mouth related words, areas of the motor cortex involved with the motion of the leg and the mouth respectively showed higher activation. Hauk et al.
2004 also showed that reading action words e.g. lick, pick, or kick related to the body parts: face, arms, and legs respectively activate overlapping or
adjacent areas to the actual movement of the tongue, ingers, or feet. Other studies have also conirmed similar indings, albeit in a different fashion. For
example, one used auditory action related sentences instead of readings and found similar activation in the respective somatotopic areas of the premotor
cortex Tettamanti et al., 2005. Another study Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006 looked at foot, hand, and mouth actions, where participants observed one of
these actions and also read a literal phrase relating to the same action. They found congruence in the area of the premotor and prefrontal regions for both
visually seeing the action and reading the literal phrase about it. Furthermore, Simmons et al. 2008, using MRI, conirm that conceptual
processing does not involve a single type of representation e.g. amodal symbol manipulation. They show that multiple systems are involved to
which they conclude, “[A]t this point, we are somewhat sceptical that completely amodal representations exist in the brain” p. 116. Jirak et al.
2010, after doing a meta-analysis of numerous research papers that looked at how language comprehension activates the same neural systems used for
perception and action, state that the “primary motor, supplementary motor and premotor cortices are repeatedly reported to be active during language
processing” p. 718. So there is a growing consensus that cognition is not disembodied and encapsulated, but rather emerges through the body
perceiving and acting in the world.
3.2 A closer look at one theory of embodiment
Embodied cognition has the potential to provide a unifying perspective for psychology Glenberg, 2010 and other ields within cognitive science. Yet
for many, it is not a yes or no question, but rather has to do more with the scope of embodiment, as Machery 2007 frames the question, “[t]o what
extent do we use reenacted perceptual representations in cognition and to what extent do we use amodal representations?” p. 42. This falls under the
assumption that both modes of representation are necessary for cognition. To better grasp the range of embodiment perspectives, Meteyard et al. 2012 laid
out the theories on a continuum from secondary embodiment, where semantic content is independent but associated with sensory-motor systems,
to weak embodiment, where semantic content has partial dependence on the sensory-motor system, to strong embodiment, which asserts that there is
complete dependence on the sensory-motor system.
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Barsalou’s Perceptual Symbol Theory is one example of the weak form of embodiment. Barsalou’s 1999 Perceptual Symbol Theory seeks to “integrate
traditional theories with grounded theories” p. 622 and has been one of the more inluential embodied theories of cognition, which views mental
representations as being grounded in perceptual symbols and “[a]s collections of perceptual symbols develop, they constitute the representations that
underlie cognition” p. 578. Again it is helpful here to contrast this theory against the traditional theory of cognition, which holds to a mentalese view
of thought or a “language of thought” Fodor, 1975 where language is disembodied and language comprehension involves the manipulation of
abstract symbols. In this view, the body naturally provides input to the mind, but this sensory input then goes through a process of transduction that
results in a neural code and this code is then further processed as amodal whereby these arbitrary symbols are completely distinguishable from their
sensory bodily origins. While on the other hand, in a grounded cognition approach, “cognition is typically grounded in multiple ways, including
simulations, situated action, and, on occasion, bodily states” Barsalou, 2008, p. 619.
As people move about in the world, engaged in various real world experiences, interacting with the environment and others, they selectively
attend to certain sensory-motor information such as smell, taste, motor movements, and so on. This sensory-motor information is then associated
with concepts involved in that particular situation. When applied to semantic content, such as when one reads a story or is engaged in a conversation, the
semantic processing recruits the associable perceptual and motor states and partially simulates or reenacts these experiences. To clarify what a simulation
is, Barsalou 2008 describes it as “the reenactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective states acquired during interaction with the world, body, and
mind” p. 618 something like what Zwaan 2004 terms “experiential traces”. So when one comes into contact with a lower, various modal states are
captured within the brain and in the speciic case of lowers this may involve olfactory, tactile and visual, as well as, somatosensory systems. This
knowledge of lowers is also situated and the simulation may involve certain background situations such as planting lowers in a garden, putting lowers in
a vase, choosing lowers for a wedding, etc. Instead of being detached and abstract, this knowledge of lowers is situated and grounded. Language
comprehension then would involve running simulations that are multi-modal and involve the activation of these various sensory systems like smelling,
seeing, and feeling. These sensory-motor activations become the semantic content for words Pulverm̈ller, 1999; 2001.
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4. LANGUAGE: OUT OF THE HEAD AND INTO THE BODY AND SOCIAL WORLD
