Articulation of Ethics of Care as Feminist Ethics

65 reasoning over the other. Instead of proposing the primacy of ethics of care, Gilligan proposes for the complementation of the two ethics.

3.2.3.2. Articulation of Ethics of Care as Feminist Ethics

Noddings develops further Gilligan‘s concept of ethics of care as distinct women‘s moral reasoning into a model of ethics based on the principle of caring. Noddings claims that ethics built on caring are characteristically feminine in sense that they have a root in women‘s history and tradition. 144 Ethics of care as feminine ethic do not imply a claim of essentialism that they exclusively represent all women‘s experience and cannot be shared by men, but they assert that women are better equipped in caring than men partly due to a result of the construction of psychological deep structures in the early mother-child relationship. 145 As woman does not need to turn away from the mother in developing their sexual identity as happened in man, she can develop continuous connections with the mother and thus, create flexible selves with permeable ego boundaries that enables them better in caring and empathetic relationship. Hence, the prevalence of women in caring practice is not due to natural femininity, but social constructions. The fact that ethics of care arise under condition of women‘s subordination is not a reason to reject them. It is important to assess their best features and encourage both male and female to develop this ethical values. Noddings claims the universality of caring attitude. 146 Caring like rationality is the most fundamental feature of human beings. Everybody has ever experienced what it means to be cared for in the practice of mothering. This experience of ‗to be cared for‘ is the foundation to develop the caring attitude. 144 Noddings, Nel. Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education. New York: Teacher College Press, 2002, p. 10 145 Noddings, Nel. Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Berkeley: California UP, 1984, p. 97. 146 Noddings. Educating Moral People…. p. 21. 66 Noddings states that the essential element of caring is in the relation between the ‗one- caring ‘ and the ‗cared-for‘. 147 The relation between the ‗one-caring‘ and the ‗cared-for‘ is ongoing relational process that concerns of apprehending the other‘s reality as nearly as possible, building healthy relationship set in concreteness of each moral situation and using all o f one‘s capabilities to respond to the needs of the ‗cared-for‘. In this kind of caring relationship individual difference and uniqueness are preserved. 148 Noddings distinguishes two kinds of care: caring for‘ and ‗caring about‘. She defines ‗caring for‘ as follows: A, B is a caring relation or encounter if and only if a. A cares for B—that is, A‘s consciousness is characterized by attention and motivational displacement —and b. A performs some act in accordance with a., and c. B recognizes that A cares for B. 149 From above explanation it can be seen that caring relationship always involves four elements: engrossment, displacement of motivation, commitment and confirmation. Engrossment or receptive attention refers to desire for other‘s well-being by meeting the needs of the other as totally as possible for the entire time of caring relationship. Engrossment must also be followed by displacement of motivation which means that the ‗one-caring‘ steps out of hisher personal frame of reference and into the other‘s so that the ‗cared-for‘s aspiration is also aspired by the ‗one-caring‘. Caring relationship also needs commitment from the ‗one-caring‘ to perform caring effort even in difficult times. The last element is confirmation or conscious responds from the ‗cared-for‘ to the caring effort of the ‗one- caring ‘ for the completion of caring relationship. From the formulation above then it can be seen that Noddings‘s concept of ‗caring for‘ emphasizes the concrete and active encounter to particular ‗the cared-for‘ and the recognition 147 Noddings. Caring: A Feminine…, p. 9. 148 Noddings. Caring: A Feminine…, p. 5. 149 Noddings. Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy. California: University of California Press. 2002, p. 19. 67 from ‗the cared-for‘. It is different from the concept of ‗caring about‘ which she explains as follows: I have brushed aside ―caring about‖ and, I believe, properly so. It is too easy. I can ―care about‖ the starving children of Cambodia, send five dollars to hunger relief, and feel somewhat satisfied. I do not even know if my money went for food, or guns, or a new Cadillac for some politician. This is a poor second- cousin to caring.―Caring about‖ always involves a certain benign neglect. One is attentive just so far. One assents with just so much enthusiasm. One acknowledges. One affirms. One contributes five dollars and goes on to other things. 150 From the above explanation it can be seen that Noddings‘ concept of ‗caring about‘ is less direct, immediate and intense than ‗caring for‘. Noddings states that ‗caring about‘ is not sufficient to constitute an ethics of care unless it is accompanied by the active action of ‗caring for‘. However, it does not mean that ‗caring about‘ is insignificant. One cannot directly care for every more distant oth er in the level of ‗caring for‘. ‗Caring for‘ is limited within inner circle of family and second circle of those with whom one interacts on the regular basis. It is hard to keep the intensity of ‗caring for‘ to the third circle of the rest of the world. However, one can still care indirectly or ‗caring about‘ to the more distant others. Therefore, Noddings states that ‗caring about‘ has to be seen as the extension of ‗caring for‘ that moves ‗the one-caring‘ into wider public sphere. As ‗caring about‘ moves the one-caring into wider sphere, ‗caring about‘ is the foundation of human sense of justice. 151 By stating this, Noddings relates ethics of care with ethics of justice by positing that caring supplies the basic good in which the sense of justice is grounded. 152 She further states that, ―justice itself is dependent on ‗caring-about‘, and ‗caring-about‘ is in turn dependent on ‗caring-for‘.‖ 153 Noddings notices that t hough ‗caring about‘ extends one‘s capacity for caring into wider public sphere, ‗caring about‘ has flaws because it tends to be self righteous, politically correct and depends on abstraction and thus, unworkable in practice. Therefore, ‗caring about‘ 150 Noddings. Starting at Home …, p.22. 151 Noddings. Starting at Home …, p.22. 152 Noddings. Starting at Home …, p.22. 153 Noddings. Starting at Home …, p. 6. 68 alone is never enough. However, ‗caring about‘ offers the individual an opportunity to engage more deeply in caring activities. Therefore, f or Noddings, the ideal function of ‗caring about‘ is the instrument to enhance ‗caring for‘. 154 Noddings‘ ethics of care have been criticized by Sarah Lucia Hoagland for the unidirectional ity of Noddings‘ care concept. According to Hoagland Noddings‘ care is unidirectional where it is ‗the one-caring‘ who is constantly giving, while ‗the cared-for‘ has not any obligation to ‗the one-caring‘. 155 According to Hoagland this kind of relation does not teach ‗the cared-for‘ the burdens of ‗the one-caring‘ and does not teach ‗the one-caring‘ about the importance of her or his own needs. 156 The morality of caring commonly has been misunderstood because it costs self- sacrifice and selflessness. Noddings rejects that view because the morality of caring is about affirming one‘s own interests through the process of affirming others‘ needs. Whenever one practices caring they do not only fulfill others‘ need, but also fulfills his own need to remain connected with others. 157 Therefore, caring is never unidirectional as claimed by Hoagland. In her postulation of ethics of care, Noddings focuses more on developing ethics of care in private realm of family and friendship. She does not develop effectively her ethics of care for wider socio-political life. The expansion of ethics of care into political or public domains is pursued further by other care theorists, such as Virginia Held and Joan Tronto. The following section discusses how ethics of care can be applied in the wider public realm. 154 Noddings. Starting at Home …, p. 23. 155 Tong, p. 179. 156 Tong, p. 179. 157 Tong, p. 169. 69

3.2.3.3. Expanding Ethics of Care into Political Domain