IEUPNYK InstEcon3_Common

Institutional economics 3
Commons
BERNARD CHAVANCE
ABIK JUNE 2010

John R. Commons (1862-1945)
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 The founder of the Wisconsin School

 A man of action, expert, consultant, legislator and






academic
« Institutional economics » : the combination of law,
economics and ethics
A theory of institutions centered on organizations

The search for a « reasonable capitalism »
The problem of « social control »

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Main books
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 Proportional Representation, 1896.

 Trade Unionism and Labor Problems, 1905.
 Races and Immigrants in America, 1907.

 J. R. Commons et al., eds., History of Labour in the





United States, 4 vol., 1918-35.

Industrial Goodwill, 1919.
Legal Foundations of Capitalism, 1924.
Institutional Economics – Its Place in Political
Economy, 1934.
The Economics of Collective Action, 1950.

Reinterpreting economic theories
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 Wrong postulates: natural abundance, harmony of

interests (Smith), as opposed to scarcity and conflicts
 Individual psychology in place of the role of
institutions
 What matters is the ‘social psychology of
negotiations and transactions, arising out of
conflicts’ (1934)
 Institutional economics should subsume equilibrium
theories (neoclassical) and process theories (Veblen),
focusing on intentional or deliberate change


The institutionalized mind
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 ‘Individuals begin as babies. They learn the custom

of language, of co-operation with other individuals,
of working towards common ends, of negotiations to
eliminate conflicts of interest, of subordination to the
working rules of the many concerns of which they are
members’ (1934)
 ‘Instead of isolated individuals in a state of nature,
they are always participants in transactions,
members of a concern in which they come and go,
citizens of an institution that lived before them and
will live after them’(1934)

« Going concerns »
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 Active organizations, typical of advanced capitalism
 Going concern : the joint expectation of beneficial

transactions, regulated by ‘working rules’
 Three types of going concerns: economic, political,
cultural
 Common characteristics: duration (they survive the entry
and departure of individuals), sovereignty or
autonomous power, legitimate authority, working rules,
sanctions and transactions
 Legitimate « authoritative figures » lay down and enforce
the rules of the organization

The State as a template for all going
concerns
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 The American democratic State of the beginning of

the twentieth century becomes in a way the generic

model of any going concern
 The « common law method » is the general way to
devise working rules in going concerns
 Sovereignty, originally an exclusive attribute of the
state has been progressively extended by delegation
of the latter to all other going concerns.
 Diverse organizations « are, indeed, governments,
since they are collective action in control of
individual action through the use of sanctions »

Hierarchy of collective action
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 Commons stresses the similarities between the

state and other going concerns, sometimes
characterizing it as a going concern among others
 But there is an essential difference between them,
namely the ascendancy of state rules on other
organizations’ rules, following a pattern of

subordination and delegation
 The physical sanctions used by the state are also
superior to the economic sanctions of the economic
organizations, or the moral sanctions of the
cultural organizations

Organizations as institutions
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 ‘It is these going concerns, with the working rules

that keep them agoing, all the way from the family,
the corporation, the trade union, the trade
association, up to the state itself, that we name
Institutions.’ (1934)
 The institution is ‘collective action in control of
individual action’, more precisely ‘collective action
in restraint, liberation, and expansion of individual
action’
 A paradoxical liberating constraint, in the relation

between individual and collective action

Working rules
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 Custom: unorganized collective action
 A process of « artificial selection » by authorities when

conflicts arise …
 … leading to working rules or organized collective action
 Every concern ‘must have its working rules, which are its
laws. These spring from authority, custom, habit,
initiative, or what not. They are the common law, the
statute law, and the equity jurisprudence of the concern.
The state, the business concern and the cultural concern
are alike in their dependence on these working rules, the
difference being mainly in the kinds of sanctions,
whether physical, economic, or moral, which they can
bring to bear in enforcing the rules.’ [1924]


Artificial selection
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 It was the starting point of Darwin, who developed

by contrast the concept of « natural selection »
 Veblen spoke of natural selection of institutions, but

this neglects the role of human will
 The way authorities of going concern decide about

working rules is rather like artificial selection

Workable mutuality
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 If working rules are first established in order to

mediate conflicts, they do not put an end to them
 … as conflicts are a structural dimension of social

reality, based on scarcity
 « The working rule is not a foreordained harmony of
interest … but it actually creates, out of conflict of
interests, a workable mutuality and orderly
expectation of property and liberty. » (1934)
 Conflicts of interests are always to be seen within
going concerns

Transactions
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 The transaction is the ‘unit of transfer of legal

control’, it is a concept that includes simultaneously
conflict, dependence and order

 Three types: bargaining transactions, managerial

transactions and rationing transactions
 Distinguishing what economists wrongly pack in the


concept of exchange

Types of transactions
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Transactions

Bargaining

Managerial

Rationing

Position of individuals

Legally equal

Legally superior and
inferior


Legally superior and
inferior

Negociational
psychology

Persuasion or coercion
(in relation to the
bargaining power of
parties)
Scarcity

Command and
obedience

Pleading and argument

Efficiency

Equity

Absence of distinction
between
principal and agent
Ownership transfer
(debts of performance
and payment)

Individual or hierarchy

Collective authority

Wealth creation

Distribution of wealth
(apportioning benefits
and burdens)

Prices and quantities

Input and output

Budgets ; taxes; pricefixing ; wage-fixing

General principle
Identity of Principal

Object of transaction

Execution of future
commitment

Strategic and routine transactions
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 Strategic transactions relate to the ‘limiting factor’ of the

action, routine transactions to its ‘complementary
factors’
 Limiting factor of the action: its control, carried out in
the appropriate form and at the appropriate time and
place, activates the complementary factors in order
to obtain the desired results
 Once placed under control, the limiting factor becomes
complementary and another factor becomes the limiting
factor
 Anticipation of evolutionary theory of the firm (Nelson &
Winter)

The common law method
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 The Anglo-american tradition of law

 … is actually at work within going concerns…

 It implies ‘making new law by deciding conflicts of

interest, thus giving greater precision and organized
compulsion to the unorganized working rules of
custom or ethics’ (1934)
 ‘The decisions, by becoming precedents, become the
working rules, for the time being, of the particular
organized concern.’

Futurity
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 The individual acts in the light of future reality as he sees

it in the current institutional framework
 ‘in the futurity-dimensions of present activity, afforded
by the expectations of institutions, the human organism
converts future happenings into present action. (...) What
we say of Time holds of Space. It is only institutionalized
brains that compass the world, and they do it through the
going concerns and machines that serve as instruments.’
(1934)
 A striking similarity with Keynes’ view of expectations

Reducing structural uncertainty
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 The future is marked by uncertainty, but the effect of

institutions is to reduce this uncertainty:
institutional economics considers a society ‘whose
future is frankly recognized as unpredictable but
which can be controlled somewhat by insight and
collective action.’ (1934)
 Another parallel with Keynes…
 Who wrote to Commons in 1927: ‘there seems to me
to be no other economist with whose general way of
thinking I feel myself in such general accord’

Beyond methodological
individualism and holism
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 The opposition between individualism and holism

 Commons gives a critical weight to individual action, and develops a

« volitional », « negotiational » and « transactional » psychology differing from holist approaches
 His is simultaneously distinguished from individualist theories by the
prominence attributed to « collective action » and by his hierarchical
view of working rules of going concerns
 Sequence of relations:
evolving individual actions -> evolving customs -> common-law
method -> changed working rules of going concerns, by authoritative
actors -> collective action -> control of individual action -> evolving
individual actions -> ...