Development perspectives

Development perspectives

Writings on international development use the notion of culture in a number of different ways. At root, the term simply means ‘cultivation’ – of land, crops, animals, bacteria. This led to: the cultivation of the mind and representation in art and literature; characterizing elite conduct and lifestyles as being ‘cultured’; and, more recently, a more democratized perspective in the current preoccupation with ‘popular culture’. Traditionally a matter for personal or national investment, this has long been an area of concern for UNESCO (the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization), and its place has been consolidated in international policy with recent World Bank interest in supporting sites of ‘cultural heritage’, such as the walled city in Lahore or the Medina in Fez (Serageldin and Martin-Brown 1999). 1

The predominant use of ‘culture’ in development, however, tends to be more general. Talk is usually of ‘other cultures’ or ‘a people’s culture’. ‘Cross- cultural’ is often used interchangeably with ‘cross-national’. Culture thus appears as shorthand for group identity, often coterminous with a nation state, or (increasingly) language-based or ethnic groups within it. This runs counter to many theorizations of identity, which stress the multiple dimensions and scope for variation and change within and between them. Sen’s contributions to the debate press for a vigorous acknowledgement of this diversity, and are central to the advocacy of ‘cultural freedom’, which is discussed in greater detail below. This reflects in part the priority given to the individual in the human development approach (see Chapter 2). It also, however, has a political intention. (Cross)cultural generalizations serve as a fertile breeding ground for the bigotry and identity-based conflict that Sen, especially in Identity and Violence, is at pains to counter. The danger of a renewed emphasis on culture is that it be used to seal off debate, rather than open an additional point of entry into further discussion.

CULTURE AND RELIGION

To use culture as an explanation is to view it as a factor whose presence or absence is responsible for development itself. The earliest example of this is Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, which maintained that the cultural and religious beliefs of early capitalist entrepreneurs were significant to the development of capitalism in Europe. It is noteworthy, however, that Weber saw ‘culture’ as being only one part of the explanation, which came into play only because of the presence of appropriate material factors. More recent authors have been less scrupulous, however: Samuel Huntington (2000) uses ‘culture’ to explain the developmental differences between Ghana and South Korea since the 1960s. This is strongly rejected by Sen (2004), who pointed out that differences during this period also existed in terms of class structures, politics and government, relations with major capitalist economies and levels of literacy. Such ‘cultural determinism’ (to use Sen’s term) tends to fix entire nations within certain cultural coordinates, ignoring many forms of interaction with the wider world and changes in culture over time.

Huntington’s approach echoes the dominant way in which culture has been conceived in relation to international development – as an obstacle. Modernization theories in the 1960s were built on the contrast between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, using culture as a marker of the otherness of peoples who were prevented by primordial bonds from joining the rational pursuit of progress. Psychologists demonstrated how, in the process of ‘making men [sic] modern’ cultural difference (indexed by nation) would eventually slip away (Inkeles, 1969). This form of cultural chauvinism, and the very tangible relations of power over which it was draped, continues to be a significant aspect of the development enterprise, within countries as well as between them. Stacey Leigh Pigg (1992) shows how manuals for health development workers in Nepal reproduced stereotypes by caste and class in their depiction of ‘more’ and ‘less’ developed people, for example. Such stereotypes are not always negative, of course. Since colonial times the relationship has also been seen in the reverse, with development as the threat and ‘indigenous cultures’ as endangered, needing protection if they were to retain their local values and integrity. Such images predominate, for example, in representations of contemporary clashes over the construction of dams or extractive industries in

areas where indigenous people live. 2 Tanya Li (1996) helpfully reminds us that the cultural unity even of such communities is not merely given, but may be represented differentially depending upon the making of claims on specific resources.

Another strong trend in the development literature is to identify culture cognitively, that is, with ideas, beliefs and values. This is a step forward from the simple opposition between subjective perceptions (of individual actors?) and objective measures (of outsiders?), since it recognizes that perceptions do not belong simply to isolated individuals, but are conditioned by societal norms and expectations. Nevertheless, to use Marxist terminology, this still situates ‘culture’ at the level of superstructure, rather than seeing it as

TOPICS

structuring society itself in more fundamental ways. A good example of this approach can be found in Vijayendra Rao and Michael Walton’s introduction to Culture and Public Action (2004, p9), which was sponsored by the World Bank:

A culturally-informed perspective is thus not so much a prescription as it is a lens – a way of seeing. It sees individuals as (being) driven by a culturally-influenced set of motives, incentives, beliefs and identities that interact with economic incentives to affect outcomes . . . . We believe that incorporating this lens into more conventional economic ways of understanding will, in many situations, lead to more effective policy.

This approach has much to recommend it over the simplistic notion that beliefs and values are somehow fixed or given for any nation or social group as a whole. Instead, culture is viewed more flexibly, as a prism that offers people particular ways of seeing the world. However, the move is not perhaps as welcome as it might at first appear. Seeing culture as a ‘lens’ does not undermine the ‘analytic primacy of the rational, value-maximizing individual’ (Good, 1994, p39, after Sahlins, 1976), which is so foundational to Western economic thought. Individuals and the economic incentives to which they respond remain, it would seem, outside culture, and even motives, beliefs and identities are only ‘influenced’ by them. Similarly, the confidence that such a lens might be ‘incorporated’ within existing approaches suggests that there is no need for a fundamental shift in existing institutions of international development. This rationale for taking culture into account is in fact highly reminiscent of arguments for increasing people’s participation in development projects: the more people are involved, the more effective projects are likely to

be. As many critics have pointed out, however, instituting participation in public projects does not necessarily signal any real shift in power relations. It may simply neutralize and de-politicize potential threats (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Selznick, 1949; White, 1996). If a ‘cultural lens’ is to be used to enhance policy effectiveness, this leaves the bigger question open: who owns the policy or the development intervention?