JURNAL FORDEMA VOL 8 NO 2 NOVEMBER 2008
FORDEMA
ISSN:1412-0437
{FoRUM DOSEN EKONOMI MANAJEMEN dan AKUNTANSI}
Volume 8 Norho. 2. November 2008
LEMBAGA PENERBIT FAKULTAS EKONOMI
UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH PALEMBANG
FORDETA
Akuntansi )
Nomor 2, November2oo8
( Forum Dosen Ekonomi llianajem€n dan
Volume 8
DEWAN REDAKSI
Pimpinan umum / Penanggung Jawab / Pimpinan Redaksi
Sunadi
Wakll Ketua Penyunting
Wani Fitdah
Dewan Penyunting
Munrokkhim (Universitas lslam lndonesia)
Edy Suardi Hanid {Universits lslafl lndonesia]
Bambang Widagdo (Univ€Eitas Muhammadiyah Malang)
Hj. Nurlina lamizl (Univelsitas Sriwijaya)
Diai Natalisa {Univesitas Sriwijaya)
lmlon Zahi ( Universitas Srilyijaya )
SaadahSiddik (tlniyeGitas Muhammadiyah Palembang)
Fatimah (UniveEihs Muhammadiyah Pal€mbang)
Mustola lradi Batubara (UniveBitas Muhammadiyah Palembang)
lbrahim Rachman (Universitas Muhammadiyah Pdembary)
Diah Isnaini Asiati (UnlveBitas Muhammadiyah Palembang)
P€nyunling Pdsksana
Belliwati Kosim
Hj. Khotitah
Amidi
Betri
Mizan
Rsdaksi Pdaksana
Fauziah
FORDEMA dlterbltkan s€jak 2001. dengan trekuens' 2 kalisetahun.
Redaksi menorima karangan ilrniah tentang hasil"hasil penelitian,
Survey, dan telaah pustaka yang erat hubungannya dengan bidang Ekonomi.
Alanat Rodaksi I Psnerbit :
Fakultas Ekonomi univeEitas l\,iuhammadiyah Palembang
Jl. Jend. A. Yani 13 Ulu Palembang (30263)
Telp (0711) 51 1433 {huntlrq} Fa( (071 1} 518018
F0
Pengantar Redaksi
Pembaca Fordema yang lerhormal
(Forur
Assa amu a ark!m Wr. \,\lb.
nir.:: r:.1
i::c,f
Ahamduillah Puli syukur kehad rat A alr SWT atas
::ah d berikan
kepada klta semua sehingga Jurna F0RDEtr"4A dapal kembali hadir d tergalr
pembaca
Pada ed si ifi, Fordema menyal kan beberapa ad kel baik pene tr3n aan ,ron pene lian
dl b dang manalemen dan slud pembangunan . seperli lsnurhadi tentan! Determ nants 0f
operating Performance 0f [/alaysan State Owned Enterprses After Prvatzaton Barnbang
Widagdo dan Sugiarti. tentang, Model Pemberdayaan Ke uarga M sk n di W ayah Sub Urban
Daam PerspektifGender, Hafta Wazol tentang Pengaruh PDRB,Jumlah Penduduk dan Jum ah
Kunlungan Pasen Terhadap Penerimaan Retrlbus Peayanan Kesehatan (S!atu Kasus pada
Dnas Kesehatan Prov. Sumatera Seatan) R. lvulyo Hendarto dan Hastarini Dwi Atmanti
Kajian Terhadap Pernbentukan Daerah Olonom Earu dan bu Kota Daerah Purwadi Hubungan
Penddikan Dar Peatthan Serta Kompensasi Terhadap Kinerja Anggota Satuan Pois Pamong
Prala Kota Palembang Didik Susetyo tentang, Analiss DanaAlokasi um!m Dan Upaya Fiska
P.:ktk Akuntaasi c::: :
0lan PutriMaharafr da
i,lodel PemberCay.a-'=
Bambang Wldrgdo
Pefgaruh FDR.a
Deaerimaea
Jr-:_
(esehataf Prov
Hatt! Wa2ol
S"..i,
Reftb-:
l(atian Terhadap
Kota Palembang
Daarn bidang Akunlans menyalkan hasil peneitian Dian Putri lvaharani dan
Sa'adah, tentang Praktik Akuntans Pada Perusahaan Skala l\,,lenengah D Kota Paembang,
Weily lenlang Penghaigaan, Perlaku Pimpinan Pefaku Tim Keia Komtmen orcanisasl.
Efesiens Perubahaan Dan Orientas Kerjasama Terhadap Komitmen Program Serla
Pengaruhnya Terhadap Kinerja Pimpifan, Sapta Dyah Puspjtarini dan Antariksa
Budileksmana tentang Pengaruh Corpante Saciai Respanslb/iity Terhadap Nila Perusahaan
Dengan Kepem likan lvlanajemen Dan T pe ndustri Sebagai Varabel Pemoderas Karyanti dan
Suryo Pratolo, tentang Pengaruh Kualitas Auditor Kondis Keuangan Perusahaan Op n Aud I
Tahun Sebelumnya Perlunbuhan Perlsahaan Daf Debl Det'ault Terhadap Kemungk nan
Penermaan 0p nlAud I Gaing Cancern
Tiada gadng yang tak retak berbaga kritk dai saran yang membangln selalu kam
harapkar Ter ma kasih dan semoga arukel alr kel ni bermanfaat bagi pembaca semua
WassalamLr aakLrm Wr Wh
Paembang, November 2008
d:.
::
!e-:;-
R.lr!lyo Hendartc
Penghargaair Per
ft-
e.,:
EiesleisiPerubaf-e- l;
Sena Pergafuhfya :'.:
lebrrnifarts 0i 0!e.:: Entenrrses After
Pr,-,
lsnurhadi
l:- _:
s :r'
NubufOan Pendid
ancgota sallan Fr
Pu
adi
t-engaruh Co,?orale
-ia: :
(epemilkan
Sapta Dyah
[iana]er€-,
Puspitrri.i I
Redaksi
Ana lsrs Dana Alokas
_-.
Didit Susetyo
'1 Pergaruh Kualitas Aur:rSebelumnya, PertwrLr--:
\emungkinan Pener n::Karyanti dan Suryo Praic
F@R&ffiffiA
( Forum oosen Ekonomi Manajemen dan Akuntansi )
Volume Nomor 2, November 2008
I
-r-a : : ::_ :l leTikan
r:-: .:- : .:_::"baca
:ra: :_ :: :_ :arelitan
ri =-- . l:.- -a'ts 0f
:E :- - -:::_ 3ambang
Hs, : . =.:- :-b Jioan
-rr :_ ::-:-r,. ::. Jum ah
:saa:-: _ : -::' '::sLls Pada
d-- -:s-i1l
DAFTAR ISI
Dwi Atmanti
:--_ tirwadi Hubungan
,-!g:- :=j:' 'olls Pamong
rs --,- ler LlPaYa Fiska
4.
D€- tJtri Maharani dan
:-€.,::- I (ora Palembang,
5.
..a- trnen
Organ Sasi
{a- irien Program Seda
\Jsphanni dan Antariksa
-9.iadap Nia Perusahaaf
::€ ::ncCerasr Karyanti dan
_aa' ra'L.rsahaai 0pni Audit
i'
a,-. -.-aaap
6.
l\4odel Pemberdayaan Xeluarga [,4iskii di Wilayah Sub Urban Da]amPe6peklif Gender
11s,130
114
Pengaruh PDRB,Jumlah Penduduk dan Jumlah Kunjungan Pasien Terhadap
Penedmaan Relribusi Pelayanan Kesehatan (Suat! Kasus Pada Dinas
(esehatan Prov. Sumatera Se atan)
Hatta Wazol
131
Kajian Terhadap Pernbentukan Daerah olonom Baru dan lbuKota Daerah
R. Mulyo Hendarto dan Hastarini owi,qtrnanti
145 - 152
Penghargaai, Peilaku Pmpinan, perilaku Tim Kerja, Komitmen organisasi,
Efesiensi Perubahaan Daf oientas Ketasama Terhadap KomitTen Program
Serta Pengaruhnya Terhadap Kinerla Pimpinan
Welly
153-172
Detefninants Of operaling Performance 0f ilalaysian State-owned
Enterpises After Pivalizatio n
173 182
-144
lsnufiadi
Kemungkinan
;,_j -a-::-!un
99
Bambang lrvidagdo dan Sugiarti
E
,:.e
Praklik Ak!nlansiPada Perusahaai Skala l4enengah DiKola Palembang
Dian Putri Maharani dan Sa'adah
Hubungan Pendidkan Dan Pelatihan Serta Kompensasi Terhadap Kineia
Anggota Satuan PolisiPamong Praja Kota Piiembang
se a u kami
183 - 196
Pulwadi
',:!ember 2008
Pengaruh Copolrle Socla/ Responsibi,ryTerhadap Nilai Perusahaan Dengan
Kepemilikan l\,4anajemen Dan Ipe lndusti Sebagai Vaiabel Pemoderasi
Sapta Dyah Puspitarini dan Antadksa Budileksmana
197 210
Analisis Dana Alokasl Umum Dan Upaya Fiskal Kola Palernbang
211
Redaksi
224
Didik Susetyo
10
Pengar!h Kualilas Aud lor, Kondisi (euangan Perusahaan, 0piniAudiiTahun
Sebelumnya, Pertumbuhan Perusahaan Dan Debl Defa//l Terhadap
Kemungkinan Penerirnaan Opini Audit Goirg Concern
Karyanti dan Suryo Pratolo
k
rl
I
t
225 - 242
Wdly
_ -:-ae 0f
DETERMINANTS OF APERATING PERFARMANCE OF
MALAYSIAN STATE.OWNED EAIIERPRiSES AFISR PRIVATIZATION
lsnurhadir
ln A
4bsract
P vatizalion is the transfetung af ownership frcm state lo pivate ownerchip expeclinq Utat the
la -htu\Lat dno ur sa/, clar Io4 peiot na. ce ot sale.awned entd4.|hses cin be th1p191 s,i. Tp15
study focuses on the evalualion of apenting pefornances of the newly privatjzed finns which
lssued shares it capital mafuet. The research was ca ed out by investigating the opeftting
peiornance of lhe privatized finns aftet ptivalizatian and factots that are responsible on 1e
post-pivatizatian petonnance. The peformance were sfi/died throrgh stai/arcal analysis of lhe
dependency af several independenl vaiahles nanely peiormance pmxjes i.e. soft budget
canslraint, lraction of sharc sald, share allocaled to emplayee and top nanagemen! tcan cltaige
an dependent variables i.e. retun on sa/es (RoS.J, returil ol? assets_{RoA) and rctL lt on equily
(RAq, real sale antl net incane. The results shawed lhat the lactors thal arc rcsfionshle o; the
posl'pivalizatbn peionnance diffet depending on tt\e pefornance proxies. The factors
rcsponsible for ROS are lhe shaftlenn debt la Iolal asset and the share allocated to enptoyee,
the fftction af sharc sold and the share allocated to employee arc responsible for ROA, while ke
ROE is affecled by ke tap managenent lean change only. fhe real sale is iflue ced bv the
ftactian of sharc sotd and the share allocated to enplayee, while neI pnht is not affe.tcd by any
t'actat considered in this study.
Kewards: Pivalization, Stale Owned Enterpises
Privatization as a policy of transfening
nations such as the United Kingdom, France,
United States, and Japan
emergin0
.wnership from state to private or public
:ssets has been ofe of lhe most popular
coLrntdes
l.{argaret Thatchels conseryative
lovemment which came to rule United
Chile, Brazil, and i\,{exico in Laiin America,
Malaysia as one
thc leading
eConomy from eme€ing ntarket has embrace
privatization since eady 1980. The generally
ol
{ingdom in 1979 is regarded as ihe pioneer
Jf the modem privatization programs. The
rolicy has been adopted by many countdes
I which govemmenls frcm various politicai
lackluster performance and unsatisfactory of
staie-owned efiterprises iogethet with
rackgrounds enthusiastically sold state,
lwned erteprises (SOES, hereafter) to
significant
-.dvate investorc expectifg
economic
F
recession
ffst
his
announced
government's
privatization policy in 1983. lssuinq shares in
This
rivatizaUon policy has transfoimed the role
:f the state in the economy in almost every
euntry if every contifent from industrialized
'Senior Leciurer oi
c sis in ihe iom of
requircd the change in the policy. The then
l4alaysia Prime lvinister [,,lahathir l,lohamad
a
of the companies.
to
as
l\,4alaysia, Thailand,
lndonesia, and Philippine in Asla, as well as
:conomic policy lor the last twenty frve years.
lprovement
such
capital market is one popular mode of
privatization in l!y'aiaysia which usually
fance alth€ Facu tv oi Economics, Sriwjaya Llniversily
t7
ves '-.;ry largc rompan-os sLlah as
i,,1: eys n Alrlics. Telek.rnl [4ai:vsie, TV3
inl Froror aftoi-rtst otfers. Thsse
companes pay ve.y mpoiiant roe n Bursa
i.ia
lJalays a after prvalizaiof lJorrc 19!5).
Now after more than h,.'o decades of
privatlzation poJicy in many coitntries n the
vr'ord, the impacts o1the po icy have been a
terUe qrcLrnd to study. Privatization studies
ionr weslern countales pfmaily,,4restein and
eastem European countajes are
quite
increased efficiefcy
Pdvatization emLtlates
ertens ve bul quite fe\ry come liom emerging
couilry ike lf4alaysia For example,
Galai,
Jones, Tandon and Vogesang (1991) using
case study apprcach reporled an average fet
fare gains
in 11 of 12
because theoreUcaly it is
debates
a good policy to
improve the finn pedormance whtch is
lackng under state o\4ncEh p. Hor,lever,
privatized
empirical evidences show mlxed resulls. This
companies considered in lheir siLtdy wirich
equa on average 26 perce|i irs cofitpared to
lhe sales of lhe Jirn belore pri\,atized. U.tfg
large sample from many co!ntries arc rnaay
indrcatea that evidences are ifconcluslve and
we
ifdlstdes,
tr4egginson,
Nash and
van
therefore Froie researches on pdvatization
are wairanted and morc empical results are
need to beter understand and expain the
privatization phenom-.nof
Randenborgh (1994) Boubakri and Cosset
(1998) ard DSolsa and N4egginsof (19!9)
report that on average the pedormance of
S0Es is improvino upon prlvatizaton. On the
Dther hafd Haeer {2001), usinq a sample of
Czcch flrnrs, repods that the efllc ency and
the p.ofrlab ty
the ltms decrease
of
lmfired ately fo lovin! privatzation.
Ecke, Eckel and Slngal (1997) reporls
lhat the per{ormance of the Eritsh Aidines
lmproves Lrpon privatlzation Ramamll1i
{1-og7) aid La Poda and Lopez de,Silanes
(199S), usif! a single industry sample, also
repod
tavorabe peTformance upon
p
a
hard, l,ladin and
Parkcr (1995) find that only less than haf
Brltish firms they stud ed pedom better after
bclfg privauzed Newberry ard Polit (1997)
conclude thai BriUsh Eiectriclty Compafy's
(CEGB) restru.turinq afd prvatizalion was il
Vatization. On the other
facl vr'odhwh e, however, it could have
ifto acco!nt ol
fare. Fivalizailon program n
better impemefted takng
pL.rblics vre
beeal
'oae and sali i
jrirtt cf !eli ai l
.,hen a cofirl-.irl.
: :tnailt. no tf'J | !_ .
,Etc fid itght 1., I ,:
, surp us eft af[_
.rmpafy wil! l.: -:
sofle trafsiton countries pr nariy Russia ts
considered fai ed lt.iel is, 1999) Pdvatizait.ir
thrclgh mass and rap d scheftes as a tl.ese
trafsitlof econofiies ol fomer So,/ct LJnian
and Ceniral Easter E!ropea. countries
tumed oler assets to peop e who are lacking
incentves, skllls, and resouices to mafage
the flm ln th s insUtLtiona vaclurn,
prvatizaton can and has led to stagfation
rather thaf to better flnancial res!lts afd
The aim of this study is to eramine thc
effeci
ol
privalization on the
fnafclal and
state oy,/ned
opeiatrng pcdonnances of
efterpdses (SOE) and 10 evaiuate [re
detemlfanls that possibly responsible for ihe
variatior on the perfomtance. Thls study
contribLrtes in many aspects Fi$ty, thls
study employs a sirgle country data rvhich is
more homogefeoirs ihat lead to more
nreanlngfui concuson Secondiy. thls stldy
Jocuses on a soft budgel constratnt theory
introduced by Komai (1980) whlch is used to
assess the phenomenon of unsalisfactory
performances
many state-owned
companles if fomery planned ecorom es of
Eastem Europeaf Countries.
of
,emsetz,
l
theories.
Prom nent theories that support
privalization are notably property ight, public
:ifi
_ranagemeJrl
.
'efce agencY
.'
Prol
fus, the prope6 -!rnclship leads 1o'-fterlrses are i.:l
:_an pivale cnteli I
Other
,
:-
...hr.
e!! ol !teaknes!..
:.rLr
i0 choice thec.
:iat prL ic rnrra::
i trc irn5 w1 I Ll5-. tLllsue
ihef
ovn_
.:irLe ilrm s eijii . -r v.rtriilon a ,.
:nlTepTenC t15
ttr
r
:
^rarimizln!-bure.:
.
r itrc
.
ans. Unler .
-.ds
ic
-iiiess ons,
..
lar!€
il 5
i
fistet and key
!
:
:
diIgenlserrcl '.:',ratizetcit faee.: :
: rrden 01 l]o ilicai , ':
-leia, llmits po i.::
:r
: I elpr :te's alilvh a!
I Pelsonal ag-.: .
'':
: the e|lcrprse t-:rnomc pedom:i
Theory Related to Privatization
Criticisfi of the extstence of stateovr'ned efterpdses {SOEs) is based on
1872
:rossman & Hrft
- ea y beneft lrcaa
:-. one v/il bf sir,
lh-" ji.ii
rr.t. 1980) arE-::
, objective f!n.t.
r(im ze and ii_re a: ,
I
.
tfre so-cailea
,
Driarrlr irirrrii
llt'l
chorcc
.
lnn1
:,.rntrias
., :cklng
' lrallaJc
r,:ftt |l,
:i!!fatlon
:
,
lrbai-"s
:
:
r
policy to
rrlr
ch
s
Nawe!el,
':s!lts. This
:: ratlzatior'l
_: :asults are
:
:
-
{trrlril llle
-.I;nllne the
'-ifc a
atld
:,a irate the
::rs!aforilre
- Tlil5 studY
, ; sty thls
lria
r/hlch
is
|l !ir.
iii rir
:fd :oft Iuilget coiislra ri:
: at'l
the finn would have a high poljtlca cost,
i'ran private enlerprises
whose buderi wriuld be distilbuted viiihin a
Olher schao of thought ihat shares 3
liew of weaknesses ol pub ic ownelsh p i9
the other hand, the cost ol thc baiout
fublc chol.e theory. This lheory suggests
Ilrat publc mara!ers, bureaucrats and
roiticars will use their .ontro af SOES ic
:rrrsue Ureir o!/n inierest ralher th3n the
state frrn's eificency {l.iiska.en 1971).
rrivatization alows prclt naxlmiz ng
:ntrepreneLrls to take the plaoe ci size-
r'rsnUslactory
:iaLe owled
-
lrcessions
I
s nrore !/orihwhie tc lobby
pjbl. ofJiclal foi flfd thai
:'rtsria liinlls polticlans ability tc redirect the
:rtemrlse's acUvites ii a way th:rl promcte
:
rcnomic pedormanie
The soft budllet constrairts lhecry
i::l
. .-.,e oi stale:, : based on
:: .. iirai suppolt
::.1,
riQhi P'Jblic
0n
asirecls
te
ated
to
bLrilCing
hypotfests) The i-.asof
why
nra|;t$.rrs arc able tc do lhart,,,rithort iacing
tlre thfeal of bankr!ptcy
i.
€latcd to
the
second disiofion, the so{t budget cotskalnt.
in any sltuation in wliich the lrms havc
enqaqed rn ur\vlse lNvestrncnts. ty/ill be in
the rntercst of th-A govemment io b?il thc ilmr
out ustng the prblic budgel. The rational ior
this r6les or thc fait that ihe birokruplcy of
wel-deired pclltical grolp, I ke
rrio|s.
On
caf
be
spread over the larfayels, a less organized
larger qror..rp
ln
socieiy, v/ith dversifcd
lnteiests aod preferences. The lhre3i of
is
non crcd blc under public
ovrnership beaa,Jse rh4 polilical kr5s llt,r{rlved
ln closlrg a pLrblicly owfed company is arger
tfrar trc pc itical cost of uslfg iaxpayet
bankruptcy
to bail it orl llhich result,r
il
soil bltd0et constralnts
io
lowei
.jssess
lhe
privatlzation proqrarn n tulal3vsia
ie d ligent search for ways af reducing costs
ri, pe$oralalcnda cladfes the objectives
'the enterprise, afd lead to enhaiced
:
i(inat
matinrizator of ""nrloyitent at the cost ol
rffr.ier.y 3rd polliica preslge lihe emplre
money
.r ratlzation frees efteprlses laom the
rrdef of politca infeieace afd non nadet
'
ve
rlfilclen.l/ und-"f p,rblc o\,/nership This is the
cssence of th s researh that is to app y the
'rira
:
!bl!.i
raximizing bureaLrcrats anC vole nrarimizlng
.. n sler and key
ttr;s study
ft thcory
,s used to
!,,ha
:.ilicans. Under pubric cwneEhip which
:ads to laage subsid es afd oth,"a
:::.j tr.i 'Nore
,
-im i(oflr;r, 1930) PLtb li mirn:!ers
teid tD repod io a oa iL c an lfd pursie
llre'r po ti.al careels rcofpolate t!. tlte
rrL.b
pont of vel.1l cl t]operty rlghls l.:iLr-aj
!1/ll:n :l comfant has ito cl-.ar r-.i lir:
.la maft no rfdlvidualor grorp r: a.e:rlt
speclfed rlht to cain any resdla Laf;llls
or supius eft aiter othcr cla ms arc net ttle
conpaNy v/l be less elficlefl (Aclraf a
Demsetz 1!172t Demsetz, 193E and
Grossman & Har1, 1986) Sncc ro ofe
dearly befelt lrom SOE s effcrert operat on,
no one r',/il be skcfgy motivated to lrold
maragenrent accouftablc for perfornrance,
ience agency problems will not be ieduced.
Ihus, the propedy ri.qht analyss of public
ownelshlp leads to ihe conc usicn that iublic
enlerprises aae l-"ss economcally eillaent
or0ai 1980) argu€s that dstoftions in both
.. objective fLrnction thai nranagels seek to
r(im ze and the constra nts they fac-. is dre
:
the so-aaed ,{i1 buaqet cofslrants
Methodology Research
The subje.t of this research is stale
o!{ned enlerpriscs privaiized thtough p!biic
olfering in Bulsa llalaysa Th€ :rarrrlc
rcpresefis tlre who c po!ulat0n of privatized
SOES tlrat are fully
and padally pivatzeJ
thrcu!h sfare se0e prl.,'aiizirlion (SlP).
Chooslng tris sarple is not viithoLti reason
The frnrs that are priralized in this v{ay
cont nue to genemte post
accoLrnUrr! data thal
issle fi|a:]ciaj afd
a€ di€ctly
comparab e
lti
Deternrifarrls
ofopeiafing.
.... .... ..
tsnu radi
to pre divestiture data. There are 41 slateowned efteiprises listing thef stocks of the
l,4ain Board of Brlrsa [,1alays]a. These flrms
v/ere privatized fron '1983 to 2001. However,
due to the uncompleteness of the data, ofly
30 iirms are managed to include in the
explaln the vadation in flrns'pedonnance
due to privatization, {lve modes (a set of
independent vaiiable regressed on five
sample.
dlfferent dependent variables) are developed.
Data weae collected from
vadous
sorrces, mostly f.om Burca l\4alaysia library,
Dataquest. a commerciai data provider and
rnvestment consultant in Pulau Pifang.
To
investigate factois that could
Based or the previous studles, the
rela{ionships between the dependent
:anrely the shon
SDTA) and the
e
5[4PL).
The s gnli
adepefdent vara
n general or
sLrb
ihe propositlon
ti
budget constraint
n the fofiir of
(
shl
ratio influefces si!
such as, stock issue prospectuses, Annual
Companies' Handbooks, KLSE on disk, and
variables comprising of the perfomance
proxies and ihe independent va ables are
of llflns upon pr
individual annual company repod. Otherdata
ate collected from intetnet sources such as,
l,ralaysia
website
linear in parameters. Hence, the models take
the form ofmuitivariate linear regression. The
iftroduced by Korl
Bursa
{http://iaww bursamalaysia.com)
and
individual companies' websites. Pa( of the
daia on daily siock price is procured from a
commercial data company
Pusat
i.e.
Kompuler Profesional
in Kuantan,
Pahang
and some old and rare stock price data have
to be taken out manually frcm stock daily
diaries in Bursa [.4alaysia- Otherdata such as
financial statement data are supplemented by
P=
d-
BSDTA -
/ILDIA
dependent variables consist of ROS, ROA,
ROE, rcal outp0t (RS) and reai net income
(Nl) while the jndependent vadables
supporis the theor
soft budget
are
Ihe Enpial
STDA, LTDA, SOLD, EIVPL and TOPMGT.
The
aegressed on
independent vaiables
are
these performance measures
and form multivarjate reg.ession models as
F
Constani
SDTA
111
LDTA
+ pTSOLD +
p
E[,4p1+
li
Top[.4cT + e
1.46
SOLD
after privatizaiion. Those iaciors conslst of
P= Average three yearpost privatization
pedomance mitus average thrce year pre
privatization performance (as measured by
LN EMPL
percentage of equity sold at initial offer when
TOPI,4GT
the finns are pdvatized changes in top
management team in the company around
Total Assets. SOLD=
Percentage oi equity sold by govemment.
the time of pdvatizalion, and sharcs allocaied
to employees at ihe oifer These factors arc
E[1PL = Share allocated on employee of the
llrm upon privaiization. ToP[,4GT = A dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 ifthere was
change in K€y top management like CEOS
and the managing direclot and 0 otherwise.
regressed
tem
Liabilities
:
Result And Analizyng
There are several factors identilied in the
Iilerature that are possibiy related to the
pedomance changes between beforc aFd
17t;
004
shod{erm and long{erm debt assumed
before the trnl privatized, debt and
Nl) SLTA = ShonLiabilities : Totai Assets. LLTA= Long-
ROS, ROA, ROE, RS and
lern
crlnl
on the
several proxies of
performance consisting of returns on sales
(ROS), returns on asseis (ROA), retums on
equity (ROE), real sales (RS) and real net
income {Nl) The results of the test for the
lve regressions are prcsented in Table 1.
The signincant independent variables
vary across regressions for each model
When retlrn on sales (ROS) is used as
dependent variable, there are t!!o
independent vanables that are siqnillcant
093
097
Ldt
tl
R?
F value
Prob F
a
Signilicant..t' at
The
19
rlumbe
hEs I
perfomance SL
ernployees
contradicted with
afd
Rapaczynski
difierent insider
pedormancei for
6
discemable reven!
Delerfir
: :::: prcvlder ard
r-:-: -an!l
'::: .- that could
:*: pE.formance
: -:.::s (a set of
on five
=J'::sad
.€:
efe developed.
{:L: siirdies, the
:-t depend,"nt
:; i_: perfonnance
..,]:'i rariables are
:'a€.temodelstake
a€a'regression. The
r$-i ol ROS, RoA,
ad real net income
r:
iffanance measures
:-qEssion models as
.
..
....
..
.lsnurhadi
namely. the short rur debts to total assels
(SDTA) and the employee sharc ownership
subsidles granted
(E[4PL).
enterpises in the loffner Sovlet Unior and
formei communrst counties of Cenfral and
Easterf Europe. Consequently the budget
The slgnlficant
of
SDTA
as
of lims upon privatization. This
an
rm
debt
assumed
and
;iu?ed, debt
i
a: ir t
offer when
changes in lop
rj
aL
te.company around
z,"d shares aLlocated
These factors arc
s
s
:
(ROA), retirms on
(RS) and teal net
oi lhe test for the
;:ntcd in Table
1.
!ariables
'iependeft
-s for each model.
tRCS) is used as
tiere are
hvo
tiai are slgniJlcant
should be hardened in order to discipline the
managemenls
of
state,owned compaties.
Holrever, the qovernment should be caltious
in implementing the policy as fot too hard
because
es
Frydman, Gray, Hessel and
Rapaczynski (2000) roted, the supposedly
suppods the theory of scft budget constrainl
lntroduced by Komai(1980)who argued that
govemment on stale owned enterp ses are
"hard" budgel constraints imposed by a
soft budget conslraints in lhe form of
not very elfective either.
Table
1
The Etnpiical Results of Regresslo, ,Analysls on lhe samp le of 30 privatized
Rosa r
RoA. t
Conslani 44.27 2.26" '19.45
SDTA
21.30 76'* 3 44
111
LDTA
I91 0.95 1.59
146
-0.59 -1.32 -0.27
soLD
0.04
LN EMPL
3.33 1.77- 1.63
0.93
TOPI4GT -0.33 -0.06
,0.75
lims
RoE6 r
RS, I
NF
-2.16* 19.50 1.29 0 51 0 t6 115
0.67 9.18 0.81 2.32 1.07 1.98
0.35 -10 33 -0.91 0 34 0.2C 2.34
42 -1.40 -0 07 -2.40* 0.02
2.30" 155 132 0.78 :.64*- C.18
,0 37 t.72 2 4S* 0.18 0 24 -0.57
2.41.
0
-0 97
R'
0 2590
0.1046
AdjR,
-=i.
;€reral Prcxies of
ai retlrns on sales
the
many
flnding
1
iI+e
- iactors conslst of
by goverfments as
rnaif cause oi the failure for
independent variabe to capturc soft budget
in general or subsidy ln pailicular sLrppods
lhe proposition that, to some extent, soft
budget corstraint or subsidy which manlfesis
in the fom of shod'run liabilities to assets
Gtio inlluences siqnilicantly the perfofinance
'.Jeai variables are
'Pi- end TOPIVGT.
rarables ate
rafts ofoperirling
slgiiii.ant
*-"
t.2115
0.3025
0.3170
0 0834
a.15f2
0.1;41
0.2360
0 0768
0.0845
0 2325
1.6118
1.5282
2 0820
0 1783
0 2185
t
*
at 1%,
Signilicant at 5%, and
The nunber of share allocated to
employees has positive impact on the
perfomance. Surprisingly, this result ls
contradicted with Frydman, Gruy, Hessel,
and Rapaczynski (1998) who uncover that
difierent insider ownershlp has dlfferent
pedomance; for employee owned iirms no
discemable revenue effect could be found.
1028
. Signiiicant at 10%.
l\4oreover, Liplon and Sachs (1990) argued
that dominant ownerchip by employees could
result
in the
perpetuaton
of
existing
inefficiencies. On the other hand, this ilnding
is in lin-" with Djankov and Poh (1998) viho
ilnd that prlvatization to lnsiders do
not
hamper firm restructuring. Fudher suppott
comes from Smlth, Cin and Vodopivec (1997)
111
t.::rrr rir
!r'fr
L!
f' llEriilf!
frnd that
emp
oyee cv/fershi!
s
e55n.iat-"d $lth figher va u-" addea.
Thls st!dy proves lhat lri l,,l;rlays a. ilr-.
empicyee olincrship has posittve relalionslt
l/il
pedonnance imprcvemeft whiah
!
s
rncons stent with evidefces of Frydman et a
(1!l,qil) and Liplon and Sachs (1!90). Oviner
cmployees ln [lalays a are far ffon] ftee rder
0v,/ner ifstead they support the managenreni
iovrard achievin! conrpanys oblectives by
perfaps workirq h3rder or iruttirrq every elfo.t
tcward ccmpany's s!ccess ll seems that lhe
empoyees as the ovJferc are arvare ihey
hale 10 give suppod foi their own beneiits
Long-term debts io total assets
(LDTA) a prcxy to capture soft .hudget
cofstra nts does nct seems to effect
performance change signilicant y. lt is
possibly that lhe solt budget is maily
accumulatng
in the fcnn oi
short term
l:rbilties rathcr than long term debis. The
percentage of share sold (SOI-D) by the
govemment and the ch?nge ir 1op
maragenreft team (TOP[4GT) is not
sigfificaNt e ther.
!1
iir
ii cd
dIe
Then, tlr s
fn.lin! rit:ry sL.rggest that
10 the llovemment reuctance
rnterierc
!,/
to
th the mafagenreft of
the
rs l,l'allanted.
A furnber of stridtes repotl that the
chafges in top managemeut aflect tlre
exierd rn aLrh-:
lhrs fact is rf
1997). The reasons for diflerent ilnding of this
study with those tv/o earlier studies could be
opposite ilndiN!s
explaifed
transition coLItirE.
as
foliows.
ln
fulalaysian
role very nudt
does
ma0agers in ili:
conkol. As a rE:: . :
fot
cccur rlght away when
privalizatlon implemented. lnstead
the
the
clran-qe in top manaqement occuls aroufd
the tim-" the pilalzaUof rnplemefted; either
performance change upon privahzation. lt is
0ther eXpl.
new leaTn to qet ne,,v manaitemeri taleft
old mafagemert Fudhemoie it is
considerng
se
eciing
vr'orth
prcfessiofal
franagement
privatzed
fev/
conlpanies so that the management does nct
have more lTeedom ir rnanaging thlj firm. t
is aso possible th3t the government ndeed
girve up sonrc contrc but fot as much as the
percentagc of o,,litershif sold afd hefce. the
t nres they are govemnteni veterans
The vaiabe SOLD has negative effect
or ROA vr'hich is ifconsisteni wth the public
.hoice theory Pubic cholce theory argues
thai the higher the eq!ity olvnerchip retaifed
{lo!r'er p-"rcentege of equ ty sald) is tlte hlgher
stiil
other word,
intervenes vr'ith
ol the
y
hiqher percentaqe of share sod does noi
reflect lhe contro haad over. This means
Ianage the c0':
bility of the govemmeft's
interJcrence cn the day to day frm's
the
poss
tr i:
ir. | "
nn
)etcise cenarf i.niy lor cefia I
n:rrneT
Tlrc
.
ittiferl]nce n t,i l
r.,t ie?d to I e ,/.: ::
15
Epoded in a
rl
The posll
managemenl team even from outside the
the
the
or li
necessatjy p(laLrra
On the other lr. l
roLtntltes, 0ltr; firanrgcrs gel rJ:
opportunily
!,/h ch at leasi \ail stdve to per{orm betler that
:
sejl l.rgher per:!
one ltear pror or cne year {olowing the
privatizatior l\'loreover, less thaf ha i of the
privalized companies change their top
managemeft position. Ths is a possible
reason \i/hy this variabe does not afleci
compafies as many if foi all the lop
Tnanagemefl in old state owned compan es
comes from govefilmefts sectois and many
prvatiTation
mrnterpads in 1',i
prlvatizatiof the change in top ntanagenent
managemeni shoud be rcplaced wlth the
gor.,emment
managernents i.
perfomance significantly (Badrerls, Boycko,
Shleifer and Tsukafova 1996 and Dyck,
worth considerlnq that in pnvaUzato|, the
in
llalaysia gc!cfirrnterfere,,l,iih d-.r ::
despi|: the faot it,:.
nalority of !Ni.:
conlpanies pad al prvattzatiof is not enoLlah
suqqestif! that cofi.pl-.ie or full Jrrvat zat of
predlcls thal the ntore contnl surrendered bv
does not llive up adeqlrate contrcl
J
peTforntafce
:
tirc io lor{ng er: :
not
It ls quite interestifg ttr.t SOLD does
not affccl ROS PubliD cholce theory v/hich
a goveTnntent iL.lds to esser ooverfrnents
lnterference of the managemeni vr'hich in
tufir !v ll improve efficiefcy. This tns gfificant
flndirg presenls afibiguoUS inte.prelaton:
there is a possibillty tlat the governmenf
opEration if tt,j ,
fo a notse faf,r - SOLD is pre.irli
ihal the assumpliof that lf1] more ihg transler
1,'felshiir the control is sLrrrc tder s noi
,..
:l4PL is also in.r :
:s prcdiltcd, iJ:.-r:
-.npitlca
sirdies
,r!tative eflect
.r ::
tievto|s shtdies r.:
'rrmea iransil arr
:lllopeal r?tiant5 j !
,:u{lies, employae , .
. ih \rorse pefioffl:-
:
do wittt the,r.-
:rrng tie p.ra:t.
r l,i:l
I
I
5 tlai
.r::i
inat
:: : _: ._.i the
: , ercugh
.iilzation
. -i
::at
--:_::iaat
llre
lhe
:r.. , Eoycko,
-: .lr]d Dyck,
: '-.n90{ths
:'-l:: Ccu d be
' i.'lirLaysian
':: .jr agement
:,r- fhen the
i:laad the
: :: - r:i aTound
r:.-:^tel ether
:: , _tillrg the
:, .
:3iofthe
-:
i.ot affeci
--,r::ator
:_
Ll is
:: latiDn. the
: . :l \{lth the
., .n:nt ta ent
: r'"" letier that
-,j i : vJoril
-:- lJislde the
_:. i: tlle top
:.-:r !!rrpanies
!:::-: aild many
::
.
.J:rt're effect
:l- the Public
: :a -:arry aruu€s
: :_r'i p reta ned
:_:: r .ltre hilher
rr /emnlent s
. - day flm's
oitetatan I the fLrilre v,/h af n tLrri|r cad
to a woTse peTformafae Herce tir-. ra,ia[]l-.
SOLD is lrrcdicted to fra,re a pos ljle mpilci
pedoflrafce Thls frdlnq is rnleresirq and
cipaiaton co!d be possbe.
['1e aysia !ovemment poss b]y chooses to
the folow nil
interfere !v1h day lo day operation se ectvely
despite the fact that the government o!/ns the
maiorty of share lt means that the
manalements of SOES have, to sonlc
oxtcnd, i.n autoromy ln managjng SOEs
This fact ls in conkadiction lvith theii
coufterpans in transrton counbes wherc the
opposlte findings lr,ere
lransiuon countries,
I
foufd. ln
the
rectoB cf SOEs piay a
role very much similar as pioduction Line
managels in the compary without niuch
control. As a rcsult the [4a aysian SOES that
sell hiqher percentaqe of share Co not
recessarily pioduce a beLer perfornance.
On the olher hend, the SOES in trafsition
countrles, orce they arc privairzecj, the
ntanagc$ gel much control and freecom to
manage the conpany afd hence. nrole
opportuirlty tc inprove the performance.
Olher euplanation, ['1a aysia gonernmei]t may
erercse cedain degree of i erventi,lr but
.ny ior cedalr policy and in a positive
man|er. Theiefore, the govemmeft
irtErfe.enc! in tlre SOES in [lalaysia does
nol ead to tie v/orse pedonnance cf SOES
:s repoded in a fumber oi lileratrlres.
The posltive effect of the varlable
ls also lncorsistent with the prcdiction
qs predicted based of enomolrs previous
:1,'1PL
-.mprdca studies EIIPL shcu d have
.egative effect on pedomance Again, the
irfevlor.rs studies are nrostiy conducted in
'irnEr rransition colntres cf Eastern
rLrrcpear natiofs. As akeady foLrnd nmany
:i.rdies. employee ollnership vias asso€ialed
'rth v/orse pedormance lt has nrany thlnqs
r do \!tf the macro economic cofdtiof
'rL.{nq the prvatizaiion eTa !'!'heie the
efi!!,!eas \ircr! roi etposed to th,. frce
nai(et such as n tlte /esiem ecofonty As
a resu t. ihe el][ilo,r'ecs d.) irct knor./ !/ )ai ti]
do vrith ther o,rfefsh]!i other tfar hkifE
vith ass!nnll polces thal !,ere
delrimert l! the coiipanies such as ralsng
lrages etc At the end, the empoyee
adlantage
ovr'nership is not beneflcal for the compaf es
but lnstead ,.vorsening the performance of the
c0mpany
When ROE
is used as
dependent
vaiabl€. orr y the change oi top m;Iagemcnl
in the companies has significanl effect on
ROE This res.rlt s consistent with Baberis
Boycko, Shleiter and isukanova (1996) who
arque that qettinq new nanirqers lnew
human capital in their lvords) ifcrcases firm
etfrciercy Dyck {19!7), ln East Genrany
shows that successful privalization hinlle:i on
the frm s ab liiy to replace old and inetficienl
managers lt s argued that few rnaltager wlil
ifto ihe mmp.rry or .l
least tlrere is lr€sh nevl talenl comlng.
Hence. the change h top frar]agrrnent lcanr
bring rew expedise
or members oiboard of dlrectors ,,viil l-.ad tc
a bettei pefornatce for the companes at
east in llte shcn-turt because ncw comei
almosl a y/ays v/art io sholr' h s/her
performai.e lllhen the dependeil lariab e
s substtlrted by rea sale, the variable 50LD
and Ln EI,IPL er-" statisticir y s lnificant {]f
couise. the signiflcanl effect of S0LD:nd
Ln
EltlPL
of
ROE has
tle
slmliar
explaraticn wrth thc prev ous nrode
Flnally wher Tea |e1 tncorne s useq
as d-apend-.fL vaiable no one irdcplfdclt
varabie is siq|illcant This res!l n(lical-"s
tlrat the data do noi suppcd the nrodel and
herce. conbinations
of al
ifiepefdent
varlabies are not able to exp a n the vaiation
if rca nei inconre lf shoi ort of five
ifiependenl rariables. only ong term debt to
toia assets has fe,,,er been statlstcally
slg:r faani ior a difereni nrodels tifdcates
l-iLl
D-1,t ,.- otOo-d
o
.. .... sftdraci
that lona-ternt debl to tolal assets does fot
have any effects on the pedomtafce of ftnns
upon plvalizalion.
The variations on the post privaUzation
pedormance
state-owned efteaprises
could be explained by several factorc. When
the Return on sales used as the dependent
vadable, the explanatory variables are Shod
term Debt to Total Asset and Ln Employe-"]
when Return on Asset used as ihe
dependent variable, fraction of ownership
sold and Ln Employee; when Retum on
of
Equity used as dependent variable, top
managemenl change, real sales, fEction sold
and Ln employee; and when Net lrcome
used as dependent vadable, none is
significant
Lessons Fr'
Demsetz, Harold (1988) The Theory of the
Firm Revisited, Jauntal af Law.
Economics axl Oryanjzatjatl 4, j4j
Workng Pat
.rydman,
Work?
Djankov, Simeon and cerhard pohl (2000).
Restructuring
Large Firms in
Slovania. l{orkiig papel, World Bank
of
D'Souza, Juliet and William L. l/eoqinson
(1999). The Financial and Operating
of
privatized Firms
Performance
during the 1990s. Jaunal of Finance
trydman, Roman
Hessel, an
(2000)
54, n0.4, 1397-1438.
Constaints
D'Souza, Juliet, William L. fi,legginson and
on
Pedomancei Evidence
Chalacteristics
A. and Harold Demsetz
(1972). Production, lnfomation Costs
and Economic Organization, Anetican
Econanic Review 62,777 -795.
Barberis, Nicholas, Maxim Boycko, Andrei
Shleifer, Natalia Tsukanova (,1996).
How Does
Privatization Work?
Eviderce from the Russion Shops.
Journal of Political Econony,
V
.104.
Boubaki, Narjess and Jean-Claude Cosset
{1998). The Financial and Operating
Pedonnance of Newiy Privatized
Fjrms: Evidence frcm Developing
Counlties, Jaumal of Finance, 53, no.
3, 1081-1110.
Boycko, Maxim, Andrei Shleifer and Robert
W. Vishny (1996).
Theory of
A
Privatization, Econanic Jaunal, 1A6,
309-319
Th
Ownership
Economies,
Applied Ea
and
Alchian, Amen
Th
Ownership (
in the Tran!
PapeLWarl,
Robe,1 Nash i2005). Effect of
lnstitutional
Fim specific
Refetences
Romar
Hessel, a.
(1ee8). w
161.
NYU, New
poslprivatization
frcm
Galal,
A., L.
Y
Jor
Developed Countries. Joumal of
Vogelsang
Cceomte Finance
Consequcnc
1
1, 747-766.
Enterprises
Dyck, Alexande. (1997). Privatization in East
Germany: management Seiection and
Economic Transition, Amedcan
Economic Review 87, 565 597.
Earle, John
S. and Saut Estrin
(1998).
Pdvalizatiof , Competition, and Budget
Constraintsi Disciplining EnteD ses in
Russia, Warking papeL Wold Bank.
Eckel, Catherine, Doug Eckel, and Vijay
Singal (1997). Pdvaiization
and
Efficiency: lndustry Effect of the Sale
of British Airways, Joumal ol F/itancla/
Ecananics 43,275-298.
Frydmar, Roman, Cheryl cray, Marek
Hessel, afd AndEej Rapaczynski
(1996). Pdvate Ownership and
Corporate Performancei Some
Press.
Grossman, Satlol(
(1986). The
Ownership: ,
Lateral lnteg
Econony
94
Harper, Jocl T (21
Pivatization
Pei'formance
Journal of Fi
No 1, 119 13
Haeer, Joel T. (20
Pivalized
I
Republic, "i
Finance 26 i,
Jonro, K. S. (19951
Malaysia
Re
DEl.
li.ory
-E
of the
z af Law.
,'.'--
n
aer
3
Flms
Nlegginson
and Operating
Privaiized Firms
La
Constraints
Lbgginson and
-Yijence
i€s
from
JournaL of
11.7 47.766.
Hvatization in East
nent Seiectron and
American
ttiln,
ti
Estrin (1998).
efihl], and Budget
nifu Enierprises in
w.
Waid Bank.
Er*el. afd Vijay
hivatizaton and
Efiect of the Sa{e
lorJnal of Fhancial
a€.
!"',1 Gray, llarek
lz€j
Rapaczynski
O{ne6hip and
rmancet some
and Hard
in the
Budget
Transition
Shortage, t4lod
ISSN:1412-0437
{FoRUM DOSEN EKONOMI MANAJEMEN dan AKUNTANSI}
Volume 8 Norho. 2. November 2008
LEMBAGA PENERBIT FAKULTAS EKONOMI
UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH PALEMBANG
FORDETA
Akuntansi )
Nomor 2, November2oo8
( Forum Dosen Ekonomi llianajem€n dan
Volume 8
DEWAN REDAKSI
Pimpinan umum / Penanggung Jawab / Pimpinan Redaksi
Sunadi
Wakll Ketua Penyunting
Wani Fitdah
Dewan Penyunting
Munrokkhim (Universitas lslam lndonesia)
Edy Suardi Hanid {Universits lslafl lndonesia]
Bambang Widagdo (Univ€Eitas Muhammadiyah Malang)
Hj. Nurlina lamizl (Univelsitas Sriwijaya)
Diai Natalisa {Univesitas Sriwijaya)
lmlon Zahi ( Universitas Srilyijaya )
SaadahSiddik (tlniyeGitas Muhammadiyah Palembang)
Fatimah (UniveEihs Muhammadiyah Pal€mbang)
Mustola lradi Batubara (UniveBitas Muhammadiyah Palembang)
lbrahim Rachman (Universitas Muhammadiyah Pdembary)
Diah Isnaini Asiati (UnlveBitas Muhammadiyah Palembang)
P€nyunling Pdsksana
Belliwati Kosim
Hj. Khotitah
Amidi
Betri
Mizan
Rsdaksi Pdaksana
Fauziah
FORDEMA dlterbltkan s€jak 2001. dengan trekuens' 2 kalisetahun.
Redaksi menorima karangan ilrniah tentang hasil"hasil penelitian,
Survey, dan telaah pustaka yang erat hubungannya dengan bidang Ekonomi.
Alanat Rodaksi I Psnerbit :
Fakultas Ekonomi univeEitas l\,iuhammadiyah Palembang
Jl. Jend. A. Yani 13 Ulu Palembang (30263)
Telp (0711) 51 1433 {huntlrq} Fa( (071 1} 518018
F0
Pengantar Redaksi
Pembaca Fordema yang lerhormal
(Forur
Assa amu a ark!m Wr. \,\lb.
nir.:: r:.1
i::c,f
Ahamduillah Puli syukur kehad rat A alr SWT atas
::ah d berikan
kepada klta semua sehingga Jurna F0RDEtr"4A dapal kembali hadir d tergalr
pembaca
Pada ed si ifi, Fordema menyal kan beberapa ad kel baik pene tr3n aan ,ron pene lian
dl b dang manalemen dan slud pembangunan . seperli lsnurhadi tentan! Determ nants 0f
operating Performance 0f [/alaysan State Owned Enterprses After Prvatzaton Barnbang
Widagdo dan Sugiarti. tentang, Model Pemberdayaan Ke uarga M sk n di W ayah Sub Urban
Daam PerspektifGender, Hafta Wazol tentang Pengaruh PDRB,Jumlah Penduduk dan Jum ah
Kunlungan Pasen Terhadap Penerimaan Retrlbus Peayanan Kesehatan (S!atu Kasus pada
Dnas Kesehatan Prov. Sumatera Seatan) R. lvulyo Hendarto dan Hastarini Dwi Atmanti
Kajian Terhadap Pernbentukan Daerah Olonom Earu dan bu Kota Daerah Purwadi Hubungan
Penddikan Dar Peatthan Serta Kompensasi Terhadap Kinerja Anggota Satuan Pois Pamong
Prala Kota Palembang Didik Susetyo tentang, Analiss DanaAlokasi um!m Dan Upaya Fiska
P.:ktk Akuntaasi c::: :
0lan PutriMaharafr da
i,lodel PemberCay.a-'=
Bambang Wldrgdo
Pefgaruh FDR.a
Deaerimaea
Jr-:_
(esehataf Prov
Hatt! Wa2ol
S"..i,
Reftb-:
l(atian Terhadap
Kota Palembang
Daarn bidang Akunlans menyalkan hasil peneitian Dian Putri lvaharani dan
Sa'adah, tentang Praktik Akuntans Pada Perusahaan Skala l\,,lenengah D Kota Paembang,
Weily lenlang Penghaigaan, Perlaku Pimpinan Pefaku Tim Keia Komtmen orcanisasl.
Efesiens Perubahaan Dan Orientas Kerjasama Terhadap Komitmen Program Serla
Pengaruhnya Terhadap Kinerja Pimpifan, Sapta Dyah Puspjtarini dan Antariksa
Budileksmana tentang Pengaruh Corpante Saciai Respanslb/iity Terhadap Nila Perusahaan
Dengan Kepem likan lvlanajemen Dan T pe ndustri Sebagai Varabel Pemoderas Karyanti dan
Suryo Pratolo, tentang Pengaruh Kualitas Auditor Kondis Keuangan Perusahaan Op n Aud I
Tahun Sebelumnya Perlunbuhan Perlsahaan Daf Debl Det'ault Terhadap Kemungk nan
Penermaan 0p nlAud I Gaing Cancern
Tiada gadng yang tak retak berbaga kritk dai saran yang membangln selalu kam
harapkar Ter ma kasih dan semoga arukel alr kel ni bermanfaat bagi pembaca semua
WassalamLr aakLrm Wr Wh
Paembang, November 2008
d:.
::
!e-:;-
R.lr!lyo Hendartc
Penghargaair Per
ft-
e.,:
EiesleisiPerubaf-e- l;
Sena Pergafuhfya :'.:
lebrrnifarts 0i 0!e.:: Entenrrses After
Pr,-,
lsnurhadi
l:- _:
s :r'
NubufOan Pendid
ancgota sallan Fr
Pu
adi
t-engaruh Co,?orale
-ia: :
(epemilkan
Sapta Dyah
[iana]er€-,
Puspitrri.i I
Redaksi
Ana lsrs Dana Alokas
_-.
Didit Susetyo
'1 Pergaruh Kualitas Aur:rSebelumnya, PertwrLr--:
\emungkinan Pener n::Karyanti dan Suryo Praic
F@R&ffiffiA
( Forum oosen Ekonomi Manajemen dan Akuntansi )
Volume Nomor 2, November 2008
I
-r-a : : ::_ :l leTikan
r:-: .:- : .:_::"baca
:ra: :_ :: :_ :arelitan
ri =-- . l:.- -a'ts 0f
:E :- - -:::_ 3ambang
Hs, : . =.:- :-b Jioan
-rr :_ ::-:-r,. ::. Jum ah
:saa:-: _ : -::' '::sLls Pada
d-- -:s-i1l
DAFTAR ISI
Dwi Atmanti
:--_ tirwadi Hubungan
,-!g:- :=j:' 'olls Pamong
rs --,- ler LlPaYa Fiska
4.
D€- tJtri Maharani dan
:-€.,::- I (ora Palembang,
5.
..a- trnen
Organ Sasi
{a- irien Program Seda
\Jsphanni dan Antariksa
-9.iadap Nia Perusahaaf
::€ ::ncCerasr Karyanti dan
_aa' ra'L.rsahaai 0pni Audit
i'
a,-. -.-aaap
6.
l\4odel Pemberdayaan Xeluarga [,4iskii di Wilayah Sub Urban Da]amPe6peklif Gender
11s,130
114
Pengaruh PDRB,Jumlah Penduduk dan Jumlah Kunjungan Pasien Terhadap
Penedmaan Relribusi Pelayanan Kesehatan (Suat! Kasus Pada Dinas
(esehatan Prov. Sumatera Se atan)
Hatta Wazol
131
Kajian Terhadap Pernbentukan Daerah olonom Baru dan lbuKota Daerah
R. Mulyo Hendarto dan Hastarini owi,qtrnanti
145 - 152
Penghargaai, Peilaku Pmpinan, perilaku Tim Kerja, Komitmen organisasi,
Efesiensi Perubahaan Daf oientas Ketasama Terhadap KomitTen Program
Serta Pengaruhnya Terhadap Kinerla Pimpinan
Welly
153-172
Detefninants Of operaling Performance 0f ilalaysian State-owned
Enterpises After Pivalizatio n
173 182
-144
lsnufiadi
Kemungkinan
;,_j -a-::-!un
99
Bambang lrvidagdo dan Sugiarti
E
,:.e
Praklik Ak!nlansiPada Perusahaai Skala l4enengah DiKola Palembang
Dian Putri Maharani dan Sa'adah
Hubungan Pendidkan Dan Pelatihan Serta Kompensasi Terhadap Kineia
Anggota Satuan PolisiPamong Praja Kota Piiembang
se a u kami
183 - 196
Pulwadi
',:!ember 2008
Pengaruh Copolrle Socla/ Responsibi,ryTerhadap Nilai Perusahaan Dengan
Kepemilikan l\,4anajemen Dan Ipe lndusti Sebagai Vaiabel Pemoderasi
Sapta Dyah Puspitarini dan Antadksa Budileksmana
197 210
Analisis Dana Alokasl Umum Dan Upaya Fiskal Kola Palernbang
211
Redaksi
224
Didik Susetyo
10
Pengar!h Kualilas Aud lor, Kondisi (euangan Perusahaan, 0piniAudiiTahun
Sebelumnya, Pertumbuhan Perusahaan Dan Debl Defa//l Terhadap
Kemungkinan Penerirnaan Opini Audit Goirg Concern
Karyanti dan Suryo Pratolo
k
rl
I
t
225 - 242
Wdly
_ -:-ae 0f
DETERMINANTS OF APERATING PERFARMANCE OF
MALAYSIAN STATE.OWNED EAIIERPRiSES AFISR PRIVATIZATION
lsnurhadir
ln A
4bsract
P vatizalion is the transfetung af ownership frcm state lo pivate ownerchip expeclinq Utat the
la -htu\Lat dno ur sa/, clar Io4 peiot na. ce ot sale.awned entd4.|hses cin be th1p191 s,i. Tp15
study focuses on the evalualion of apenting pefornances of the newly privatjzed finns which
lssued shares it capital mafuet. The research was ca ed out by investigating the opeftting
peiornance of lhe privatized finns aftet ptivalizatian and factots that are responsible on 1e
post-pivatizatian petonnance. The peformance were sfi/died throrgh stai/arcal analysis of lhe
dependency af several independenl vaiahles nanely peiormance pmxjes i.e. soft budget
canslraint, lraction of sharc sald, share allocaled to emplayee and top nanagemen! tcan cltaige
an dependent variables i.e. retun on sa/es (RoS.J, returil ol? assets_{RoA) and rctL lt on equily
(RAq, real sale antl net incane. The results shawed lhat the lactors thal arc rcsfionshle o; the
posl'pivalizatbn peionnance diffet depending on tt\e pefornance proxies. The factors
rcsponsible for ROS are lhe shaftlenn debt la Iolal asset and the share allocated to enptoyee,
the fftction af sharc sold and the share allocated to employee arc responsible for ROA, while ke
ROE is affecled by ke tap managenent lean change only. fhe real sale is iflue ced bv the
ftactian of sharc sotd and the share allocated to enplayee, while neI pnht is not affe.tcd by any
t'actat considered in this study.
Kewards: Pivalization, Stale Owned Enterpises
Privatization as a policy of transfening
nations such as the United Kingdom, France,
United States, and Japan
emergin0
.wnership from state to private or public
:ssets has been ofe of lhe most popular
coLrntdes
l.{argaret Thatchels conseryative
lovemment which came to rule United
Chile, Brazil, and i\,{exico in Laiin America,
Malaysia as one
thc leading
eConomy from eme€ing ntarket has embrace
privatization since eady 1980. The generally
ol
{ingdom in 1979 is regarded as ihe pioneer
Jf the modem privatization programs. The
rolicy has been adopted by many countdes
I which govemmenls frcm various politicai
lackluster performance and unsatisfactory of
staie-owned efiterprises iogethet with
rackgrounds enthusiastically sold state,
lwned erteprises (SOES, hereafter) to
significant
-.dvate investorc expectifg
economic
F
recession
ffst
his
announced
government's
privatization policy in 1983. lssuinq shares in
This
rivatizaUon policy has transfoimed the role
:f the state in the economy in almost every
euntry if every contifent from industrialized
'Senior Leciurer oi
c sis in ihe iom of
requircd the change in the policy. The then
l4alaysia Prime lvinister [,,lahathir l,lohamad
a
of the companies.
to
as
l\,4alaysia, Thailand,
lndonesia, and Philippine in Asla, as well as
:conomic policy lor the last twenty frve years.
lprovement
such
capital market is one popular mode of
privatization in l!y'aiaysia which usually
fance alth€ Facu tv oi Economics, Sriwjaya Llniversily
t7
ves '-.;ry largc rompan-os sLlah as
i,,1: eys n Alrlics. Telek.rnl [4ai:vsie, TV3
inl Froror aftoi-rtst otfers. Thsse
companes pay ve.y mpoiiant roe n Bursa
i.ia
lJalays a after prvalizaiof lJorrc 19!5).
Now after more than h,.'o decades of
privatlzation poJicy in many coitntries n the
vr'ord, the impacts o1the po icy have been a
terUe qrcLrnd to study. Privatization studies
ionr weslern countales pfmaily,,4restein and
eastem European countajes are
quite
increased efficiefcy
Pdvatization emLtlates
ertens ve bul quite fe\ry come liom emerging
couilry ike lf4alaysia For example,
Galai,
Jones, Tandon and Vogesang (1991) using
case study apprcach reporled an average fet
fare gains
in 11 of 12
because theoreUcaly it is
debates
a good policy to
improve the finn pedormance whtch is
lackng under state o\4ncEh p. Hor,lever,
privatized
empirical evidences show mlxed resulls. This
companies considered in lheir siLtdy wirich
equa on average 26 perce|i irs cofitpared to
lhe sales of lhe Jirn belore pri\,atized. U.tfg
large sample from many co!ntries arc rnaay
indrcatea that evidences are ifconcluslve and
we
ifdlstdes,
tr4egginson,
Nash and
van
therefore Froie researches on pdvatization
are wairanted and morc empical results are
need to beter understand and expain the
privatization phenom-.nof
Randenborgh (1994) Boubakri and Cosset
(1998) ard DSolsa and N4egginsof (19!9)
report that on average the pedormance of
S0Es is improvino upon prlvatizaton. On the
Dther hafd Haeer {2001), usinq a sample of
Czcch flrnrs, repods that the efllc ency and
the p.ofrlab ty
the ltms decrease
of
lmfired ately fo lovin! privatzation.
Ecke, Eckel and Slngal (1997) reporls
lhat the per{ormance of the Eritsh Aidines
lmproves Lrpon privatlzation Ramamll1i
{1-og7) aid La Poda and Lopez de,Silanes
(199S), usif! a single industry sample, also
repod
tavorabe peTformance upon
p
a
hard, l,ladin and
Parkcr (1995) find that only less than haf
Brltish firms they stud ed pedom better after
bclfg privauzed Newberry ard Polit (1997)
conclude thai BriUsh Eiectriclty Compafy's
(CEGB) restru.turinq afd prvatizalion was il
Vatization. On the other
facl vr'odhwh e, however, it could have
ifto acco!nt ol
fare. Fivalizailon program n
better impemefted takng
pL.rblics vre
beeal
'oae and sali i
jrirtt cf !eli ai l
.,hen a cofirl-.irl.
: :tnailt. no tf'J | !_ .
,Etc fid itght 1., I ,:
, surp us eft af[_
.rmpafy wil! l.: -:
sofle trafsiton countries pr nariy Russia ts
considered fai ed lt.iel is, 1999) Pdvatizait.ir
thrclgh mass and rap d scheftes as a tl.ese
trafsitlof econofiies ol fomer So,/ct LJnian
and Ceniral Easter E!ropea. countries
tumed oler assets to peop e who are lacking
incentves, skllls, and resouices to mafage
the flm ln th s insUtLtiona vaclurn,
prvatizaton can and has led to stagfation
rather thaf to better flnancial res!lts afd
The aim of this study is to eramine thc
effeci
ol
privalization on the
fnafclal and
state oy,/ned
opeiatrng pcdonnances of
efterpdses (SOE) and 10 evaiuate [re
detemlfanls that possibly responsible for ihe
variatior on the perfomtance. Thls study
contribLrtes in many aspects Fi$ty, thls
study employs a sirgle country data rvhich is
more homogefeoirs ihat lead to more
nreanlngfui concuson Secondiy. thls stldy
Jocuses on a soft budgel constratnt theory
introduced by Komai (1980) whlch is used to
assess the phenomenon of unsalisfactory
performances
many state-owned
companles if fomery planned ecorom es of
Eastem Europeaf Countries.
of
,emsetz,
l
theories.
Prom nent theories that support
privalization are notably property ight, public
:ifi
_ranagemeJrl
.
'efce agencY
.'
Prol
fus, the prope6 -!rnclship leads 1o'-fterlrses are i.:l
:_an pivale cnteli I
Other
,
:-
...hr.
e!! ol !teaknes!..
:.rLr
i0 choice thec.
:iat prL ic rnrra::
i trc irn5 w1 I Ll5-. tLllsue
ihef
ovn_
.:irLe ilrm s eijii . -r v.rtriilon a ,.
:nlTepTenC t15
ttr
r
:
^rarimizln!-bure.:
.
r itrc
.
ans. Unler .
-.ds
ic
-iiiess ons,
..
lar!€
il 5
i
fistet and key
!
:
:
diIgenlserrcl '.:',ratizetcit faee.: :
: rrden 01 l]o ilicai , ':
-leia, llmits po i.::
:r
: I elpr :te's alilvh a!
I Pelsonal ag-.: .
'':
: the e|lcrprse t-:rnomc pedom:i
Theory Related to Privatization
Criticisfi of the extstence of stateovr'ned efterpdses {SOEs) is based on
1872
:rossman & Hrft
- ea y beneft lrcaa
:-. one v/il bf sir,
lh-" ji.ii
rr.t. 1980) arE-::
, objective f!n.t.
r(im ze and ii_re a: ,
I
.
tfre so-cailea
,
Driarrlr irirrrii
llt'l
chorcc
.
lnn1
:,.rntrias
., :cklng
' lrallaJc
r,:ftt |l,
:i!!fatlon
:
,
lrbai-"s
:
:
r
policy to
rrlr
ch
s
Nawe!el,
':s!lts. This
:: ratlzatior'l
_: :asults are
:
:
-
{trrlril llle
-.I;nllne the
'-ifc a
atld
:,a irate the
::rs!aforilre
- Tlil5 studY
, ; sty thls
lria
r/hlch
is
|l !ir.
iii rir
:fd :oft Iuilget coiislra ri:
: at'l
the finn would have a high poljtlca cost,
i'ran private enlerprises
whose buderi wriuld be distilbuted viiihin a
Olher schao of thought ihat shares 3
liew of weaknesses ol pub ic ownelsh p i9
the other hand, the cost ol thc baiout
fublc chol.e theory. This lheory suggests
Ilrat publc mara!ers, bureaucrats and
roiticars will use their .ontro af SOES ic
:rrrsue Ureir o!/n inierest ralher th3n the
state frrn's eificency {l.iiska.en 1971).
rrivatization alows prclt naxlmiz ng
:ntrepreneLrls to take the plaoe ci size-
r'rsnUslactory
:iaLe owled
-
lrcessions
I
s nrore !/orihwhie tc lobby
pjbl. ofJiclal foi flfd thai
:'rtsria liinlls polticlans ability tc redirect the
:rtemrlse's acUvites ii a way th:rl promcte
:
rcnomic pedormanie
The soft budllet constrairts lhecry
i::l
. .-.,e oi stale:, : based on
:: .. iirai suppolt
::.1,
riQhi P'Jblic
0n
asirecls
te
ated
to
bLrilCing
hypotfests) The i-.asof
why
nra|;t$.rrs arc able tc do lhart,,,rithort iacing
tlre thfeal of bankr!ptcy
i.
€latcd to
the
second disiofion, the so{t budget cotskalnt.
in any sltuation in wliich the lrms havc
enqaqed rn ur\vlse lNvestrncnts. ty/ill be in
the rntercst of th-A govemment io b?il thc ilmr
out ustng the prblic budgel. The rational ior
this r6les or thc fait that ihe birokruplcy of
wel-deired pclltical grolp, I ke
rrio|s.
On
caf
be
spread over the larfayels, a less organized
larger qror..rp
ln
socieiy, v/ith dversifcd
lnteiests aod preferences. The lhre3i of
is
non crcd blc under public
ovrnership beaa,Jse rh4 polilical kr5s llt,r{rlved
ln closlrg a pLrblicly owfed company is arger
tfrar trc pc itical cost of uslfg iaxpayet
bankruptcy
to bail it orl llhich result,r
il
soil bltd0et constralnts
io
lowei
.jssess
lhe
privatlzation proqrarn n tulal3vsia
ie d ligent search for ways af reducing costs
ri, pe$oralalcnda cladfes the objectives
'the enterprise, afd lead to enhaiced
:
i(inat
matinrizator of ""nrloyitent at the cost ol
rffr.ier.y 3rd polliica preslge lihe emplre
money
.r ratlzation frees efteprlses laom the
rrdef of politca infeieace afd non nadet
'
ve
rlfilclen.l/ und-"f p,rblc o\,/nership This is the
cssence of th s researh that is to app y the
'rira
:
!bl!.i
raximizing bureaLrcrats anC vole nrarimizlng
.. n sler and key
ttr;s study
ft thcory
,s used to
!,,ha
:.ilicans. Under pubric cwneEhip which
:ads to laage subsid es afd oth,"a
:::.j tr.i 'Nore
,
-im i(oflr;r, 1930) PLtb li mirn:!ers
teid tD repod io a oa iL c an lfd pursie
llre'r po ti.al careels rcofpolate t!. tlte
rrL.b
pont of vel.1l cl t]operty rlghls l.:iLr-aj
!1/ll:n :l comfant has ito cl-.ar r-.i lir:
.la maft no rfdlvidualor grorp r: a.e:rlt
speclfed rlht to cain any resdla Laf;llls
or supius eft aiter othcr cla ms arc net ttle
conpaNy v/l be less elficlefl (Aclraf a
Demsetz 1!172t Demsetz, 193E and
Grossman & Har1, 1986) Sncc ro ofe
dearly befelt lrom SOE s effcrert operat on,
no one r',/il be skcfgy motivated to lrold
maragenrent accouftablc for perfornrance,
ience agency problems will not be ieduced.
Ihus, the propedy ri.qht analyss of public
ownelshlp leads to ihe conc usicn that iublic
enlerprises aae l-"ss economcally eillaent
or0ai 1980) argu€s that dstoftions in both
.. objective fLrnction thai nranagels seek to
r(im ze and the constra nts they fac-. is dre
:
the so-aaed ,{i1 buaqet cofslrants
Methodology Research
The subje.t of this research is stale
o!{ned enlerpriscs privaiized thtough p!biic
olfering in Bulsa llalaysa Th€ :rarrrlc
rcpresefis tlre who c po!ulat0n of privatized
SOES tlrat are fully
and padally pivatzeJ
thrcu!h sfare se0e prl.,'aiizirlion (SlP).
Chooslng tris sarple is not viithoLti reason
The frnrs that are priralized in this v{ay
cont nue to genemte post
accoLrnUrr! data thal
issle fi|a:]ciaj afd
a€ di€ctly
comparab e
lti
Deternrifarrls
ofopeiafing.
.... .... ..
tsnu radi
to pre divestiture data. There are 41 slateowned efteiprises listing thef stocks of the
l,4ain Board of Brlrsa [,1alays]a. These flrms
v/ere privatized fron '1983 to 2001. However,
due to the uncompleteness of the data, ofly
30 iirms are managed to include in the
explaln the vadation in flrns'pedonnance
due to privatization, {lve modes (a set of
independent vaiiable regressed on five
sample.
dlfferent dependent variables) are developed.
Data weae collected from
vadous
sorrces, mostly f.om Burca l\4alaysia library,
Dataquest. a commerciai data provider and
rnvestment consultant in Pulau Pifang.
To
investigate factois that could
Based or the previous studles, the
rela{ionships between the dependent
:anrely the shon
SDTA) and the
e
5[4PL).
The s gnli
adepefdent vara
n general or
sLrb
ihe propositlon
ti
budget constraint
n the fofiir of
(
shl
ratio influefces si!
such as, stock issue prospectuses, Annual
Companies' Handbooks, KLSE on disk, and
variables comprising of the perfomance
proxies and ihe independent va ables are
of llflns upon pr
individual annual company repod. Otherdata
ate collected from intetnet sources such as,
l,ralaysia
website
linear in parameters. Hence, the models take
the form ofmuitivariate linear regression. The
iftroduced by Korl
Bursa
{http://iaww bursamalaysia.com)
and
individual companies' websites. Pa( of the
daia on daily siock price is procured from a
commercial data company
Pusat
i.e.
Kompuler Profesional
in Kuantan,
Pahang
and some old and rare stock price data have
to be taken out manually frcm stock daily
diaries in Bursa [.4alaysia- Otherdata such as
financial statement data are supplemented by
P=
d-
BSDTA -
/ILDIA
dependent variables consist of ROS, ROA,
ROE, rcal outp0t (RS) and reai net income
(Nl) while the jndependent vadables
supporis the theor
soft budget
are
Ihe Enpial
STDA, LTDA, SOLD, EIVPL and TOPMGT.
The
aegressed on
independent vaiables
are
these performance measures
and form multivarjate reg.ession models as
F
Constani
SDTA
111
LDTA
+ pTSOLD +
p
E[,4p1+
li
Top[.4cT + e
1.46
SOLD
after privatizaiion. Those iaciors conslst of
P= Average three yearpost privatization
pedomance mitus average thrce year pre
privatization performance (as measured by
LN EMPL
percentage of equity sold at initial offer when
TOPI,4GT
the finns are pdvatized changes in top
management team in the company around
Total Assets. SOLD=
Percentage oi equity sold by govemment.
the time of pdvatizalion, and sharcs allocaied
to employees at ihe oifer These factors arc
E[1PL = Share allocated on employee of the
llrm upon privaiization. ToP[,4GT = A dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 ifthere was
change in K€y top management like CEOS
and the managing direclot and 0 otherwise.
regressed
tem
Liabilities
:
Result And Analizyng
There are several factors identilied in the
Iilerature that are possibiy related to the
pedomance changes between beforc aFd
17t;
004
shod{erm and long{erm debt assumed
before the trnl privatized, debt and
Nl) SLTA = ShonLiabilities : Totai Assets. LLTA= Long-
ROS, ROA, ROE, RS and
lern
crlnl
on the
several proxies of
performance consisting of returns on sales
(ROS), returns on asseis (ROA), retums on
equity (ROE), real sales (RS) and real net
income {Nl) The results of the test for the
lve regressions are prcsented in Table 1.
The signincant independent variables
vary across regressions for each model
When retlrn on sales (ROS) is used as
dependent variable, there are t!!o
independent vanables that are siqnillcant
093
097
Ldt
tl
R?
F value
Prob F
a
Signilicant..t' at
The
19
rlumbe
hEs I
perfomance SL
ernployees
contradicted with
afd
Rapaczynski
difierent insider
pedormancei for
6
discemable reven!
Delerfir
: :::: prcvlder ard
r-:-: -an!l
'::: .- that could
:*: pE.formance
: -:.::s (a set of
on five
=J'::sad
.€:
efe developed.
{:L: siirdies, the
:-t depend,"nt
:; i_: perfonnance
..,]:'i rariables are
:'a€.temodelstake
a€a'regression. The
r$-i ol ROS, RoA,
ad real net income
r:
iffanance measures
:-qEssion models as
.
..
....
..
.lsnurhadi
namely. the short rur debts to total assels
(SDTA) and the employee sharc ownership
subsidles granted
(E[4PL).
enterpises in the loffner Sovlet Unior and
formei communrst counties of Cenfral and
Easterf Europe. Consequently the budget
The slgnlficant
of
SDTA
as
of lims upon privatization. This
an
rm
debt
assumed
and
;iu?ed, debt
i
a: ir t
offer when
changes in lop
rj
aL
te.company around
z,"d shares aLlocated
These factors arc
s
s
:
(ROA), retirms on
(RS) and teal net
oi lhe test for the
;:ntcd in Table
1.
!ariables
'iependeft
-s for each model.
tRCS) is used as
tiere are
hvo
tiai are slgniJlcant
should be hardened in order to discipline the
managemenls
of
state,owned compaties.
Holrever, the qovernment should be caltious
in implementing the policy as fot too hard
because
es
Frydman, Gray, Hessel and
Rapaczynski (2000) roted, the supposedly
suppods the theory of scft budget constrainl
lntroduced by Komai(1980)who argued that
govemment on stale owned enterp ses are
"hard" budgel constraints imposed by a
soft budget conslraints in lhe form of
not very elfective either.
Table
1
The Etnpiical Results of Regresslo, ,Analysls on lhe samp le of 30 privatized
Rosa r
RoA. t
Conslani 44.27 2.26" '19.45
SDTA
21.30 76'* 3 44
111
LDTA
I91 0.95 1.59
146
-0.59 -1.32 -0.27
soLD
0.04
LN EMPL
3.33 1.77- 1.63
0.93
TOPI4GT -0.33 -0.06
,0.75
lims
RoE6 r
RS, I
NF
-2.16* 19.50 1.29 0 51 0 t6 115
0.67 9.18 0.81 2.32 1.07 1.98
0.35 -10 33 -0.91 0 34 0.2C 2.34
42 -1.40 -0 07 -2.40* 0.02
2.30" 155 132 0.78 :.64*- C.18
,0 37 t.72 2 4S* 0.18 0 24 -0.57
2.41.
0
-0 97
R'
0 2590
0.1046
AdjR,
-=i.
;€reral Prcxies of
ai retlrns on sales
the
many
flnding
1
iI+e
- iactors conslst of
by goverfments as
rnaif cause oi the failure for
independent variabe to capturc soft budget
in general or subsidy ln pailicular sLrppods
lhe proposition that, to some extent, soft
budget corstraint or subsidy which manlfesis
in the fom of shod'run liabilities to assets
Gtio inlluences siqnilicantly the perfofinance
'.Jeai variables are
'Pi- end TOPIVGT.
rarables ate
rafts ofoperirling
slgiiii.ant
*-"
t.2115
0.3025
0.3170
0 0834
a.15f2
0.1;41
0.2360
0 0768
0.0845
0 2325
1.6118
1.5282
2 0820
0 1783
0 2185
t
*
at 1%,
Signilicant at 5%, and
The nunber of share allocated to
employees has positive impact on the
perfomance. Surprisingly, this result ls
contradicted with Frydman, Gruy, Hessel,
and Rapaczynski (1998) who uncover that
difierent insider ownershlp has dlfferent
pedomance; for employee owned iirms no
discemable revenue effect could be found.
1028
. Signiiicant at 10%.
l\4oreover, Liplon and Sachs (1990) argued
that dominant ownerchip by employees could
result
in the
perpetuaton
of
existing
inefficiencies. On the other hand, this ilnding
is in lin-" with Djankov and Poh (1998) viho
ilnd that prlvatization to lnsiders do
not
hamper firm restructuring. Fudher suppott
comes from Smlth, Cin and Vodopivec (1997)
111
t.::rrr rir
!r'fr
L!
f' llEriilf!
frnd that
emp
oyee cv/fershi!
s
e55n.iat-"d $lth figher va u-" addea.
Thls st!dy proves lhat lri l,,l;rlays a. ilr-.
empicyee olincrship has posittve relalionslt
l/il
pedonnance imprcvemeft whiah
!
s
rncons stent with evidefces of Frydman et a
(1!l,qil) and Liplon and Sachs (1!90). Oviner
cmployees ln [lalays a are far ffon] ftee rder
0v,/ner ifstead they support the managenreni
iovrard achievin! conrpanys oblectives by
perfaps workirq h3rder or iruttirrq every elfo.t
tcward ccmpany's s!ccess ll seems that lhe
empoyees as the ovJferc are arvare ihey
hale 10 give suppod foi their own beneiits
Long-term debts io total assets
(LDTA) a prcxy to capture soft .hudget
cofstra nts does nct seems to effect
performance change signilicant y. lt is
possibly that lhe solt budget is maily
accumulatng
in the fcnn oi
short term
l:rbilties rathcr than long term debis. The
percentage of share sold (SOI-D) by the
govemment and the ch?nge ir 1op
maragenreft team (TOP[4GT) is not
sigfificaNt e ther.
!1
iir
ii cd
dIe
Then, tlr s
fn.lin! rit:ry sL.rggest that
10 the llovemment reuctance
rnterierc
!,/
to
th the mafagenreft of
the
rs l,l'allanted.
A furnber of stridtes repotl that the
chafges in top managemeut aflect tlre
exierd rn aLrh-:
lhrs fact is rf
1997). The reasons for diflerent ilnding of this
study with those tv/o earlier studies could be
opposite ilndiN!s
explaifed
transition coLItirE.
as
foliows.
ln
fulalaysian
role very nudt
does
ma0agers in ili:
conkol. As a rE:: . :
fot
cccur rlght away when
privalizatlon implemented. lnstead
the
the
clran-qe in top manaqement occuls aroufd
the tim-" the pilalzaUof rnplemefted; either
performance change upon privahzation. lt is
0ther eXpl.
new leaTn to qet ne,,v manaitemeri taleft
old mafagemert Fudhemoie it is
considerng
se
eciing
vr'orth
prcfessiofal
franagement
privatzed
fev/
conlpanies so that the management does nct
have more lTeedom ir rnanaging thlj firm. t
is aso possible th3t the government ndeed
girve up sonrc contrc but fot as much as the
percentagc of o,,litershif sold afd hefce. the
t nres they are govemnteni veterans
The vaiabe SOLD has negative effect
or ROA vr'hich is ifconsisteni wth the public
.hoice theory Pubic cholce theory argues
thai the higher the eq!ity olvnerchip retaifed
{lo!r'er p-"rcentege of equ ty sald) is tlte hlgher
stiil
other word,
intervenes vr'ith
ol the
y
hiqher percentaqe of share sod does noi
reflect lhe contro haad over. This means
Ianage the c0':
bility of the govemmeft's
interJcrence cn the day to day frm's
the
poss
tr i:
ir. | "
nn
)etcise cenarf i.niy lor cefia I
n:rrneT
Tlrc
.
ittiferl]nce n t,i l
r.,t ie?d to I e ,/.: ::
15
Epoded in a
rl
The posll
managemenl team even from outside the
the
the
or li
necessatjy p(laLrra
On the other lr. l
roLtntltes, 0ltr; firanrgcrs gel rJ:
opportunily
!,/h ch at leasi \ail stdve to per{orm betler that
:
sejl l.rgher per:!
one ltear pror or cne year {olowing the
privatizatior l\'loreover, less thaf ha i of the
privalized companies change their top
managemeft position. Ths is a possible
reason \i/hy this variabe does not afleci
compafies as many if foi all the lop
Tnanagemefl in old state owned compan es
comes from govefilmefts sectois and many
prvatiTation
mrnterpads in 1',i
prlvatizatiof the change in top ntanagenent
managemeni shoud be rcplaced wlth the
gor.,emment
managernents i.
perfomance significantly (Badrerls, Boycko,
Shleifer and Tsukafova 1996 and Dyck,
worth considerlnq that in pnvaUzato|, the
in
llalaysia gc!cfirrnterfere,,l,iih d-.r ::
despi|: the faot it,:.
nalority of !Ni.:
conlpanies pad al prvattzatiof is not enoLlah
suqqestif! that cofi.pl-.ie or full Jrrvat zat of
predlcls thal the ntore contnl surrendered bv
does not llive up adeqlrate contrcl
J
peTforntafce
:
tirc io lor{ng er: :
not
It ls quite interestifg ttr.t SOLD does
not affccl ROS PubliD cholce theory v/hich
a goveTnntent iL.lds to esser ooverfrnents
lnterference of the managemeni vr'hich in
tufir !v ll improve efficiefcy. This tns gfificant
flndirg presenls afibiguoUS inte.prelaton:
there is a possibillty tlat the governmenf
opEration if tt,j ,
fo a notse faf,r - SOLD is pre.irli
ihal the assumpliof that lf1] more ihg transler
1,'felshiir the control is sLrrrc tder s noi
,..
:l4PL is also in.r :
:s prcdiltcd, iJ:.-r:
-.npitlca
sirdies
,r!tative eflect
.r ::
tievto|s shtdies r.:
'rrmea iransil arr
:lllopeal r?tiant5 j !
,:u{lies, employae , .
. ih \rorse pefioffl:-
:
do wittt the,r.-
:rrng tie p.ra:t.
r l,i:l
I
I
5 tlai
.r::i
inat
:: : _: ._.i the
: , ercugh
.iilzation
. -i
::at
--:_::iaat
llre
lhe
:r.. , Eoycko,
-: .lr]d Dyck,
: '-.n90{ths
:'-l:: Ccu d be
' i.'lirLaysian
':: .jr agement
:,r- fhen the
i:laad the
: :: - r:i aTound
r:.-:^tel ether
:: , _tillrg the
:, .
:3iofthe
-:
i.ot affeci
--,r::ator
:_
Ll is
:: latiDn. the
: . :l \{lth the
., .n:nt ta ent
: r'"" letier that
-,j i : vJoril
-:- lJislde the
_:. i: tlle top
:.-:r !!rrpanies
!:::-: aild many
::
.
.J:rt're effect
:l- the Public
: :a -:arry aruu€s
: :_r'i p reta ned
:_:: r .ltre hilher
rr /emnlent s
. - day flm's
oitetatan I the fLrilre v,/h af n tLrri|r cad
to a woTse peTformafae Herce tir-. ra,ia[]l-.
SOLD is lrrcdicted to fra,re a pos ljle mpilci
pedoflrafce Thls frdlnq is rnleresirq and
cipaiaton co!d be possbe.
['1e aysia !ovemment poss b]y chooses to
the folow nil
interfere !v1h day lo day operation se ectvely
despite the fact that the government o!/ns the
maiorty of share lt means that the
manalements of SOES have, to sonlc
oxtcnd, i.n autoromy ln managjng SOEs
This fact ls in conkadiction lvith theii
coufterpans in transrton counbes wherc the
opposlte findings lr,ere
lransiuon countries,
I
foufd. ln
the
rectoB cf SOEs piay a
role very much similar as pioduction Line
managels in the compary without niuch
control. As a rcsult the [4a aysian SOES that
sell hiqher percentaqe of share Co not
recessarily pioduce a beLer perfornance.
On the olher hend, the SOES in trafsition
countrles, orce they arc privairzecj, the
ntanagc$ gel much control and freecom to
manage the conpany afd hence. nrole
opportuirlty tc inprove the performance.
Olher euplanation, ['1a aysia gonernmei]t may
erercse cedain degree of i erventi,lr but
.ny ior cedalr policy and in a positive
man|er. Theiefore, the govemmeft
irtErfe.enc! in tlre SOES in [lalaysia does
nol ead to tie v/orse pedonnance cf SOES
:s repoded in a fumber oi lileratrlres.
The posltive effect of the varlable
ls also lncorsistent with the prcdiction
qs predicted based of enomolrs previous
:1,'1PL
-.mprdca studies EIIPL shcu d have
.egative effect on pedomance Again, the
irfevlor.rs studies are nrostiy conducted in
'irnEr rransition colntres cf Eastern
rLrrcpear natiofs. As akeady foLrnd nmany
:i.rdies. employee ollnership vias asso€ialed
'rth v/orse pedormance lt has nrany thlnqs
r do \!tf the macro economic cofdtiof
'rL.{nq the prvatizaiion eTa !'!'heie the
efi!!,!eas \ircr! roi etposed to th,. frce
nai(et such as n tlte /esiem ecofonty As
a resu t. ihe el][ilo,r'ecs d.) irct knor./ !/ )ai ti]
do vrith ther o,rfefsh]!i other tfar hkifE
vith ass!nnll polces thal !,ere
delrimert l! the coiipanies such as ralsng
lrages etc At the end, the empoyee
adlantage
ovr'nership is not beneflcal for the compaf es
but lnstead ,.vorsening the performance of the
c0mpany
When ROE
is used as
dependent
vaiabl€. orr y the change oi top m;Iagemcnl
in the companies has significanl effect on
ROE This res.rlt s consistent with Baberis
Boycko, Shleiter and isukanova (1996) who
arque that qettinq new nanirqers lnew
human capital in their lvords) ifcrcases firm
etfrciercy Dyck {19!7), ln East Genrany
shows that successful privalization hinlle:i on
the frm s ab liiy to replace old and inetficienl
managers lt s argued that few rnaltager wlil
ifto ihe mmp.rry or .l
least tlrere is lr€sh nevl talenl comlng.
Hence. the change h top frar]agrrnent lcanr
bring rew expedise
or members oiboard of dlrectors ,,viil l-.ad tc
a bettei pefornatce for the companes at
east in llte shcn-turt because ncw comei
almosl a y/ays v/art io sholr' h s/her
performai.e lllhen the dependeil lariab e
s substtlrted by rea sale, the variable 50LD
and Ln EI,IPL er-" statisticir y s lnificant {]f
couise. the signiflcanl effect of S0LD:nd
Ln
EltlPL
of
ROE has
tle
slmliar
explaraticn wrth thc prev ous nrode
Flnally wher Tea |e1 tncorne s useq
as d-apend-.fL vaiable no one irdcplfdclt
varabie is siq|illcant This res!l n(lical-"s
tlrat the data do noi suppcd the nrodel and
herce. conbinations
of al
ifiepefdent
varlabies are not able to exp a n the vaiation
if rca nei inconre lf shoi ort of five
ifiependenl rariables. only ong term debt to
toia assets has fe,,,er been statlstcally
slg:r faani ior a difereni nrodels tifdcates
l-iLl
D-1,t ,.- otOo-d
o
.. .... sftdraci
that lona-ternt debl to tolal assets does fot
have any effects on the pedomtafce of ftnns
upon plvalizalion.
The variations on the post privaUzation
pedormance
state-owned efteaprises
could be explained by several factorc. When
the Return on sales used as the dependent
vadable, the explanatory variables are Shod
term Debt to Total Asset and Ln Employe-"]
when Return on Asset used as ihe
dependent variable, fraction of ownership
sold and Ln Employee; when Retum on
of
Equity used as dependent variable, top
managemenl change, real sales, fEction sold
and Ln employee; and when Net lrcome
used as dependent vadable, none is
significant
Lessons Fr'
Demsetz, Harold (1988) The Theory of the
Firm Revisited, Jauntal af Law.
Economics axl Oryanjzatjatl 4, j4j
Workng Pat
.rydman,
Work?
Djankov, Simeon and cerhard pohl (2000).
Restructuring
Large Firms in
Slovania. l{orkiig papel, World Bank
of
D'Souza, Juliet and William L. l/eoqinson
(1999). The Financial and Operating
of
privatized Firms
Performance
during the 1990s. Jaunal of Finance
trydman, Roman
Hessel, an
(2000)
54, n0.4, 1397-1438.
Constaints
D'Souza, Juliet, William L. fi,legginson and
on
Pedomancei Evidence
Chalacteristics
A. and Harold Demsetz
(1972). Production, lnfomation Costs
and Economic Organization, Anetican
Econanic Review 62,777 -795.
Barberis, Nicholas, Maxim Boycko, Andrei
Shleifer, Natalia Tsukanova (,1996).
How Does
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Eviderce from the Russion Shops.
Journal of Political Econony,
V
.104.
Boubaki, Narjess and Jean-Claude Cosset
{1998). The Financial and Operating
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Boycko, Maxim, Andrei Shleifer and Robert
W. Vishny (1996).
Theory of
A
Privatization, Econanic Jaunal, 1A6,
309-319
Th
Ownership
Economies,
Applied Ea
and
Alchian, Amen
Th
Ownership (
in the Tran!
PapeLWarl,
Robe,1 Nash i2005). Effect of
lnstitutional
Fim specific
Refetences
Romar
Hessel, a.
(1ee8). w
161.
NYU, New
poslprivatization
frcm
Galal,
A., L.
Y
Jor
Developed Countries. Joumal of
Vogelsang
Cceomte Finance
Consequcnc
1
1, 747-766.
Enterprises
Dyck, Alexande. (1997). Privatization in East
Germany: management Seiection and
Economic Transition, Amedcan
Economic Review 87, 565 597.
Earle, John
S. and Saut Estrin
(1998).
Pdvalizatiof , Competition, and Budget
Constraintsi Disciplining EnteD ses in
Russia, Warking papeL Wold Bank.
Eckel, Catherine, Doug Eckel, and Vijay
Singal (1997). Pdvaiization
and
Efficiency: lndustry Effect of the Sale
of British Airways, Joumal ol F/itancla/
Ecananics 43,275-298.
Frydmar, Roman, Cheryl cray, Marek
Hessel, afd AndEej Rapaczynski
(1996). Pdvate Ownership and
Corporate Performancei Some
Press.
Grossman, Satlol(
(1986). The
Ownership: ,
Lateral lnteg
Econony
94
Harper, Jocl T (21
Pivatization
Pei'formance
Journal of Fi
No 1, 119 13
Haeer, Joel T. (20
Pivalized
I
Republic, "i
Finance 26 i,
Jonro, K. S. (19951
Malaysia
Re
DEl.
li.ory
-E
of the
z af Law.
,'.'--
n
aer
3
Flms
Nlegginson
and Operating
Privaiized Firms
La
Constraints
Lbgginson and
-Yijence
i€s
from
JournaL of
11.7 47.766.
Hvatization in East
nent Seiectron and
American
ttiln,
ti
Estrin (1998).
efihl], and Budget
nifu Enierprises in
w.
Waid Bank.
Er*el. afd Vijay
hivatizaton and
Efiect of the Sa{e
lorJnal of Fhancial
a€.
!"',1 Gray, llarek
lz€j
Rapaczynski
O{ne6hip and
rmancet some
and Hard
in the
Budget
Transition
Shortage, t4lod