Conclusion Journal Modern Accounting & Auditing 2010-6.
The effect of earnings forecast precision on firm value and insider trading under voluntary disclosure in Taiwan
42
in the form of summary financial forecast, which seems safer than the other form. My explanation for this phenomenon is that the entrepreneur takes the cost of forecast error into account when he makes disclosure
decision. The opinion is consistent with the viewpoint in Bradbury 1992 who finds that managers choose the safest method of disclosure, either non-quantified disclosure or non-disclosure.
The empirical results of this paper are consistent with Fischer Verrecchia 2000. Their model indicates that when the market cannot perfectly adjust for the manager’s bias, the manager may be strictly better off with
the option to bias. Although this study shows that the forecast error of voluntary disclosure may negatively impact firm values, insiders reduce the degree of forecast manipulation when the cost of forecast error is taken into
consideration, such behavior also can result in earnings management. It means that firms use positive discretionary accruals to manage reported earnings upward when earnings would fall below earnings forecasts.
Additionally, audit committees have become a more common mechanism for ensuring good corporate governance in some countries. For example, the United States, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore and Thailand
mandate that public companies have an audit committee as part of their corporate structure Chen, Duh Shiue, 2008. In Taiwan, however, the formation of an audit committee is voluntary. Dechow, Sloan Sweeney 1996
report that firms without audit committees are more likely to manipulate earnings. Thus, audit committees should be set up to develop monitoring functions and strengthen governance mechanisms. The competent authority thus
should improve corporate governance and require public companies to make properly use the public disclosure system to let shareholders and stakeholders understand the financial conditions of the firm.
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Edited by Mary and Linda
June 2010, Vol.6, No.6 Serial No.61 Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing, ISSN 1548-6583, USA
44
Analysis on the exchange rate of Australian dollar
JIA Xian-wei
Economics and Management College, Sichuan Agricultural University, Ya’an 625014, China
Abstract: Australian dollar AUD maintains a fluctuant increase for long period, but in recent two years,
this currency represents an anomalistic change. In order to forecast the trend of AUD, this essay examines the exchange rate of AUD in then years from March of 2000 to March of 2010, and argues the factors which create
these trend changes. By means of secondary research and graphs analysis, the relevant evidence and argument was selected into four terms below: relative raw materials prices changes, relative domestic price level and
Import-Expert changes, relative interest rate changes, and other factors. The examples based on the theoretics, graphs, statistics and experts’ opinions.
Key words: real exchange rate; nominal exchange rate; Australian dollar AUD