Conclusion Journal Modern Accounting & Auditing 2010-5.
The market reaction on the human resources information disclosure in Chinese listed companies
44
executives’ shareholdings have no significant impact on PB. The industry statistics revealed no significant impact between average age and PB because each group of age has its own advantages.
This advantage makes information users can not use the same criteria to evaluate the factors on the business value of responses. Theoretically, professional proportion has a positive correlation with the company’s PB, but
the statistics show that if is not significant indicators in this area. The reasons may be that the author selected the variable in a large confine and the author can’t define it clearly. The average assess also didn’t have a significant
impact because the sample area is technology industry and the intellectual capital plays an important role. So the impact of assess is relatively weakened. The prior articles suppose that executives’ shareholdings disclosure will
enable the investors to understand the distribution of shares better, and reduce the degree of information asymmetry. However, our study results show that this information in the regression showed no obvious correlation
with PB. There exist two situation of this failure: companies didn’t have his policy and they don’t want to disclose this information. This information uncertainty makes investors can’t make the right decisions. So the
impact is not significant. Other indicators variables: The staff salaries costs, average profit margins rate, the average management fees,
personnel development plan and the disclosure of remuneration policy have significant impact with PB, this result match with our hypothesis. Average profit margin ratio showed a positive correlation between with PB.
Enterprises have good incentive systems for staff, the staffs can maximize their ability for the company to create the greatest value. The average management fees showed a significantly positive correlation with PB that the
company’s corporate value can increase accompany with the raise of each staff management fees. The reason is that with the management staff cost increases, investors can see that companies attach importance to the staff and
this factor may inspirit staff to create more value for the company. Other indicators show that some enterprises are willing to disclose human resources information in order to achieve the purpose of attracting investors and this
conclusion matches the previous research. The average staff salary indicators in the analysis associated with a number of indicators significantly. In
order to reduce the impact from Co linearity, the author removed this variable. In theory, employees are important intangible assets in company, the company would encourage the employees to create more value through various
incentives, and this factor is one of the most important factors. When companies provide a higher salary to their employees, the company indicated that they pay much attention on their staffs, and also showed that companies
are more solid strength and performance better, the company’s market value has potential to get higher. Therefore, this indicator can be studied in the future in-depth research.
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May 2010, Vol.6, No.5 Serial No.60 Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing, ISSN 1548-6583, USA
46
Tunneling, overlapping owner and investor protection: Evidence from merger and acquisition in Asia
∗
Sumiyana
1
, Mas’ud Machfoedz
1
, Ratna Candra Sari
2
1. Faculty of Economics and Business, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta 55281, Indonesia; 2. Faculty of Sosial and Economics, Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta,
Yogyakarta 55281, Indonesia
Abstract: Tunneling is to describe transfer resource out of the firm for benefit of their controlling
shareholders. Better legal protection and stronger social norms improve minority shareholders’ protection from expropriation. They consequently reduce the private benefits of controlling shareholders La Porta, 1999. This
study aims to investigate tunneling in the context merger and acquisition MA and to examine whether tunneling occurs only in emerging markets with poor law enforcement or whether it also occurs in developed
countries. This study documents that managers are more likely to overpay target in merger and acquisition with high overlapped owner which have stakes in bidder and target firm. That overpayment, a transfer of wealth from
owners of bidder’s firm to overlapping owners, is a type of tunneling. This study concludes that tunneling occurs
in nations not only with low investor protection, but also with high investor protection. Key words:
tunneling; expropriation; merger acquisition; investor protection