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World Development Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 589±600, 2001
Ó 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Printed in Great Britain
0305-750X/01/$ - see front matter

www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

PII: S0305-750X(00)00114-5

Challenges to Proponents of Common Property
Recource Systems: Despairing Voices from the Social
Forests of Zimbabwe
BRUCE CAMPBELL, ALOIS MANDONDO, NONTOKOZO NEMARUNDWE,
BEVLYNE SITHOLE
University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe
WIL DE JONG
Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia
MARTY LUCKERT
University of Alberta, Alberta, Canada
and
FRANK MATOSE *

Forestry Commission, Harare, Zimbabwe
Summary. Ð There is a fair degree of misplaced optimism about common property resource (CPR)
management. In investigating common property issues for woodlands in communal areas in
Zimbabwe, we are struck by the numerous case studies showing a breakdown of local institutions
for CPR management, and the lack of any emerging alternative institutions for such management.
There are a number of contributing economic, social and ecological factors to this phenomenon.
We argue that the formal rule-based systems that form the cornerstones of the proposed CPR
systems are far removed from the current institutional systems, rooted in norm-based controls. We
suggest that advocacy of CPR systems has to be tempered with critical analysis. Ó 2001 Elsevier
Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Key words Ð Southern Africa, Zimbabwe, common property, local institutions, governance,
woodlands

* This

study was achieved with the ®nancial contribution of: (a) European Union Actions in Favour of
Tropical Forest in Developing Countries Budget Line
(B7-6201) and the Center for International Forestry
Research (CIFOR) for the project ``Management of
Miombo Woodland;'' (b) the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation for research on ``Biodiversity

and Institutions in the Forest of the Future'' (facilitated
by CIFOR); (c) the Department for International
Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom for the
``Micro-catchment and common property resources
R7304'' research project; (d) the Ford Foundation
and International Development Research Centre
(IDRC) to (i) the Centre for Applied Social Sciences,
589

and (ii) the Forestry Commission for ``Strengthening
Social Forestry Research Capacity''; (e) IDRC and the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
to Marty Luckert. We acknowledge the stimulating
comments or seminars of Ben Cousins, Marshall
Murphree, Jesse Ribot and an anonymous reviewer
which have assisted us in ®nalizing this manuscript. The
authors acknowledge this support and are solely
responsible for all opinions expressed in this document,
which do not necessarily re¯ect those of any of the
above individuals or organizations. Authorship alphabetic; paper based on a presentation to CIFOR sta€ by

B. Campbell. Final revision accepted: 9 September
2000.

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WORLD DEVELOPMENT

1. INTRODUCTION
Common property resource (CPR) management 1 is receiving much interest from the
development community, for the management
of a wide range of resources. Part of this interest
is the current worldwide trend to devolve
natural resource management to local communities (Agarwal & Gibson, 1999; Chambers &
McBeth, 1992; Christo€erson, Campbell, & du
Toit, 1998; DFID, 1999; Getz et al., 1999;
Heermans & Otto, 1999; Rhode, Ho€man, &
Cousins, 1999; Western & Wright, 1994). CPR
management is thought to be one of the institutional vehicles to realize such devolved
management. The literature on the topic of
CPR management or local management goes

under the guise of many di€erent terms. Thus
Wollenberg (1998) identi®es 20 commonly-used
terms for local forest management, a number of
which are based on CPR systems (e.g.,
community-based management, joint management, collaborative management). 2
A signi®cant and in¯uential component of
the CPR literature is that centered on identifying the set of variables that enhance the
likelihood of users organizing themselves to
avoid the social costs associated with open-access (this literature includes the delineation of
``design principles'') (Arnold, 1998; Baland &
Platteau, 1996; McKean, 1998; Ostrom, 1992,
1999). This literature and much of the literature
on community-based natural-resource management (CBNRM) (especially that literature
reaching the practitioners) is largely optimistic
in outlook (e.g. Child, Ward, & Tavengwa,
1997; DFID, 1999; Fisher, 1995; Getz et al.,
1999; Ostrom, 1994; Wollenberg, 1998). For
instance, Ostrom (1994) in her article on selfgovernance and forest resources writes ``The
case-study literature now demonstrates without
a doubt that it is possible for CPR appropriators to design, operate, monitor and enforce

their own institutional arrangement.'' Agarwal
and Yadama (1997) note that according to
researchers ``local communities can create and
sustain local institutions to manage their
collectively owned resources quite successfully,
often in the face of adverse pressures from the
state, demographic changes and market
forces.'' Reading such literature, one could be
excused if one emerged with the belief that the
implementation of CPR management is a
relatively simple task, or, at the very least, that
with some e€ort, successful CPR management
could be implemented.

The thesis in this essay is that this large body
of literature displays a degree of optimism that
does not appear relevant to the social forests 3
of Zimbabwe, as there are numerous factors
which make it dicult, if not impossible, to
implement. We then ask why such optimism

has developed.
2. CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING
CPR SYSTEMS
Our analysis is based largely on the
Communal Areas of Zimbabwe. Portions of the
landscapes in these areas consist of grazing
areas, often containing woodlands, which are
jointly used by households from a speci®c
village or from households from neighboring
villages. An array of rules applies to these
grazing areas and woodlands (Figure 1), ranging from national to local, and from formal to
informal (Mandondo, 1997; Nhira & Fortmann, 1993). In investigating common property issues for woodlands in the communal
areas, we do not ®nd many working examples
of CPR management, despite the array of rules.
There are a number of factors which we believe
provide challenges to proponents of CPR
management or CBNRM, including national
policies and legislation which are not enabling,
changing and di€erentiated household strategies, the lack of legitimacy of local organizations and various resource features. Each of
these is brie¯y tackled below.

(a) National policies
The state policies governing control and use
of woodlands are not enabling to sustainable
management of resources at the local level
(McGregor, 1991, 1995). Thus, for example, the
Communal Lands Forest Products Act restricts
use of woodland resources to own use by local
people, while allowing outsiders to exploit the
resources through obtaining permits from state
agencies, bypassing village structures. It can be
argued that the national legislation is of limited
relevance to actions at local level, as local
people do not uphold the laws and the level of
enforcement is close to nonexistent (Sithole,
1999; Mukamuri & Kozanayi, 1999). Enabling
legislation could, however, stimulate local
management, by providing incentives for
management, through spelling out paths to
responsible devolution to local communities, by
de®ning clear decision-making processes that

COMMON PROPERTY RECOURCE SYSTEMS

591

Figure 1. Rules for grazing areas and woodlands.

are inclusive of all stakeholders etc. Choice of
how resources can be used should lie with local
communities, rather than with Acts that give
powers to state bodies, such as the Natural
Resources Board and the Forestry Commission, the current state agencies that control
land and woodland use in Zimbabwe (McGregor, 1991).
There are signs of change as a new Environmental Management Act is currently being
discussed. In an early draft of the Act, it was
implicit that the achievements of the wildlife
policies behind CAMPFIRE 4 had been
acknowledged. CAMPFIRE is a relatively
successful program (Child et al., 1997; Getz et
al., 1999) that allows local communities to

manage and derive incomes from wildlife. A
problem remains that the authors of the Act
appear to focus on the Rural District Councils
(RDCs, the lowest level of local government) as

the ``appropriate authority'' 5 rather than on
actual user communities. As discussed below
RDCs may not be the appropriate level for
management of natural resources.
The decentralization policy sweeping the
country, and many other countries in the
region, could bode well for empowering local
people (Roe, 1995). Decentralization has been
accommodated, however, by decreasing central
government grants to local level. The grants
from central government were supposed to be
matched by increasing reliance on a local tax
base, but the growing impoverishment of rural
communities, and the on-going diculty of tax
collection has proved a serious obstacle. There

has also been almost no government facilitation
for the relocation of power to district level
(Mukamuri, Campbell, & Kowero, forthcoming). In addition, as Murphree (1990) noted
``decentralization turns out to mean simply the

592

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

addition of another obstructive administrative
layer to the bureaucratic hierarchy.'' In
Zimbabwe, decentralization has meant devolving power to the RDCs, which, to emphasize
the point made above and discussed below,
may not be the appropriate level to undertake
CBNRM.
(b) Household strategies
It is believed that the declining national
economy has had a negative impact on CPR
institutions. The economic structural adjustment program (ESAP), which was implemented
in the early 1990s, had some positive impacts

on the national economy, but largely on the
large-scale commercial farming sector (Addison, 1996; World Bank, 1996). In the smallholder sector, it appears that the farmers
generally became less well-o€, a result of rising
farming input costs, reduced remittances from
urban areas, higher costs of services (e.g.,
health, education) etc., without higher prices
for outputs (Oni, 1997; Campbell, Mukamuri,
& Kowero, 2000; Mukamuri et al., forthcoming). 6 The higher prices for agricultural
produce probably bene®ted a minority of
wealthier
smallholder
farmers,
thereby
increasing di€erentiation within communities.
Because of declining cash income, households
have had to turn to a range of income-generating activities, which they themselves
acknowledge to be sometimes socially or
ecologically detrimental. For example, the
widespread sale of forest products is regarded
as socially unacceptable as it goes against the
``traditional'' 7 rules prohibiting this activity
(Mukamuri et al., forthcoming; Campbell et al.,
2000; Cavendish, 1997; Scoones et al., 1996).
There has been a rise in locally-illegal practices
related to woodland use (e.g., the cutting of
trees, which may be done under the cover of
dark) and a rise in thefts (Campbell, Grundy, &
Matose, 1993; McGregor, 1991; Nhira &
Fortmann, 1993).
Woodland resources are an essential
component of many of the emerging livelihood
strategies, largely because they come as a ``free''
resource, needing only labor to ensure their
extraction (Cavendish, 1997, 1999a; Gibson &
Marks, 1995). Local ``traditional'' institutions
have generally been unable to cope with the
rapid pace of change. For instance, the 20-fold
increase in marketing of woodcarvings within
®ve years (Braedt & Standa-Gunda, 2000) has
placed much stress on local institutions

governing use of wood from the commons.
Sithole (1999) has concluded that ``on the
whole, there is a breakdown of all types of
[CPR] institutional arrangements'' [in the face
of market forces]. She was looking at common
pool resources in wetland systems, including
water sources, sacred woodlands and grazing
resources. Mukamuri and Kozanayi (1999)
write, in the context of the commercialization
of baobab products, that ``there is no evidence
that the local rules are being adopted or that
new rules are being developed to cater for the
new situations.'' Once again, we would stress
that these trends do not result in an institutional vacuum: there are still a complex of
customs and norms that impact on how
resources are used. While most of the work
cited above was based on changes in the early
1990s, we would hypothesize that the more
recent decline in the Zimbabwean economy has
had similar impacts on households and institutions.
Within a single Ward, 8 of about 1,000
households, a case study by Cavendish (1997)
shows that the richest 20% of the population
have a total income (including subsistence) that
is 4±5 times higher than the poorest 20%
(Cavendish, 1997, 1999b). There is also evidence that di€erentiation is increasing (Cavendish, 1999c; Mukamuri et al., forthcoming).
Di€erent groups within villages have very
di€erent needs from the commons. For
instance, while the wealthy 20% want the
commons largely for cattle feed, the poor 20%
are reliant on a range of woodland resources to
sustain their incomes. While CPR institutions
are possible in highly heterogeneous communities, it is generally acknowledged that they are
less likely to work in such communities
(Murphree, 1993; Ostrom, 1999; Saxena, 1997).
Thus the rising di€erentiation could bode
poorly for current and proposed institutions
governing CPRs. In addition, it may be the
richer members of the community that dominate local politics and local organizations, as
found in some joint management systems in
India. The results of this are systems that are
designed to bene®t certain sectors of the
community (Saxena, 1989).
A new era of social relations is apparentÐ
there is a demise of community values and a
rise of individualism and household-centered
behavior (Mukamuri, forthcoming; Mukamuri
et al., forthcoming; Scoones et al., 1996).
Scoones et al. (1996) write that ``most [local]
people observe that co-operation is on the

COMMON PROPERTY RECOURCE SYSTEMS

decline''. If there is any management of
woodland resources it is usually directed at
those components that are found in privatelycontrolled niches in the landscape (Campbell et
al., 1993). Community activities such as work
parties are less frequent, to be replaced by paid
labor. Households ¯out many ``traditional''
rules governing woodland use in the face of
household needs. Changing social situations
have also resulted in much switching of roles,
between male and female, and young and old,
and a di€erent suite of relations between rich
and poor. Many of the changes lead to erosion
of ``traditional'' values and behavior, a
common theme in much writing (see next
section).
(c) The legitimacy of local institutions
(i) Modern institutions
Local governance structures in Zimbabwe's
communal areas tend to be ine€ectual. Rural
District Councils are cash-strapped and often
lack legitimacy. While the RDCs may propose
by-laws or levies related to natural resources,
inevitably the laws are not enforced and the
levies are not collected (Braedt & StandaGunda, 2000; Hobane, 1995; Madzudzo &
Hawkes, 1996; Mandondo, 2000a; Mukamuri
& Kozanayi, 1999; Murombedzi, 1990).
A serious problem is the emerging competition between RDCs and the people they
purport to represent (Campbell, Sithole,
Cavendish, Frost, & Mukamuri, 1999a; Dzingirai, 1995; Madzudzo, 1999; Sithole, Hwenha,
& Kozanayi, 1999). In CAMPFIRE schemes,
where the RDCs are generally in ®rm control
(through acquiring ``appropriate authority''
status), they are taking high proportions of the
income. Early in the program some RDCs were
congratulated for taking low overheads (10±
33%ÐChild & Peterson, 1991; Child et al.,
1997), but now a minimum of about 50% is
usually retained by the RDC. In some areas,
this may rise to 90%, leaving small amounts of
money to be subdivided by the households in
the project area or to be used for communityidenti®ed development projects (Madzudzo,
1999). Wildlife revenues are providing a
powerful incentive to RDCs not to devolve
proprietorship to lower levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy (Dzingirai, 1995; Murphree,
1990, 1993). Field results indicate that local
people often see CAMPFIRE as a government
program, rather than a community-based
program (Dzingirai, 1995; Sithole et al., 1999).

593

Interviewees in Sengwe often expressed a
number of reservations about the RDCs and
the councilors elected from their area that make
up the council (Sithole et al., 1999). As one
person quipped ``as soon as they become
councilors they forget where they come from.''
The RDCs can be likened to the local government structures in India, the Panchayats, which
were also assumed to represent the interests on
the local communities, where in fact they often
were seeking control of resources, and showed
little evidence of any interest in the poor
(Fisher, 1995; Saxena, 1997). Saxena (1989)
recorded that many of these village organizations were weak in their ability to manage joint
forest management and were not trusted by
local people.
One of the arms of the RDCs is the
VIDCO. 9 These elected village committees
often lack legitimacy. In many areas households are uncertain as to which VIDCO they
belong, where its boundaries are, and who is in
the committee (Blench, 1998; Hot Springs
Working Group, 1995). There were, and still
are, con¯icts between the VIDCOs and the
``traditional'' structures. The traditional structures were somewhat displaced by the post-independence government, especially in areas of
in-migration (Campbell, Luckert, & Scoones,
1997; Scoones et al., 1996; Mukamuri, 1995).
Under other circumstances, the ``traditional''
leadership has become involved in these
modern structures (Sithole, 1999; Sithole &
Bradley, 1995; Scoones et al., 1996).
There are also user groups that have some
rules and regulations about resources and their
management. For instance, ZINATHA
governs the a€airs of the traditional healers
(Mukamuri, 1999; Mukamuri & Kozanayi,
1999); the Binga Craft Centre has some 3,000
members who produce crafts for it (Mukamuri
& Kozanayi, 1999); and, each woodcraft
market has a market committee (Braedt &
Standa-Gunda, 2000). In general, these kinds of
committees are somewhat ine€ective in
governing resource use, as the above literature
attests.
(ii) ``Traditional'' institutions
Work has shown numerous stated local
controls on woodland resources, which may be
termed ``traditional,'' sacred, pragmatic and
civil (Campbell et al., 1993; Mandondo, 1997;
Nhira & Fortmann, 1993). These local controls
have been assumed to be the building blocks for
CPR institutions. For woodland resources,

594

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

common themes are the low observance of local
controls, the all-but-absent local enforcement
regime, the general breakdown of ``traditional''
institutions and the lack of any emerging
alternative institutions for CPR management
(Gwaai Working Group, 1997; Mandondo,
forthcoming a, 2000a,b; Mukamuri, 1989,
1995, forthcoming; Mukamuri & Kozanayi,
1999; Mukamuri, Matose, & Campbell, 2000;
Nhira & Fortmann, 1993; Scoones et al., 1996;
Sithole, 1997, 1999). Sithole (1999) has
demonstrated the rapid decrease of sacredness
of landscape patches over the last decades, this
trend indicating the weakening of ``traditional''
institutions. Mukamuri and Kozanayi (1999)
record an extreme case of the breakdown of
controls, where it was recorded that baobab
bark stripping was being done within gravesites. The ``traditional'' leadership may be weak
because of its history of being empowered and
disempowered by government (Matose & Wily,
1996), the modernizing and economic forces
that undermine ``traditional'' values (McGregor, 1991, 1995), the rapid expansion of
modern religions (Goebel, 1997; Mukamuri et
al., forthcoming), and the impacts of immigration (Dzingirai, 1998; Mukamuri & Kozanayi, 1999; Sithole, 1999). It is not perfectly
clear whether the changes have accelerated
rapidly in recent years. Speaking to farmers, the
impression is that the changes are particularly
noticeable in the 1990s (Mukamuri et al.,
forthcoming). It appears that ``traditional''
institutions are not adjusting to accommodate
population growth, increasing resource scarcities and ¯uctuating market conditions
(Dasgupta, 1993; Dasgupta & Maler, 1997).
The case study literature supporting the
above contentions now comes from nearly 20
sites in Zimbabwe, from a range of Districts,
including Binga, Chipinge, Chivi, Lupane,
Mutambara, Sengwe and Shurugwi. This is not
to say there is a vacuum of institutionsÐa
range of controls remain, many of them related
to ``good manners'' (Mandondo, forthcoming
a, forthcoming b). Compliance often relies
mainly on cultural norms and mores, ``laws of
the heart'' or moral texts, rather than on any
formal disciplinary procedures. Nor is the
above to say that the institutional change that
is occurring is good or bad; the emerging
institutional arrangements for woodlands (a
key feature of which may be there lack of
clarity regarding woodland use) could well be
the most appropriate for the current conditions. Furthermore, the nature of the institu-

tional controls can vary over short distances,
from one village to the next (Campbell et al.,
1997; Scoones et al., 1996).
(iii) Summing up
Given the weakness of Councils, VIDCOs
and ``traditional'' leaders to e€ect management
of natural resources, one wonders which
governance structure would be able to e€ectively support CPR management. A number of
authors have raised the problem of who is the
``community'' in community-based management (Agarwal & Gibson, 1999; Blench, 1998;
Kepe, 1998; Leach, 1999; Mukamuri et al.,
2000; Ribot, 1999).
(d) Resource features
The success of particular CAMPFIRE
schemes can be largely ascribed to the very high
economic value of the resource (particularly
elephant for safari hunting) (Campbell et al.,
1999b; Child et al., 1997). The theory predicts
this: higher resource values can support the
higher transactions costs associated with
complex property rights arrangements (Pearse,
1988). Woodland resources have much lower
values. Resource scarcity has been linked to a
breakdown of ``traditional'' rules and regulations, and the rise of illegal practices (Campbell
et al., 1993; McGregor, 1991; Nhira & Fortmann, 1993). As yet, we have still to see a new
set of rules emerge to cater for the new situations. There has been some move to implement
by-laws but this is still at a very early stage (see
above). Given the poor soils and the low rainfall, the productivity of many of the woodlands
is not high (Frost, 1996). Perhaps the returns to
management of the woodland resources are just
too low and the transaction costs of managing
are just too high to stimulate the establishment
of CPR institutions.
Another feature of the woodland resources is
the lack of clear boundaries, and the lack of
congruence between biophysical and social
boundaries. Nemarundwe (2000) has shown
that the modern administrative boundaries and
the ``traditional'' village boundaries do not
match with biophysical boundaries, and for
each woodland resource there is a di€erent
spatial pattern of use. Boundaries are generally
porous, are open to individual interpretation
and contestation, and are changeable
(Mandondo, forthcoming b, 2000b). In general,
it is very dicult to see how boundaries can
become more clearly de®ned. Any attempts to

COMMON PROPERTY RECOURCE SYSTEMS

harden the boundaries are likely to be frustrated by local people or user groups, as has
occurred in some CAMPFIRE schemes
(Madzudzo & Hawkes, 1996).
3. WHY THEN THE OPTIMISM
There are hundreds of articles about forest
CPRs, community-based natural resource
management, joint forest management, cooperative management etc. There is a lack of
congruence between the optimism displayed by
the literature and the realities on the ground
(Mukamuri et al., 2000). The emphasis in the
literature is on the possible positive outcomes
rather than on the ®eld complexities. Much of
the theoretical literature is thought to have
strong practical implications, as, for example,
summarized in the design principles of Ostrom
(1994, 1999).
In Zimbabwe there is only one example of
joint forest management, and it is too early to
say whether it will endure or be successful.
Zimbabwe does have CAMPFIRE, which is
often presented as a successful example of
community-based management (e.g., Child et
al., 1997; Getz et al., 1999). 10 CAMPFIRE is
highly peculiar, however, in that (a) it is based
on a resource with a very high economic value
(Campbell et al., 1999b), (b) some US$45
million has been spent on CAMPFIRE by
donors, and (c) there are some concerns as to
whether local people are doing the managing
and bene®ting vis-
a-vis the Rural District
Councils (Campbell et al., 1999a; Madzudzo,
1999; Campbell & Shackleton, 2000).
A challenge for us is to understand why there
is such a large di€erence between the optimism
of much of the literature and the empirical
world of the social forest in Zimbabwe.
We have a number of suggestions, outlined
below.
ÐIs the di€erence due to the CPR literature
being derived from fundamentally di€erent
systems from those that we have studied
(e.g., much of the CPR literature appears
to be derived from other resource typesÐirrigation systems feature prominently, Ostrom, 1999,Upho€, 1986)?
ÐIs the pessimism emerging from our studies
of woodland resources in the Zimbabwean
social forest due to one or more of the
following factors?
The low biological productivity in many of
the woodlands (Frost, 1996).

595

A less supportive state in Zimbabwe (e.g.,
Village Forest Councils were formed in
Asia as far back as the 1930s, Agarwal &
Yadama, 1997).
Higher transaction costs in establishing
CPR institutions in Zimbabwe.
A lower degree of forest dependence in
Zimbabwe (and thus lower values) than in
areas where joint forest management has
been implemented in Asia (but see Campbell et al., 1997).
A lesser amount of social capital (Bebbington, 1997) in Zimbabwe.
ÐAlternatively is the optimism in the CPR
literature an artifact of particular ideologies
or to an overstatement of the successes?
Thus, are the optimists tending ``to reconstruct traditional social organizations, viewing them as relatively harmonious ideals''
(Agarwal & Yadama, 1997), or are the successes that we read of ``islands of sustainability in seas of unsustainable development''?
(Bebbington, 1997; see also Saxena, 1997).
Is too much of the current literature in the
functionalist developmental tradition rather
being informed by critical insights into institutions? (Leach, 1999).
ÐPerhaps the optimism in some of the literature is based on the acceptance that formal
rule-based systems, as epitomized in ``design
principles,'' have widespread applicability.
(Mandondo, forthcoming a, 2000b) and Sithole (1999) have argued strongly that design
principles and formal rule-based systems are
far removed from the current local control
systems in the communal areas. The controls
that exist and are operative are largely those
that are deeply rooted in traditions, culture
and norms. The formulation and enforcement of these controls is steeped in subtle
and often complex processes (Mandondo,
forthcoming a). People or groups of people
are situated agents who react to the informal
rules, and the manner which they are enforced, according to how these in¯uence
their various interests. Implementing formal
rule-based systems comes with considerable
transaction costsÐperhaps the resources
we are dealing with have insucient value
to support such systems.
Given the lack of congruence between the
optimism of the literature and the realities on
the ground, we suggest that much of the literature has limited applicability to on-going
research and development on community-based
or common property systems.

596

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

4. WHERE ARE THE VOICES FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?
One possible reason for what we would
regard as false optimism is that the international debate has few contributors from developing countries (especially from Africa), while
the subject matter is predominantly about
developing countries. Four of the ®ve
Zimbabwean authors of this essay grew up in
the rural areas of Zimbabwe. One of them was
born and grew up in the site where he did his
PhD! Thesis authors are very familiar with their
study topics; they are immersed in the experience and socio-cultural-economic milieu of the
communal areas. Given that we believe that the
control systems in the social forests of Zimbabwe (and the region) are steeped in traditions
and culture, such experience can make a
signi®cant contribution to the international
debate.
How can we ensure that such voices are
heard? Developing country scientists will have
to become more aggressive in their marketing
of their workÐall too many studies end as
reports with minimal circulation.
5. THE WAY FORWARD
The term property carries with it the notion
of a secure claim to a resource. Going by the
strict technical de®nition of common property
resource (e.g., Ostrom, 1990; Berkes & Farvar,
1989) not many researchers will be worried if
one shows skepticism about working examples
of CPR systems in woodlands. Common
property may be a theoretical idealÐin real life
we have common property-like and open
access-like scenarios. But the degree to which
the optimism re¯ected in much of the literature
is not in line with the vast amount of case study
work is striking.
There are many reasons why CPR systems
will be dicult to put in place or to maintain in
the social forests of Southern Africa. As
researchers, we need a more nuanced understanding of the resources of the commons and
the users thereof, if we are to understand the
paradox between our reality and the optimism
expressed in much of the literature. In particular, we need a more detailed description of
property rights, where we move away from
simplistic classi®cations (e.g., common property, private property, open access, state property) to an in-depth understanding of each

landscape unit or resource, in terms of such
characteristics as excludability, comprehensiveness, use designation, duration of use,
allotment type, size, transferability, fees, operational requirements, operational control and
security (Kundhlande & Luckert, 1998). We
also need a nuanced understanding of ``communities,'' namely the interests and processes
within communities, and between communities
and other stakeholders (Agarwal & Gibson,
1999).
Our CPR research needs to pay more attention to spatial contexts, temporal contexts,
including history, the micro-politics of resource
use and transaction costs. Above all, we need
more interdisciplinary perspectives, so that the
economics of the household and the socio-cultural dynamics can be understood as a whole.
We also need more ecological results on the
state of the commons (not just perceived
condition of the forest, as used by Agarwal &
Yadama, 1997).
We would argue that much of the literature
that displays optimism about CPR management is derived from a focus on formal rulebased systems. The systems currently in place
are largely built on controls derived from
traditions, culture and norms (Mandondo,
2000a). The controls are constantly contested,
changeable and individually interpreted. More
political and social ecology needs to be brought
into the debates (Agarwal & Gibson, 1999;
Berry, 1985, 1988, 1989; Li, 1996; Mosse, 1997).
The literature taking a ``design principles''
approach implies an interest in social engineering. Without the in-depth understanding of
the processes involved in the evolution and
dynamics of institutions, social engineering will
be a dangerous direction.
Mandondo (forthcoming a) notes that the
literature generally portrays two extremes on
CPR management: a pessimistic view implying
avarice and chaos, and an optimistic outlook
implying bliss and harmony! While our essay
may be viewed as pessimistic, our intention is
not to promote pessimism. We hope that this
work will result in CPR management being
approached with in-depth analysis and careful
consideration (see also Leach, 1999; Sithole,
1995; Saxena, 1997). As Saxena (1997)
concludes: ``At the outset it is important to be
able to persuade key actors of the merits of
[CPR management], but it eventually becomes
important to temper this with critical
appraisal. . .'' We hope this current paper
contributes to this goal.

COMMON PROPERTY RECOURCE SYSTEMS

597

NOTES
1. We use the term ``CPR management'' to imply a
property regime in which resources are jointly used by a
user group, with a set of rules (formal or informal)
de®ning rights and duties to access, withdrawal,
management, exclusion and alienation (Schlager &
Ostrom, 1992).

cannot be criticized per se, as there were many problems
with the implementation of the program in Zimbabwe
(World Bank, 1996). Furthermore, the comparison
should be ``with'' versus ``without ESAP'' rather than
before and after ESAP, as longer term economic trends
could be at the heart of the current economic problems.

2. As a short-hand for such approaches we have used
the term ``community-based natural resource management'' (CBNRM), implying some collective action with
respect to resource management.

7. The term ``traditional'' has to be used with care, as
many of the ``traditions'' have been shaped by the
century of colonialism, to the point where it is dicult to
separate colonial constructs from traditions (Cheater,
1990).

3. The ``social forest'' is any aggregation of trees,
however spaced and wherever located, from which local
people obtain a variety of products (Nhira & Fortmann,
1993).
4. Communal Areas Management Programme for
Indigenous Resources (Child et al., 1997).
5. The term was introduced in CAMPFIREÐthe
Ministry of Mines, Environment and Tourism can
enable Councils to acquire ``appropriate authority''
status, e€ectively giving them rights to manage wildlife.
6. A devastating drought in 1991±92 makes it dicult
to separate out the impacts of ESAP from those of
drought. In addition, the structural adjustment program

8. A Ward is a geographical unit below a District.
Each Ward has about 1,000 households and elects a
Councillor to head the Ward Development Committee
(WADCO) and to represent the Ward at the RDC.
9. Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) are the
smallest unit of governance, introduced by the state in
the early 1980s. They fall under WADCOs (see previous
footnote), with VIDCO chairpersons representing the
village at the WADCO.
10. Though for alternative perspectives on the success
of community-based wildlife programmes see Gibson
and Marks (1995), Hill (1996) and Campbell and
Shackleton (2000).

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