C ONTRIBUTIONS OF I/O P SYCHOLOGY TO S AFETY IN C OMMERCIAL A IRCRAFT 197 phases to plan ahead and discuss their options (Orasanu & Fisher, 1992).

C ONTRIBUTIONS OF I/O P SYCHOLOGY TO S AFETY IN C OMMERCIAL A IRCRAFT 197 phases to plan ahead and discuss their options (Orasanu & Fisher, 1992).

Furthermore, they issued more utterances related to strategy and planning, and issued fewer commands during an emergency. Nevertheless, although such observations help informus about the methods used to promote SA, they tell us little about the process of in-flight decision-making itself, other than good communication is a necessary precursor.

O’Hare (2003) noted in a survey of the aviation psychology research literature (O’Hare & Lawrence, 2000) that the study of decision-making was only 15th on the list of topics researched, despite it being central to flight safety. Over the last decade there has been a trend away froma classical decision-making theory-based approach, with its roots in human information-processing and experimental psychology (e.g., Wickens & Flasch, 1988), and a move toward naturalistic decision-making. With this new approach, emphasis is placed upon expert decision-making in real-life situations (see Kaempf & Klein, 1994; Klein, 1989). The potential range of solutions is unconstrained and, as often is the case in aviation decision- making, there is no readily identifiable ‘correct’ solution to a problem, only

a satisfactory or less satisfactory outcome. Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of this new paradigm lies in the analytical methods employed. The majority of naturalistic decision-making models have been developed qualitatively fromobservation and analysis of experts’ decision-making processes. How- ever, its biggest strength is also its greatest weakness. The rich description of the decision-making process precludes any element of quantification or prediction. However, new analytical approaches using neural network analyses may offer a way around this criticism (see Duggan & Harris, 2001).

Orasanu (1993) observed that decisions in the aviation domain are well- suited to a naturalistic approach, as they are often ill-structured and set in a dynamic, time-pressured environment where the consequences of a poor decision can be dire. In many cases there can be conflicting mission goals (e.g., the trade-off between safety and efficiency) which may be the product of personal biases or organizational values (see Reason, 1990). Furthermore, when flying, a decision is not an end in itself; it is merely the precursor to another decision. Finally and of prime importance, there is more than a single individual contributing to most decisions taken (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993).

As far as decision-making on the flight deck is concerned, emphasis has been placed on the development of easily trained decision-making processes. Aviation abounds with mnemonics, and aids to help aircrew adopt an appropriate decision-making strategy are no exception (e.g., DECIDE— Detect, Estimate, Choose, Identify, Do, Evaluate—Benner, 1975; QPIDR—Questioning, Promoting Ideas, Decide, Review—Prince & Salas, 1993; FOR-DEC—Facts, Options, Risks and benefits, Decision, Execution, Check—Ho¨rmann, 1995). Empirical evaluation of these guidelines is sparse, although there is some evidence that their training is beneficial. Jensen (1995) observed that pilots trained in the DECIDE technique performed better than

198 I NTERNATIONAL R EVIEW OF I NDUSTRIAL AND O RGANIZATIONAL P SYCHOLOGY 2005 those without training during a series of assessment flights. Murray (1997)

observed a positive attitude among pilots to a campaign promoting decision- making. Goeters (2002) specifically regarded appropriate use of the FOR- DEC decision-making process as evidence of ‘good’ CRM.

Effective communication and good decision-making skills are of little benefit if crews do not act together as a teamunder the direction of a leader (i.e., the captain). Unlike military aviation, where aircrew fly together as members of a fixed team, in most airlines captains and first officers rarely fly together as members of a regular crew. The assumption is that this approach avoids ‘corner-cutting’ and complacency that is occasionally evi- dent in long-established teams, hence every flight has to be conducted exactly to the prescribed standard operating procedures. As a result, quick and effective team-building is essential for flight safety in commercial aviation. The captain sets the ‘tone’ and is key in making the crew into a team. Ginnett (1993) found that those captains particularly good at establishing effective teams held extensive crew briefings and debriefings before and after each flight. During these briefings they established their credibility as a leader, spelling out the required goals for performance and leading by example, yet at the same time encouraging all crew to be active participants in the management of the flight.

Early studies on flight deck leadership used ‘management-style’ tools such as Fiedler’s (1967) least preferred co-worker approach and Blake & Mouton’s (1978) managerial grid. Initially, it was thought that task-oriented captains would produce better crew performance, although group-oriented leaders have also been found to be effective on the flight deck (see Foushee & Helmreich, 1988). By the second generation of CRM, though, the emphasis had changed to training pilots in leadership techniques and group dynamics, rather than trying to describe what makes a good leader and team player. Almost simultaneously, changes in pilot selection criteria began to take place. New-hire pilots were selected on their social and management skills in addi- tion to their technical proficiency (e.g., Bartram& Baxter, 1996; Stead, 1995; Ho¨rmann & Maschke, 1996). CRM skills tests are being developed to further aid in this process (Hedge et al., 2000).

Initially, CRM programs were instigated voluntarily by airlines, although the regulatory authorities eventually mandated the requirement for crew concept-training. Within Europe, the JAA and the UK Civil Aviation Auth- ority require flight crew to be assessed on their CRM skills as part of gaining

a professional pilot’s licence and in order to retain it during annual licensing checks (CAA, 1998a, b; JAA, 2000, Joint Airworthiness Requirement—Opera- tions [JAR-OPS]; and JAA, 1999, Joint Airworthiness Requirement—Flight CrewLicensing [JAR-FCL] ). The US FAA adopts a different approach. CRM assessment is part of the qualification process in which the carriers themselves set the proficiency objectives. CRM behavioral objectives are identified in categories that either relate to ‘enabling objectives’ (to prepare