A refutation of some objections against historical accountability

countries. This would clearly violate Principle 21 of the Declaration of the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stock- holm which postulates that nation-states’ ‘sover- eign right to exploit their own resources’ is subject to not causing ‘damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’ Molitor, 1991, p. 83. This principle has been reiterated in the preamble to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations, 1992. Third, historical accountability is supported by the principle of equality of opportunity. The natu- ral absorptive capacity of the planet earth that allows for the decay of a certain amount of green- house gas emissions truly belongs to nobody and should therefore be equally assigned to everybody in order to give everybody equal opportunity to benefit from emissions. To account for historical emissions ensures equality of opportunity to use the global resource atmosphere, no matter where or when he or she happens to live. To ignore historical accountability would mean to privilege those who lived in the past in the developed countries and to discriminate against those who live in the present or will live in the future devel- oping countries. It is sometimes suggested in the spirit of Locke and Nozick that a long history of emissions might have established the right for developed countries to prolong current emission levels into the future and that such ‘squatter’s rights’ can be derived from a common law doc- trine of ‘adverse possession’ e.g. Young and Wolf, 1991. Such a suggestion ignores the fact, however, that even Nozick 1974, p. 175, ac- knowledged that an appropriation of property rights can only be regarded as just if ‘the situation of others is not worsened’, which is clearly not the case with global warming.

3. A refutation of some objections against historical accountability

Let us turn to some objections against historical accountability now and try to refute them. A first objection claims that past generations have been ignorant of the detrimental consequences of emit- ting greenhouse gases and that the developed countries should therefore not be held account- able for historic emissions Grubb, 1995, p. 491. While the first warning of global warming dates back to the last century Arrhenius, 1896, it is presumably fair to say that it was not before the mid 1980s that the public and decision-makers became aware of the greenhouse effect. Does this therefore imply that emissions before, say, 1985 can be justly ignored? The answer is no. It is an established principle of the legal system of almost every country that ignorance does not exempt one from liability for damage caused in the case of civil law or from punishment in the case of crimi- nal law. But surely, liability and punishment is often lower in case of ignorance than in case of conscious or even deliberate infliction of harm. Does it follow therefore that while historical ac- countability might be accepted, past emissions should be heavily discounted because of igno- rance? Again, the answer is no. Historical ac- countability does not depend on past generations having deliberately or consciously caused harm to the global commons. It is not about blame or collective moral guilt, as Beckerman and Pasek 1995, p. 410, suggest, not even about awareness of harm caused, but about assigning an equal share of the beneficent existence of the absorptive capacity of nature to every individual, indepen- dent of his or her place in either space or time. The developed countries have exploited this ca- pacity in excess of what an equal per capita allocation would have granted them. Now they must be held accountable for it. A second objection holds that the present gen- eration of developed countries must not be held accountable for something that was caused not by themselves, but by individuals in the past who are long since dead Beckerman and Pasek, 1995, p. 410. So even if historical accountability was ac- cepted, this argument would call for limiting it to a period of the last 50 years or so. This objection raises a number of difficult and contentious issues that reach into debates far beyond global warm- ing. For example, most young Germans seem to accept that while none of them can justifiably be blamed for Nazi crimes undertaken more than half a century ago, as a people they are held accountable for what some of their ancestors did. Similarly, we are currently witnessing the phe- nomenon that Swiss and other banks as well as German companies cannot uphold their position that they should not compensate for wrongs done by banks and companies in the past that were different from the current ones in all but the name. Their legalistic claim would presumably survive in court, but the political and moral pres- sure forces them to be accountable whether legally required to do so or not because it is felt that they benefited from the wrongs of the past. But would it not be utterly wrong to directly compare war atrocities and genocide to the emis- sion of greenhouse gases? Yes, of course. How- ever, the very last point made above brings us back to the issue of global warming. The funda- mental counter-argument against not being held accountable for emissions undertaken by past generations is that the current developed countries readily accept the benefits from past emissions in the form of their high standard of living and should therefore not be exempted from being held accountable for the detrimental side-effects with which their living standards were achieved. 4 There can be no doubt that the development of the ‘Northern’ countries was eased, if not made feasi- ble in the first place, by having had the possibility of burning large amounts of fossil fuel with the consequence of an accumulation of carbon diox- ide in the atmosphere, the major greenhouse gas with a long atmospheric residence time. Janssen et al. 1992 have found a significant relationship between GNP per capita and the relative contri- bution to the carbon dioxide concentration rise by fossil fuel combustion per capita in a regression analysis over 11 world regions. The relative re- gional contribution to the carbon dioxide concen- tration explains two-thirds of the variations in GNP per capita in 1990 r 2 = 0.67. A third objection against full historical ac- countability holds that some of the benefits of past emissions are not confined to the emitting countries. Grubb et al. 1992, p. 316 for example, argue that past emissions enabled the develop- ment of public goods such as modern medicine or better technologies that have also raised living standards in developing countries and make it easier for later developing countries to gain the same living standards with less emissions. In prin- ciple, this argument is correct, but it is difficult to quantify the exact share of emissions that can be attributed to the provision of these kinds of public goods. My guess is that most scholars would agree that the vast bulk of emissions generated benefits to the developed countries themselves and not to the world as a whole. Maybe, therefore, historical emissions should be slightly discounted, but the argument does not invalidate historical accountability as such. A fourth objection is based on practical rea- sons. Because of boundary changes, so the argu- ment goes, put forward by Grubb et al. 1992, p. 316, it will be difficult to attribute past emissions to current nation states. The break-up of the Soviet Union as well as the creation of new nations in the process of decolonization are often invoked as examples. The question is whether these boundary changes really pose that much of a problem, however. For, firstly, the boundaries of many of the major emitters in the past, like Northern America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, have been relatively stable over time, at least much more stable than the boundaries of countries in the developing world. Second, where boundary changes have oc- curred, as in the case of the former Soviet Union, there is no reason why a new nation-state should not be held accountable for emissions that were undertaken on the territory within its current boundaries. If such detailed statistical data on fossil fuel consumption and chlorofluorocarbon CFC emissions cannot be traced back directly, then one can take population share or GNP share as a proxy. Thirdly, if one feels uneasy about the implications of boundary changes in the last cen- tury, then one might want to restrict historical accountability to some time in this century. This might also be a good idea given that the reliability of historical emission data in general decreases for periods longer back in time. A fifth objection is again based on practical reasons. Because historical accountability would 4 Again this argument does not depend on morally blaming past generations in developed countries for their emissions. mean that either the developed countries sooner or later have to drastically cut back their green- house gas emissions, or have to buy substantial amounts of permits in the case of a tradable emission permit system from the developing coun- tries, an equal per capita allocation rule with historical accountability in its pure version would require massive economic costs for developed countries. Rose et al. 1998 provide some figures on the differences in costs for developed countries following from different allocation rules. 5 For a global gross emission reduction of 16.5 by 2020, Rose et al. compute a present cost to Annex 1 countries of 119.2 billion of 1990 US dollars if emission permits are ‘grandfathered’. If the same emission reduction is achieved with emission per- mits allocated on an equal per capita basis, Annex 1 countries face costs of 913.6 billion of 1990 US dollars, most of which result from buying emis- sion permits from developing countries. Rose et al. 1998 do not compute costs to Annex 1 countries for the equal per capita allocation rule with historical accountability, but costs would, of course, be even higher. Barrett 1992, p. 106, for example, therefore dismisses equal per capita allocation with histori- cal accountability as being politically non-viable: there will be rather no global agreement on global warming whatsoever than one that allocates per- mits on an equal per capita basis and holds countries accountable for historic emissions. On this objection it has to be said that a right princi- ple is not refuted by the mere fact of not currently being politically feasible. While it makes sense for developing countries not to insist on a strict appli- cation of equal per capita emission rights with historical accountability now, they would be ill advised to give up their insistence on this alloca- tion rule coming into effect some time not too far into the future. In the meantime they might accept partly or fully another allocation rule if they have the clear commitment from developed countries that eventually they would give in towards an equal sharing of the global commons. A sixth objection claims that historical account- ability is almost irrelevant because it is closely correlated with current emissions. Gru¨bler and Fujii 1991, p. 1406, compute that the developed world is responsible for 85.9 of the contribution in the increase in atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide since 1800, but also for 73.6 of current carbon dioxide emissions in 1987, while their population share is only approximately 21 Bos et al., 1994. The reason why the developing countries should insist on historical accountabil- ity, nevertheless, and not just on an equal per capita rule without historical accountability, is twofold: first, the difference between historically accumulated and current carbon dioxide emis- sions of developed countries is likely to increase in the future. This is because current emissions of developing countries are likely to increase faster than those of developed countries and because of the time lag until this translates into significantly lower cumulated emissions for developed coun- tries. The second reason is that methane, the second most important greenhouse gas after car- bon dioxide, has a relatively low estimated atmo- spheric residence time of 10 years Smith 1995, p. 24. Because developing countries emit rela- tively more methane than carbon dioxide than the developed countries do, and because of the low residence time of methane, the gap between his- torical and current emissions will widen if the ‘comprehensive’ approach is taken. Eventually, therefore, the difference between historical and current emissions will matter.

4. Conclusion

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