Disconnection between production and consumption The nature of capitalist production and consumption tends to sever the connection between

Disconnection between production and consumption The nature of capitalist production and consumption tends to sever the connection between

consumption and waste. The commodity appears as outside human agency, as alienation to production as such. This is evident in a culture of disconnection that marks the relationship between consumer and producer (O’Brien 2008). This refers to the dissociation between the harm derived from the production and later disposal of a commodity, and the act of consumption, a process in which ‘every good and service is, in its material totality, a link in an economically infinite chain of harms’ (O’Brien 2008: 46). Thus, there is no sense of communal ownership in relation to the costs as well as the benefits of the exploitation of human and natural resources (Pepper 1993).

Another way in which harm is externalised, therefore, is through the disconnection between production and consumption relations in ways that sustain unequal trade and waste producing relations. Stretesky Another way in which harm is externalised, therefore, is through the disconnection between production and consumption relations in ways that sustain unequal trade and waste producing relations. Stretesky

The Legal-Illegal Nexus To explain the specific mechanisms by which environmental harm is transferred through time and space we need to appreciate the particularities of the waste industry generally. There are big differences between local dumping and the transnational movement of waste, between corporate behaviour and that of the individual perpetrator (see Lynch et al. 2002: 111). On the other hand, there is often overlap between the harmful actions of legitimate businesses and those of criminal syndicates. More extensive discussion would need to include analysis of local dumping (of things such as garbage, fertilizers, landfill) and the transnational movement of waste (especially e-waste), via both legal mechanisms (for example, under the guise of recycling, or as dictated by the Basel convention) and illegal mechanisms (involving both illegal activity on the part of mainstream companies, including waste companies themselves, and organised criminal syndicates such as those that operate in Naples). For now, the concern is to point to the key drivers for the harmful disposal of waste.

The dearth of adequate regulatory, enforcement and prosecution agencies and resources at the local, regional and international levels means that little disincentive exists from a cost-benefit perspective to desist from illegal dumping, however it is organised. Yet, much of the criminality associated with waste disposal has its origins in the regulatory apparatus of the state. To understand this, we need to explore several interrelated issues.

First, waste disposal is a lucrative area in which to make money. Huge profits are there to be made in cases where waste is a product with an inelastic price – that is, an increase in price does not equally reduce demand for the service (Van Daele et al 2007: 35). This has made waste disposal attractive to organised criminal syndicates while simultaneously opening the door for legal waste management companies to increase their profits by utilising illegal practices (Van Daele et al. 2007: 36).

Secondly, the impetus to bend rules and merge practices stems from the costs of waste disposal themselves. These are comprised of two major components (Dorn et al. 2007):

• High costs of legal waste management – related to industry standards, international conventions, government regulation, application of suitable technologies

• High costs of compliance – traceability, labelling, automation and book-keeping procedures Sub-contracting is one means to be legal but be the beneficiary of illegal waste management.

There are other methods used to circumvent regulations and cut costs and increase profits as well. These revolve around issues of ‘risk’, and constructions of ‘evidence’, ‘thresholds’ and ‘harms’. To take three examples, we can consider the following:

Mixing of harzardous waste with non-hazardous waste

‘this provides opportunities to mask hazardous waste proportions. These mirror entries define certain waste streams as hazardous only when their concentration in liquids exceeds a certain level. By keeping the hazardous waste degradation under legal limits, collection, transport and treatment become less regulated’ (Van Daele, 2007: 35-36).

Re-labelling waste, not for disposal, but for recycling

‘The adoption of these national and international rules that sought to control the transnational trade in toxic waste [e.g., Basel Convention] resulted in a significant reduction in exports of toxic waste for disposal in developing countries by the early 1990s. At the same time, however, a new problem emerged. It soon became apparent that instead of exporting waste for disposal, waste exporters shifted their business toward the export of toxic wastes to developing countries for recycling. There was, in effect, a loophole in the rules that allowed waste transfers to continue – legally – under the auspices of recycling.’ (Clapp 2002: 143).

Transfer of waste embedded in weapons to new international destinations Depleted Uranium

‘has been given away to military industries at no cost to the manufacturer of arms and ammunition. In its own way, this represents one means to dispose of what is legally considered ‘waste’. It also ensures the transnational movement of the waste when military operations take place in other parts of the world – such as the Middle East and the Balkans – which do not produce such products (and waste) to begin with’ (White, 2008b: 34).

The methods used to circumvent regulations and to minimise labour and other costs will vary depending upon the players involved. Distinctions can be made, for example, between bourgeois (large capitalist) and petty bourgeois (small business) class situations, whether this is in regard to legal business activity or criminal organisations (such as the so called eco-mafia in Italy). The size and dynamics of the group will influence how specific problems are tackled at the practical level.

Conclusion The apparent severing of the link between specific waste and its specific production, means that responding to the 'waste problem' (which is socially constructed via the activities of environmentalists, local residents and concerned citizens, as well as through particular and spectacular instances of harm -

e.g. Love Canal in the US) is no longer a case of blaming the producer (since we do not necessarily know how much and what kind of waste each individual producer supplies to the waste removal company). And the waste removal company, while liable to some extent for certain types of harm (depending upon how and where they dispose of waste), is not a key target for social action (perhaps due to the disconnection between production, consumption and waste disposal). As a consequence, the 'waste crisis' is often constructed as a generalised problem of society (it is 'our' waste, since it cannot be ascribed to any particular individual or company), and, accordingly, it is up to 'society' (read, the state) to clean things up. In other words, the waste crisis is re-constructed as a social problem, rather than one stemming from individual producers and their waste removal partners. Add to this the urgency of clean- up (and the delays associated with litigation and criminalisation), and pressure is on the state to intervene and do something concrete.

However, activity in the regulatory sphere (e.g., greater enforcement of the Basel

Convention and European concerns to tighten up procedures relating to waste production and waste treatment) provides impetus to cut costs by by-passing the formal waste treatment economy and adopting illegal methods of disposal, including entering into partnerships with corrupt or failed governments (e.g. Somali war lords, Ivory Coast politicians) or with organised criminal syndicates (e.g. that will secretly dispose of the problem or buy the right people off). Recession exacerbates this tendency.

In the end, the disconnection between production and consumption, and the implicit distinction between wellbeing in the North versus wellbeing in the South, ensures the continuation of global environmental degradation that puts all in peril.

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