroleintheregulatoryprocess.In
theUnitedStates,theBetterBusinessBureaus(BBBs)grewoutofthetruth-in-advertising
movementintheearly20thcentury(Pannell,2002).Comprisedoflocalbusinesspeople,
BBBsscrutinizedadvertisingfordeceptivecontent,gatheredevidence,andpresentedittolocal
authoritiesforprosecution.
Consumerboycottsexemplifymassparticipationinfurtheranceofoversightreform.Such
participationcanresultinthecreationofnewregulatoryprohibitionsinthefaceofrecognized
harm,oradditionalexternaloversightthatcomplementsanexistingregulatoryregime.Harsh
laborpracticesexperiencedbyCaliforniaagriculturalworkersgaveriseintheearly1970sto
boycottsoflettuceandtablegrapes.Someameliorationofworkingconditionsfollowed.The
riseoftheenvironmentalmovementhasseenaloweringofgrassrootsactivism,onlandand
sea.Inrecentyears,theenvironmentalNGOGreenpeacehassentvesselstotheSouthernOcean
tomonitorJapanesewhaling.Imagesofwhalesbeingharpoonedattractlittlesympathyforthe
whalingindustryorforthenationsthathostit.
Privateregulatoryactivitycanbeautonomousorguidedbythestate.IntheUnitedStates,
theSurfaceMiningControlandRegulationAct1977permittedcitizenstorequestaninspectionbyfederalregulatoryauthorities.Inthe1980s,consumerprotectionauthoritiesinatleast
oneAustralianstatemobilizedvolunteersfromtheconsumermovementtokeepaneyeoutfor
potentiallyhazardousproductsonthemarket.Thestatecanevendelegateregulatorypowerto
privateinterests.InAustraliaandtheUnitedKingdom,RoyalSocietiesforthePreventionof
CrueltytoAnimalsinvestigateandprosecutecasesofanimalcruelty.AformerAustralianpolice
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commissioneroncepubliclymusedthatfraudinvestigationmightsimilarlybeundertakenby
theprivatesector.
Technologycouldenhancenotonlythecapacityofstateoversight,butalsothepowerof
privateparties.Wearenowwellintotheinformationrevolution,andtheenormouspotential
fordigitaltechnologytoenhancetheregulatorycapacityofordinarycitizensisbecomingapparent.Morethaneverbefore,privateindividualsandinstitutionsareinapositiontoengage
intheco-productionofregulatoryservices.Torgler(2010,thisissue)notestheimportanceof
themediaintheregulatoryprocess.Inyearspastitwassaidthatfreedomofthepressbelonged
tothepersonwhoownedone.Today,thankstodigitaltechnology,individualsaroundthe
worldcancommunicateinstantaneously,tomillionsofpeople,andatnegligiblecost.Mobile
phonescanserveascameras,videorecorders,orlisteningdevicesandcancaptureactivities
thaterrantcompaniesorgovernmentagentswouldrathernotshare.Thenotoriousimagesof
prisonerabuseatAbuGhraibwerebroadcastaroundtheworldin2006.Investigativereportingisbynomeansthemonopolyofjournalistsemployedbygreatmetropolitannewspapers.
Indeed,theeconomicsofthenewspaperindustryhavebeguntomilitateagainstserious(i.e.,
expensive)journalism.Instead,individualbloggersandotherdigitalnewsentrepreneurshave
beguntodevelopanincreasingproile(e.g.,seeslate.com/, wikileaks.org/,andpropublica.org/).
AProPublicareporterwasawardeda2010PulitzerPrizeforInvestigativeReporting.
AsenvisagedbyAyresandBraithwaite(1992),citizenscanexercisevigilanceovertheperformanceofregulatoryagencies,oroverthebehaviorofcorporateactorsdirectly.IntheWest,
wealreadyhaveseenonlineencouragementofconsumerboycotts(boycottnestle.blogspot.com/)
andWebsitesthatmonitorparticularindustries(info.babymilkaction.org/)orcompanies(untied.
com/).Theevengreaterpotentialofsocialnetworkingsites,blogs,andrelatedmediacanbe
glimpsedincontemporaryChina.DespitethecensorshipofFacebook,Twitter,andYouTube
byChineseauthorities,alternativemediamaybeseentolourishintheformofsuchsitesas
likeQQZone,Tianya.cn,andKaixin001.com(Barboza,2010).Thepotentialinvestigative
capacityofsuchmediaisformidable,althoughthusfarithasbeenmobilizedprimarilyagainst
low-levelcorruptionandothergrossanti-socialbehavior.Theprivatediaryofamid-levelparty
oficialinsouthChinawaspostedon-line,and,unfortunatelyforhim,itcontaineddetailsof
sexualindiscretionsandbribesaccepted.Hewascashieredasaresult.Inanothercase,avideo
clipofunknownprovenancedepictingawomankillingakittenwaspostedontheWeb.Public
indignationwassogreat,andcooperationofparticipantsinthenetworksostrong,thatthe
womanwastrackedtoasmalltowninafarnortheastcornerofChina.Bothsheandthecamera
manweredismissedfromtheirgovernmentjobs.InOctober2007,aprovincialdepartment
offorestryannouncedthatithadidentiiedasurvivingSouthChinaTiger.Imagespostedon
theWebarousedthesuspicionsofnetizens,andtheprovincialgovernmentlaterconcededthat
indeedtheyhadbeenfaked.Thirteenlocaloficialsweredisciplined(Jin,2008).Ifsunlight
isthebestdisinfectant,thepotentialforvigilancenowwithinthecapacityofcitizenslooms
largerandmoreimportantthaneverbefore.Thepotentialoftechnologyasaninstrumentfor
mobilizingmassindignationagainstcorporatecrimemaybequitesigniicant.
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policy adoption and Implementation
Rothe(2010,thisissue)isonlypartlycorrectthat“policysuggestionsaredificulttoconceptualizeandtoimplement.”Developmentandpromulgationofpolicyproposalsisanything
butdificultandthediversepolicyessaysinthisissueattesttothis.Seeingproposedpolicy
adoptedandimplementedfaithfullyisexceedinglydificult.Conspicuouslyabsentfrommany
ofthepolicyessaysincludedhereisdiscussionofhowtheproposedpoliciesmightbeputin
placeandobstaclestoimplementation.Snider(2010,thisissue)isoneofthefewauthors
whohighlightsthecriticalimportanceofpowerrelationshipsinconstructingandgaining
passageofnewrulesandoversight.Regulatoryspaceisalmostalwayscontested.Proposals
foroversightreform,regardlessoftheirintrinsicmerit,invariablymeetwithoppositionfrom
someone,somewhere.Notallreformsarecostless;thosewhoareaskedtothebearincreased
costsresultingfromregulatoryinitiativesmightunderstandablyobject.Routinely,proposed
oversightinitiativesencounteroppositiongroundedinideologyorpoliticalpartisanship.More
importantperhaps,strugglesforreforminvariablyarewagedwithinthepoliticalandideologicalconinesofthepolitical–economiccontext.Giventhisfact,fundamentalandfarreaching
policychangeslikelywillnotoccur;onlyproposalsforincrementaltinkeringwillbedeinedas
legitimateandpotentiallyworkable.
Windows of Opportunity
Thestrategicenvironmentforreformischangeable,but“toeverythingthereisaseason”(Ecclesiastes3:1–8).Muchreformisbornofcrisis.Acuteproblemsdemandsolutions.Emergent
structuralcontradictionsinthepoliticaleconomycangiverisetoproblemsthatcannotbepapered
overwithcosmeticreforms.Inthesehistoricallyopportunecircumstances,acuteproblemscan
producemassdisaffectionandcausecitizenstoorganizeandtodemandoficialaction.Atthe
veryleast,crisisconditionscancausealossoflegitimacyandforcedacquiescencefromthose
whonormallyresistoversight.Thestockmarketcrashof1929andtheGreatDepressionthat
followedusheredinadegreeofgovernmentactivitythatwashistoricallyunprecedented.The
FederalDepositInsuranceCorporation(FDIC)andtheSECarebuttwooftheinstitutions
createdatthattime(Schlesinger,1958).TheWatergatecover-upwasfollowedbyenergeticprosecutorialandlegislativeoversightactivityindefenseofpublicsectorintegrity(Katz,1980).The
S&Lcrisisofthe1980sgaverisetotheFinancialInstitutionsReform,Recovery,andEnforcementActof1989(FIRREA).CriminalscandalsbyEnronandotherlargecorporationshelped
launcheventsthatculminatedintheSarbanes-OxleyActof2002.Thislegislationmandated
newstandardsofcorporategovernanceandpersonalresponsibilityforcorporatereportingby
high-levelexecutives.BythetimethisspecialissueofCriminology & Public Policyappearsin
print,wemightknowifthewindowofopportunityopenedbytheGreatRecessionwaswide
enoughtoallowsigniicantreformsofinancialsectoroversight.
Scandalsandaccidentsmightalsocreatecircumstancesfavorableforreform,asnoteworthy
historicalexamplesmakeclear.Thedeathof146garmentworkersintheTriangleShirtwaist
FactoryFireof1911notonlygaverisetonewsafetylaws,butalsoinspiredtheProgressive
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movement,forerunnertotheNewDeal,intheUnitedStates(vonDrehle,2003).Thedisastrous
SantaBarbaraoilspillof1968wasapowerfulcatalysttodevelopmentoftheenvironmental
movement(Molotch,1970).InApril2010,anexplosioninanundergroundcoalmineinWest
Virginiakilled29miners,andafewweekslater,adrilledbutuncappedunderseawellspewed
perhapsmillionsofgallonsofoilintotheGulfofMexico.Asthisessayiswritten,thelowofoil
hascontinueduninterruptedformorethaniveweekswithnoendisinsight.Thelong-term
impactsofthespillareinestimable.Mineexplosionsandoilspills,particularlywhenthereis
reasontobelievethatlaxoversightcontributedtotheiroccurrence,areopportunitiesthatdo
notcomealongeveryday.
Opportunities,however,areonlyasgoodasthosewhowouldexploitthem.Theskillfulpolicyentrepreneurmightsucceed,wheretheineptwouldfail.Inaddition,therelational
distancebetweenpolicyentrepreneursandsourcesofpotentialresistancemightbehighly
signiicantinexplainingthesuccessorfailureofreforminitiatives(Black,1993).Consider
RichardNixon,conservativepresidentoftheUnitedStates.TheNixonAdministrationsaw
thecreationoftheEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)andtheOccupationalHealthand
SafetyAdministration(OSHA).
Social Movements
Intheabsenceofacutecrisis,publicconsciousnessaboutagivenharmandsupportforregulatoryreformmaygrowslowlytogetherwithcallsforremediation.Insomecasesthispublic
consciousnesscanbeboostedbyalandmarkpublication.Amongtheearliermanifestationsof
riskidentiicationandinformationwastheclassicnovel,The Jungle (1906),bytheauthorand
journalistUptonSinclair.ThebookledtotheenactmentofTheMeatInspectionActandthe
PureFoodandDrugAct.
Ahalfcenturylater,thenaturewriterRachelCarsonpublishedSilent Spring(1962),
whichlednotonlytothestrengtheningofpesticideregulationintheUnitedStates,butalso
tothegrowthoftheenvironmentalmovementmoregenerally.Threeyearsafterpublication
ofCarson’sbook,RalphNaderpublishedUnsafe at Any Speed (1965),acritiqueofautomobile
safetyintheUnitedStates.Nader’sbookcontributedtotheenactmentofthe1966National
TraficandMotorVehicleSafetyAct,whichestablishedtheNationalHighwayTraficSafety
Administration.Reformsthatemergealmosteffortlesslyfromchangingpublicconsciousness
andspontaneouscallsforactionaretheexception.Morecommonarereformsthatowetheir
adoptiontoorganizedandsustainedmovements(Snider,2010).
Voluntary/Private Actions
Trustisthefoundationofresponsiveregulation.Andlikesuccessfulperpetratorsoffraud,
corporateoficialsareskilledatcreatingbeliefinothersthattheymerittrust.Whensubjected
toexternalscrutinyandcriticismforcriminalorillegalconduct,theyunfailinglyattributethe
problemstoafew“badapples.”Thevastmajorityofoficersandirmsaresaidtobehonest
andhonorableandcanbetrustedtobehaveinasociallyresponsiblefashion.Likewisetheycan
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betrustedtoimplementeffectiveinternalcontrols,todetectandrespondtorulebreaking,and
toreporttheincidentstostateagencies.
Forcorporateoficials,however,trustistreatednotassomethingwhichcontinuallymust
beearnedindaytodayactionsbutinsteadasanentitlement.Therearecountlessactionsthey
couldtaketodemonstratethattrustismerited.Oneischangesinpoliciesofcorporategovernance. Corporate governancereferstoavariegatedmixofstructuralandproceduralchangesput
inplacebybusinessirmstoreducethelikelihoodofinanciallosstoshareholdersorinvestors
causedbydistracted,incompetent,oroverlyself-interestedmanagers.Exemplaryinitiatives
includechangeinthecompositionofboardsofdirectors,revampedcompensationschemesfor
managers,andmorerobustinternalmonitoringsystems(DenisandMcConnell,2003).But
theimportanceofcompliancewithexternallyrequiredstandardsofconductandperformance
isalmostentirelyabsentfromcorporategovernancecodes;theemphasisinsteadislimited
almostentirelytotheimportanceofhonestyininternaldealings.Revisionstocodeofethics
andinternalgovernancedocumentsthatemphasizetheobligationtoobeythelawwouldsend
aclearsignaltothoseskepticaloftheintegrityofrespectabilityofcorporateactors.Theyalso
mightpromoteself-restraint.
Anotherwayofdemonstratingthatcorporateactorscanbetrustedtobehaveresponsibly
isbyspendingfundsforresearchonseriousnon-complianceandcrime.Historically,empirical
researchintothesemattershasbeenfundedalmostentirelybystateandothernon-corporate
sources.Researchsupportedbycorporateinterestsbycontrasthasfocusednarrowlyoneconomic
misconductthatvictimizesbusinessirms(BussmannandWerle,2006).Iftrustandcompliance
withoversightarepriorityconcerns,businesscoulddemonstratethisbycommittingresources
tosupportresearchintoillegalactionsthatharmoutsidersandthegeneralpublic.Thecoststo
victimsoftheirexperienceatthehandsofcorporatecriminalsisatopicpregnantwithpotential
symbolicmessagesoftrustandresponsibility.Researchintoawiderandlessself-centeredrange
oftopicswouldsendapowerfulsignalofcommitmentandmightleadtomoreeffectiveinternal
oversightandself-restraint.Trustincorporateoficialscouldbeenhancedalsobyreforming
theirapproachtoandtreatmentofwhistleblowers.
Farfromthevenuesinwhichcelebrationofself-regulationtakesplace,corporationsengage
relentlesslyinattacksoncountlessaspectsofoversightoftheiractivities.Inlegislatures,regulatory
foraandappellatecourts,theyworktoexpandtheirself-interestednotionsoffairandreasonable
oversight(MichaelsandMonforton,2005).Astheysupporteffortstoweakenthecapacityof
regulatoryagenciestomonitorandsanctiontheirmisconduct,forexample,theypressforrelief
fromcivilsuitsongroundsthattheyhavereceivedcertiicatesofcompliancefromregulators
(HarrisandBerenson,2008).Theseeffortsdolittletopromoteandmuchtounderminetrust.
Theresultsofamailsurveyofcompliancewithrequirementsoftradepracticeslegislationby999
largeAustralianbusinessesshowed“thatimplementationisoverwhelminglypartialandpossibly
symbolic.Mostbusinesseshaveimplementedsome,butfarfromall,ofthecompliancesystem
elementsconsideredbythe[government],practitionersandscholarstobenecessaryforeffective
compliancemanagement”(ParkerandNielsen,2006:482).Itisnoteworthythatcorporate
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actorsapparentlyhavemadelittleefforttofundstudiesoftheimplementationandeficacyof
“trust-and-hope”oversight.Itisdificulttocredittheirgoodwillwhentheyseemdisinclined
tocommitresourcestoidentifyingbestpracticesofinternaloversight.Theelectronicsindustry
CitizenshipCoalitionnotedbyvanErpandHuisman(2010)mightbeanexception.
Discussionsofhowtodeviseandgainadoptionofpoliciesthatlimitlure,reducetheranks
ofthosewhoarepredisposedortemptedtoexploitit,andincreasethecredibilityofoversight
canbeoverlytechnocraticinfocusandneglectlargerconstraintsandobstacles.Thedominant
politicaleconomy,itsstructuralintegrity,operatingpremises,andpowerrelationshipsseverely
constrainconsiderationandadoptionofpolicyoptions.Prominentamongtheseconstraints
istheperceivedneedtoavoidanyactionsthatwouldjeopardizebusinessconidenceandthe
stabilityofthemarkets.Theycancauseadvocatestolosesightofthefactthattheightagainst
corporatecrimeislinkedinextricablytotheightforsocialjustice.Itisaightinwhichwealth,
accesstopolicymakers,andotherresourcesgenerallyaredeterminative.Butpopulistsocial
movementscanmakeadifference.Crises,scandals,andaccidentswillcontinuetooccur,givingrisetoepisodicdisaffectionandattemptsatreform.Theoddsofsuccesswillbeaffected
signiicantlybypolitical–economicconditions.Reformishardertoresistandmorelikelyto
succeedduringeconomicboomtimeswhenproitsareup.Futureattemptstolimittheharm
causedbywhite-collarcrimelikelywillmirrorthepast,andwhetherornottheGreatRecession
willinspireorganizedandunrelentingdemandsforchangeinthepracticeofgovernmentsand
thechoicesmadebyindustryremainstobeseen.Thecontributorstothisspecialissuehave
shownwhatformthesemighttake.
references
AssociationofCertiiedFraudExaminers.2010.2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational
Fraud and Abuse.Austin,TX:AssociationofCertiiedFraudExaminers.RetrievedMay
10,2010fromacfe.com/resources/publications.asp?copy=rttnhttp://www.acfe.com/
documents/2006-rttn.pdf.
Ayres,IanandJohnBraithwaite.1992.Responsive Regulation.Cambridge,UK:Cambridge
UniversityPress.
Barboza,David.2010.ForChinese,webisthewaytoentertainment.New York Times,April
18.RetrievedApril19,2010fromnytimes.com/2010/04/19/technology/19chinaweb.
html?hp.
Bardach,EugeneandRobertA.Kagan.1982.Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory
Unreasonableness.Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress.
Benson,MichaelL.1985.Denyingtheguiltymind:Accountingforinvolvementinawhitecollar crime. Criminology,23:589–599.
Black,Donald.1993.The Social Structure of Right and Wrong.SanDiego:AcademicPress.
Black,WilliamK.2010.Echoepidemics:Controlfraudsgenerate“white-collarstreetcrime”
waves.Criminology & Public Policy.Thisissue.
Braithwaite,John.1982.Enforcedself-regulation:Anewstrategyforcorporatecrime
control. Michigan Law Review,80:1466–1507.
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-------------.2010.Diagnosticsofwhite-collarcrimeprevention.Criminology & Public Policy.
Thisissue.
Braithwaite,Valerie.2010.Criminalprosecutionwithinresponsiveregulatorypractice.
Criminology & Public Policy.Thisissue.
Bunt,Henkvande.2010.Wallsofsecrecyandsilence:TheMadoffcaseandcartelsinthe
constructionindustry.Criminology & Public Policy.Thisissue.
Bussmann,Kai-D.andMarkusM.Werle.2006.Addressingcrimeincompanies:First
indingsfromaglobalsurveyofeconomiccrime.British Journal of Criminology,46:
1128–1144.
Callahan,David.2004.The Cheating Culture.NewYork:Harcourt.
Caro,RobertA.2002.Master of the Senate.NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf.
Carson,Rachel.1962.Silent Spring.NewYork:HoughtonMiflin.
Clinard,MarshallB.andPeterC.Yeager.1980.Corporate Crime.NewYork:FreePress.
Collins,M.CaryandPeterJ.Nigro.2010.Mortgageoriginationfraud:Themissinglinks.
Criminology & Public Policy.Thisissue.
Denis,DianeK.2001.Twenty-iveyearsofcorporategovernanceresearch...andcounting.
Review of Financial Economics,10:191–212.
Denis,DianeK.andJohnJ.McConnell.2003.International Corporate Governance.
EuropeanCorporateGovernanceInstitute.RetrievedMay13,2010frompapers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=320121.
Downey,Tom.2010.China’scyberposse.New York Times,March3.RetrievedMay13,2010
fromnytimes.com/2010/03/07/magazine/07Human-t.html?emc=eta1.
Erp,JudithvanandWimHuisman.2010.Smartregulationandenforcementofillegal
disposalofelectronic�
Forestallingthenextepidemic
ofwhite-collarcrime
Linking policy to theory
peter grabosky, Special Issue Editor
Australian National University
neal shover, Special Issue Editor
U n i v e r s i t y o f Te n n e s s e e
C
rime-as-choicetheoryisusefulnotonlyfororganizingthinkingaboutthecausesof
white-collarcrimeepidemics,butalsofordrawingattentiontopotentiallypromisingwaysofreducingtheoddsofrecurrence.Threetargetareasforpolicyinitiatives
standout:(1)reducingthesupplyoflure,(2)increasingprevailingestimatesofthecredibility
ofexternaloversight,and(3)increasingtheuseofeffectivesystemsofinternaloversightand
self-restraint.Effectivepoliciesaimedatoneormoreofthesepromisetoreduceboththesupply
ofwhite-collarcriminalopportunitiesandthesizeofthepoolofindividualsandorganizations
tempted,ifnotpredisposed,toexploitthem.
Thereiscurrentlyaremarkablyoptimisticconsensusinsomeacademicquartersabout
howtoreducetheharmcausedbyprivilegedpredators.Theheartofitliesinthepresumed
promiseofpluralistic,cooperativeapproaches,andresponsiveregulation.Theseassumptions
highlighttheneedforenhancedprevention,morediverseandmoreeffectiveinternaloversight
andself-monitoring,andmoreeficientandeffectiveexternaloversight.Theyhavegaineduse
throughoutavarietyofregulatoryrealms,manysincetheirearliest,albeitembryonic,formulationnearlythreedecadesago(Braithwaite,1982).Despitevariationonspeciicpoints,taken
togetherthepolicyessaysrelectthis,nowtextbook,treatmentofwhite-collarcrimecontrol.
Theymakesensetheoretically,andweendorsethem.Wedosonotbecausetheyhavearecord
ofdemonstrablesuccessbutprincipallybecausesoleorexcessiverelianceonstateoversightand
threatofcriminalprosecutionisdificult,costly,anduncertain.Still,wearemindful,asothers
shouldbe,thattheonsetoftheGreatRecessionoccurredduringanddespitethetightembrace
Direct correspondence to Peter grabosky, RegNet, Australian National university, Cnr Fellows and garran
Rds, Acton ACt 0200, Australia (e-mail: [email protected]); Neal shover, Department of sociology,
university of tennessee, 905 mcClung tower, Knoxville, tN 37996-0490 (e-mail: [email protected]).
©2010AmericanSocietyofCriminology
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ofself-regulation,pluralisticoversight,andnotionsofself-regulatingmarketsbypolicymakers
andmanyacademicians.
lure reduction
Reducingthesupplyoflureisaformidablechallenge.Anincreasingsupplyinevitablyaccompaniesthecomplexityofmodernlife(ShoverandHochstetler,2006).Whencoupledwithweak
oversight,almosteverynewcommodityandgovernmentprogrampresentsopportunitiesfor
criminalexploitationandattractsattentionfrompotentialmalefactors.Absentcredibleoversight,
everynewtaxbecomesanopportunityforevasion.Everynewprogramofpublicexpenditure
isapotentiallureforthosewhowouldappropriatefromitunlawfully.Thisisnolesstrueof
policiesimplementedwiththebestofintentions;programsdesignedtoextendopportunities
forhomeownershiptothosepreviouslyexcludedfromtheresidentialhousingmarkethelped
createthesubprimemortgagedebacle(CollinsandNigro,2010,thisissue).Thechallengeis
toenableuseoflureforlegitimatepurposes,whilereducingitspotentialforuseasaninstrumentortargetforcrime.
Reducinglure,withoutstilingindividualinitiativeandprecludinglegitimateopportunities,iscomplicated.Commandeconomiesandsocialistsystemshavetried,butwithnotable
lackofsuccess.Thesesystems,moreover,tendtocreatesubstantialblackmarketsandoficial
corruption.WhetherthesumptuouslevelsofexecutivecompensationthatprevailintheUnited
Statescanbesigniicantlyreduced,isquestionable.Sotooaretheconsequencesofsuchpolicies
forindividualinitiative.Ifimplemented,theeffectsofsuchrestraintwouldnotseebankers
desertingtheirprofessioninfavorofacademiccareers.
Somelurecanbereducedbytechnology.Thankstotechnologicalinnovation,manyof
thehazardsthatregulationexiststomitigatehavebeensigniicantlyreduced,ifnoteliminated.
Sometraditionalproductsandpractices,alluringbutharmful,arenolongerattractive.Innovationsinpainttechnologyandthedevelopmentoflead-freepetrolhavesigniicantlyreduced
theprevalenceofenvironmentallead.“Greener”productsthatrequirefewerrawmaterialsand
energytoproduce,andwhichgeneratelesswaste,havecontributedtoacleanerplanet(van
ErpandHuisman,2010,thisissue).Theappealofmidnightdumpingistherebysigniicantly
reduced.Satelliteimagingcannowfacilitatemoreeficientagriculturalpractice,includingwater
useandtheapplicationofagriculturalchemicalsandfertilizers.Irresponsibleorillegaluseof
theseisnolongerseenastempting.
Thelurerepresentedbydependentandvulnerablepopulationshasincreasedinsizeand
importanceinthedecadessinceWorldWarII(ShoverandHochstetler,2006).Theyincludea
sizablegroupofthegreedyandgullible.Reducingthesupplyandvulnerabilityofthesepotential
victimsischallenging,butstepstakenintheUnitedStatestocurbcriminaltelemarketerssuggestsitisworthyofattention.Enhancinginancialliteracyamongthegeneralpublicisagood
idea,butgullibilitymaybedeeplyengrainedinthehumanbehavioralrepertoire.Itsupportsa
massiveglobalgamblingindustry.Ponzischemeslikelywillremainwithusforawhile.
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Increasing the credibility of External oversight
Vigilantanddeterminedoversightcanprovidesomeprotectionagainsttheworstexcessesof
capitalism.MostobserversbelievethatweakoversightwastheprincipalcauseoftheGreat
Recession,andthisviewisrepresentedbytheauthorsinthisissue(e.g.,Black,Reichman).
Certainly,anydissentershavebeenconspicuouslysilent.PrudentialregulationinAustralia,
Japan,andFinlandshieldedthoseeconomiesfromthedislocationexperiencedinpartsof
Europe.Enhancingcredibleoversightmightbemoreachievablethanlurereductionasa
meansofreducingtherateofwhite-collarcrime.Anumberofinstitutions—public,private,
andnon-proit—areinapositiontoexercisesurveillanceoverinancialandothercommercial
activities.Whennon-governmentalenergiescanbeharnessedinfurtheranceofpublicpolicy,
ortotheextentthattheycanoperatespontaneouslywithbeneicialeffect,thiscancomplement
oversightbyanoverburdenedstate.
Thecredibilityofexternaloversightisimportantnotonlyforwould-beoffenders,butalso
forthegeneralpublic.Beliefinthefairness,effectiveness,andequityofaregulatorysystem
isessentialtotheverylegitimacyofastate.LeonaHelmsleyoncestated“Wedon’tpaytaxes.
Onlythelittlepeoplepaytaxes.”Totheextentthatcitizensbelievethattaxisoptionalforthe
rich,thetaxsystem,andthestateasawhole,canfallintodisrepute(Levi,2010,thisissue).
TheweakeningoftheGreekstateasaresultofineffectivetaxadministrationbecamestarkly
apparentinApril2010.
Weliveinaworldinwhichsymbolsmatter.Intermsofconventionalcrime,reassuring
statisticsarelessreassuringthanvisible“blueshirts.”Theresponsetosexoffenders(especially
thosewhooffendagainstchildren)inEnglish-speakingdemocraciestendstobevengefuland
unforgiving.Theenactmentofdraconianlegislationinthefaceofpublicanxietyisatimehonoredpoliticalstrategy,andtheimpositionofsavagesentencesservesasimilarfunction.The
150-yearsentenceimposedonBernardMadoffmightnothaverestoredtheinancialwell-being
ofhisvictims,butsomeofthem,andmanymembersofthepublic,feltbetter(Pontelland
Geis,2010,thisissue).Thedeterrentvalueofthisandsimilarsentencesmaybenil,however,
andthecertaintyofdetectionandresponsefromoverseersprobablyhasamoresigniicanteffect(Leighton,2010,thisissue).
Evenarelativelyequitableregulatorysystemcanbediscreditedeasilywhenitisseentobe
administeredheavy-handedly.Whenauthoritiestreatthosesubjecttooversightwithrespect
andfairness,thelattermaybemoreinclinedtomeettheirobligations.Butapersistentpostureofarrogancecanbeoff-puttingandcangiverisetoan“organizedcultureofresistance”
(BardachandKagan,1982).Thiscouldindexpressioninindividual,andstatisticallyrare,
extremeresponse.InFebruary2010,anaggrievedtaxpayerlewalightaircraftintoabuilding
housinganoficeoftheU.S.InternalRevenueServiceinAustin,Texas(Leighton,2010).V.
Braithwaite(2010,thisissue)observestheimportanceofdiscriminatingbetweendegreesof
non-complianceandthenecessityofmobilizingresponsecommensuratewiththedegreeof
transgression.Probablytheoverwhelmingmajorityofoversightpersonneldosoinanycase;
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itisacharacteristicallymoralandorganizationalresponsetomanagingavolumeofworkthat
invariablyexceedsresources.
Globalization,asrelectedintherapidmovementacrossnationalbordersofinance,
commodities,labor,ideas,andviruses(digitalandmicrobial),posessigniicantregulatory
challenges,asitbothcreateslureandinhibitsdevelopmentofcredibleoversight.The“raceto
thebottom”toindderegulatoryhavensindevelopingcountrieshasbecomeafamiliartheme.
Shippingelectronicwastetothethirdworldmayridawealthynationofadisposalproblem,
butinothercases,analogouspracticesmayreturntohauntone.Carbonemissionsgenerated
inapoorcountrycontributetoclimatechangeforeveryone.Theglobalinancialsystemmight
notbetotallyintegrated,butitissuficientlytightlycoupledthataprobleminonenationcould
reverberateelsewhere.Globalinancialmarketssufferedin2008intheaftermathofthesubprimemortgagecrisisintheUnitedStates.Greekinancialwoeswerefeltnotonlythroughout
EuropebutalsoacrosstheAtlantic.Institutionsofexternaloversightmustbeglobal,aswell
aslocal,inscope.
Conidenceintheintegrityofmarketsisessentialtothestabilityandgrowthofinancial
systems.Iftoomanycitizensbelievethattheirmoneywouldbesaferifkepthiddenundera
mattressathomethanifdepositedinabankorinvestedinthestockmarket,theentireeconomy
suffers.Onlythemostnonchalantoflaissez-faireeconomistswouldfavorareturntothelaw
ofthejungle.Mostoftherestofuswouldconcurthatadegreeofcriminalenforcementisan
essentialcomponentofaregulatorysystem.Whatiscontestedisthecontext in which the hard
edgeofthestateisrequired,andthedegreeofseveritythatisappropriate.
Increasing Efective Internal oversight and self-restraint
Itwillbeextremelydificulttoengineerculturalchangetobringaboutgreaterself-restraint
(NguyenandPontell,2010,thisissue).Corporateexecutivesoftenbringasenseofentitlementtothejob(Friedrichs,2010,thisissue),andforsomepeople,enoughisneverenough.
Themarginalsatisfactiontoahighlyingbankerofanadditional2%inbonusontopof$20
millionmightstrikeusmeremortalsasinsigniicant,butanybaseballplayerwouldratherbat
.357than.350.Moreover,incentivesmattertomostpeople,andforbetterorworse,money
isameasureofperformance.Inaddition,shareholdersgenerallyarehappytoacquiescein
lavishrewardstochiefexecutiveswhoaresuccessful.Andwhentimesaredificult,itisalways
temptingtocutcorners.
Moredificulttomeasurethanpersonalwealth,butavaluethatismoreimportantto
many,ispersonalintegrity.Despitetheoldadagethat“niceguysinishlast,”captainsofindustry
oftengotogreatlengthstopromoteanimageofrespectability.Philanthropiclargesseisone
meansofcultivatingsuchanimage,butironically,visiblelargessetendstovarywithpersonal
wealth.Thenofcoursethereisthecynicaluseofphilanthropyforinsuranceagainstregulatory
orlaw-enforcementauthorities.Prominentwhite-collaroffendersoftenlaunttheirgenerosity,
beforeoraftertheirtransgressions.LikeBernieMadoff,someusephilanthropyasameansof
winningthetrustofthosewholaterbecomevictims.
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Crimeandunethicalconductbycorporatepersonneltypicallytakeplaceoutofpublicview,
behindtherespectablefacadeoftheiremployer,anditcanbenearlyimpossibleforoutsidersto
penetratethisorganizationalveil.Thisisonereasonwhywhistleblowersandinformantsrank
amongthemostimportantsourcesofinformationaboutcorporatecrime,illegalities,andunethicalconduct(AssociationofCertiiedFraudExaminers,2010).Whistleblowersareemployees
oflegitimateorganizationswhodivulgetooutsidersknowledgeorsuspicionsofwrongdoing
intheworkplace.Recognizingtheirimportanceasasourceofoversight,vandeBunt(2010,
thisissue)makesencouragementofwhistleblowingacenterpieceofhisproposalsforreducing
corporatewhite-collarcrime.IntheUnitedStates,severalstatesandthefederalgovernment
haveenactedlegislationprovidingemploymentprotectionandmonetaryrewardsforthem.
Thisismeanttospurinsiderswithknowledgeofwrongdoingtocomeforwardandreportto
authoritiesandtodosowithoutfearofreprisals.
Beyond self-regulation and pluralistic oversight
Theabsencethusfarinmostindustriesandbusinessirmsofclearorpersuasiveevidence
oftheeffectivenessofself-regulationandcooperativeapproachestooversightincreasesthe
importanceofexploringadditionalpolicyoptionsgroundedincriminologicaltheory(Laufer,
2010,thisissue).Thedominantparadigmofresponsiveregulationdoesnotprecludeinnovationandindeedinvitescontinuingreform.Recenthistoryhasseensomeisolatedinnovation
inregulatoryreform,someofwhichmightbereplicable.Intheaftermathofabriberyscandal
thatresultedinmarketingoftaintedproducts,theformerheadoftheChinaStateFoodand
DrugAdministration,ZhengXiaoyu,wasexecutedin2007.Nothingcomparablehasoccurred
inanyotherWesternnation.
Perhapsmorefeasibleispublicshaming.Onerecallsthatastheircompanieswerefailing,
chiefexecutivesofthreemajorU.S.automobilemanufacturerslewtoWashingtonintheir
corporatejetstoaskforfederalbailoutfunds.Althoughshamelessbehaviorsuchasthisleads
onetodespairabouttheprospectofgoodcorporatecitizenship,forcefulchastisementisstill
appropriate.ThereceptionthattheautoexecutivesreceivedonCapitolHillwaslessthanwarmly
welcoming,andtheirridiculebythepresswasentirelyitting.Leighton(2010)suggeststhat
theU.S.InternalRevenueServicepublishthenamesofdelinquenttaxpayers.Therewillalways
bewhite-collaroffenderswhoareirredeemablyshameless,butthosecaptainsofindustrywho
dependonamodicumofpoliticalandsocialsupportforthecontinuedviabilityoftheirbusiness
ignorepublicopinionattheirperil.Andnearlyeverybodyvaluesrespect.Thepotentialutilityof
ridiculeasameansofmobilizingpublicindignationis,inourview,worthyoffurtherattention.
Wesaythisdespitethefactthatrefusaltoacknowledgethecriminalityoftheirconductisone
ofthesharpestdistinguishingcharacteristicsofwhite-collarcriminals,onereportedinstudies
usingavarietyofresearchmethodologies(Benson,1985;ShoverandHunter,2010).
Outrightprohibitionofdesignatedproductsandpracticesshouldremainanavailable
option.Inotherareasofcriminology,behaviorsthatappearatirstblushbenign,mightbe
prohibitedbecauseoftheirpotentialformisuse.InAustralia,ordinarycitizensareeffectively
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prohibitedfrompossessingsemi-automaticirearmsoroleoresincapsicumspray.Onecommits
acrimebyproducingdatawiththeintentionthatitbeusedincommittingaseriouscomputer
offense(bycreatingwormsandviruses).Whethercertaintypesofinancialinstrumentscould
besimilarlyprohibitedisaninterestingquestion.IntheUnitedStates,Congresscurrentlyis
debatingapotentialbanonderivativestrading.
Althoughtheremightbeno“magicbullet”intheofing,onecouldtakesomecomfort
inthepotentialfortechnologicaldevelopmentstoenhanceregulatorycapacity,especiallythe
capacityforcredibleguardianshipandoversight(Gibbs,McGarrell,andAxelrod,2010,this
issue).Aswithcomputing,thedecreasingcostandincreasingaccessibilityoftechnologymake
suchenhancedguardianshipincreasinglyfeasible.Satelliteimagingcandetectunauthorizedland
clearingandwaterstorageonindividualfarms.Digitaltechnologycanidentifytheoriginof
everyporkproductproducedintheNetherlands,downtothefarmwheretheanimalwasraised.
Automatedsurveillancemethodscanidentifyanomalouspatternsoftradingonstockmarkets.
Thepaceoftechnologicalchangeisgreatandgrowing.Itissafetoassumethatapplications
unforeseentodaywillincreasethecapacityofregulatoryoversightinyearstocome.
AyresandBraithwaite(1992)observedthatpublicinterestgroupsplayacentralrolein
someregulatorydomains,arolethatcouldeasilybeenhancedandexpanded.Theynotedthat
manycountriesaroundtheworldhaveelectedworkersafetyrepresentativesthatcomplement
stateinspections.Longbeforethewidespreadtake-upofdigitaltechnology,itwasrecognized
thatordinarycitizensareinapositiontoplayasigniicantroleintheregulatoryprocess.In
theUnitedStates,theBetterBusinessBureaus(BBBs)grewoutofthetruth-in-advertising
movementintheearly20thcentury(Pannell,2002).Comprisedoflocalbusinesspeople,
BBBsscrutinizedadvertisingfordeceptivecontent,gatheredevidence,andpresentedittolocal
authoritiesforprosecution.
Consumerboycottsexemplifymassparticipationinfurtheranceofoversightreform.Such
participationcanresultinthecreationofnewregulatoryprohibitionsinthefaceofrecognized
harm,oradditionalexternaloversightthatcomplementsanexistingregulatoryregime.Harsh
laborpracticesexperiencedbyCaliforniaagriculturalworkersgaveriseintheearly1970sto
boycottsoflettuceandtablegrapes.Someameliorationofworkingconditionsfollowed.The
riseoftheenvironmentalmovementhasseenaloweringofgrassrootsactivism,onlandand
sea.Inrecentyears,theenvironmentalNGOGreenpeacehassentvesselstotheSouthernOcean
tomonitorJapanesewhaling.Imagesofwhalesbeingharpoonedattractlittlesympathyforthe
whalingindustryorforthenationsthathostit.
Privateregulatoryactivitycanbeautonomousorguidedbythestate.IntheUnitedStates,
theSurfaceMiningControlandRegulationAct1977permittedcitizenstorequestaninspectionbyfederalregulatoryauthorities.Inthe1980s,consumerprotectionauthoritiesinatleast
oneAustralianstatemobilizedvolunteersfromtheconsumermovementtokeepaneyeoutfor
potentiallyhazardousproductsonthemarket.Thestatecanevendelegateregulatorypowerto
privateinterests.InAustraliaandtheUnitedKingdom,RoyalSocietiesforthePreventionof
CrueltytoAnimalsinvestigateandprosecutecasesofanimalcruelty.AformerAustralianpolice
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commissioneroncepubliclymusedthatfraudinvestigationmightsimilarlybeundertakenby
theprivatesector.
Technologycouldenhancenotonlythecapacityofstateoversight,butalsothepowerof
privateparties.Wearenowwellintotheinformationrevolution,andtheenormouspotential
fordigitaltechnologytoenhancetheregulatorycapacityofordinarycitizensisbecomingapparent.Morethaneverbefore,privateindividualsandinstitutionsareinapositiontoengage
intheco-productionofregulatoryservices.Torgler(2010,thisissue)notestheimportanceof
themediaintheregulatoryprocess.Inyearspastitwassaidthatfreedomofthepressbelonged
tothepersonwhoownedone.Today,thankstodigitaltechnology,individualsaroundthe
worldcancommunicateinstantaneously,tomillionsofpeople,andatnegligiblecost.Mobile
phonescanserveascameras,videorecorders,orlisteningdevicesandcancaptureactivities
thaterrantcompaniesorgovernmentagentswouldrathernotshare.Thenotoriousimagesof
prisonerabuseatAbuGhraibwerebroadcastaroundtheworldin2006.Investigativereportingisbynomeansthemonopolyofjournalistsemployedbygreatmetropolitannewspapers.
Indeed,theeconomicsofthenewspaperindustryhavebeguntomilitateagainstserious(i.e.,
expensive)journalism.Instead,individualbloggersandotherdigitalnewsentrepreneurshave
beguntodevelopanincreasingproile(e.g.,seeslate.com/, wikileaks.org/,andpropublica.org/).
AProPublicareporterwasawardeda2010PulitzerPrizeforInvestigativeReporting.
AsenvisagedbyAyresandBraithwaite(1992),citizenscanexercisevigilanceovertheperformanceofregulatoryagencies,oroverthebehaviorofcorporateactorsdirectly.IntheWest,
wealreadyhaveseenonlineencouragementofconsumerboycotts(boycottnestle.blogspot.com/)
andWebsitesthatmonitorparticularindustries(info.babymilkaction.org/)orcompanies(untied.
com/).Theevengreaterpotentialofsocialnetworkingsites,blogs,andrelatedmediacanbe
glimpsedincontemporaryChina.DespitethecensorshipofFacebook,Twitter,andYouTube
byChineseauthorities,alternativemediamaybeseentolourishintheformofsuchsitesas
likeQQZone,Tianya.cn,andKaixin001.com(Barboza,2010).Thepotentialinvestigative
capacityofsuchmediaisformidable,althoughthusfarithasbeenmobilizedprimarilyagainst
low-levelcorruptionandothergrossanti-socialbehavior.Theprivatediaryofamid-levelparty
oficialinsouthChinawaspostedon-line,and,unfortunatelyforhim,itcontaineddetailsof
sexualindiscretionsandbribesaccepted.Hewascashieredasaresult.Inanothercase,avideo
clipofunknownprovenancedepictingawomankillingakittenwaspostedontheWeb.Public
indignationwassogreat,andcooperationofparticipantsinthenetworksostrong,thatthe
womanwastrackedtoasmalltowninafarnortheastcornerofChina.Bothsheandthecamera
manweredismissedfromtheirgovernmentjobs.InOctober2007,aprovincialdepartment
offorestryannouncedthatithadidentiiedasurvivingSouthChinaTiger.Imagespostedon
theWebarousedthesuspicionsofnetizens,andtheprovincialgovernmentlaterconcededthat
indeedtheyhadbeenfaked.Thirteenlocaloficialsweredisciplined(Jin,2008).Ifsunlight
isthebestdisinfectant,thepotentialforvigilancenowwithinthecapacityofcitizenslooms
largerandmoreimportantthaneverbefore.Thepotentialoftechnologyasaninstrumentfor
mobilizingmassindignationagainstcorporatecrimemaybequitesigniicant.
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policy adoption and Implementation
Rothe(2010,thisissue)isonlypartlycorrectthat“policysuggestionsaredificulttoconceptualizeandtoimplement.”Developmentandpromulgationofpolicyproposalsisanything
butdificultandthediversepolicyessaysinthisissueattesttothis.Seeingproposedpolicy
adoptedandimplementedfaithfullyisexceedinglydificult.Conspicuouslyabsentfrommany
ofthepolicyessaysincludedhereisdiscussionofhowtheproposedpoliciesmightbeputin
placeandobstaclestoimplementation.Snider(2010,thisissue)isoneofthefewauthors
whohighlightsthecriticalimportanceofpowerrelationshipsinconstructingandgaining
passageofnewrulesandoversight.Regulatoryspaceisalmostalwayscontested.Proposals
foroversightreform,regardlessoftheirintrinsicmerit,invariablymeetwithoppositionfrom
someone,somewhere.Notallreformsarecostless;thosewhoareaskedtothebearincreased
costsresultingfromregulatoryinitiativesmightunderstandablyobject.Routinely,proposed
oversightinitiativesencounteroppositiongroundedinideologyorpoliticalpartisanship.More
importantperhaps,strugglesforreforminvariablyarewagedwithinthepoliticalandideologicalconinesofthepolitical–economiccontext.Giventhisfact,fundamentalandfarreaching
policychangeslikelywillnotoccur;onlyproposalsforincrementaltinkeringwillbedeinedas
legitimateandpotentiallyworkable.
Windows of Opportunity
Thestrategicenvironmentforreformischangeable,but“toeverythingthereisaseason”(Ecclesiastes3:1–8).Muchreformisbornofcrisis.Acuteproblemsdemandsolutions.Emergent
structuralcontradictionsinthepoliticaleconomycangiverisetoproblemsthatcannotbepapered
overwithcosmeticreforms.Inthesehistoricallyopportunecircumstances,acuteproblemscan
producemassdisaffectionandcausecitizenstoorganizeandtodemandoficialaction.Atthe
veryleast,crisisconditionscancausealossoflegitimacyandforcedacquiescencefromthose
whonormallyresistoversight.Thestockmarketcrashof1929andtheGreatDepressionthat
followedusheredinadegreeofgovernmentactivitythatwashistoricallyunprecedented.The
FederalDepositInsuranceCorporation(FDIC)andtheSECarebuttwooftheinstitutions
createdatthattime(Schlesinger,1958).TheWatergatecover-upwasfollowedbyenergeticprosecutorialandlegislativeoversightactivityindefenseofpublicsectorintegrity(Katz,1980).The
S&Lcrisisofthe1980sgaverisetotheFinancialInstitutionsReform,Recovery,andEnforcementActof1989(FIRREA).CriminalscandalsbyEnronandotherlargecorporationshelped
launcheventsthatculminatedintheSarbanes-OxleyActof2002.Thislegislationmandated
newstandardsofcorporategovernanceandpersonalresponsibilityforcorporatereportingby
high-levelexecutives.BythetimethisspecialissueofCriminology & Public Policyappearsin
print,wemightknowifthewindowofopportunityopenedbytheGreatRecessionwaswide
enoughtoallowsigniicantreformsofinancialsectoroversight.
Scandalsandaccidentsmightalsocreatecircumstancesfavorableforreform,asnoteworthy
historicalexamplesmakeclear.Thedeathof146garmentworkersintheTriangleShirtwaist
FactoryFireof1911notonlygaverisetonewsafetylaws,butalsoinspiredtheProgressive
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grabosk y, shover
movement,forerunnertotheNewDeal,intheUnitedStates(vonDrehle,2003).Thedisastrous
SantaBarbaraoilspillof1968wasapowerfulcatalysttodevelopmentoftheenvironmental
movement(Molotch,1970).InApril2010,anexplosioninanundergroundcoalmineinWest
Virginiakilled29miners,andafewweekslater,adrilledbutuncappedunderseawellspewed
perhapsmillionsofgallonsofoilintotheGulfofMexico.Asthisessayiswritten,thelowofoil
hascontinueduninterruptedformorethaniveweekswithnoendisinsight.Thelong-term
impactsofthespillareinestimable.Mineexplosionsandoilspills,particularlywhenthereis
reasontobelievethatlaxoversightcontributedtotheiroccurrence,areopportunitiesthatdo
notcomealongeveryday.
Opportunities,however,areonlyasgoodasthosewhowouldexploitthem.Theskillfulpolicyentrepreneurmightsucceed,wheretheineptwouldfail.Inaddition,therelational
distancebetweenpolicyentrepreneursandsourcesofpotentialresistancemightbehighly
signiicantinexplainingthesuccessorfailureofreforminitiatives(Black,1993).Consider
RichardNixon,conservativepresidentoftheUnitedStates.TheNixonAdministrationsaw
thecreationoftheEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)andtheOccupationalHealthand
SafetyAdministration(OSHA).
Social Movements
Intheabsenceofacutecrisis,publicconsciousnessaboutagivenharmandsupportforregulatoryreformmaygrowslowlytogetherwithcallsforremediation.Insomecasesthispublic
consciousnesscanbeboostedbyalandmarkpublication.Amongtheearliermanifestationsof
riskidentiicationandinformationwastheclassicnovel,The Jungle (1906),bytheauthorand
journalistUptonSinclair.ThebookledtotheenactmentofTheMeatInspectionActandthe
PureFoodandDrugAct.
Ahalfcenturylater,thenaturewriterRachelCarsonpublishedSilent Spring(1962),
whichlednotonlytothestrengtheningofpesticideregulationintheUnitedStates,butalso
tothegrowthoftheenvironmentalmovementmoregenerally.Threeyearsafterpublication
ofCarson’sbook,RalphNaderpublishedUnsafe at Any Speed (1965),acritiqueofautomobile
safetyintheUnitedStates.Nader’sbookcontributedtotheenactmentofthe1966National
TraficandMotorVehicleSafetyAct,whichestablishedtheNationalHighwayTraficSafety
Administration.Reformsthatemergealmosteffortlesslyfromchangingpublicconsciousness
andspontaneouscallsforactionaretheexception.Morecommonarereformsthatowetheir
adoptiontoorganizedandsustainedmovements(Snider,2010).
Voluntary/Private Actions
Trustisthefoundationofresponsiveregulation.Andlikesuccessfulperpetratorsoffraud,
corporateoficialsareskilledatcreatingbeliefinothersthattheymerittrust.Whensubjected
toexternalscrutinyandcriticismforcriminalorillegalconduct,theyunfailinglyattributethe
problemstoafew“badapples.”Thevastmajorityofoficersandirmsaresaidtobehonest
andhonorableandcanbetrustedtobehaveinasociallyresponsiblefashion.Likewisetheycan
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betrustedtoimplementeffectiveinternalcontrols,todetectandrespondtorulebreaking,and
toreporttheincidentstostateagencies.
Forcorporateoficials,however,trustistreatednotassomethingwhichcontinuallymust
beearnedindaytodayactionsbutinsteadasanentitlement.Therearecountlessactionsthey
couldtaketodemonstratethattrustismerited.Oneischangesinpoliciesofcorporategovernance. Corporate governancereferstoavariegatedmixofstructuralandproceduralchangesput
inplacebybusinessirmstoreducethelikelihoodofinanciallosstoshareholdersorinvestors
causedbydistracted,incompetent,oroverlyself-interestedmanagers.Exemplaryinitiatives
includechangeinthecompositionofboardsofdirectors,revampedcompensationschemesfor
managers,andmorerobustinternalmonitoringsystems(DenisandMcConnell,2003).But
theimportanceofcompliancewithexternallyrequiredstandardsofconductandperformance
isalmostentirelyabsentfromcorporategovernancecodes;theemphasisinsteadislimited
almostentirelytotheimportanceofhonestyininternaldealings.Revisionstocodeofethics
andinternalgovernancedocumentsthatemphasizetheobligationtoobeythelawwouldsend
aclearsignaltothoseskepticaloftheintegrityofrespectabilityofcorporateactors.Theyalso
mightpromoteself-restraint.
Anotherwayofdemonstratingthatcorporateactorscanbetrustedtobehaveresponsibly
isbyspendingfundsforresearchonseriousnon-complianceandcrime.Historically,empirical
researchintothesemattershasbeenfundedalmostentirelybystateandothernon-corporate
sources.Researchsupportedbycorporateinterestsbycontrasthasfocusednarrowlyoneconomic
misconductthatvictimizesbusinessirms(BussmannandWerle,2006).Iftrustandcompliance
withoversightarepriorityconcerns,businesscoulddemonstratethisbycommittingresources
tosupportresearchintoillegalactionsthatharmoutsidersandthegeneralpublic.Thecoststo
victimsoftheirexperienceatthehandsofcorporatecriminalsisatopicpregnantwithpotential
symbolicmessagesoftrustandresponsibility.Researchintoawiderandlessself-centeredrange
oftopicswouldsendapowerfulsignalofcommitmentandmightleadtomoreeffectiveinternal
oversightandself-restraint.Trustincorporateoficialscouldbeenhancedalsobyreforming
theirapproachtoandtreatmentofwhistleblowers.
Farfromthevenuesinwhichcelebrationofself-regulationtakesplace,corporationsengage
relentlesslyinattacksoncountlessaspectsofoversightoftheiractivities.Inlegislatures,regulatory
foraandappellatecourts,theyworktoexpandtheirself-interestednotionsoffairandreasonable
oversight(MichaelsandMonforton,2005).Astheysupporteffortstoweakenthecapacityof
regulatoryagenciestomonitorandsanctiontheirmisconduct,forexample,theypressforrelief
fromcivilsuitsongroundsthattheyhavereceivedcertiicatesofcompliancefromregulators
(HarrisandBerenson,2008).Theseeffortsdolittletopromoteandmuchtounderminetrust.
Theresultsofamailsurveyofcompliancewithrequirementsoftradepracticeslegislationby999
largeAustralianbusinessesshowed“thatimplementationisoverwhelminglypartialandpossibly
symbolic.Mostbusinesseshaveimplementedsome,butfarfromall,ofthecompliancesystem
elementsconsideredbythe[government],practitionersandscholarstobenecessaryforeffective
compliancemanagement”(ParkerandNielsen,2006:482).Itisnoteworthythatcorporate
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actorsapparentlyhavemadelittleefforttofundstudiesoftheimplementationandeficacyof
“trust-and-hope”oversight.Itisdificulttocredittheirgoodwillwhentheyseemdisinclined
tocommitresourcestoidentifyingbestpracticesofinternaloversight.Theelectronicsindustry
CitizenshipCoalitionnotedbyvanErpandHuisman(2010)mightbeanexception.
Discussionsofhowtodeviseandgainadoptionofpoliciesthatlimitlure,reducetheranks
ofthosewhoarepredisposedortemptedtoexploitit,andincreasethecredibilityofoversight
canbeoverlytechnocraticinfocusandneglectlargerconstraintsandobstacles.Thedominant
politicaleconomy,itsstructuralintegrity,operatingpremises,andpowerrelationshipsseverely
constrainconsiderationandadoptionofpolicyoptions.Prominentamongtheseconstraints
istheperceivedneedtoavoidanyactionsthatwouldjeopardizebusinessconidenceandthe
stabilityofthemarkets.Theycancauseadvocatestolosesightofthefactthattheightagainst
corporatecrimeislinkedinextricablytotheightforsocialjustice.Itisaightinwhichwealth,
accesstopolicymakers,andotherresourcesgenerallyaredeterminative.Butpopulistsocial
movementscanmakeadifference.Crises,scandals,andaccidentswillcontinuetooccur,givingrisetoepisodicdisaffectionandattemptsatreform.Theoddsofsuccesswillbeaffected
signiicantlybypolitical–economicconditions.Reformishardertoresistandmorelikelyto
succeedduringeconomicboomtimeswhenproitsareup.Futureattemptstolimittheharm
causedbywhite-collarcrimelikelywillmirrorthepast,andwhetherornottheGreatRecession
willinspireorganizedandunrelentingdemandsforchangeinthepracticeofgovernmentsand
thechoicesmadebyindustryremainstobeseen.Thecontributorstothisspecialissuehave
shownwhatformthesemighttake.
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