The Threshold of Meaning in the
Darin Tenev
The Threshold of Meaning
(Notes on Literary Phenomenological Archeology)
It seems easier to write on a given author than merely to focus on a certain problem. All the easier
it is to write on a chosen problem as it occurs in the work of a given author. If we look at the
majority of the literary studies and investigations, we won‟t be too much surprised to see how many
of them are dedicated to the study of a single author. Of course, there are studies that deal with two
or three or more authors at the same time, like Shakespeare and Montaigne, T.S.Eliot and Ezra
Pound, etc. But the principle remains in general the same. It is as if the author is still what
guarantees the unity and comprehensibility of the investigated problem, and also what postulates
the inducibility of a founding “logic”, on the basis of which the problem is posed. By this I do not
mean that all such critical texts claim that the author guarantees the concrete meaning of his works.
Now in the sphere of literary studies it is almost generally accepted that in a way the author should
be dead, in other words that a certain interpretational procedure has become unavoidable. And yet
the author still serves as an excuse when defining chosen problematic, she or he helps to explicate
the limits of the field of research. I am not saying that it‟s illegitimate. What I am trying to say is
that the presupposition of the given field guaranteed by an author functions as a non-questioned
evidence, as if it was obvious why we make (or have to make) the presupposition.
One can easily object that in the analysis it will become clear whether or not the presupposition was
legitimate. If a homogenous “logic” underlying the investigated problem is indeed found, then
obviously the choice made when choosing the author as a guarantee of the field was correct. And it
is quite often the case with the investigations concerned with a given author.
In the text that follows I want to pose the question: What does this (the confirmation – in the light of
the analysis – of the legitimacy of the presupposition of the author as a guarantee of the field of
research) mean in regards to the literary work? By using the methodology of the phenomenological
archeology, I will try to show why and following what procedures do we presuppose the author
(understood in the above sense), and what this has to do with the construction of the meaning of the
work.
As I said, the author could have served as a formal reason (let say an “empty premise”) to disclose
the unities in his works. But at a second step, these disclosed unities only confirm the legitimacy of
the premise, in a way they fill its emptiness. The analyses, in this sense, are fulfillments. Thus in a
retrospective way the discourse bearing on an author and his ideas is justified. We could even say
more generally that not only the notion of the author works in this way but also the notions of
literary trends, schools, worldviews, etc. As I will try to show, the retrospective justification, or
what could be called retrospective fulfillment procedure is in a certain sense bound to succeed. It
cannot make a mistake. (What is most curious is that it works even when the analyzed work was
eventually found not to be by the presupposed author.)
Now, a different reading is also possible. A reading that would insist on the disintegration of the
unities, on their decomposition. This type of reading (if it could be labeled indeed a “type”) is, as is
well known, usually associated with what is called deconstruction. It shows that the unities are not
naturally given, that they are historical constructs, and are therefore deconstructible. All this is
probably all too well known. I only want to underline the significance of this reading. It does not
only mean that different unities along with the ones already accepted, could also be constructed but
that the very procedure by which we construct such a unity is a rather complicated process.
How can this procedure in its most universal aspect be elucidated?
Let us introduce two terms that could help us in the elucidation.
The first one is that of actualization. I believe that literary works are fields of potentiality, each one
a singular or rather unique (since it is not opposed in any way to multiplicity or plurality) field. The
actualization of this potentiality is what happens in a usual reading. It is in the actualization that the
meaning of a work is not just grasped but created, or in other words the meaning is not pre-given or
pre-determined and does not precede the actualization. Critics like Roman Ingarden (1973) and
Wolfgang Iser (1978) have done much to clarify the actualization.
(In fact, what is here called “actualization” is very close to Ingarden‟s concretization although the
both terms are used by him (See Ingarden 1973, Fizer 1983). Let me parenthetically explain how
Ingarden defines their difference. The concretization is used in regards to the aesthetic
potentialities of the work and thus has the character of an outside action towards the work, which is
why it can be analyzed only in a historical perspective. Ingarden‟s actualization concerns only the
artistic side of the work itself, it has a descriptive character and represents the work as a static
construction, guaranteeing its identity. The discrimination of these two potentialities, one related to
the aesthetic side, and the other to the artistic, is delusive. There could be no actualization
non-related to a historical horizon, so the idea that there is an identity of the literary work
independent of all historical contexts should be abandoned. From this it follows that the
potentiality of the literary work itself has to be conceived in a different way, a way that won‟t bind
it to a static identity, or to an essence that lies there, waiting for no more than its realization by the
reader. This is what I meant when I spoke of a certain non-pre-given-ness. In truth, it concerns not
only the meaning but the very essence of the literary work.)
The actualization is done by the reader, it is a one-time act on his part by which he grasps the
meaning of a work. The universal structure of this act is probably most well described in Wolfgang
Iser‟s The Act of Reading (1978).
The second term I want to introduce is that of idealization. Here it is understood in the meaning
Husserl gives to it in his later writings. In the field of phenomenology usually two types of
idealizations are distinguished. First-order idealizations are of the type “and so on” (“und so
weiter” – the supposition that what has proven its validity will still be valid in the future) or “I can
again and again” (“Ich kann immer wieder” – the supposition that I can do again what I already did
once) and they are accomplished on the level of the life-world. Then there are the second-order
idealizations, which are those who made modern science possible. In The Crisis of European
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology E. Husserl analyzes in detail such idealizations in
Galilee‟s mathematizations of physics (Husserl 1970, 23-60, §9) but maybe the best descriptions
are to be found in “The Origin of Geometry” where he follows the steps of mathematical
idealization revealing the crucial role played by language and writing (Husserl 1989, 160-164). Yet
since first-order idealizations are usually related to the natural attitude and are associated with the
life-world (a reason for Husserl to name the language “a first idealization” – see Husserl 1973, 58),
the idealizations we will speak, should at the beginning be thought of as first-order idealizations.
Let us return now to our problem. I think we can schematize in a simplified way the procedure as
follows. 1. First we have the reading, or the gaze of the reader discovering the underlying
(homogenous) logic by actualizing the potentialities of the text. 2. Secondly, we have another act,
accompanying the first, which idealizes the actualization. This means that the reader now
constitutes his own reading as an independent ideality “abstracting” it from the text. (Yet as
Husserl points out in “The Origin of Geometry”, the ideal objectivity created by literary language
does not have the same status as the scientific ideal objectivity (Husserl 1989, 160). The ideal
objects of literature are, so to speak, not ideal enough. Their ideality is due to the language used,
but as objects they remain irreducibly singular.) Probably it won‟t be wrong if we say that by this
idealization an institution/ establishment (Stiftung) is accomplished that permits the actualized
meaning to be sedimented so that further actualizations can be based on it. 3. Finally, the idealizing
act leads to a retrospective justification of a former idealization that made possible the first act of
actualization. In fact, only now, retrospectively, this former idealization, preceding the
actualization, can be grasped as an idealization at all. (But doesn‟t it mean that the very Ur-Stiftung
is produced “backwardly” by some of the Nach-Stiftungen?)
Thus actually we have three acts that need not but could coincide temporally. The triple aspect
introduces a particular circularity which should not mislead us. It is this circularity, not to be
mistaken either with the hermeneutical, or with the vicious circle, that constitutes the background
of the unities, as well as their infallible persuasiveness and legitimacy.
(Also, it won‟t be wrong to say that if we are not so easily mislead, it is perhaps mostly in virtue of
the work done by deconstruction – though the meaning we put in this last word should be clarified.)
Let me resume. It is easier to write on an author because the author “stays there”, she “is there”. But
that means only that we presume the “being there” of the author so that it can be justified
afterwards. This first presumption – which as yet has not the strict character of idealization since it
is originally void of any content – predetermines the actualization, or at least its most general
direction. Of course, if this is true, it will be true not only for the “author” but for all the empty
premises. The empty premises constitute the threshold of meaning for the literary work. There is a
sort of double bind here because on the one hand there will be no literary potentiality without such
thresholds and on the other – the thresholds cannot but foreclose the potentiality with the
actualizations that reduce it to an essence. There cannot be a literary potentiality without a
threshold for many reasons, one of which is that without the threshold of meaning as an empty
premise the reader will not suspend her or his usual frames of reference and will have no
understanding of literature at all. (In this sense, perhaps the very notion of literature could be seen
as such empty premise. Of course, in the case of literature this could hardly be seen because of the
many Nach-Stiftungen that instituted conventions, etc.) But since the threshold is idealized
retrospectively (this is the third stage described above), idealization veils its specific function, and
thus the literary potentiality.
(A question appears therefore, a question concerning this potentiality – the singular potentiality of
a literary work – and if it is at all thinkable. Is it possible for the gaze of the reader not to reduce it
to his particular actualization? Is there a reading that will remain meaningful and yet will not
idealize only its own stance? I can‟t answer these questions here, so I will only make an optimistic
hint that the answer should be sought in the direction of a reading working by incompatible
actualizations, opening by the problematic possibilities the open possibility of the work.)
In the above schematization many oversimplifications were made for the clarity of the structure.
For example, it is well known that real readers do not differ that much in the way they view the
literary works. It can be objected therefore that the actualizations do not depend so much on the
concrete reader and the above scheme is wrong. It could be answered however that there are levels
of actualizations and some of them, as we supposed, depend on others which have established
idealities. The way we read Baudelaire‟s poems is not arbitrary; it does not depend only on the
empty premise of an unknown name. Our regard is structured by some of the former institutions
(Stiftungen). This comes down to say that there is never only one threshold of meaning. The
different thresholds are often interdependent, sometimes participate in complex hierarchies, and
are always subjected to a certain history. The complex of thresholds is what determines the
individual regard.
Instead of conclusion, I want to pose a final question: Why do most people choose the way of
actualization that presupposes the unity guaranteed by the author? Why not choose a reading that,
while still being a form of concrete actualization, will stress the dissemination and the
disparateness? Perhaps the answer lies in the very fact that the idealities are related to unities that
not only put in order the work, but also put in order the world. (Maybe they make the world a world,
of course, retrospectively.) Therefore the answers probably lies in the formula used in the
beginning of this text: it is easier.
References
Fizer, John (1983), “ „Actualization‟ and „Concretization‟ as Heuristic Devices in the Study of Literary Art”,
In Literary Criticism and Philosophy, Joseph Strelka (ed.), Yearbook of Comapartive Criticism,
vol.X, University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, pp.65-77.
Husserl, Edmund (1970), The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,
trans. David Carr, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Husserl, Edmund (1973), Experience and Judgment, trans. James S.Churchill & Karl Ameriks, Evanston:
Northwestern University Press.
Husserl, Edmund (1989), “The Origin of Geometry”, trans. David Carr, In: Jacques Derrida, Edmund
Husserl’s The Origin of geometry : An Introduction, trans. John P. Leavey, Lincoln & London:
University of Nebraska Press, pp. 155-180.
Ingarden, Roman (1973), The Literary Work of Art. An Investigation on the borderlines of Ontology, Logic,
and the Theory of Literature, trans. George Grabowicz, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Iser, Wolfgang (1978), The Act of Reading. A Theory of Aesthetic Response, Baltimore and London: The
Johns Hopkins University Press.
The Threshold of Meaning
(Notes on Literary Phenomenological Archeology)
It seems easier to write on a given author than merely to focus on a certain problem. All the easier
it is to write on a chosen problem as it occurs in the work of a given author. If we look at the
majority of the literary studies and investigations, we won‟t be too much surprised to see how many
of them are dedicated to the study of a single author. Of course, there are studies that deal with two
or three or more authors at the same time, like Shakespeare and Montaigne, T.S.Eliot and Ezra
Pound, etc. But the principle remains in general the same. It is as if the author is still what
guarantees the unity and comprehensibility of the investigated problem, and also what postulates
the inducibility of a founding “logic”, on the basis of which the problem is posed. By this I do not
mean that all such critical texts claim that the author guarantees the concrete meaning of his works.
Now in the sphere of literary studies it is almost generally accepted that in a way the author should
be dead, in other words that a certain interpretational procedure has become unavoidable. And yet
the author still serves as an excuse when defining chosen problematic, she or he helps to explicate
the limits of the field of research. I am not saying that it‟s illegitimate. What I am trying to say is
that the presupposition of the given field guaranteed by an author functions as a non-questioned
evidence, as if it was obvious why we make (or have to make) the presupposition.
One can easily object that in the analysis it will become clear whether or not the presupposition was
legitimate. If a homogenous “logic” underlying the investigated problem is indeed found, then
obviously the choice made when choosing the author as a guarantee of the field was correct. And it
is quite often the case with the investigations concerned with a given author.
In the text that follows I want to pose the question: What does this (the confirmation – in the light of
the analysis – of the legitimacy of the presupposition of the author as a guarantee of the field of
research) mean in regards to the literary work? By using the methodology of the phenomenological
archeology, I will try to show why and following what procedures do we presuppose the author
(understood in the above sense), and what this has to do with the construction of the meaning of the
work.
As I said, the author could have served as a formal reason (let say an “empty premise”) to disclose
the unities in his works. But at a second step, these disclosed unities only confirm the legitimacy of
the premise, in a way they fill its emptiness. The analyses, in this sense, are fulfillments. Thus in a
retrospective way the discourse bearing on an author and his ideas is justified. We could even say
more generally that not only the notion of the author works in this way but also the notions of
literary trends, schools, worldviews, etc. As I will try to show, the retrospective justification, or
what could be called retrospective fulfillment procedure is in a certain sense bound to succeed. It
cannot make a mistake. (What is most curious is that it works even when the analyzed work was
eventually found not to be by the presupposed author.)
Now, a different reading is also possible. A reading that would insist on the disintegration of the
unities, on their decomposition. This type of reading (if it could be labeled indeed a “type”) is, as is
well known, usually associated with what is called deconstruction. It shows that the unities are not
naturally given, that they are historical constructs, and are therefore deconstructible. All this is
probably all too well known. I only want to underline the significance of this reading. It does not
only mean that different unities along with the ones already accepted, could also be constructed but
that the very procedure by which we construct such a unity is a rather complicated process.
How can this procedure in its most universal aspect be elucidated?
Let us introduce two terms that could help us in the elucidation.
The first one is that of actualization. I believe that literary works are fields of potentiality, each one
a singular or rather unique (since it is not opposed in any way to multiplicity or plurality) field. The
actualization of this potentiality is what happens in a usual reading. It is in the actualization that the
meaning of a work is not just grasped but created, or in other words the meaning is not pre-given or
pre-determined and does not precede the actualization. Critics like Roman Ingarden (1973) and
Wolfgang Iser (1978) have done much to clarify the actualization.
(In fact, what is here called “actualization” is very close to Ingarden‟s concretization although the
both terms are used by him (See Ingarden 1973, Fizer 1983). Let me parenthetically explain how
Ingarden defines their difference. The concretization is used in regards to the aesthetic
potentialities of the work and thus has the character of an outside action towards the work, which is
why it can be analyzed only in a historical perspective. Ingarden‟s actualization concerns only the
artistic side of the work itself, it has a descriptive character and represents the work as a static
construction, guaranteeing its identity. The discrimination of these two potentialities, one related to
the aesthetic side, and the other to the artistic, is delusive. There could be no actualization
non-related to a historical horizon, so the idea that there is an identity of the literary work
independent of all historical contexts should be abandoned. From this it follows that the
potentiality of the literary work itself has to be conceived in a different way, a way that won‟t bind
it to a static identity, or to an essence that lies there, waiting for no more than its realization by the
reader. This is what I meant when I spoke of a certain non-pre-given-ness. In truth, it concerns not
only the meaning but the very essence of the literary work.)
The actualization is done by the reader, it is a one-time act on his part by which he grasps the
meaning of a work. The universal structure of this act is probably most well described in Wolfgang
Iser‟s The Act of Reading (1978).
The second term I want to introduce is that of idealization. Here it is understood in the meaning
Husserl gives to it in his later writings. In the field of phenomenology usually two types of
idealizations are distinguished. First-order idealizations are of the type “and so on” (“und so
weiter” – the supposition that what has proven its validity will still be valid in the future) or “I can
again and again” (“Ich kann immer wieder” – the supposition that I can do again what I already did
once) and they are accomplished on the level of the life-world. Then there are the second-order
idealizations, which are those who made modern science possible. In The Crisis of European
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology E. Husserl analyzes in detail such idealizations in
Galilee‟s mathematizations of physics (Husserl 1970, 23-60, §9) but maybe the best descriptions
are to be found in “The Origin of Geometry” where he follows the steps of mathematical
idealization revealing the crucial role played by language and writing (Husserl 1989, 160-164). Yet
since first-order idealizations are usually related to the natural attitude and are associated with the
life-world (a reason for Husserl to name the language “a first idealization” – see Husserl 1973, 58),
the idealizations we will speak, should at the beginning be thought of as first-order idealizations.
Let us return now to our problem. I think we can schematize in a simplified way the procedure as
follows. 1. First we have the reading, or the gaze of the reader discovering the underlying
(homogenous) logic by actualizing the potentialities of the text. 2. Secondly, we have another act,
accompanying the first, which idealizes the actualization. This means that the reader now
constitutes his own reading as an independent ideality “abstracting” it from the text. (Yet as
Husserl points out in “The Origin of Geometry”, the ideal objectivity created by literary language
does not have the same status as the scientific ideal objectivity (Husserl 1989, 160). The ideal
objects of literature are, so to speak, not ideal enough. Their ideality is due to the language used,
but as objects they remain irreducibly singular.) Probably it won‟t be wrong if we say that by this
idealization an institution/ establishment (Stiftung) is accomplished that permits the actualized
meaning to be sedimented so that further actualizations can be based on it. 3. Finally, the idealizing
act leads to a retrospective justification of a former idealization that made possible the first act of
actualization. In fact, only now, retrospectively, this former idealization, preceding the
actualization, can be grasped as an idealization at all. (But doesn‟t it mean that the very Ur-Stiftung
is produced “backwardly” by some of the Nach-Stiftungen?)
Thus actually we have three acts that need not but could coincide temporally. The triple aspect
introduces a particular circularity which should not mislead us. It is this circularity, not to be
mistaken either with the hermeneutical, or with the vicious circle, that constitutes the background
of the unities, as well as their infallible persuasiveness and legitimacy.
(Also, it won‟t be wrong to say that if we are not so easily mislead, it is perhaps mostly in virtue of
the work done by deconstruction – though the meaning we put in this last word should be clarified.)
Let me resume. It is easier to write on an author because the author “stays there”, she “is there”. But
that means only that we presume the “being there” of the author so that it can be justified
afterwards. This first presumption – which as yet has not the strict character of idealization since it
is originally void of any content – predetermines the actualization, or at least its most general
direction. Of course, if this is true, it will be true not only for the “author” but for all the empty
premises. The empty premises constitute the threshold of meaning for the literary work. There is a
sort of double bind here because on the one hand there will be no literary potentiality without such
thresholds and on the other – the thresholds cannot but foreclose the potentiality with the
actualizations that reduce it to an essence. There cannot be a literary potentiality without a
threshold for many reasons, one of which is that without the threshold of meaning as an empty
premise the reader will not suspend her or his usual frames of reference and will have no
understanding of literature at all. (In this sense, perhaps the very notion of literature could be seen
as such empty premise. Of course, in the case of literature this could hardly be seen because of the
many Nach-Stiftungen that instituted conventions, etc.) But since the threshold is idealized
retrospectively (this is the third stage described above), idealization veils its specific function, and
thus the literary potentiality.
(A question appears therefore, a question concerning this potentiality – the singular potentiality of
a literary work – and if it is at all thinkable. Is it possible for the gaze of the reader not to reduce it
to his particular actualization? Is there a reading that will remain meaningful and yet will not
idealize only its own stance? I can‟t answer these questions here, so I will only make an optimistic
hint that the answer should be sought in the direction of a reading working by incompatible
actualizations, opening by the problematic possibilities the open possibility of the work.)
In the above schematization many oversimplifications were made for the clarity of the structure.
For example, it is well known that real readers do not differ that much in the way they view the
literary works. It can be objected therefore that the actualizations do not depend so much on the
concrete reader and the above scheme is wrong. It could be answered however that there are levels
of actualizations and some of them, as we supposed, depend on others which have established
idealities. The way we read Baudelaire‟s poems is not arbitrary; it does not depend only on the
empty premise of an unknown name. Our regard is structured by some of the former institutions
(Stiftungen). This comes down to say that there is never only one threshold of meaning. The
different thresholds are often interdependent, sometimes participate in complex hierarchies, and
are always subjected to a certain history. The complex of thresholds is what determines the
individual regard.
Instead of conclusion, I want to pose a final question: Why do most people choose the way of
actualization that presupposes the unity guaranteed by the author? Why not choose a reading that,
while still being a form of concrete actualization, will stress the dissemination and the
disparateness? Perhaps the answer lies in the very fact that the idealities are related to unities that
not only put in order the work, but also put in order the world. (Maybe they make the world a world,
of course, retrospectively.) Therefore the answers probably lies in the formula used in the
beginning of this text: it is easier.
References
Fizer, John (1983), “ „Actualization‟ and „Concretization‟ as Heuristic Devices in the Study of Literary Art”,
In Literary Criticism and Philosophy, Joseph Strelka (ed.), Yearbook of Comapartive Criticism,
vol.X, University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, pp.65-77.
Husserl, Edmund (1970), The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,
trans. David Carr, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Husserl, Edmund (1973), Experience and Judgment, trans. James S.Churchill & Karl Ameriks, Evanston:
Northwestern University Press.
Husserl, Edmund (1989), “The Origin of Geometry”, trans. David Carr, In: Jacques Derrida, Edmund
Husserl’s The Origin of geometry : An Introduction, trans. John P. Leavey, Lincoln & London:
University of Nebraska Press, pp. 155-180.
Ingarden, Roman (1973), The Literary Work of Art. An Investigation on the borderlines of Ontology, Logic,
and the Theory of Literature, trans. George Grabowicz, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Iser, Wolfgang (1978), The Act of Reading. A Theory of Aesthetic Response, Baltimore and London: The
Johns Hopkins University Press.