How Xi plans to deal with internal disse
commentary
Commentary, April 6, 2018
HOW XI PLANS TO DEAL
WITH INTERNAL DISSENT
LORENZO CAPISANI
onth after month, Xi Jinping’s reform plan for China unveils its
solid grounds. The recent move
for unlimited presidential terms
caused quite a stir, but the National People’s
Congress has surprised analysts for the part ’s cohesion around Xi’s leadership. Premier
Li Keqiang reported on government activities
and stressed China’s achie ements in economic innovation, infrastructures, and responses to national and international challenges, such as last ear’s flooding in the
Yangtze area or the G20 Hangzhou Summit.
Yet Li’s commitments for the ne t fi e ears
anticipate something further: a working
frame ork for “ne era” socialism, enacted
through reform of the People’s Republic’s
governing body.
M
©ISPI 2018
The State Council is indeed the top-level institution in China. Chiefly, its reshuffle has
been a common practice for Chinese politicians, adjusting organization charts to new
strategic goals. For example, the importance
of space technology was marked in 1982 by
the transformation of an unspecified seventh
department into the Ministry of Aerospace
Industry. Six years later, it was merged with
the aviation bureau, thus giving a perspective
more centered on technological development for civil use.
Today, the focus is on streamlining the machine. Central approvals for administration
regulations were reduced by a third in 2017.
The management of many services and organizations needing government supervision
was standardized. Shortly before the opening
of the People’s Congress, the reform of the
council was announced and has been recently approved. Overall, it shall remove eight
ministerial figures and seven deputy figures.
Competences are being reassigned among
institutions and a longer list of ministries is
going to handle previously dispersed duties.
If combined with Xi Jinping’s efforts to fight
corruption, the State Council reform indicates
a renewed stress put on political education
and training, especially regarding local cadres. On the one hand, cutting expenses and
Lorenzo Capisani, PhD in Modern Chinese History, Catholic University of Sacred Heart
1
The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of ISPI
The ISPI online papers are also published with the support of Fondazione Cariplo
commentary
and state institutions is an inevitable requirement for strengthening long-term governance”, declared Liu He, Xi’s Har ard-educated
and prominent economic advisor since 2012,
who is now promoting government restructuring. In a commentar in the People’s Dail ,
he criticized the overlapping of government
ministries, leading to unsatisfactory results and
inefficiencies. As the removal of the two-term
limit lea es little doubt about Xi’s intentions,
then the reforms might be meant to rely on
the idea of a strong presidency.
lowering the central monitoring level should
admittedly require decentralization to local
authorities. On the other, the move to prevent
misuses of public funds and graft should give
the state stabilit b fostering an “optimal”
administrative mechanism.
The problem of party discipline and internal
dissent is consequently becoming central. In
this regard, one major change concerns anticorruption policies. The Ministry of Supervision
and the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention have been merged into the newly created
National Super ision Commission. This “anticorruption organization with Chinese characteristics” as said to take efforts to a hole
new level. It will be under the direct orders of
the State Council and will work in conjunction
with its counterpart inside the party. At local
levels, the commissions will become state
structures, being accountable only to the
highest authorities. Clearly, the Commission
may represent a new frontier for the promotion of political rectitude, and might be a powerful tool to get rid of internal disagreement.
However, party dissent might still be provoked
b Xi’s prospecti e third mandate, since it ill
likely overshadow the next generation of party
leaders and block institutional turnover.
Historically, China can be seen as floating
between collegial and presidential forms of
government, at least since the times of the
First United Front. While opposing the cabinet-based government of Wang Jingwei in
1927-1928, Chiang Kai-Shek pushed for new
organic laws and more agile rule by the leader. Nonetheless, he ultimately failed to solve
the internal problems of the Nationalist Party,
raising internal opposition for almost a decade.
As for the present, China might be undergoing
a real transformation in coming years, and this
would not be unusual for the CPC. The growth
of Xi’s po er is indeed remarkable and it
might serve the purpose of reforming the
country, but he will have to consider, however,
the many counterweights that have balanced
party-country relations so far.
©ISPI2018
Xi and his entourage really seem to envisage a
“ne era”. “Deepening the reform of the part
2
Commentary, April 6, 2018
HOW XI PLANS TO DEAL
WITH INTERNAL DISSENT
LORENZO CAPISANI
onth after month, Xi Jinping’s reform plan for China unveils its
solid grounds. The recent move
for unlimited presidential terms
caused quite a stir, but the National People’s
Congress has surprised analysts for the part ’s cohesion around Xi’s leadership. Premier
Li Keqiang reported on government activities
and stressed China’s achie ements in economic innovation, infrastructures, and responses to national and international challenges, such as last ear’s flooding in the
Yangtze area or the G20 Hangzhou Summit.
Yet Li’s commitments for the ne t fi e ears
anticipate something further: a working
frame ork for “ne era” socialism, enacted
through reform of the People’s Republic’s
governing body.
M
©ISPI 2018
The State Council is indeed the top-level institution in China. Chiefly, its reshuffle has
been a common practice for Chinese politicians, adjusting organization charts to new
strategic goals. For example, the importance
of space technology was marked in 1982 by
the transformation of an unspecified seventh
department into the Ministry of Aerospace
Industry. Six years later, it was merged with
the aviation bureau, thus giving a perspective
more centered on technological development for civil use.
Today, the focus is on streamlining the machine. Central approvals for administration
regulations were reduced by a third in 2017.
The management of many services and organizations needing government supervision
was standardized. Shortly before the opening
of the People’s Congress, the reform of the
council was announced and has been recently approved. Overall, it shall remove eight
ministerial figures and seven deputy figures.
Competences are being reassigned among
institutions and a longer list of ministries is
going to handle previously dispersed duties.
If combined with Xi Jinping’s efforts to fight
corruption, the State Council reform indicates
a renewed stress put on political education
and training, especially regarding local cadres. On the one hand, cutting expenses and
Lorenzo Capisani, PhD in Modern Chinese History, Catholic University of Sacred Heart
1
The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of ISPI
The ISPI online papers are also published with the support of Fondazione Cariplo
commentary
and state institutions is an inevitable requirement for strengthening long-term governance”, declared Liu He, Xi’s Har ard-educated
and prominent economic advisor since 2012,
who is now promoting government restructuring. In a commentar in the People’s Dail ,
he criticized the overlapping of government
ministries, leading to unsatisfactory results and
inefficiencies. As the removal of the two-term
limit lea es little doubt about Xi’s intentions,
then the reforms might be meant to rely on
the idea of a strong presidency.
lowering the central monitoring level should
admittedly require decentralization to local
authorities. On the other, the move to prevent
misuses of public funds and graft should give
the state stabilit b fostering an “optimal”
administrative mechanism.
The problem of party discipline and internal
dissent is consequently becoming central. In
this regard, one major change concerns anticorruption policies. The Ministry of Supervision
and the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention have been merged into the newly created
National Super ision Commission. This “anticorruption organization with Chinese characteristics” as said to take efforts to a hole
new level. It will be under the direct orders of
the State Council and will work in conjunction
with its counterpart inside the party. At local
levels, the commissions will become state
structures, being accountable only to the
highest authorities. Clearly, the Commission
may represent a new frontier for the promotion of political rectitude, and might be a powerful tool to get rid of internal disagreement.
However, party dissent might still be provoked
b Xi’s prospecti e third mandate, since it ill
likely overshadow the next generation of party
leaders and block institutional turnover.
Historically, China can be seen as floating
between collegial and presidential forms of
government, at least since the times of the
First United Front. While opposing the cabinet-based government of Wang Jingwei in
1927-1928, Chiang Kai-Shek pushed for new
organic laws and more agile rule by the leader. Nonetheless, he ultimately failed to solve
the internal problems of the Nationalist Party,
raising internal opposition for almost a decade.
As for the present, China might be undergoing
a real transformation in coming years, and this
would not be unusual for the CPC. The growth
of Xi’s po er is indeed remarkable and it
might serve the purpose of reforming the
country, but he will have to consider, however,
the many counterweights that have balanced
party-country relations so far.
©ISPI2018
Xi and his entourage really seem to envisage a
“ne era”. “Deepening the reform of the part
2