From Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995: 81–2

production and perpetuation of inequalities in society. Consequently we will discuss his approach in more detail in the next chapter, which deals specifi- cally with critical approaches in the study of language. Another branch of work known as discursive psychology is associated with Rom Harré. Harré’s work is broadly social constructionist but see Harré, 1979, and thus there are overlaps with the kinds of theoretical positions found in the discursive psychological work we have been concerned with in this chapter Edwards and Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996a. Harré has been at the forefront of the critique of the cognitive orientation of psychology 1987, and we can illustrate his position by thinking about the concept of the ‘self’. He argues that it is no longer reasonable to assume that ‘selves’ are theoretical mental entities or cognitive schemata Harré, 1979; Davis and Harré, 1990. Instead he argues that we need to study the discourse through which selves are occasioned and brought into being. In this, Harré draws from Wittgenstein’s later philosophy 1953. Wittgenstein argued that the vocabulary of the mind such as concepts and words referring to the self is defined by observations of symptoms and not of mental phenomena in themselves. His philosophy empha- sised that linguistic discourse is essentially part of an on-going social process: the uses of, and constraints over, the language of the mind and self are social derivatives which arise in human practice. Following this line of philosophy, Harré states that the theoretical mental entities the will, the self, etc., which are currently invoked to explain how people behave, should be replaced by a concern to investigate the linguistic procedures through which this mental vocabulary is used in social life e.g., Harré, 1995; see also his work on ‘account analysis’, 1997. It is at this point where Harré departs from the kinds of discursive psycho- logical research discussed in this chapter. This is because he seeks to identify the grammars of expression through which selves and other mental entities are brought into being Harré, 1989. The focus on grammar reflects his inter- est in the formal and logical properties of the ways in which psychological dis- course is used: that is, the pre-conditions of the use of psychological language. The focus on formal and logical structures of language means that investiga- tion of psychological discourse is largely viewed as a conceptual exercise, and not as a task for empirical research. His kind of discursive psychology is an exercise in logical analysis, in which the analyst tries to identify the kinds of conditions in which it makes sense to use particular kinds of psychological dis- course cf. Coulter, 1989; 1999. Moreover, Harré relies on Speech Act Theory by which to investigate these formal grammars of psychological discourse. This encourages inventing examples of discourse as an aid in this form of logical conceptual inquiry e.g., Harré, 1989. However, as we saw in Chapter 1, the reliance on intuited or made-up examples of discourse is problematic. First, it encourages analytic speculation rather than empirical investigation of actual utterances in real-life situations Schegloff, 1988b. But it also invariably offers an impoverished view of the detail and complexity of actual language use. It DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY 127