the accuracy of autobiographical memories, and that the research agenda should be expanded to include memory functions hitherto not considered in
cognitive psychology, for example, their communicative functions. He suggests we need to consider some of the broader social contexts of memory sharing.
He notes that the simple act of telling of one’s own memories, and hearing those of others, performs functions beyond the mere transmission of informa-
tion. Pillemer cites Tenney’s 1989 study of the ways in which new parents inform friends of the birth of a child, which suggests that what gets reported
owes more to social and interactional norms rather than any memory of the events being reported. Pillemer argues that it is necessary to study the under-
lying norms which inform the ways we report memories, claiming that the ‘
grammar of memorial expression … has yet to be fully described’ Pillemer, 1992: 242; original italics.
Pillemer is just one of a number of cognitive psychologists who are pressing for a more sustained analysis of the ways in which memory formulations are
produced in discourse, and the kinds of functions they are designed to achieve. Given their overriding focus on the action orientation of language and inter-
action, conversation analysts and discourse analysts would appear to be well placed to contribute to, and indeed carry forwards, this work. For example,
Edwards and Potter 1992 have already made important contributions to debates in cognitive psychology, and conversation analysts have studied the
interactional basis of rememberings and forgettings Drew, 1989; Goodwin, 1987. But even just a cursory summary of the study of the ‘X … when Y’
formulations indicates that CA has much more to offer cognitive psychology. It offers a method for the analysis of the ways in which autobiographical
recollections of this type are produced in everyday discourse, and in more dis- tinctive contexts, such as research interviews. It shows that inferential matters
clearly inform the ways in which recollections are designed, for example, to attend to possible sceptical responses. This in turn begins to flesh out the inter-
est in the functions of memory sharings. Finally it reveals the ways in which speakers orient to expectations regarding ‘normal’ or ‘competent’ conduct,
thereby exposing the kinds of socially organised normative frameworks which underpin memory production. In this sense, CA-informed discourse research
can make a significant contribution to cognitive psychology’s understanding of the grammar of memorial expression in everyday contexts.
Implications for psychiatry: the normative basis of recognising delusional talk
Palmer 1997, 2000 has examined the discourse of people who have been diagnosed as having severe psychiatric problems. He shows how such
people routinely deviate from the conventions of interactional practice, for example, in the way they produce narratives or anecdotes, and shows how
these deviations are not addressed by the speakers as accountable or notice- able matters. He uses this analysis to suggest an interactional basis for the ways
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in which both professional psychiatrists and lay members of society come to see particular individuals as displaying signs of psychopathology.
This interactional approach to the discourse of psychopathology is an inno- vative contribution to our understanding of the ways in which people come to
be seen as having serious psychological problems. Palmer argues that in psychi- atry ‘much of the important work in recognising delusions is performed
through tacit skills’ Palmer, 2000: 667. By using CA, Palmer is able to lay bare some of the distinctive features of what we might term delusional talk. To illus-
trate his argument we can consider his analysis of the following account, which comes from a person who is diagnosed as having schizophrenia.
5.9 From Palmer, 2000: 669. ‘C’ is the interviewer, ‘R’ is the person
with delusions.
1 C: So you believe there’s an afterlife then? 2
. 3
R: Ye:s I do no:w. No:w I’ve see a god as 4
well you jknow. Well he doesn’t call himself 5
God he calls himself Tho:r 6
0.8 7 C: Ye:ah
8 R: I saw him on a f:- . I’ve se:en him a couple of
9 ti:mes on a field up in Leicestershire I saw him
10 once.
11 C: Ri:ght Questioning tone
12 R: Right out in the countryside where I was wo:rking. 13
. 14 C: Yeah.
15 R: I had a job as a ga:mekeeper there for Mr. Burnett 16
the animal food manufacturer. 17 C: Uh huh.
18 0.5
19 R: And e:r he visited me while I was up the::re. 20
. 21 R: For some re:ason.
22 C: Wuh-What kind of thing does 23
What did Floor-Thor look like? 24
0.8 25 R: Well he’s uh quite looks qui:te impressive
26 he’s gotta ·hhh catsuit on.
27 C: Ri:ght. 28 R: With an orange fla:sh down the front
29 like a: flash of li:ghtning would look
30 like sometimes
Lines omitted about what Thor created 47 C: Is he kind of hu:ge.
48 0.4
110 CONVERSATION ANALYSIS AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
49 C: a big bloke or? 50 R: No: he’s not hu:ge he’s a biggis:h looking
51 bloke though.
52 C: Right 53
0.7 54 R: a bih- ter:: . not bigger than 0.5 no:rmal
55 big men but . big you know
56 C: Ri:ght. Couldn’t he:- 1. pahh I don’t want 57
to sound shkeptical but- couldn’t he have just 58
been a jo:gger or something like that?
One feature of Palmer’s analysis is that he shows how the structure of R’s account deviates markedly from the kinds of accounts of unusual experiences
reported by non-delusional people. For example, accounts of paranormal experiences are designed to address evidential issues: to warrant the claim that
something objectively real happened, and which was not merely hallucination, wish fulfilment, or the misidentification of mundane phenomena. And one
way in which this is managed is to build the report of what happened to undercut the relevance of possible sceptical explanations. The ‘X … when Y’
device allows speakers to demonstrate their ‘normality’ and ‘social compe- tence’, thus defusing the likelihood that the veracity of the story can be under-
mined by reference to deviation from cultural norms and expectations.
Palmer focuses on the stretch of talk in lines 47 to 58. It is apparent the inter- viewer, C, is seeking some kind of evidence for R’s claim to have met Thor, the
God of Thunder. C’s question about Thor’s size invites a consideration of his supernatural qualities: thus ‘Is he kind of hu:ge.’ invites a response which focuses
on the ways in which Thor was not like normal men. However, R does not offer any evidential work. Instead he provides a merely factual answer. Moreover, he
does not provide a factual answer and then corroborate the claimed paranormal status of the figure: he does not say, for example, ‘No he wasn’t huge but he did
appear out of nowhere and alter the weather’ Palmer, 2000: 673. R offers the claim that Thor was normal in size
and no more. This is in marked contrast to accounts of paranormal experiences from non-
delusional people. It is clear that their accounts are organised to display their evidence for the paranormal status of the event, and explicitly to address
possible sceptical alternative accounts. This defensive work is conspicuously absent from the account from the delusional person, the organisation of which
suggests a lack of concern that the story may be doubted. It is as if the norms of everyday conduct have not informed this account. In Palmer’s terms ‘he
appears disengaged from interactional concerns which constitute the normal social world’ 2000: 673.
Palmer goes on to argue that clinicians and psychiatrists have to assess their patients’ mental states from the things their patients tell them. And this story
is precisely the kind of claimed experience which might lead to the conclusion that this person is delusional. But there is a problem: the
content of this story
PERSUASION AND AUTHORITY 111
is not that different from the experiences reported by non-delusional people, and which are studied by parapsychologists. What is different, though, is the
way the story is reported. In non-delusional people it is apparent that accounts are constructed to display the speaker’s normality, and this entails showing
an awareness and rebuttal of alternative, sceptical versions of ‘what really happened’. But the delusional person whose account is discussed in Palmer’s
paper shows no interest in this kind of delicate interactional work. His story seems to be informed by a different set of expectations and norms from those
which demonstrably inform accounts from non-delusional people. Palmer goes on to suggest that psychiatry would benefit from these kinds of conversation
analytic observations, because they lay bare the complex and subtle inter- actional practices on the basis of which we might come to see some people as
sane and others as delusional.
Summary
• Rhetorical psychology restricts its focus to argumentation and ideology;
and empirical research thus concerns a limited set of issues. •
Discourse analytic studies of factual or authoritative language offer close description of the organisation and use of communicative resources, and
in this they resemble conversation analytic studies of interactional devices and their inferential consequences.
• Sacks’ substantive and methodological observations constitute an invalu-
able resource for a range of discourse analytic projects.
It is clear that conversation analysis can make a significant contribution to studies of how language can be used to produce authoritative formulations of
events and opinions, both in the context of everyday discourse and in the pro- duction of controversial or contested accounts. But it may have a greater influ-
ence and reach. In the last section I discussed three instances in which Sacks’ work on doing being ordinary connected with the concerns of other disci-
plines, and suggested new avenues of research. But all of these disciplines are concerned with broadly cognitive phenomena: parapsychological experiences,
autobiographical memory and the recognition and diagnosis of psychopathologies. Can conversation analysis contribute to the study of ostensibly psychological
phenomena? To answer this, we have to consider discursive psychology, and that will be the topic of the next chapter.
112 CONVERSATION ANALYSIS AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
