Decentralization of fisheries management in Indonesia

Decentralization of fisheries management in Indonesia

Arif Satria a *, Yoshiaki Matsuda

a,b,

a Department of Marine Social Science, Faculty of Fisheries, Kagoshima University, Shimoarata 4-50-20, Kagoshima 890-0056, Japan b Department of Fisheries Socio-Economics, Faculty of Fisheries and Marine Sciences, Bogor Agricultural University, Lingkar Kampus 1, Darmaga

Campus, Bogor 16680, Indonesia Received9 September 2003; receivedin revisedform 5 November 2003; accepted10 November 2003

Abstract Decentralization is highly considered as an alternative to make better fisheries management. This is due to that decentralization

appears as a means for increasing the efficiency andequity of development activities andservices delivery, andalso for promoting local participation and democracy. The evolution of decentralization of fisheries management policy in Indonesia showed that the decentralization was gradually developed from deconcentration and delegation to devolution form. After Reform Era, devolution form of decentralization has been implemented due to the enactment of UU 22/1999 (the Local Autonomy Law), where local government has gainedthe amount of new authorities concerning marine-fisheries management. By such devolution, however, the community based management system, which is rooted from traditional fishing communities, is recognized. The effectiveness of the community basedmanagement system for the marine resources sustainability is causedby the bottom up planning andparticipative approach that ledto the increasing of the local fishers’ sense of steward ship over the resources. Even though this kindof decentralization practice has been dealing with several problems, this is still a better way rather than centralization. This paper identifies some agendas are being encountered both in the central and the local level. This is related to the need of improvement of the legal framework, the capacity building of the local government, and the revitalization of the local institution. r 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Decentralization of fisheries management; Local autonomy; Community based-fisheries management system; Devolution; awig-awig

1. Introduction throughout the worldnew legislation has been enacted which redefines the right of the state whereas water

Currently, decentralization of fisheries management is resources have been nationalizedin the interest of the highly considered as an alternative to overcome the

state. Decolonization was often accompaniedby the problem of resources depletion. As commonly accepted,

nationalization of resources, andthen post-colonial the resources depletion is because of the practices of the

governments continuedthe centralization policies of centralization of marine fisheries management. The

the colonist by making state-property out of common centralization of fisheries management was character-

property [2,3] .

izedby the existence of national policy that all marine The critical matter of the centralizedpolicy is that all waters are state property, to be managedcentrally,

waters become de facto open access, even though they through the provincial, regency, andvillage offices of

were de jure regulated, such as Indonesia in which are the central government, for the benefit of the entire

regulatedthrough fishing zone basedon size of fishing nation [1] , such as in Indonesia. This centralization

vessel. Certainly, these centralizedpolicies leadto the regime was actually derived from Western industrialized

resources depletion. This happened due to high cost of nations that neglectedcommon property regimes in

centralizedmanagement enforcement, which means fisheries [2] . Moreover, in post-colonial societies

unlikely to conduct fisheries management without role andresponsibility of local people in which marine and coastal ecosystem large and widely diverse. Meanwhile,

*Corresponding author. Tel.: +81-99-286-5505; fax: +81-99-286- 4297.

actually many fisheries community management systems

E-mail addresses: arifsatria@ipb.ac.id(A. Satria), matsuda@fish.

(CBFMs), which have amounts of traditional rules or

kagoshima-u.ac.jp (Y. Matsuda).

local wisdom, which contains valuable norms how to

A. Satria, Y. Matsuda / Marine Policy 28 (2004) 437–450

wisely treat natural marine resources, are found. They resources management effective [7] . Concerning demo- are implementedbasedon d efinedgeographical areas

cratic values of decentralization, Seddon (1999) argued,

‘‘sub national governments’ proximity to their constitu- monitoredby local fishers, andenforcedby local moral

andcontrolledaccess. In ad d ition, they are self-

ents will enable them to respondbetter to local needs andpolitical authority [4,5] . These are the great

andefficiently match public spending private needs only strengths of such systems andwhat they have to

if information flows between citizens andlocal govern- contribute to co-management designs [6] . Nevertheless

ment. On the other hand, the process of decentralization due to centralization policy they are being undermined.

can itself enhance the opportunities for participation by Those conditions, which led to create open access

placing more power andresources at a closer, more regime, pushedthe rise of ‘‘free competition’’ in marine

familiar, more easily influencedlevel of government’’ [9] . waters among fishermen crossing different economic

Accordingly, decentralization theoretically gives more scale (class), ethnical andcultural background , and

opportunities for local people to participate in a decision others. As a result, resources depletion (such as over

making process due to the nearness of social distance fishing, destruction of mangrove and coral reef) and

between policy maker andthe people, who must feel the social conflict were inevitable, andit certainly threatens

policy influence. Certainly, because the community marine fisheries sustainability in the future.

participation in the decision-making process theoreti- However, currently in some Asian developing coun-

cally leads to increasing efficiency and equity in natural tries there are political systems changes towarda

resources management anduse, in terms of marine- decentralist pattern that certainly imply marine-fisheries

fisheries management, CBFMs are potentially recog- management model. By definition, decentralization is

nized, revitalized, and developed well. Nevertheless, any act in which a central government formally transfers

beside the potential positive impact of decentralization powers to actors andinstitutions at lower levels in a

as explainedbefore, d ecentralization may leadto political-administrative and territorial hierarchy [7] . In

conflict, particularly when they involve the transfer of Indonesia, decentralization has been proceeded by the

natural resources management anduse powers [7] . establishment of Undang-Undang 22/1999 on Local

This paper is organizedin four parts, starting with an Government, which then calledthe Local Autonomy

analysis of the evolution of decentralization of fisheries Law. By this law, local government has got the bundles

management in Indonesia, and then followed by analysis of new authorities concerning marine-fisheries manage-

of the fisheries management system under the new ment. As mentionedin this law as far as 12 miles water

decentralization policy. It then proceeds to analyze the sea area from shoreline is under provincial government

policy implication in trying to identify the legal frame- authority, andwithin those 12 miles there are 4 miles

work, capacity building, and revitalization of local under the authority of the local or district government

institutions that are necessary for implementation of (articles 4 and10). These authorities includ e: (a)

the decentralization of fisheries management. exploration, exploitation, conservation, andmarine resources management within the authority water area, (b) administrative management, (c) zone management, (d) law enforcement of local regulation or central

2. Evolution of decentralization policy in fisheries sector government regulations that are deconcentrated to local government. Indonesia, therefore, is still dealing with

Indonesia is an archipelago of more than 18,100 amounts of agendas how to institutionalize and estab-

islands. The economy relies heavily on its natural lish their marine fisheries management in decentralized

resources. The fisheries sector, moreover, although still ways.

in an early stage of development, plays an increasingly However, decentralization becomes the most appro-

important role in the national economy, especially as a priate form of fisheries governance in which enables

source of income andemployment opportunities, local governments to fundamentally control local fishing

foreign-exchange earnings, source of animal protein by community basedmanagement system [8] . Decen-

for local diet and rural development. With its 5.8 million tralization is also justifiedas a means for increasing the

square kilometers of seas andthe coastal line stretching efficiency andequity of d evelopment activities and

more than 81,000 km, Indonesia is blessed with abun- services delivery, and also for promoting local participa-

dant rich aquatic resources. Various economically tion andd emocracy [7] . The efficiency andequity

important species are endowed in the Indonesian waters benefits of decentralization come from the presence of

including shrimp, tuna, skipjack, giant perch, eastern democratic processes that encourage local authorities to

little tuna, king mackerel, squid, coral fishes such as serve the needs and desire of their constituents [7] .

grouper andspiny lobster, ornamental fishes, shellfish However, a democratic decentralization is a promising

and seaweed. Indonesia also has a vast area of brackish means of institutionalizing andscaling up the popular

water, lakes, reservoirs, rivers, andfreshwater pond s, participation that makes community basednatural

which are very suitable for aquaculture development.

A. Satria, Y. Matsuda / Marine Policy 28 (2004) 437–450

Those characteristics of various marine resource

Table 1

endowments need an appropriate governance system,

Decentralization policy of fisheries management in the post indepen-

so the resource sustainability can be maintained. dence period (1945–1966) Decentralization is one of the governance types that in

Series of policies

Titles

fact hadbeen implementedsince long time ago.

Government Regulation

Decentralization of inland

Decentralization can be defined as the transfer of

No. 31/1951

fisheries to Western Java

authority andresponsibility for public functions from the central government to subordinate or quasi-inde-

Government Regulation

Decentralization of inland

pendent government organizations or even the private

No. 43/1951

fisheries to

sector andcommunity associations Southern Sumatera provincial [10–13] . Moreover,

government

there are three types of administrative decentralization: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution [10,12] .

Government Regulation

Decentralization of inland

Deconcentration is the transfer of decision making

No. 46/1951

fisheries to

authority andmanagement responsibilities to local

Central Sumatera provincial government

government but it is still under the supervision of central government ministries. This form is often

Government Regulation

Decentralization of inland

considered the weakest form of decentralization and

No. 49/1951

fisheries to

is usually strongly implementedin unitary states.

Northen Sumatera provincial

Delegation is the transfer responsibility for decision- government making andadministration of public functions to semi

Government Regulation

Decentralization of inland

autonomous organizations whereas central government

No. 59/1951

fisheries to

retains the right to take power back. Devolution is the

Yogyakarta Special Autonomous

transfer of authority for decision-making, finance, and

Provincial government

management to quasi-autonomous units of local gov- ernment with corporate status andwithout reference back to central government. It seems to be a political

Government Regulations ( Peraturan Pemerintah), as decentralization. Devolution requires national legisla-

shown at Table 1 .

tion andsupporting regulations [12] : With these Government Regulations, the central government decentralized some authorities to provincial

(a) grant specific local-level units corporate status, governments to manage inlandfisheries in their respec- (b) establish clear jurisdiction and functional bound- tive provinces by referring to annual plan authorizedby aries for such units, the central government andthe guidelines issuedby the (c) transfer defined powers to plan, make decisions, Ministry of Agriculture (article 1). It means that the andmanage specifiedpublic task to such units, fisheries regulations of the province hadto be approved (d) authorize such units to employ their own staff, by the Ministry of Agriculture. In fact, to develop some (e) establish rules for the interaction of such units with activities, such as training andeducation of government other units of the governmental system of which fisheries specialists, the provincial government also had they are a part, to get approval from the central government (article 18). (f) permit such units to raise revenue from such This, therefore, shows that even though the decentrali- specifically earmarkedsources as property tax, zation was implemented, the central government had public utility charges, etc., still strong position to control the provincial govern- (g) authorize such units to establish andmanage their ment. Even, fisheries research activities was under the own budgetary, accounting, and evaluation sys- central government authority, so if the provincial tems. governments attemptedto d evelop inlandfisheries

Concerning decentralization of fisheries management research, the approval from the central government in Indonesia, therefore, a tracing of the evolution of

was required(article 5). Nevertheless, the provincial decentralization can be divided into three periods: post-

governments were grantedfull authorities on some independence period, New Order period, and Reforms

points: to regulate andmanage the availability and period.

distribution of fish seedlings, and to maintain the buildings, land, and equipment handed over by the

2.1. Post-independence period (1945–1966) central government. Besides getting these physical things, the provincial governments also hadto handle

The beginning of decentralization policy in fisheries debt and credit related to decentralized authorities. sector can be tracedfrom the enactment of legal

Meanwhile, to support the decentralization process, the products of Indonesian Government in 1951. Within

central government provided the personnel to be this year, the central government establishedfive

employedas the provincial government officer status.

A. Satria, Y. Matsuda / Marine Policy 28 (2004) 437–450

On decentralization of marine fisheries, the central fisheries sector. There are several critical important government enactedGovernment Regulations No. 64/

factors leading to such conditions. Firstly, even if the 1957. This Government Regulations identified some

central government sharedauthorities to the provincial authorities of the provincial government as follow:

government, the central government still has the power (a) To conduct extension services of fishing technology

to withdraw those delegations. It happened due to political atmosphere at which the provincial government

basedon scientific research (article 1.1). was forcedto comply with what the central government (b) To develop fishing communities and to encourage decided, even if it was under provincial government the development of fishers association, and to authority. It means that the central government is in monitor andguide such association (article 1.2). stronger position than the local government while a top (c) To release regulations of marine fisheries in their down approach of management became more dominant, province (article 3). andultimately the local initiatives were getting less (d) To carry out fisheries training course for the important. Secondly, the establishment of Spatial Plan- fisheries specialist ( mantra perikanan) by referring ning Law No. 24/1992 is important for implementing to the ministry of agriculture’s guidelines, and also decentralization of coastal management, but unfortu- to holdtraining course for crew captain and nately this law has not been followedimmediately by motorist (article 5). detail government regulations that should be promul- (e) To regulate andmonitor fishes auction activities, gatedby the Ministry of Home Affairs [14] . As a result, andin case of any fishers association fulfilling the decentralization of coastal management did not work government requirements, the fish auction will be well. Thirdly, there were no clear delineation of taken over by the fishers association (article 7). territorial boundary between the central and the local

According to article 35, to support the decentraliza- government in fisheries management. This condition led tion process, the central government placedthe person-

to difficulties to set necessary fisheries management nel at the service of the provincial government. Then,

approaches that are suitable for existing conditions in further assignment to these personnel was under the

terms of ecological, social, political, andeconomic authority of the provincial government.

aspects, except for running the items mentionedby During the Post-Independence period, the position of

those above regulations. Fourthly, even if each district the central government was still strong because the

had Dinas or fisheries service office, they couldnot decentralized authorities to the provincial government

effectively function as the managers of resources rather couldbe run with the central government approval only.

than providing recommendations for users to get license This means that decentralization policy at that time was

from the provincial government. It means that the role characterizedas a weak decentralization.

of local government in fisheries management was depended on the willingness of central government only.

2.2. New order period (1966–1998) Fifthly, there was no recognition of traditional marine tenure or traditional fisheries management practices as a

The government policy under the New Order was consequence of Undang-Undang No. 5/1979 (the Rural characterizedby a centralization regime. In a centralism

Governance Law). This Rural Governance Law in- regime, the marine andfisheries were managedby the

tended to make uniformity of the rural governance central government. It happenedd ue to the Basic

system andcertainly ledto neglecting customary system Provisions of Local Government Law No. 5/1974 that

in terms of administrative and resources governance. asserted the local government did not have jurisdiction

Accordingly, there were no responsibility, participation,

andsense of stewardship of local people to conserve and Fisheries Law No. 9/1985 doesn’t clearly mandate

over marine andfisheries resources. In ad d ition, the

protect marine resources from destructive activities. fisheries to neither the local government nor local

Under these conditions, marine resources were not well people. Nevertheless, even though the centralism be-

managedandfinally resources d epletion becomes came the dominant approach to run economic develop-

inevitable.

ment andfisheries management, there were some With respect to the protection of small scale fisheries, decentralized policies on marine and fisheries affairs.

the central government hadhave means by issuing the One of them is the Spatial Planning Law No. 24/1992

Minister of Agriculture decree No. 607/1976 on zoning that mandates the local government to conduct marine

for capture fisheries. It has been promulgatedto spatial planning, whereas the others are presentedat

overcome social conflicts arising from the trawling era Table 2 .

between traditional fishers and modern fishers. Accord- By referring to the decentralization type, these policies

ing to this decree, there are four zones as shown by seem to be ranging between ‘‘delegation’’ and ‘‘decon-

Table 3 .

centration’’ category, rather than ‘‘devolution’’. How- Nevertheless, this regulation seems to be an ideal ever, they are ineffective in regardto govern marine

policy but it is not working well. The main reason is that

A. Satria, Y. Matsuda / Marine Policy 28 (2004) 437–450

Table 2 Decentralization policy of fisheries management in the new order period (1966–1998)

Series of policies

Titles

Content

Government Regulation (Act) No: 15/

(a) Delegating the provincial governors to issue Fisheries 1990

Fisheries enterprise

Enterprise Certificate ( Izin Usaha Perikanan or IUP) andthe license for catching fish ( Surat Penangkapan Ikan) to fisheries companies that engage in fishing activities in the provincial area by using non-motorizedboats, outboardengine boats, inboardengine boats of less than 30 gross ton andor those boats that have an engine of less than 90 horsepower, which are without foreign worker andcapital. (b) Delegating the provincial governors to issue IUP to fisheries companies that develops fresh water, brackish water, andmari-culture does not employ foreign workers nor use foreign capital (article 10).

Government Regulation No: 8/1995

Decentralization of Part of

The local government have part of authorities in fisheries

Authorities to 26 Districts of

sector:

Pilot Project

(a) Testing andapplication of technology (b) Assessment of fisheries resources (c) Development of production (d) Guidance of productions input development (boats, gears, seeds, feeds, and medicines (e) Issuing certificate of enterprise (f) Guidance of fisheries business (g) Development of the quality of fisheries product (h) Development of market information (i) Development of fisheries infrastructure (j) Fishermen housing, andmanpower development (k) Auction

Ministry of Agriculture

Governor or Chief of District/regency are appointedto Decree No. 509/Kpts/IK.120/7/95

A Guideline of Fisheries

Partnership System

decide the qualification of fishermen who are allowed to become the partners.

Management of FAD within 3 miles is under authority of the Decree No. 51/Kpts/IK.250/I/97

Ministry of Agriculture

Fish Aggregating Device (FAD)

district government, while between 3–12 miles is under authority of provincial government.

Directorate General of Fisheries Decree

(a) Local collector companies, as intended by article 3, point Number: HK. 330/Dj. 8259/95

Size, location, andmethodof fish

catching of Napoleon wrasse

2 b, are obligedto have certain collecting licenses issuedby

( Chellinus urdulates Ruppel) type

the Chief of Provincial Fisheries Service or appointedofficer (article 10 point 1) (b) When engaging in aquaculture business, as mentionedin article 11, local collector companies are obligatedto get collection license from the Chief of Provincial Fisheries Service after getting recommendation from the Chief of District Fisheries Services (article 12, point 1). Both Provincial andDistrict Fisheries Services are in charge of controlling andsurveillance of this policy in their jurisdiction area (article 13).

Within 7 business days the Chief of Provincial Fisheries Number: 14128/Kpts/IK.130/XII/1998

Directorate General of Fisheries Decree

Operational Direction of

IntegratedQuality

Services should delegate supervisors of fisheries product

Management System

quality, who are placedin Provincial Fisheries Service Office, initially examine fisheries processing units belonging to the requester.

the central government face difficulties to enforce it, the marine resources hadbeen d e facto open access particularly because of the limitation of finance and

again, andthis cond ition certainly causedresources personnel to carry out monitoring andsurveillance

depletion and social conflicts among fishers. This is an activities. Transaction costs for such centralistic en-

evidence that centralization fails to create an effective forcements are also high. The enforcement failure ledto

andefficient fisheries management.

A. Satria, Y. Matsuda / Marine Policy 28 (2004) 437–450

Table 3 Zoning system for capture fisheries

Zone I

Restrictedto fishing vessels of more than 5 GT or 10 horsepower Zone II

0–3 miles

Restrictedto fishing vessels of more than 25 GT or 50 horsepower Zone III

3–7 miles

Restrictedto fishing vessels of more than 100 GT or 200 horsepower Zone IV

7–12 miles

Restrictedto pair trawl except in Indian Ocean Note: Basedon the Minister of Agriculture Decree No. 607/1976.

12–200 miles

2.3. The reform era (since 1999) from the shoreline is under provincial government authority, andwithin the 12 miles, there are four miles

The Reform era has began since the establishment of under the authority of the local or district government the Ministry of Marine Affairs andFisheries (MMAF)

(article 3 and10). These authorities includ e: (a) andthe Local Autonomy Law. After the reform era of

exploration, exploitation, conservation, andmarine 1999, there hadbeen a staunch political d ecision of

resources management within the authorizedwater area, former President Abdurahman Wahid to establish the

(b) administrative management, (c) zone management, Ministry of Marine Affairs andFisheries (MMAF).

(d) law enforcement of local regulation or central Prior to that reform era fisheries sector was under the

government regulations that are deconcentrated to local coordination of the Ministry of Agriculture.

government. The elucidation of article 10 states that the In order to implement marine and fisheries develop-

territorial sea does not restrict traditional fishing rights, ment, Presidential Decree No. 177/2000 identified the

but rather traditional fishers may go fishing elsewhere. duty and functions of MMAF. The main duty of

This is quite different from the situation before that MMAF is to assist the President in conducting some of

when all coastal areas were under central government the government tasks in marine andfishery field, and

authority.

handle some functions including: (a) establishment and To implement the Local Autonomy Law, the central monitoring of the local autonomy implementation plan

government hadreleaseda government regulation, which covers giving guidance, counselling, training,

namely Peraturan Pemerintah (PP) 25/2000 that identi- leading, andsupervision in maritime andfishery fields;

fied a detailed description of authorities of both central (b) management andimplementation of plans for

andprovincial government over marine andfisheries protection of natural resources of the seas within the

affairs. Table 4 shows these authorities according to

12 miles of marine andfishery field ; (c) setting both PP 25/2000 andUU 22/1999. In order to accelerate Authorization/Licensing standards for the region in

implementation of decentralization, the central govern- marine and fishery fields; (d) dispute resolution among

ment establishedsome regulations, as id entifiedat provinces in marine andfisheries; (e) hold ing the

Table 5 .

authority beyond12 miles of marine area; (f) national Nevertheless, during the more than 3 year of policy over exploitation, conservation, management and

implementation of the decentralization policy, there natural resources benefiting in the maritime outside 12

were some problems andnegative effects on marine miles, including Nusantara water area andmaritime land

fisheries management. These problems are usually andalso Exclusive Economic Zone of Indonesia (EEZI)

relatedto false perception andmisund erstand ing of andcontinental base; (g) policy formulation and

the meaning of ‘‘management authority’’ as mentioned regulation of sea borders; (h) standardizing decision

in the Local Autonomy Law. Some local governments andseashore, coast, andsmall islands management; and

andpeople assume the term ‘‘authority’’ has a similar (i) authorization activities in maritime andfishery in the

meaning of ‘‘sovereignty’’ over territorial water, which sea area outside 12 miles, including Nusantara water

are 12 miles for provincial authority and4 miles for area andsea base, also EEZ andcontinental base.

district authority [15] . Therefore, some social conflicts With this reforms era, the decentralization of marine

among fishers arose after the establishment of the Local andfisheries sectors, however, has been wid ely pro-

Autonomy Law which are often assumedto be the motedto correct what practicedin the New Order. The

consequence of such misperception, even though such basic legal framework for the decentralization is the

conflicts have actually occurredlong time ago prior to enactment of Undang-Undang (UU) No. 22/1999 on the

the Local Autonomy Law. Many other factors actually Local Government, so calledthe Local Autonomy Law.

have ledto the increasing of the fishers’ conflicts, such as With this law, local government has a set of new

technological gap (conflict of class), ecological orienta- authorities on marine-fisheries management. As men-

tion gap (conflict of orientation), andalso ethnical tionedin this law, as far as 12 miles of water sea area

heterogeneity (conflict of primordial) [15] . Accordingly,

A. Satria, Y. Matsuda / Marine Policy 28 (2004) 437–450

Table 4 Authorities of multilevel government on marine andfisheries sector accord ing to UU 22/1999 (the Local Autonomy Law) andPP 25/2000 (Government Regulation)

Government level UU 22/1999

PP 25/2000

The Central Not mentioned(a) To set policy and management of exploration, conservation, Government

management, andutilization of marine resources beyond12 (Beyond12 miles)

miles. (b) To set policy andregulation of management andutilization of valuable goods and wrecked ship beyond 12 miles of sea water. (c) To set a policy andregulation of marine borders which includes sea water autonomous areas borders and borders based on the international marine law. (d) To set a measure of coastal and small island management. (e) To enforce law in seawater both beyondandwithin the 12 miles that correlates with specific andinternational matters.

The Provincial (a) Exploration, exploitation, conservation, and (a) To manage sea waters under provincial authority. Government (4–12

marine resources management within the (b) To explore, exploit, converse andmanage marine resources miles)

authority water area.

in provincial sea water area. (c) To conserve andmanage the local specific biodiversity and fisheries protection in provincial sea water. (d) To issue business license on marine culture and capture fisheries in provincial sea water. (e) To monitor the utilization of fisheries resources in provincial seawater.

(b) Administrative management.(c) Zone management.(d) Law enforcement of local regulation or central government regulations that are deconcentrated to local government.

The District (a) Exploration, exploitation, conservation, and

Not mentioned

Government (0–4 marine resources management within the miles)

authority water area. (b) Administrative management. (c) Zone management. (d) Law enforcement of local regulation or central government regulations that are deconcentrated to local government.

the opinion of that fishers conflicts are significantly what Pomeroy andBerkes (1997) pointedout, that in influencedby the local autonomy is not reliable. But,

the national level, the devolution of fishery management this misperception is supposedto be a critical matter of

authority from central government to local governments the Local Autonomy Law, so public opinion has been

andorganizations is an issue that cannot be easily brought to call for the withdrawal of this law.

resolved. These problems should be well understood in This happenedbecause of the minimum effort of the

order to set more conducive institutional arrangement of central government in promoting public communication

decentralization.

concerning the implementation of the Local Autonomy Aside those problems, there are some problems Law. The socialization or public communication pro-

relatedto institutionalization of marine fisheries decen- grams are necessary to make the local people under-

tralization to be dealt with at the local level [16] , as stand well what intended by the law. In addition, the

follow:

central government has been too late to follow up the Local Autonomy Law through promulgating more

(a) The local governments lack qualifiedhuman detailed regulations, which more clearly defined the

resources on coastal andmarine affairs, so that district government authorities. As a result, each

becoming basic constraints in attempting sustain- district’s interpretation over the law are varied, so that

able marine fisheries management. it causes implementation of decentralization is far from

(b) The local governments tendto aim at too high goals what expectedby the Local Autonomy Law. What has

of economic growth or quick yielding economic happenedto Indonesia actually seems to be similar to

activities as the highest priority, andconsequently

A. Satria, Y. Matsuda / Marine Policy 28 (2004) 437–450

Table 5 Decentralization policy of fisheries management in the reform period(1999–present)

Series of policies

Titles

Content

Government Regulations

(a) To delegate provincial governors to issue Fisheries Enterprise (act) No: 54/2002

Fisheries enterprise

Certificate ( Izin Usaha Perikanan or IUP), the license for catching fish ( Surat Penangkapan Ikan or SPI), andthe license for fishes transport vessel ( Surat Ijin Kapal Pengangkut Ikan or SIKPI) to fisheries companies that engage in fishing activities in the provincial area by using non-motorizedboats, outboardengine boats, inboard engine boats of between 10–30 gross ton andor those boats that have an engine of less than 90 horsepower, which are without foreign worker andcapital. (b) To delegate provincial governors to issue IUP to fisheries companies that develop fresh water, brackish water, and mari- culture not employing foreign workers nor using foreign capital. (c) To delegate regency chiefs or mayors to issue Fisheries Enterprise Certificate ( Izin Usaha Perikanan or IUP), the license for catching fish ( Surat Penangkapan Ikan or SPI), andthe license for fishes transporter vessel (Surat Ijin Kapal Pengangkut Ikan or SIKPI) to fisheries companies that engage in fishing activities in the provincial area by using non-motorizedboats, outboardengine boats, inboardengine boats of less than 10 gross ton andor those boats that have an engine of less than 30 horsepower, which are without foreign workers andcapital. (d) To delegate to regency chiefs or mayors issue IUP to fisheries companies that develops fresh water, brackish water, and mari- culture not employing foreign workers nor using foreign capital.

(a) The state recognizes the existence of customary law based andFisheries

Minister of Marine Affairs

Guideline of Sustainable

resources management in small island. Decree No. 41/2000

Community BasedSmall Island

(b) The local government (provincial or District) have authorities in

Management

strategic planning, zoning, resources assessment, giving a name of island, and issuing a certificate of small island management. (c) Local people must participate in surveillance activities.

Ministry of Marine Affairs

(a) The state pushes the role of local institution in promoting andFisheries Decree No.

A Guidance of community based

surveillance system (siswasmas) on

siswasmas.

marine andfisheries resources management

(b) The local government have a compulsory to facilitate empowering the people group of surveillance actors.

The Local government have role to cooperate, coordinate, and andFisheries Decree No.

Minister of Marine Affair

Intensification of Aquaculture

synchronize among government offices andstakeholders in Kep.09/Men/2002

providing production means, capital, management (planning, evaluation, controlling) andextension services.

Minister of Marine Affair

The local government have authority to holdspatial planning of andFisheries Decree No.

A Guideline of Integrated Coastal

Management Planning

coastal area.

Kep. 10/Men/2002

3. Fisheries management system under the new (c) Marine fisheries data and information are limited

too much pressure over the resources happens.

decentralization policy:Lombok Barat case because the local governments are hesitant to gather andsubmit such data to the provincial government,

Lombok Barat is regency in Nusatenggara Barat whereas in fact fisheries data and information are

Province that encompasses the mainlandand18 small necessary for formulating fisheries management. It

islands ( Fig. 1 ). Total area of Lombok Barat Regency is happens due to poor compliance of district govern-

3001.64 km 2 , with a landarea of 1649.15 km 2 andsea ment to request of the higher-level government.

area of 1352.49 km 2 , whereas the coastline length is (d) In the district area, facilities and infrastructure for

327.27 km. Lombok Barat Regency has two main technological development are limited; accordingly

waters, namely: Java Sea in the northern part and they become constraints to technological improve-

Indian Ocean in the southern part. The potential of ment of small-scale fishers.

fisheries resources is 33,270 tons per year wherein the

A. Satria, Y. Matsuda / Marine Policy 28 (2004) 437–450

Following the issuing of IUP, the LBRG imposes a retribution fee, which is basedon the enterprise and technology types, for all fisheries company andindivi- dual fisheries enterprises. This retribution fee is allo- catedto cover ad ministration andmanagement cost, including checking and measuring of enterprise site, monitoring, surveillance andcontrolling cost.

Meanwhile, Perda No. 15/2001 was issuedto regulate resources fee. The resources fee is a fee withdrawn over fish products either from capture fisheries or aquacul- ture heldby the fishers who got IUP. The value of resources fee for the capture fisheries is 2.5% of the catch value, whereas for aquaculture is 1% of the harvestedvalue basedon production andconstant price. The production and constant price are fixed by Kepala

Fig. 1. Map of Lombok Barat & Nusatenggara Barat Province.

Dinas Kelautan dan Perikanan (the Regency Marine and Fisheries Office Chief) andthe Mayor. This resources fee then becomes one of the sources of LBRG income for local development. The resources fee is important to

exploitation rate is around 76%. In addition, the ensure that the entire people enjoy the benefits of the potency of aquaculture consists of 873 hectares for

resources [18] .

brackish water culture and2236 hectare for mari culture This is the first opportunity for LBRG to regulate such as pearl, seaweed, and dragon fish. The actual

local fisheries whereas before the Reforms period, the utilization reaches 53.4% and80.7% for brackish water

fisheries management was heldby the provincial culture andmari culture, respectively [17] .

government on behalf of the central government or under deconcentration form. Nevertheless, the current

3.1. Formal local fisheries management decentralization of fisheries management to the local government level has been implementedwithout any guidelines from the central government concerning how

Responding to the enactment of UU 22/1999 ( the

a proper policy shouldbe formulated . Moreover, the Local Autonomy Law), which decentralized marine central andthe provincial governments have not affairs to the local government, the Lombok Barat formulateda series regulations associatedwith the Regency government (LBRG) releasedsome local fish- Local Autonomy Law yet, which are necessary for eries management regulations: (a) Peraturan Daerah operating decentralization. Therefore, LBRG has ( Perda) No. 14/2001 and(b) Peraturan Daerah (Perda) been in ‘‘trial anderror’’ concerning the local fisheries No. 15/2001. The former is about Usaha Perikanan policy. So far, the LBRG’s policies are not problema- (fisheries enterprise) containing licensing arrangement. tical, even in promoting the rise of community based With this regulation, each fisheries company engaging in fisheries management the LBRG’s policies are in fisheries in Lombok Barat regency, both of capture

positive way.

fisheries andaquaculture; have to get Izin Usaha Nevertheless, in attempting to promote marine con- Perikanan (IUP) or a fisheries enterprise certificate. servation through marine natural tourism park (MNTP) The IUP is grantedto the fisheries enterprise that is not in Lombok Barat, the central government is still using foreign capital andforeign employees. Within reluctant to share the authority to the local government. IUP, the area, quantity andsize of fishing vessels, MNTP is still under the authority of the Balai andfishing gears, andaquaculture location are signed Konservasi Sumberdaya Alam (Station for Natural up. According to article 8, IUP is not applicable for Resources Conservation), which belongs to the Ministry those: of Forestry, even though according to the Local

(a) Fishing activities heldby trad itional fishers with Autonomy Law marine conservation is one of the local non-motorizedboats or outboard -engine, or in-

government authorities. Moreover, the authority of the boardengine boats which are less than five gross

Ministry of Forestry over MNTP is also questionedby ton and/or less than 15 horse power;

the Ministry of Marine Affairs andFisheries, which (b) Inlandaquaculture heldless than two hectares;

attempts to take over such authority. Therefore, such (c) Brackish water culture less than four hectares and

institutional conflict among the ministry offices and or with density of 50.000 fries per hectare;

between the central government andthe local govern- (d) Mari culture held in less than 0.5 hectare; and

ment certainly interrupts the process of devolution of (e) Fisheries activities for scientific purposes.

fisheries management to the local government.

A. Satria, Y. Matsuda / Marine Policy 28 (2004) 437–450

3.2. Devolution to the local institutions awig was effective to overcome destructive fishing practices. This means that such awig-awig become

The rise of local institution of fisheries management ‘‘rule-in use’’ as Ostrom [21] called. The effectiveness or calledcommunity basedfisheries management in

of most awig-awig was causedby the bottom up Lombok Barat actually constitutedthe local fishers

planning andparticipative approach that ledto the response to the monetary crisis andthe national reform

increasing of the local fishers’ sense of stewardship over from 1998, which was markedby the d ismissal of

the resources. Furthermore, the various awig-awig rules Soeharto from his presidential position. Such reform

made the local fishers easier to enforce them because of movement ledto the unaccountability of the govern-

the suitability of such rules to specific communities, in ment authority, including the authority to enforce

terms of culture andsocial structure of the local people, formal rules in fisheries. Accordingly, the local people

andtheir ecosystem. Nevertheless, awig-awig implemen- initiatedto revitalize the local institution called awig-

tation has been dealing with some problems related to awig, which was applicable in these areas long time ago.

operational supports, such as the availability of speed- Awig-awig, which means ‘‘a local rule’’, was part of the

boats, communication facilities, and so on. In addition, cultural system of the Lombok people. Nevertheless, the

sometimes accountability of the traditional authority term ‘‘ awig-awig’’ itself actually stemmedfrom a Bali

was questionedby the members like what happenedin term, because of the Bali Empire’s occupation of

Gili Indah that then led to unenforceability of zoning Lombok in the past. The Bali people, however, in

rules. The main cause of unenforceability of zoning Banjar or pastoral life, culturally hadbeen boundedto

system was that awig-awig was supposedto be an the tradition, which was formulated as awig-awig, the

interest of tourism rather than fisheries, so a conflict unwritten customary law that shouldbe obeyedby all

between people who engage in tourism andtraditional Banjar community [19] . Proposals to establish awig-awig

fishers who felt marginalizedby tourism through awig- in Lombok Barat arose following the recognition of

awig was becoming inevitable. Nevertheless, overall increasing local use of destructive fishing practices,

awig-awig, particularly on prohibition of destructive especially bombing or dynamiting, a practice which

fishing, have been effectively enforceable. originally stems from Japanese troops’ practice during

One important point is that existence of awig-awig is the colonization periodin Gili, Lombok Barat begin-

recognizedby the LBRG. Even, the LBRG officially ning 1942. Aside overcoming destructive fishing prac-

recognizedthrough signing up to the written document tices, the establishment of awig-awig is also devoted to

of awig-awig, especially in Gili Indah village. The LBRG protect traditional fisheries and keep traditional culture

realizedthat devolution to the local people was mean- relatedto fisheries.

ingful to make the effectiveness of monitoring, control- Awig-awig, however, is an institutional capital for

ling, andsurveillance. The LBRG felt that the role of fisheries management. Institutional capital is the stock

awig-awig was helpful in attempting to overcome the of rights andrules within resource management

destructive fishing practices. The local government decisions [20] . Common institutional characteristics of

recognition of awig-awig showedthat there was devolu- community based management identified by Ruddle,

tion to the local people to manage their coastal area. which are clear territorial boundary, rules, authority,

Nevertheless, such devolution actually occurred after andsanctions, [8] , are applicable to awig-awig system.

the local people established awig-awig, as their self- There are four types of awig-awig establishedby the

governance over the marine resources, in response to the local people in different area, Kecamatan Tanjung,

political instability during the Reform era. This means Gangga, Pemenang, Bayan, andKayangan, as summar-

the devolution was fought for by the local people rather izedby Table 6 . Using Ostrom’s framework [21] , these

than grantedby the local government, even though the awig-awig are practicedboth as operational and

Local government eventually recognizes the role of such collective rule. Among those awig-awig, Lembaga

self-governance.

Masyarakat Nelayan Lombok Utara (LMNLU) has the higher level function to subordinates others and become representative of the fishers in northern part of Lombok

4. Policy implications

Barat. The interesting point is that what the local fisher ruledis compatible to the formal rules. Nevertheless,

To make effectiveness of decentralization of fisheries concerning physical sanctions without resulting a death

management in Indonesia, however, several agendas is still questionedbecause this such sanction is supposed

shouldbe taken into accounts in the multi level; central to be violating the human right value andout of the

government level, local government level, andcommu- formal rules as well. Nevertheless, there is no warning to

nity level.

the authority of awig-awig to withdraw such sanctions. Firstly, in the central government level, one of the most The result of awig-awig, however, is very meaningful

important points of agendas is the improvement of legal for the marine resources sustainability, because awig-

framework. At least there are two legal aspects needed

A. Satria, Y. Matsuda / Marine Policy 28 (2004) 437–450

Table 6 Awig-awig system in Lombok Barat (2000–present)

Type Rules

Compatibility to the formal laws Awig-Awig Gili Indah

Sanctions

(a) The Fisheries Law No. 9/1985: in Kecamatan

(a) Zoning system.

Fine, anddamaging seaweed

~ Fine of Rp. 25 million Pemenang

(b) Prohibition of destructive

culture

fishing practices. ~ Confinement of 6 months to 10 years (c) The mechanism of

(b) The Environmental Law No. 23/1997: authorization for

~ Confinement of 10–15 years appropriation activities.

~ Fine of Rp. 500 million to Rp.750 million Awig-Awig Kelompok

(a) Fisheries Law No. 9/1985: Nelayan Pantura in

(a) Prohibition of fishing by

Fine, andconfiscating fishing

~ Fine of Rp. 25 million Kecamatan Kayangan

dynamite, trawl net, and seret

gear

net (gillnet) in awig-awig area. ~ Confinement of 6 months to 10 years (b) Closedseason system.

(b) Environmental Law No. 23/1997: ~ Confinement of 10–15 years ~ Fine of Rp. 500 million to Rp. 750 million (c) Provincial Regulation of NTB No. 5/1996 ~ Fine of Rp. 50,000.00 ~ Confinement of 6 months

Awig-Awig Sari Laut Prohibition of fishing by

(a) The Fisheries Law No. 9/1985: ~ Fine of in Kecamatan Bayan

Fine, andphysical sanction

dynamite, potassium, trawl

Rp. 25 million ~ Confinement of 6 months to net

without resulting a death

10 years (b) The Environmental Law No. 23/ 1997: ~ Confinement of 10–15 years ~ Fine of Rp. 500 million to Rp. 750 million (c) The Provincial Regulation of NTB No. 5/1996 ~ Fine of Rp. 50,000.00 ~ Confinement of 6 months

(a) The Fisheries Law No. 9/1985: Kecamatan Tanjung,

Awig-awig LMNLU in Prohibition of fishing by

Fine, physical sanction

~ Fine of Rp. 25 million Pemenang, Kayangan,

dynamite and potassium

without resulting a death, and

~ Confinement of 6 months to 10 years andBayan