NTERNATIONAL R EVIEW OF I NDUSTRIAL AND O RGANIZATIONAL P SYCHOLOGY 2005 were expanded upon and added to by Prince, Oser, Salas, and Woodruff

188 I NTERNATIONAL R EVIEW OF I NDUSTRIAL AND O RGANIZATIONAL P SYCHOLOGY 2005 were expanded upon and added to by Prince, Oser, Salas, and Woodruff

(1993). For any line-oriented training session to be successful, trainees should undergo two briefings prior to their ‘flight’. The first briefing should outline the training objectives and how the session would progress. The second would be a regular briefing (route, weather, aircraft service- ability, etc.) to put the flight into an operational context. LOFT scenarios should be designed to address specific training objectives, and the scenarios should be realistic, including such mundane items as flight deck paperwork, tower communication, and the periods of inactivity that characterize many flights. All these factors should enhance the reality of the simulation and help to ensure flight crew ‘buy in’.

Hamman, Seamster, Smith, and Lofaro (1993) suggest that the problems faced by the crew in training should begin with the premise that the pilots should be able to exercise both their technical and interpersonal skills. The problems faced should comprise an initiating event, irrelevant occurrences to distract and/or mislead the crew, and other scenario-supporting factors. There should also not be just a single solution to the problem. The role of the facilitator during the debriefing is another key to its training effective- ness. The FAA (1990) suggest that the debrief include a discussion of the positive aspects of the crews’ performance as well as the negative aspects. The role of the facilitator in these sessions should not be judgemental. How- ever, Dismukes, McDonnell, and Jobe (2000) observed great variations in facilitator performance. It was noted that the mean debriefing duration of a post-simulator ride (which typically lasted approximately 2 hours) was only

31 minutes. One-third of this time was often spent reviewing incidents on the video and, in the remaining time, the training captain (facilitator) overseeing the session often spent more time talking than did the crew in training. While line training (and associated CRM programs) have been thought to provide great safety and economic benefits to the airlines, this has been difficult to establish empirically (Edkins, 2002). The methods by which CRM programs have been evaluated are covered in more detail in the section on Management (p. 194) issues; however, relatively recently there have been some questions raised about the fundamental basis of LOFT training.

The raison d’eˆtre of LOFT is to encourage effective flight deck manage- ment practices through team-based training and debriefing performed within abnormal and emergency flight scenarios. However, the threats to flight safety faced in such a training session may not be the key threats to opera- tional safety faced by aircrew on a day-to-day basis. Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSAs) began to be introduced to airlines (initially US carriers) in the late 1990s. Audit data are collected on a non-jeopardy basis by trained observers during regular line operations. The initial idea was that these data formed the basis of an audit process to check the everyday safety of an airline at an organizational level. Data in three broad categories are collected: external threats to safety (e.g., air traffic controller problems, adverse The raison d’eˆtre of LOFT is to encourage effective flight deck manage- ment practices through team-based training and debriefing performed within abnormal and emergency flight scenarios. However, the threats to flight safety faced in such a training session may not be the key threats to opera- tional safety faced by aircrew on a day-to-day basis. Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSAs) began to be introduced to airlines (initially US carriers) in the late 1990s. Audit data are collected on a non-jeopardy basis by trained observers during regular line operations. The initial idea was that these data formed the basis of an audit process to check the everyday safety of an airline at an organizational level. Data in three broad categories are collected: external threats to safety (e.g., air traffic controller problems, adverse

Developing training needs directly fromline operational requirem ents reflects the training philosophy outlined by the FAA in the Advanced Qualification Program. The emphasis in the program is away from time- based training requirements to fleet-specific, proficiency-based requirements (see FAA, 1991, AC 120-54). In this qualification process, the applicant (not the regulatory authority) develops a set of proficiency objectives based upon that airline’s requirements for their specific type of operations. The process is based upon a rigorous task analysis of operations, but with emphasis firmly placed upon the cognitive aspects of the flight task, such as crew decision- making or the management of the aircraft’s automation (see Seamster, Redding, & Kaempf, 1998). In many ways, the process is identical to the elicitation of training requirements undertaken in many other industries. The revolutionary aspect of this process in the aviation industry lies in the releas- ing of the regulatory shackles when approving the content of the training program. However, the complexity of the qualification process means that considerable professional skills and resources have to be applied to the pro- gramto gain approval, and there is a likelihood that only the major airlines with such resources will benefit (Maurino, 1999).

While regulations now require professional pilots to undertake multi-crew cooperation courses there has been no such corresponding advance in the training requirements for the understanding and management of advanced automation. It could be argued that this is inherent in any aircraft-type rating (one of the final stages in flight crew licensing); however, some authors are now suggesting that training for automation could start much earlier in a