Reliable and Misleading Intuitions

8 Conclusion

I have described and motivated a contextualist solution to the puzzle of faultless disagreement about personal taste. This solution avoids truth relativism, preserves logical bivalence, and still allows us to explain why people arguing about taste seem equally remote from the objective truth.

As a welcome side effect, we have explicated the distinction between what we called ‘pulling’ and ‘pushing’ reasons for adopting a theory. We have cast the truth–usefulness con- nection as a pushing reason for our solution, and we have used the same connection to evaluate

the reliability of the linguistic intuitions relevant to the explanation of faultless disagreement.

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