THE PUBLIC AND THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSES

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3. THE PUBLIC AND THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSES

Source: Tribun Kaltim Fitri 2016

3.1 INCREASED COOPERATION

Cooperation between ASEAN countries and beyond is intensive. During the Indonesian visit by U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron , a counter-terrorism package was agreed. Fifty police officers will be trained in the UK and religious leaders will be exchanged in both, the UK and Indonesia. Interaction between Australian, U.S. and European security forces are on-going while Singapore and Indonesia cooperate continuously on hard and soft measures. France, for example, provides training to counter-insurgency forces 176 . Indonesian officials recognize the effectiveness of social media campaigns and the radicalization of some in the middle-class. Governments recognize the increase in sophistication in communications and coordination of efforts to carry out terror attacks Philomin 2016. Some of the problems of a lack of cooperation surfaced in the post-mortem of the attacks in Paris and Brussels. Constraints, inability, and unwillingness to share intelligence allowed the Islamic State operatives to bypass French and European intelligence services. Initially, disagreement on the translation of names in Arabic or Cyrillic compounded the problem. The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights wrote, “….On 19 January, EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini said the EU had agreed “to share intelligence information not only within the European Union but also with other countries around us starting from the Mediterranean and the Arab world, Turkey, Egypt, Gulf countries, North Africa but also looking to Africa and Asia,” as well as encouraging the European Parliament to reopen the Passenger Name Record PNR file. On 21 January, EU Commissioners began discussing how to “tighten security and prevent terrorism as part of the European Agenda on Security for 2015- 2020”….” Rights 2015 In reaction to the Paris attacks, the European Union will create in the next year years, 2,680 new jobs exclusively focused on counter-terrorism activities. Active surveillance of persons posing a potential terrorist threat has increased by 130, The French Passenger Name Record PNR system has gone operational in September 2015. 176 http:hosted2.ap.orgAPDEFAULT3d281c11a96b4ad082fe88aa0db04305Article_2016-06-09-ML-- Syriaid- 88479f2133364dd7b5dce3a9197ee6b2?utm_content=buffer74a13utm_medium=socialutm_source=twitter .comutm_campaign=buffer ; 9 June 2016 Page 86 of 126 A database of those charged with terrorist offences will be created and those people monitored at regular intervals. Greater surveillance of jihadist communication will be carried out, including online, where the cooperation of Internet service providers will be sought Rights 2015. A change in the Data Retention Directive DRD will enhance the surveillance and data collection processes 177 . In October 2015, U.S. and Malaysia agreed to launch ASEANs first digital messaging center to combat violent extremism in cyberspace on May 1, 2016. The Malaysian government will allocate 66 million USD to counter online radicalization Straits Times 2016 and will be based on similar lines as the UAE-based Sawab Center Yusof, Benar News 2015 Sawab Center n.d. combating any form of violence and extremism. It plans to cooperate with Interpol to deny at least 132 Malaysians in Syria and Iraq their right to return to Malaysia. Indonesia is planning to revoke passports of approximately 400 Indonesians having joined Islamic State Straits Times 2016. The center will be set up as a messaging center to counter terrorism online and apply counter narratives that reflect the true meaning of Islam Mergawati Zulfakar 2015. Under the Homeland Security Presidential Directive No 6 HSPD-6, the U.S. would share with Malaysia information about some 86,000-suspected terrorists included in a Washington-based database Yusof, Benar News 2015. A similar global U.S. cyber campaign is underway for some time Defense 2009 with targeting extremists ’ networks, profiling electronic habits of commanders, acting under a false flag to redirect forces, imitation of alternate messages Sanger, The New York Times 2016. In December 2015, after the Paris and San Bernardino attacks, the U.S. administration received orders to be part of a strategic shift from cyber defense to cyber offense Hennigan 2016. “Send in the Malware” Fidler 2016 is a policy shift is needed to combat the sophistication of Islamic State. The increase of repeated attempts of executing acts of terror in Kuala Lumpur, the discovery of new Islamic State cells in Singapore and repeated arrests in Indonesia confirms our long term concern that Islamic State is a game-changer in the context of its ability to operate across national boundaries. The Strait Times wrote, “….it is almost certain that terror groups will rush to claim bragging rights as authors of the first successful attack on Singapore. An attack here will have propaganda value far in excess of the size and complexity of the operation or actual body count. Singapore is a prized target as it is one of the last world cities to have successfully kept the scourge of terrorism at bay ….” Boey 2016 The Deputy National Security Advisor Rose 2015 178 of the Obama administration has met with technology executives in Silicon Valley, Austin, Boston, and Washington to come up with a more integrated plan Kang 2016 179 for taking down social media posts and develop a 177 Ibid. 178 Lisa Monaco estimated 90,000 Twitter accounts are associated with the Islamic State. 179 The meeting included Denis R. McDonough, the White House chief of staff; Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch; James R. Clapper Jr., the director of national intelligence; James B. Comey, the F.B.I. director; and Lisa Mo a o, the p eside t s ou te te o is ad ise . The et ith Ti oth D. Cook, Apple s hief e e uti e, as well as top executives from Facebook, Twitter and Google. Page 87 of 126 counter-narrative Lieberman n.d. 180 after the administration acknowledged the on-line efforts to counter extremists’ recruitment failed Kang 2016. A similar rethinking, engagement with the industry and activity is needed in Asia 181 . One of the results of the combination of cyber and other intelligence operations was the raid against Fathi ben Awn ben Jildi Murad al-Tunisi a Tunisian national alias Abu Sayyaf of Islamic State killed in a U.S.UK Special Forces raid on 1516 May 2015 Nilsson 2016 and a bombing raid on a cash storage of Islamic State on 11 January 2016 Barbara Starr and Daniella Diaz 2016. The estimated value of Islamic State in February 2015 amounted to 289.5 million USD. The raid is said to be the most successful operation in U.S Special Forces ’ history. However, important lessons can be drawn from the raids and the cyber campaign. Islamic State is applying traditional tradecraft. For example, the New York Times reported, “Wives of the top Islamic State leaders, including Mr. Baghdadi’s, play a more important role than previously known, passing information to one another, and then to their spouses, in an effort to avoid electronic intercepts. ” Schmitt 2015. A similar situation should be expected in Asia with penetrating and detecting new groups delineating the lines of intelligence operations, law enforcement, and milit ary insurgency. The “Joint” task force concept is the path forward. The counter-terror capability before and while the attack was unfolding, Indonesian security forces were actively after the Eastern Indonesian Mujahideen group, killing at least one member of the group in Poso on Friday, January 15, 2016 Promchertchoo 2016 and since the January attack has continued to execute Operasi Camar Maleo and Operasi Tinombala. to target the Santoso group. Following the Sarinah and Brussels attacks, the United States ’ regional support for counter- terrorism efforts can be seen in adding Santoso alias Abu Wardah leading the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur MIT to the list of U.S. Specially Designated Global Terrorists SDGT. With this designation, US assets are able to coordinate efforts across the US government and with US international partners to disrupt, deny and use law enforcement actions targeting the Islamic State faction Salim 2016. Santoso alias Abu Warda alias Abu Wardah alias Abu Wardah as-Syarqi alias Abu Yahya is now facing a wide array of technical, soft and hard systems to apprehend him Eric 2016 182 . Despite counter terror, efforts are underway - Operation Tinombala is designed to capture or kill the jihadists and erode his cell, central Sulawesi police denied Santoso was killed in firefights Okezone 2016. At the time of this report, fourteen members were arrested, four men were captured alive and ten of the group’s members were killed by security forces 183 . 180 The State Department operates the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications CSCC to counter Islamic State ideology. 181 Ibid. 182 Santoso born on 21 August 1976 in Tentena, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia 183 Ibid. Page 88 of 126

3.2 IMPROVE SOFT SKILLS

However, more work on the “softer” side of counter terror efforts needs strengthening. Private- government initiatives, such as the Ernst Young ASEAN Cyber Security Centre of Excellence, for government and public sectors attempt to develop better infrastructure policies and capabilities in the cyber space. Indonesia lacks similar initiatives. Although some of the social media space is monitored, the program to counter radicalization must go beyond the odd monitoring program. A greater, and socially inclusive, wider effort is needed to counter a decade-long radicalization of Indonesians. Regardless how violent Hizb ut-Tahrirs vision is, societys answer should not be to ban it, but rather to expose and ridicule the intellectual poverty of its delusions. Ridicule, as opponents of the religious hatred legislation are so keen to point out, is a potent weapon. It should be one of the weapons of choice in the fight against what is dubbed by some observers as Islamic escapist fascism Sardar 2005. A view that is shared by observers in the region. Whereas the increase of counter terrorism branches throughout all of the Malaysian states and the creation of the Emergency Response Teams in Singapore are a needed evolution to deter and counter new threats, it will not solve the root causes Au 2016 of Islamic State, its on-line proselytization and planning to conduct revolutionary changes to societies in Southeast Asia. One of the key problems the security community has suffered since the first jihadist attack since 911 is the reactive response to any global terror attack in a response to public outcries. The various national warning systems changing “green to yellow” and similar systems are very often activated following an attack Arshad 2016. A mindset change is needed to issue pre- attack warnings, which will deter the attackers, and engage the public. This requires a mindset change within the intelligence and national security framework. Of recent attacks in Paris, Brussels and Jakarta, it is obvious that even experienced European security services were ignorant about the warning signals present Wei 2016. The strategic period of any of the terror groups involves long-term strategic planning and honing of skills. Jihadists see time works against societies as a timeless struggle. In both, Brussels and the Paris attacks, as well within the business community in Asia, we see a return of complacency. 3.3 LEGISLATIVE CHANGES Revisions of the current anti-terror legislation for preemptive arrest power for the police and the State Intelligence Agency are being submitted to the Indonesian parliament. It is expected the parliament will pass the suggested changes by mid-April allowing a six-month ’ preventive detention for terrorist suspects F. C. Soeriaatmadja 2016. Usually, this will invoke the cry by the civil society and environmental groups as returning to the days of the New Order regime. Human Rights Watch calls for rejecting the bill that will revise the 2003 Anti-Terrorism Law as the revocation of citizenship an d a new set of definitions of what constitutes as a ‘radical group’ were introduced Karensa 2016. The role of pre-emptive judicial powers being expanded and pre-charge detention periods are not only introduced in Indonesia. The European Page 89 of 126 Union grapples with the same challenges as the growing weight of intelligence blurs the distinction between intelligence and evidence Policies 2014 184 . With the call for greater legislative power, the Indonesian police will demand an increase in budgets and skills for the police force in conducting counter-insurgency training Chan, Straits Times 2016. In July 2015, the police chief requested that army raiders and Special Forces train Brimob in jungle warfare IPAC 2016. With domestic legal limitations imposed since 1998, the army may not able to train the police forcing the latter to seek counter insurgency training from the United Kingdom Sundaryani 2015. As a direct result of the events in Jakarta, the National Intelligence Agency BIN has proposed new powers of preventive detention and recruiting additionally 2,000 staff to cope with the intelligence demands counter terrorism and address the fast changing environment. Although three-men and a 15-year-old boy were en route to Syria to be deported back to Indonesia on 21 February 2016, all were released Chan, Straits Times 2016 - even though they were planning to join IS and had links to Indonesian militants to the 14 January attack. The four, Untung Sugema Mardjuk, 49; Risno, 28; Mukhlis Koifur Rofiq, 23; and his brother Muhammad Mufid Murtadho, who is only 15 – were radicalized in an Islamic boarding school, called Pesantren Chan, Straits Times 2016. The current Indonesian legislation does not permit individuals being held for being terror suspects. 3.4 COUNTER POLITICAL NIHILISTIC NARRATIVES “...I see the counter-narrative as the only way that Western governments can deal with the ISIS propaganda, but theres no strategy right now …” Straits Times 2015 Too often, Indonesian policies are marked by oversimplification and opportunistic political interference. Counter narratives must include the dispensing of conspiracy theorists that are beginning to flood the space of narratives. One 2014 okezone.com report argued that Poso terrorists are deliberately maintained for police rank promotion and budget purposes Anggriawan 2014. These pundits claim the hunt for terrorists are deliberately not solved. The fallacy resurfaced in the post-2016 online circulatory reports widely in use in social media. It shows the line between propaganda and facts are thin and the ‘deep battle’ is about winning the counter narrative. In Riau, and rest of Indonesia, there is continuous room for improvement. The trend towards a radicalization of society cannot be defeated by the message of ‘love’ and ‘peace’. These narratives sound hollow and are quickly dismissed and countered by the radical narrative claiming moral and religious superiority over the narrative of the state. Moderate Islamic and western leaders lack the credibility with those most susceptible to the radical plot Straits Times 2015. Whereas the efforts by NU for a liberal, pluralistic Islam comes at a time when Islam is at war with itself, the efforts are drowned out by the media savvy radical narratives. With the central question on how faith is defined in the modern era, the counter narrative must move in equal speed adopting modernity whilst countering radicalism. Whereas the narrative of Islamic State 184 The Strait Times, 15 February 2016, p. 19 Page 90 of 126 is relatively easily identified, the Khilafah narrative, a cornerstone of Islamization, remains unchallenged. We are not convinced this deep battle will be won. Others, like the leftist commentators and some Islamist fractions such as the Chairman of Muhammadiyah in charge of Justice, Busyro Muqaddas, mention the terrorist movement in Indonesia because of intentional negligence. Busyro said the movement ’s patterns of radicalism today tend to be the same as the radicalism in the New Order era Redaksi 2016. The Marxist groups argued that in the past decade, ranging from the bombings in Bali, the Australian embassy bombing and the Marriott hotel bombing in Jakarta, in the name of combating terrorism and collective security, extra-judicial acts are performed repeatedly by security forces Pontoh 2016. The argument that the politicization of social argument of poverty and poor welfare Posmetro 2016 causes terrorism in Indonesia was quickly regurgitated by some Indonesian intellectual writers in the New York Times. It is true that a tiny number of the countrys army of poorly educated, desperately underemployed young men are attracted to the guts-and-glory narrative spun by ISIS, Elizabeth Pisani wrote in the Financial Times. But their discontent is based on economic rather than religious or political marginalization, she said Jensen 2016. This oversimplification fails to understand or address the ideological aspect of modern day terrorism and fails the litmus test if we examine the social conditions and compare them in Europe, which have seen a spate of attacks because of political correctness, failed integration policies and western values clashing with the destruction culture of the jihadi movement. A large number of recent bombers in Europe are, in fact, of European descent. The rise of Islamic State has become a battle within the jihadist movement itself, mixing attempts to create insurgency with shock tactics. Islamic State has to continue its attacks, otherwise, it appears weak Zenn, The Jamestown Foundation 2016. 3.5 GREATER ENGAGEMENT WITH RELIGIOUS LEADERS “An ultimate defeat of ISIS cannot happen without a reformation within Islam….” Arango 2015 Although de-radicalization programs by BNPT are ongoing, the refusal by one of the attackers to participate in the program shows the limitation of such programs. The political will to exclude Islamic State and declaring the organization and its members, as Takfiris would differentiate the terror groups as un-Islamic. The religious exclusion of calling the extremists Takfiri is not been used widely used in the Indonesian context and is, in our view, a policy agenda that needs to be revisited since the attackers displayed all the signs of a Takfiri Imam 2015. The use of Nahdlatul Ulamas leadership arguing Indonesian Islam is distinctively different from the Arab version must be reinforced 185 because the Arabization of the Islamic narrative in Indonesia has taken hold Bazzi 2015. The Takfiri is central to the ideology of most of todays Islamist militant groups, who have killed far more Muslims than non-Muslims 186 . ISIS is inspired by a group of clerics 185 http:www.muslimhebat.com201512ketua-nu-islam-indonesia-bukan-islam.html ; no date 186 Ibid. Page 91 of 126 and religious scholars across Islams history who advocated the idea of declaring other Muslims as infidels or apostates, and justifying their killing. The inter-faith attacks have already commenced in Indonesia and will continue for the foreseeable future. However, the engagement must include groups scholars ’ description of ‘believing without belonging’ and ‘neither believing nor belonging’ Mathews 2016 allowing to counter the Islamic State ’s cherry-picking of Islamic scholars as befits the justification of its nihilistic emulation of appearing credible. Whereas Ibn Taymiyya is regularly quoted while justifying violence, the historical facts of his anti-Mongol fatwas – justifying violence against fellow Muslims, declaring non-believers as infidels or kafirs – can be found in the jihadi narratives, however, the historical facts show he believed Islamic theology had been corrupted by philosophy and mysticism. This can be seen in the recent attacks against Shi’ite mosques in Bangladesh Straits Times 2015 187 . In December 2015, Indonesian police prevented attacks against the Shia communities in Pekalongan Central Java, Bandung and Pekanbaru Sumatra Aljazeera 2015. He argued that Islamic law should be based on a literal interpretation of only two sources: The Quran and the Sunnah. He dismissed analogical reasoning and the consensus of scholars, two sources that had helped Islamic law evolve over time Bazzi 2015. This historical fact should be expanded and challenged and provides a counter narrative opportunity not sufficiently exploited. The current adaptation of a narrow view of a new Islamic vanguard is needed to restore Islam to be the “leader of mankind 188 ” and Muslim rulers who do not apply Islamic law should be removed from power. This interpretation includes the countries in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The removal of the Saudi and Jordanian royal houses 189 are identical to the removal of the Malaysian, Indonesian, Thai and Philippine governments. Whereas the autonomy of the South of Thailand or Southern provinces in the Philippines was a national objective, the Islamic State has eroded these boundaries. The political statement that radicalism arises from Islamic countries that failed to develop and exacerbated with internal conflicts spreading to other countries The Jakarta Post 2016, fails to recognize the social and political environment in developed and prosperous countries such as France or the United Kingdom. The statement made by the Indonesian Vice President at the International Summit of the Moderate Islam would suggest Indonesia is a failed state with internal strife. Following the Paris attacks, the French government engaged 400 Islamic leaders, 10 Muslim organizations, and five Grand Mosques to reject the Islamic State narrative. With approximately eight percent of the population – or five million – Muslims in France, the initiatives are paradigm shifts from the failed 1980 attempt to nurture liberal Islam in France 190 . On the political front, a recent Pew report showed four percent of 1,000 Indonesians support the radical movement, causing alarm within the political leadership Lumanauw 2016. In Malaysia, an estimated 11 percent of the population is sympathetic to jihadist causes. This 187 Although “hi ites a e a ti i o it i Bangladesh, the attacks are attempts to spread discontent and undermine stability of the state. 188 Ibid. 189 Ibid. 190 Call in France for enlightened Islam to win battle of ideas, The Strait Times, 1 December 2015, pg 10 Page 92 of 126 represents a considerable challenge for the political leadership. However, the military leadership of the Philippine army dismissed the recruitment videos Weiss 2015 released by Islamic State as propaganda. With the changing political relationship between MILF and the Philippine state, a rift within the MILF will occur providing fertile ground to recruit already radicalized fighters into Islamic State. Source: Asiaone Asiaone 2015 The threat of IS in Mindanao creates increasingly new forms of radical groups. In central Mindanao, a Christian group called the Red Gods Defenders to counter the rising threat of jihadists Tomlinson 2016 has arisen. The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters on Friday said it believes that the military was behind the existence of the Red God ’s Defender Maitem 2016. The rift within the MILF, the rise of Islamic State and counter violence all bear the signs of an increase in violence in Mindanao for the foreseeable future. Extremists from Southeast Asia hiding out in the Philippines may face increasing pressure. The MILF will likely use the knowledge of wanted Southeast Asian jihadists to negotiate favourable terms with the Philippine government 191 . But regardless of the regional and tactical developments, Indonesian policy officials continue to face off with the ideological challenges to counter the radical ideology. Like other jihadists ’ ideology, the question is no longer about the angry young men joining Islamic State but the fundamental motivation of recruits must be addressed. Reme Ahmad wrote in the Strait Times, “… Today, I worry for my religion as it has been hijacked by angry voices who think spilling innocent blood is the way to go…” and, “…The terrorists who have hijacked Islam also promote the idea that they are fighting an apocalyptic war…” Ahmad 2016 A fundamental shift in counter terror policy must include the political will, religious engagement and clear and defined legislative framework recognizing the threat of radicalization, hate speech and jihadi misinterpretation of Islam. This battle must be fought in the mosques and within the communities and schools not captured by the national school system. Without deep structural reform of the educational system, radicalization of communities will continue. Whereas poverty plays one aspect in the radicalization process the political will of both, the religious and political leadership and the need for greater social cohesion Lim 2016, will set conditions to reduce radicalization. Although the size of Islamic State in Indonesia is still small, the ignorance by the political elite, the intelligentsia, the media and religious leadership of approaching Islamic State with a 191 Ibid. Page 93 of 126 nonchalant attitude provides the oxygen IS and jihadist extremism need. Islamic State breeds mistrust among different groups, calls for a total removal of Islamic order in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, driving a social wedge between groups and creating distrust Straits Times 2016 of communal harmony. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Tahrir 2014, although never banned in Indonesia, holds the political objective that it is not only the duty of Muslims to re-establish the Khilafah state or Caliphate, but the most important obligation of Muslims 192 . Source: Facebook Bersyariah 2016 Challenging pluralism and calling for an end of capitalism and the prospects of Islamic Civilization under Khilafah the Caliphate must be viewed with a critical perspective of the political and ideological orientation as in line with leftist groups who call an end of the capitalist system and a replacement of democracy. A similar view is held by members of the Khatib Nusantara who stated, If you catch us, we will only increase in number but if you let us be, we will be closer to our goal of bringing back the rule of the Khalifah caliph. Straits Times 2016 With the pressure on Islamic State ae likely to increase because of the coalition targeting Islamic State, a shift of actions in the far- battle space like the Philippines and Indonesia could increase. Indonesian policy officials must come to terms that beyond the elite in Jakarta, they must find a balance between consistent counter terror policies. Today, jihadists have hijacked Islam claiming they are fighting an apocalyptic war Sulizar 2013. After fifteen years of fighting jihadist ideology, the question is a constant reality even applicable for the “people’s president”. 192 Ibid. Page 94 of 126

3.6 OVERHAUL THE PRISON SYSTEM

A dramatic overhaul of the prison system is needed including de-radicalization programs and facilities, which address the notoriously poor and corrupt prison guards K. a. Kapoor 2016. Corruption is rampant within the prisons. The weapons heist, riots in Kerobokan prison in Bali on 21 April, Tewaan Bitung detention centre in North Sulawesi on 6 April, Malabero prison in Bengkulu on 25 March, Rajabasa prison in Lampung on 18 March and Muara Bulian prison in Jambi on 17 March 2016, are indicators of the chronic problems within the prison system. Some indicators of the extent of the imprisoned jihadists operating behind prison bars surfaced following the January Sarinah attack W. Soeriaatmadja, Straits Times 2016 193 . The government reacted by breaking up the imprisoned leaders W. Soeriaatmadja, Straits Times 2016 194 but a more comprehensive prison management approach is needed. The current system is prone to support prisons ’ recruitment and radicalization within the prison population. The conditions in the prisons provide fertile ground for inmate radicalization, recruitment and learning capabilities to enhance criminal skills. The percentage of reformed inmates is low and de-radicalization efforts are often rejected. Particularly, with an increase in length in prison sentences Free Malaysia Today 2016 195 the long-term implications of prisons are the Harvard schools of crime and terrorism the issues governing the sentencing, incarceration and post-prison management are in dire need for reform and modernization. The Indonesian prison service is the stepchild of enforcement. Overcrowding, poorly trained and underpaid staff, corruption is rampant providing the vacuum the terrorists thrive in. Examination of reports shows an incredible system of communication, leadership instruction and continuation of building the jihadist structures. The physical rebuilding of high security prisons, restriction of movements and limitation of visitation rights are becoming much needed urgent reforms W. Soeriaatmadja, Straits Times 2016. To quote the European Commission study once more, As many studies show in the case of the IRA members in Northern Ireland, or the RAF activists in Germany, the prison system is an important factor for the development of radical thinking. 193 Cell searches of Aman Abdurrahman found six mobile phones, headsets, ideological books, described as iole t ooks , 3 SIM cards, cables and switching devices. Communications with the outside was made with set of ou ie s ho possesses good e o izatio skills . The Isla i “tate ideologue sha ed his ell ith Musola alias Muhamad Ibrahim Musa, a bomb maker for JI and Iwan Darmawan Muntho alias Rois who helped Noordin Top to bomb the Australian embassy in 2004 and is on death row. 194 Heri Kuncoro, Iwan Darmawan Muntho alias Rois and Abrory alias Makadov who headed an Islamic boarding school in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara influenced his student in bomb making. Heri Kuncoro attempted to s uggle fi ea s f o the Philippi es to I do esia. ‘ois as ide tified tea hi g the Jaka ta Fou ta ti s when visiting Rois in early January 2016 see this ; 1 March 2016. 195 Four jailed for 90 years in total for terror plan; He was visited by Syaiful Bahri alias Apuy. In 2004 Bahri, Hasan aka Purnomo aka Agung, and Sogir aka Ansori were arrested carrying waist bomb belts weighing 0.5-2 kg made out of TNT, carrying 50 rounds of ammunitions. see this ; 26 November 2004 Page 95 of 126 Conventional wisdom on recruitment is very often based on a misleading behaviourist assumption or a form of domino effect Moghaddam, 2005: it is as if there was a chain reaction between reading particular books, living in the vicinity of charismatic inmates that would necessarily lead to indoctrination and eventually to violent action. More cautious approaches and studies on prisons and radicalisation Hamm, 2012, 2009; Jones, 2014; Silke, 2011 show a less dramatic and perhaps more simple reality: over-crowded closed environment such as our prisons inevitably contributes to the development of different strategies of resistance to the institution. Temporary and opportunistic alliances between prisoners are a common behaviour in prisons Policies 2014. [Emphasis added] The creation of Detachment 88 brought not only a tactical and operational change in mind-set, a similar drive is needed for the prison service to reduce terrorist capabilities while incarcerated. Failure to do so will lead to the third revolution – with Darul Islam being the first, Jemaah Islamiyah being the second, Islamic State the third – broadening the movement giving it the spark it may need. Historical examples are ample, the Ayacucho prison riots in 1982 Herald-Tribune 1982, the Lurigancho and El Fronton riots in 1986 Project n.d. 196 in Peru, or the IRA ’s Long Kesh – renamed the HM Prison Maze – prison riots BBC 1974 show a similar development with the movements ’ deliberate action attempting to force political recognition of the groups’ motive. In the case of the IRA, the tactic worked, while in Peru, it failed eventually leading to a defeat of Shining Path by arms, and, society rejecting Marxism. Ample of commentaries are made since the discovery of fact the Sarinah attack was planned, coordinated and supplied from within the prisons walls resulting the Indonesian government to move Abu Bakar Baasyirs and Muhammad Natsiruddin 197 from Pasir Putih penitentiary in Nusakambangan Central Java to Gunung Sindur in Bogor, West Java into solitary confinement Gabrillin 2016. Source: Okezone.com Setyawan 2016 196 18 June 1986; published on 2 February 2008 197 Muhammad Natsiruddin alias Cecep alias Tegar; see this ; 16 April 2016; Muhammad Natsiruddin is the replacement the released Harry Kuncoro alias Husain alias Uceng alias Bahar alias Salim alias Joko Suseno alias Seno alias Wahyu Nugroho alias Roni alias Rahmat alias Muhammad alias Shobari alias Agus alias Ibnu alias Bagus, who was released on 20 March 2016 after serving six years for terrorism charges helping Dulmatin acquiring ammunition; see this ; 21 March 2016 Page 96 of 126 However, the moving of the leadership to different jails are only partially addressing the problem. In the case of Indonesia in 201516, about 200 convicted terror members will be returning to the public. As seen in the case of Abu Husna, who within weeks of his release formed the Katibah Aliman KA Sputniknews 2014 Institute For Policy Analysis Of Conflict 2016. Examining, engaging, and continuously interacting with extremists’ prison populations has provided a good sampling of comprehending the social dynamics of group and individual motivation of extremists. Contemporary work in Southeast Asia concerning prisoners as well as examining the motivation and profiles on terrorists are plentiful Alexander 2002 and continues to evolve Arie Perlinger 2014. But, examining the large volume of evidence continues being inconclusive. Motivations are wide ranging and diverse, both social, religious and economic. Southeast Asian extremists, particularly in Malaysia, are no longer the purist type of jihadists but come from all walks of life 198 their backgrounds are so diverse that they defy a single profile. After the attacks of Sept 11, 2001, Professor Alan B. Krueger, a Princeton economist, tested the widespread assumption that poverty was a key factor in the making of a terrorist Krueger 2007. His analysis of economic figures, polls, and data on suicide bombers and hate groups found no link between economic distress and terrorism Straits Times 2016. Examining prisoner records are important real time data points outlining the IndonesianSoutheast Asia motivation and social- economic relationships motivating the radical scene. In comparison, interviewing neo-socialistsMarxist extremist prisoners, we found many of the markers of extremists usually associated with jihadists. Alienation from society, deliberate isolation, claims of grievances real and fictitious, narrow interpretation of religious and political doctrine, critical questioning of order and adaptation of a new doctrine to replace societal order with new narratives by violent means 199 . The oversimplification of why individuals joined an extremist movement according to research will fail. The Strait Times wrote, quoting research, “As a practical matter, scientists note, checklists are mathematically certain to fail. Even a test with 99 per cent accuracy would be wrong far more often than right. In a country with a huge population and a tiny number of terrorists, even a near-perfect test would flag many more innocent people than actual terrorists. ” Straits Times 2015

3.7 DE-RADICALIZATION: NEW IDEAS NEEDED

We must imprint on the minds of generations of Muslims that the Palestinian problem is a religious one... I indeed wish to go to war for the sake of Allah I will assault and kill, assault and kill, assault and kill Victoroff 2005 In our view, the de-radicalization of large sways of Islamic State or jihadist members will only work if society and the political leadership reject Islamic violence. So far, the Indonesian program has produced in mixed results. 198 The patte o o alit has ee ide tified i the ajo it of studies o hat oti ates te o ists. 199 On-going study Department of Prisons Page 97 of 126 Some consider the Indonesian program as not successful, lacking initiatives, lacking direction, expensive, and have not been able to prevent the spread of jihadist doctrine Sapiie, The Jakarta Post 2016. The de-radicalization programs are not well-coordinated between government agencies as counter-terrorism is given priority over de-radicalization 200 . France, for example, following the Paris attack, has begun to revamp its deradicalisation program investing 62 million dollars creating counter radicalization centres throughout the country. Deradicalisation requires investment. The same applies for Indonesia, the Philippines or Bangladesh. The range of investments will provide a measurement on the future trajectory of the government’s efforts. Early studies governing deradicalisation carried out by the U.S. Department for Homeland Security in 2009 Dr John Horgan 2009 highlighted the issue of recidivism of incarnated jihadists Dr John Horgan 2009. The early successes of the former JI commander Bin Abbas lost its effectiveness since the program was at the beginning largely informal and linked to the personal relationship between captives and captors. Examples, such as Ali Imron regretting his own actions and speaking out against Islamic State, are needed as a constant message to the public. With the group size and prison population now having evolved, the original approaches are seen as a betrayal within the prison population. This change within the jihadist population is indicative of the ineffectiveness of the program but also shows the Indonesian jihadists have evolved and are today more battle proven, tested and continue to evolve to remain resilient against efforts to de-radicalize. A lack of interests by agencies and ministries and the absence of coordinated efforts provided the vacuum leading to the organizing, planning and supplying of the Sarinah attacks from within the prison system. A 2014 European Union study highlights the point of the counter-radicalization efforts, which showed mixed results. Both responses, “administrative” – i.e. passport confiscation, deportation, asset freezing, etc. – contributed to an escalation and justification for political violence. “Softer” approaches produced equally mixed results Policies 2014. Experiences in Northern Ireland show interestingly comparable data. Gerry Adams, presiden t of Sinn Fe´in, claimed that the British government ‘‘failed to facilitate the reintegration of prisoners,’’ claiming that former prisoners were being kept as lesser citizens in ‘‘all aspects of social and economic life. 201 ’ Similar statements are made by Indonesian jihadists in prison with the economic life in a post- prison environment providing maybe some solution, however, the de-radicalization will only be successful if a large segment of religious, political and the general public denounces jihadist ideology. The German experience is equally noteworthy. Daniel Kohler, Director of GIRDS in Germany said, “…answers brought by the families must rely on a comprehensive and thorough analysis of the communication used by radicalised individuals. All means of contact 200 Ibid. 201 Ge Ada s, E ualit Ca ot e a Illusio : It Must e a Fa t, Belfast Teleg aph, Ja uary 17, 2001, Opinion; quoted here ; 2010 Page 98 of 126 were put to use, including letters, emails, Skype sessions and face-to-face meetings in ‘neutral’ countries. The ultimate objective of the intervention programs was to get closer to radicalised individuals and to give families a voice to express t heir views.” He goes on, “The prevention of radicalisation was said to be particularly effective when it relied on deradicalised individuals and mothers who lost relatives. While the former were well- placed to explain why they joined and left a violent extremist movement, the latter had a credible and emotionally powerful voice.” Nur Diyanah Binte Anwar 2015 This approach has not yet gained traction in Indonesia although a simplification of the response such as socio-economic, family andor religion will not address the de-radicalization of extremists. Much-needed overhaul of the program is needed. The attraction, recruitment and fascination with the death-like cult continues to attract new recruits to Islamic State. The counter ideological narrative is ineffective. Some commentators consider a recidivism rate to be at least 15 percent whereas the Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency BNPT said that only 25 out of 300 released terrorists returned to their ‘old ways’ Sim and Ismail 2016. It is not yet clear how many of the 150 imprisoned jihadists planned to be released by the end of 2016 will return to their ‘old ways’ and how many of the 100 Indonesians having returned from Syria remain faithful to the cause. Another 200 Indonesians were deported by Turkey trying to enter Syria Hussain, Straits Times 2016. This adds up a pool of 450 potential new radicals to already existing number of known jihadists. An all-encompassing process is needed to isolate the narrative. Examples, such as the use of former active members of the IRA – and not only ‘converted’ former IRA members - to focus on the youth have shown positive results in preventing radicalization or the Malaysian de- radicalization program should be considered. Malaysia claims a 95 per cent success rate. Police and prison officials described a two-year Integrated Rehabilitation Module in use since 1948, when the authorities began battling a communist insurgency Teoh 2016. In contrast, the Indonesian program studies suggest that imprisonment did not change their ideological beliefs Sim and Ismail 2016. For them, jihad as understood by them, is the legitimate use of violence against the enemy of Islam. The only question is when and how to use it. However, other extremist movements show an economic self-sufficiency to become entrepreneurs to start a small business. Similar programs were applied with the IRA, FARC in Columbia and Shining Path in Peru. Unfortunately, none of the released extremists have received help from any government programs. The disconnect between the tactical units like Densus 88, the National Counter Terror Agency and the Prison service contributes to poor performance of the de-radicalization program 202 . 202 Ibid. Page 99 of 126 Like with the Shining Path in Peru, prison is a place for mobilization, indoctrination and cementing the group dynamic as identical to recent reports of imprisoned jihadists. The jihadist leadership is also issuing fatwas to prevent fellow inmates from leaving the groups. Publications to counter the counter-radicalization arguments are produced in quantity 203 . Some small steps emerge. The Nahdlatul Ulama NU and the University of Vienna initiated a project in 2014 Varagur, The Huffington Post 2016 called VORTEX, the Vienna Observatory for Applied Research on Radicalism and Extremism, funded by the Ministry for Internal Security with an aim to produce counter narratives against radical ideas. NU is also working on projects with the Swedish and British governments Varagur 2015. A prevention centre based in Indonesia, expected to be operational by the end of the year, will train Arabic-speaking students to engage with extreme ideology and messaging under the guidance of NU theologians who are consulting Western academia. The problem with Middle East Islam is they have what I call religious racism, said Dr Azyumardi Azra, an Islamic scholar and former rector of the State Islamic University in Jakarta. They feel that only the Arabs are real Muslims and the others are not. Straits Times 2015 But, we are pragmatic. The NU unit consists of 400-500 online activists who are self-funded volunteers, Hodge 2016. In contrast, these programs daily face the Islamic State’s ‘swarm cast’ generating 3.4 million tweets referencing Islamic extremism, in 3.3 million accounts and 1.8 million websites. A similar early detectioncounter radicalization program utilizing the Vienna-based Woman Without Border WWB Straits Times 2016 Ioffe 2016 initiative, who in cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, set up the first training session in Indonesia only in February 2016. Again, these initiatives are noteworthy but lack, in our view, scalability and sustained support from the political elite in Indonesia and in the region. 4. RE-THINKING COUNTER-TERROR STRATEGIES: THE ROLE OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES TNI Islamic State’s challenge for the Indonesian armed forces to “come to them”, i.e. Syria, may require a rethink of bringing the long-lines of communications to the Syrian battlespace to pursue Indonesian Islamic State in the field of battle with limited force . Contrary to the domestic groups of JI, MMI or JAT, the Islamic State is a foreign group waging war against Indonesian interests. Although the Indonesian cells are homegrown, they pursue an Islamic State ideology and its members are fighting on a foreign battlefield. Nevertheless, in the same breath, the resurging of Jemaah Islamiyah to reconstitute its military capability is repeatedly stressed as an emerging mediumlong term threat King 2016. In June 2015, the former Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, admitted in an interview with the Sydney Morning Herald that the United States asked to join the coalition against Islamic State but declined over concerns of a backlash by domestic radical groups Chan, Straits Times 203 Ibid. Page 100 of 126 2015. With the growth of the militant scene in sheer size, standing on the sidelines may no longer be an option for the current administration. However, a commitment of Indonesian Special Forces to operate in foreign far battle space, and in fact ASEAN countries, requires to review the application of force with a mix of Clausewitzian theory of Short Lines of Communications versus Long Lines of Communication and close battle versus deep battle 204 Ziemke 1983. The debate of what are the doctrinal response by law enforcements domestically close battle versus the deep battle intelligence battle have been going on for some time Ryan 2013. Whereas the previous Indonesian administration considered dispatching Indonesian troops as “cosmetic”, the current administration may be forced to deal with the far-threat in a different manner. This complexity is not uniquely a problem for Indonesian counter terror efforts. Michael Hayden in a recent BBC interview admitted that the U.S. intelligence community and the military, is considerably effective in the close battle but the results in the deep battle are somewhat mixed. His statement applies to the Indonesian and Southeast Asian counter terror efforts. Whereas the close battle – discovering attacks and disrupting plots, capturing or killing planners – is domestically the domain of Detachment 88 and law enforcement and has a long and successful history, little efforts are given to address the deep battle and regional threats such as Abu Sayyaf in the southern parts of the Philippines or the ideological counter narrative. Robert Martinage, former deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Special Operations, was quoted, The goal is to start a chain reaction of intelligence-driven raids that increase in frequency and expand in scope over ti me,” he goes on, “The metric becomes, can you disrupt and dismantle the network faster than the enemy can repair and regenerate it?” The objective of the Asian strategy must continue a combination of combat by arms, but cannot be disengaged from the political process to reject radicalism in Indonesia and the region. Whereas during the Malayan Emergency, the Malaysian counter propagandist C.C. Too understood the importance of the deep battle as an integral part of strategy that includes both, domestic security services and national defense, ample room for improvements in the deep battle space for Indonesian and other affected ASEAN countries exists. The rise of Islamic State and the far battle forces an adjustment of hegemonic approaches towards counter terrorism efforts. It will pose the question if Indonesian and Malaysian Special Forces are engaging selectively with the Islamic State on the battlefield in Syria and Iraq. Taking the counter terror efforts to the Middle Eastern region and a greater joint- commandjoint-operations focus should be considered under the current defense policy of the presidency of Joko Widodo Chan, Straits Times 2016. We argue against foreign military entanglement by the Indonesian armed forces but in limited force with defined objectives waging tactical battles against the Islamic State Indonesian elements maybe required to eliminate sanctuaries following the hostage taking by Abu Sayyaf Straits Times 2016 andor defeating the Indonesian Islamic State elements with specific direct 204 Close battles are described as tactical engagements whereas the deep battle is the ideological fight having a very deep time horizon; see this ; page 149 Page 101 of 126 action in cooperation with other coalition partners. This will provide battle experience and also valuable intelligence for the Indonesian counter-terror efforts. The Indonesian armed forces were isolated since 1998 as part of the political process and recent reports showing a more people friendlier face with TNI engaging in farming practices has caused frustrations within the ranks of the TNI. Creating a “people’s army” narrative with the public keeps the Indonesian army in high regards Soeriaatmadja 2016, however, departs from its military readiness and purpose. Source: Twitter 0709Kebumen 2016 With the combination of insurgency type of groups operating in the depths of the jungle, the traditional urban counter terror response is not sufficient. An integrated approach of armed forces and police is needed. With Islamic State Indonesian section are a foreign entity the counter-terrorcounter-insurgency role of the Indonesian armed forces gains importance by default. Domestically, the Indonesian armed forces are operating in a joint police armed forces operation hunting the Santoso group in Sulawesi is a positive step to deescalating the traditional tensions that exist between the police and the armed forces. Evidence, in particular, Malaysia and isolated cases in Indonesia, show the penetration of security forces to be in line with jihadi doctrine. Hence, a strong internal control mechanism within the security services is required. The armed forces and police in the region is not immune from jihadist recruitment efforts. Source: USMC Academy Corps 2015 205 205 slide 80 Page 102 of 126 Where is the brutality coming from? The guiding principle stems from the purification of Islamic society taking priority over combat against non-Muslim societies; however, the 2015 set of attacks are part of the expansion policies of the Islamic State. The destruction, removal of hypocrites, dissemblers or false Muslims Munafiqin, Apostates, Shia RafidahRafidites and near, and close enemies. However, the purification of the Islamic State is not uniquely IS. In the book, Purifying the Land of the Pure, the author Ispahani 2016 points out that since the Pakistani independence, the non-Muslim population of 26 percent has dropped to merely 3 percent today. Hence, today we are faced with an ideological battle as much as an actual tactical struggle. Islamic State calls for a removal of secular governance structures, condemns al Qaeda , Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, the Saudi and Hashemite dynasties, rejects the Kaaba as a pagan symbol, forcibly policing the Umma and renewal of the Ridda Wars of 632-633 AD Corps 2015 206 . This utopian vision of cleansing of Islam and rearranging society is based on the vacuum that the “Armies of Rome” – i.e. the U.S. and its allies – have left behind. But interestingly, the vision, as the U.S. Marine Corps Academy notes, in its Information Warfare strategy of ISIS, is Maoist in orientation. This arrangement of different ideologies merging in the Islamic State does de-facto allow both, regional ASEAN and global counter terror strategies, to draw from a large pool of historically relevant strategies to defeat Islamic State. However, since most of the groups are located in Syria and filter back into Asia, intelligence trip lines – i.e. pre-warning stages- and forward-looking monitoring of ISIL movements in the neighboring countries, will qualify for the Clausewitzian concept of long lines of communications providing security forces in the Southeast Asian region an opportunity to degrade the operational capability of returning fighters from Syria. Filtering individuals or cells back to Asia will become increasingly more difficult since law enforcement and counter terrorism units are increasingly more sophisticated in reacting to the threats. It is not yet clear if Islamic State in Indonesia follows the IS structures in Syria with forming different combat-oriented branches such as the Inghimasiyun those who plunge into battle, a shock force leading assaults with suicide bombings aimed to cause mass casualty shock attacks. Dhabiha slaughterers, who carry out executions of hostages, who operate in conjunction with mediaIO elements, or an Indonesian version of the Al-Khansaa Brigade , an all-female unit Corps 2015 - the evolution to an Indonesian female suicide bomber or jihadist cell to take a more direct action role Jones, The Lowy Institute for International Policy 2015, as experts suggest. So far, only the Malaysian jihadists have attempted to source weapons from Army depots, a shift in tactical behavior by the IS that cells could see a sourcing of firearms by raiding police posts or army depots. Historically, terror cells attacking army and police post are not unusual. The FARC, for example, used the attacks to serve as a training regime to test cell members, collect weapons and ammunition and communications equipment. It is part of the evolutionary process. 206 slide 83 Page 103 of 126 The coordination between attacks in Turkey, Indonesia, attempts in Malaysia, Burkina Faso and elsewhere shows a coordinated command and control structure between the ISIL branch entities is in place, coordinating and directing actions in Indonesia. One such example is the call by the Khatib Nusantara to Al Shabab to join its cause. The geographic and ideological orientation is eroding Wimmer 2012. Committing jihad with every means possible remains a mantra of the extremist fractions. 5. EXAMINATION OF INDONESIAN TRENDS First , ISIL has provided ample of verbal pre-warnings to the authorities that the battle would descend to Indonesia. The rapid response to the attack on the January 14, 2016 in Jakarta suggests the alert level by the first responders were in place preventing large casualties. Within eleven 11 minutes, off-duty armed police officers eliminated the terrorists by the time the first bomb went off 207 . Thirteen 13 suspects were arrested while six 6 had direct knowledge of the attack beforehand 208 . Second , the low count of victims should be considered as the key operational failure for Islamic State in the Jakarta attack. Of the current count of eight deaths, five were extremists. This represents 63 percent. Only two civilians were reported killed. This represents 40 percent. Compared to Paris, Nairobi and Burkina Faso, where the horrific death toll favored the terror groups - at the 21 September 2013 Westgate attack in Nairobi, 63 civilians 4 attackers were killed Straziuso 2013. This represents 94 percent success ratio with the attackers representing 6 percent. A similar disproportionate ratio is present in the November 2015 Paris attack. Of a total of 137 deaths including seven attackers, 130 deaths, or 95 per cent, were victims with the terrorists representing 5 per cent. In the Burkina Faso attacks on 15-16 January 2016, 36 deaths including seven attackers were recorded Hebdo 2016 209 . This represents 81 percent victims versus 19 percent loss for the attackers. The number slightly changes, as two- three deaths’ association with the attackers are unknown at the time of this report. Thirdly , the Indonesian response and the response at the Splendid Hotel in the capital of Burkina Faso prevented likely more mass casualties. In Burkina Faso, a high number of hostages could be freed or escaped. In Jakarta, the quick cordoning-off the incident area and engaging the terrorists head-on likely triggered a premature detonation of one of the devices. Fourth , ample of intelligence indicators, “chatter”, and movement on social media suggested something is “coming”. Promchertchoo, Channel News Asia 2016 Having intelligence four 4 days before the attack should be considered an intelligence success. The source accuracy depends on the access to the attack cell which prior to an attack was likely in isolation and halted all communications. 30-60 days is an above-average intelligence success. However, things can and will go wrong. Fifth , a general definition of groups’ activities has emerged. Whereas Jemaah Islamiyah’s signature trademark were Western targets and sophisticated and more advanced bombings, Islamic State is less sophisticated but aims to cause mass casualties. Whereas JI operates in a 207 Indonesian who join ISIS risk losing citizenship; The Straits Times, 22 January 2016; pate A15 208 Ibid. 209 In the attack two former Swiss parliamentarians were killed Page 104 of 126 purist narrative of its ideology, Islamic State holds lesser scruples and aims to shock and awe; it uses force indiscriminately Marhaenjati 2015. The Paris attacks were a paradigm change to change from a single attack – a bombing, a shooting, or a hostage taking – to set off all three at the same time. Over a period of two years, the attackers studied their targets. One of the mobile phones found contained archived images of the Bataclan theatre layout showing pre- planning of its operations. The security forces were overwhelmed Rukmini Callimachi 2016. Reports show a consistent large number of cell members. Iraqi intelligence reported that 24 people were reportedly involved in the operation: 19 attackers and 5 others supporting the cell with planning and logistics Koehli 2016. Salah and Ibrahim Abdeslam were in charge of logistics. This again shows intelligence – the “dots” – and over-the-horizon intelligence is available and governments continue to fail to collaborate to recognize the data points. Sixth , infiltrating police and the army, as seen in Malaysia, is straight out of the textbook of Islamic State’s Naji 2006 Management of Savagery . So are the taking of hostages and attacks against tourists. The repeated attack is designed to show how ineffective the “the apostates” organs of the states are and that Islam, and its nobles, are invincible. As always, the true battle will be the rejection of extremists’ ideology. In 2006, Abu Bakr Naji wrote in the Management of Savagery , “The first goal: Destroy a large part of the respect for America and spread confidence in the souls of Muslims by means of: 1 Reveal the deceptive media to be a power without force. ” Seventh , with access to firearms in Asia being somewhat limited, the shift to knifing attacks as seen in the Drummer Rigby attack, the hatchet attack against New York police officers or the attacks against French police in the events leading up to the Charlie Hebdo attacks are a real high probability threat scenario in this region, including Singapore. In the Jakarta attack, one of the killed attackers carried a large slashing type of knife, which would have been used once the attacker ran out of ammunition. A knife, or kitchen choppers, are commonly available and would represent a real threat scenario in Singapore Boey 2016, Bali, Jakarta, in shopping malls or popular places. Eighth , Islamic State is not merely another evolution of a terror organization. The amalgamation of ideologies arguing for the need of rearranging Islamic society, Islamic State is no different than the Nazis, or as increasingly shown, extreme Maoists. Islamic State is not merely against western interests; it is against all non-Islamic State conformist views. If not aggressively removed from the ‘battle space’ Islamic State will metastasize and create a new era of radicalization. The key evolution of this development will be the sheer size of available recruits to the pool of wannabe jihadists. In October 2014, German authorities reported twelve injured jihadi sympathizers clashed with Salafists from Chechnya in a registered demonstration in the city of Celle. The attacks against Saudi mosques Al Jazeera 2016 are a manifestation of the fight within Islam. These waves of localized “turf wars” are de-facto battles over influence to establish Jihadist enclaves. The European example of the growing attraction of Islamic State should serve as an indicator for the near future in Asia. Page 105 of 126 In Germany, the number of members identified by authorities jumped from 4,500 in 2012 to 5,500 in 2013 210 . But data reviewed for this report shows discrepancies claiming 677 individuals departed Germany for Syria or Iraq before 30 June 2015. The German Federal Agency for Constitutional Protection claims more than 800 people left for conflict zones. About one-third are known or assumed to have returned to Germany. 70 are thought to have experienced combat or undergone some form of military training Heinke 2016. On 2 June 2016, German police prevented an attack in Düsseldorf arresting an Islamic State cell ready to strike Troianovski and Turner 2016 in the city center plotting to strike with two suicide bombs and “kill as many passersby as possible” 211 in a Mumbai style attack. Conversely, again, an overstating of the threat is not solving the ideological attraction of Islamic State or the jihadi doctrine. Whereas the Indonesian and the Asian version is an Islamic State “lite” version, the attraction to the Syrian and Iraqi IS members is the same. A French hostage compares this to “street kids drunk on ideology and power”. Nevertheless, all the jihadists groups display technical interconnectivity, following the news obsessively, but everything going through their own filter Hénin 2015 . Germany’s welcoming migrants is seen troubling to the jihadist cause, as cohesion and tolerance is not what Islamic State wants to see. It could be argued the increase of Jihadist action in Germany is aimed to cause a rift in Germany against immigrants. The rise of the far-right would support the jihadi thinking. Unlike in Indonesia, the increase of intolerance noted Malaysia is of greater concern. Today, the number of actual terrorists executing operations are relatively small, but the battlefield experiences of Syria in 2016 replacing the first generation of Asians fighting in Afghanistan are developments that should be of concern. Combat-tested fifth generation of Islamic fighters, wannabe jihadists, and radicalized individuals attracted to the cause will continue if policy and communities are not countering Islamic State. Following the Paris attacks, police interviews indicated that one of the attackers, Abaaoud, claimed he was in charge of a 90-men-strong Islamic State cell who infiltrated Europe with the flood of Syrian war refugees through Greece Rukmini Callimachi 2016. With the transnational nature of Asian terrorists having a long history hence, the events in Paris and Jakarta provide an indicator of cross boundary actions for the future if Islamic State is becoming the pre-dominate consolidating body superseding local squabbles for power. Terrorist movements have ended due to a number of factors, including “decapitation” or removal of a leader; the inability of a group to pass on its values to the next generation; the participation of the group in political processes or negotiations; the loss of public support; or the achievement —or perceived achievement—of the group’s objectives Fink and Hearne 2008. The erosion of organizational structures and, ergo, the operational capability to regenerate new leaders, is by default and the actions of Islamic State, most likely, a foreseeable outcome. Whereas other activities – such as engagement and de-radicalization go hand in hand, the 210 Annual 2014 report; Ministry for Interior page 107 211 Ibid. the cell consisted of four Syrians; Abd. Arahman K. charged for producing explosive vests which he already done in Syria in 2013 for the Al Qaeda Nusra Front. Hamza C. and Saleh A. travelled to Germany via the G ee e f o Ma h to Jul . The ell filte ed i to Ge a as pa t of the efugee a e. “aleh A. ordered by Islamic State handler Abou Dujana al-Tunisi. The head for operations in Europe is Abu Sulayman al- Faransi suspected to be a French national linked to the spokesperson Abu Mohammed al-Adnani. German prosecutors claim the operations in Dusseldorf were planned as early as 20132014 see this Page 106 of 126 elimination of the terror leadership and reduction of reproducing future leader remains a priority. Indonesia and the region continuously face the transnational travelling jihadi joining the fights in Syria and Iraq. The ‘ratlines’ are known as far back as the Soviet-Afghan war. The case of Afif Abdul Majid, 63, outlines the attraction of Islamic State. Found guilty and now serving four years for collecting 25 million IDR to fund a militant training camp in Aceh Soeriaatmadja, Straits Times 2015, he was arrested after returning from Syria. In 2014, a small town doctor Chan, Straits Times 2015 in Yogyakarta provided the contacts to the handlers in Turkey. The returning fighters will find fertile ground with the main stream of radicalized segment of the population as the current administration is not setting the right tone to counter radical process. Although NU has initiated programs to reject Takfiri ideology, the political climate is distinctively split along rural and urban lines providing a fertile ground for radicalization. As quoted earlier, “An ultimate defeat of ISIS cannot happen without a reformation within Islam…” Arango 2015, the reformation of Islam is faced with an increase in ultra-secularism. This provides an interesting paradoxical problem for governments attempting to prevent individuals to join Islamic State. For some time, authorities attempted to prevent individuals to move to Syria. Halting migration is, however, a flawed approach since this would be a reversal of democratic principles. It also causes a problem for policing the exodus of radicalized followers. The recent arrest and successful conviction of returning Islamic State individuals as seen in the case of Tareena Shakil for encouraging acts of terrorism seems, for the moment, a better response Fricker 2016. 6. A SPECIAL CASE: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR RIAU What lessons can we draw for the industry? The erosion of the ideological base causes fluctuations of activists switching from one extreme ideology to the other. The example of Shiello Poernomo alias Abi Humaira switching from the communist PRD to the radical Front Pembela Islam FPI is a good representation of individual ideological orientation change if the right “trigger” is present motivating an already radicalized individual. The slogan of FPI, “ to live nobly or better die in a holy war as a martyr ” Council 2014, provides an insight into the mindset of the jihadist today. But Shiello Poernomo aka Abi Humaira is not the only individual identified undergoing a transformation. Usman Hariansyah, the former Executive Director of Friends of the EarthWALHI, is now known for spending most of his time at the Masjid Raudhatul Jannah mosque in Pekanbaru. The mosque is well known for its large Salafi-based following. Although the Indonesian Salafists are not explicitly supporting jihadist narratives Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism And Terrorism Mostly Dont Mix 2004, the Indonesian Salafi movement is not immune to jihadist teachings and the more moderate open streams of Salafi thought provide a fertile recruitment ground for jihadists in Riau. With both radicals were identified as Persons of Interests following the 2011 murder, the evolution from leftist radical to joining Font Pembela Islam and Salafi mosques are standing out in the evolutionary process of individual activists identified targeting Indonesian stakeholders. Page 107 of 126 The surfacing of the Ta’dzimus Sunnah Foundation Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism And Terrorism Mostly Dont Mix 2004, the Al Kahfi Foundation in Batam and the Pesantren Al Furqon in Pekanbaru, the Salafi presence in Pekanbaru has been firmly established for some time. The Ta’dzimus Sunnah Foundation 212 operates a website carrying the Islamic State’s logo. Source: Ta’dzim Sunnah 213 Riau The split within the Indonesian Salafists is between the “purists” and the more tolerant and inclusive mindset within the movement. Whereas the purists categorically reject the Muslim Brotherhood, the political party PKS, Hizbut Tahrir, Jemaah Tabligh or Darul Islam Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism And Terrorism Mostly Dont Mix 2004. Individual examination of what level of radicalization the individuals within the cells, factions and group has reached may be in direct confrontation with the more peaceful inclined moderates within the Salafi structure in Riau. Din Wahid wrote, “…Muslims groups who oppose the democracy, such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia HTI, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia MMI and Salafis. These groups maintain that democracy is against Islam, because Islam does not recognize democracy. Democracy as symboli zed by “the power of people” contradicts the basic doctrine of Islam concerning the sovereignty. In Islam, they maintain, the power or sovereignty belongs to God only.. .” Wahid 2014 The prisoner debriefing notes state that t he ‘conversion’ of PRD activists to join Islamic cells and vice versa as reported by the University of Indonesia study Muluk, Milla and Cahyono 2014 points to a new emerging phenomena that applies in the case of Riau-based radicals identified in the orbit of the 2011 murder and arsons. Whereas yet largely ignored by the academia and police officials, counter terror officials interviewed for this paper are more concerned about the erosion of the ideological base. So are we. Imprisoned Muhammad Ridwan warned of a new direction of the campaign in late 2015, which would be consistent with the shift in alliances of individual members joining non-socialist causes. The anecdotal evidence would suggest such a shift. 212 http:www.tazhimassunnah.or.id ; the Ma had Ta zhi is “u ah Peka a u is lo ated at Jl. “e ai III, No. , Pekanbaru 28282 213 Ibid. Page 108 of 126 Intelligence reports consistently show a lateral movement of PRD activists joining the radical FPI or vice versa. Besides the University of Indonesia study, the prison interview, the actual evidence – as shown below – shows the intelligence collection in fact confirms the physical evidence of known PRD radicals. The objective to ‘kill white people’ – i.e. foreign looking - is a theme often seen in Islamic State-inspired attacks Le Temps 2016 but its reach has gone beyond Java and the traditional targets. Reports confirm the evolutionary development of Islamic State-type of franchises emerging in East Java, Lampung, Sumatra, South, West and Central Sulawesi 214 . Whereas academics dismiss the expansion of Islamic State to Sumatra as Indonesian jihadists are over- reaching, we do not. The expansion of the Front Pembela Islam FPI to Riau is one of such examples. Small, and violent, the historical linkages of intolerance towards minorities are documented and known to authorities. So are the links to groups like the Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid JAT, the Indonesian Islamic Propagation CouncilDewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia DDII, the Islamic Student MovementGerakan Pemuda Islam GPI ICG 2010 or HMI-MPO. The conversion from ‘fighting for the state’ to ‘fighting for jihad’ can be found in the statement quoted by the Crisis Group, “…As one preman convert to the Islamic Defenders’ Front candidly explained, “now, in the reformasi era, nationalism, ‘defending the state’ bela bangsa and all that shit don’t cut it anymore. It’s the groups that are about jihad and fighting vice maksiat that are the way to go”…” 215 The expansions are consistent with the regional ambition of Islamic State to unify different factions and secure new and better supply and logistics routes and rebuild the movement. One of the examples are the recent warnings by Thai intelligence services of two Uighurs, known as Ali Yalcin Egin and Hidayet Dorsun Bernama 2016, travelling from Phuket to Malaysia, Indonesia or Singapore. As a note, Phuket hosts the largest Muslim community outside of the southern region. Whereas Phuket would provide an attack equal to the attacks in Bali, an attack against the tourist destination will harm the insurgency in the South. An attack against the smaller tourist location such as Koh Samui presents a better strategic target. Both tourist destinations were named in a sensitive intelligence dossier leaked to Malaysian press 216 . Whereas the role of the FPI reaches as far back as 1998 and has its roots in the post-Suharto 1997 days with the police Saragih 2011 217 attempting to control the radicalization of Islamic cells, today’s cells and association with the extremist jihadist fraction is unlikely being able to be kept under control. It is at best a chained beast that is constantly tamed. Evidence for this strategy only having limited effect will, in the strategic timeframe, backfire. The ideological pressures to pursue a Khilafah – the caliphate – is a more dominant narrative than the preservation of the state. 214 Jakarta intensifies hunt for most wanted terrorist; Strait Times, 1 December 2015, page A9 215 Ibid. 216 Ibid. 217 The police general was identified as Insp. Gen. ret. Nugroho Djayusman Page 109 of 126 To best describe the relationship, the court hearing of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir provides the answers to groups like FPI and their relationship to the Indonesian jihad. Because my physical condition was already weak, I could not give any support except giving financial aid to the best of my ability, as I had provided support to the Islamic struggle in Palestine via the Islam Defenders Front [FPI] and the MER-C [Medical Emergency Rescue Committee], said Ba’asyir The Jakarta Post 2016. “Ba’asyir said that in Islam, armed exercises were compulsory because along with one of God’s orders, all Muslims must prepare themselves to defend Islam.” 218 The role of the Islamic State-planned action in Sumatra with its terrorists travelling through Batam are worrying developments for the industry. Whereas in the past, Batam and Riau were a transit point, the industrial targeting should not be ruled out since Islamic State has attempted to reach out to militants in the province. 7. ARREST OF FORMER FELDA MEMBERS: THE RISE OF ISLAMIC STATE IN SUMATRA, THE RIAU ISLANDS AND TOBA The arrests on 16 November 2015 and 27 November 2015 are a noteworthy example for the industry showing the erosion of narratives and ideologies providing a potent mix finding its appeal across the extremist spectrum finding roots in Sumatra. In the post-mortem of the Jakarta Sarinah attacks, the increasing role of Sumatra and Riau is emerging in multiple perspectives. First, as a transit point for travelling jihadists leaving Indonesia heading to Syria, second, as recruitment ground for the Katibah Aliman KA founded by a jihadist freshly released from prison and thirdly, for the historical linkages to al Qaeda with a wife of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad living in Riau. Examination of active Twitter accounts shows presence of Islamic State sympathizers in Medan. Examinations that are more detailed is required but the example of “Abu Hamzah” is not an exception. Source: Twitter Hamzah 2014 The 31-year-old arrested assistant manager of housekeeping of the hotel in Nusajaya, Johor was originally from Sabah. Although no evidence indicates an Islamic State cell operates in Sabah, a large number of Indonesian migrants in Sabah are mainly providing manpower to the 218 Ibid. Page 110 of 126 plantation sector. Whereas some academics in Malaysia feel that Islamic State has no foothold in Sabah, evidence suggests otherwise as the plantation sector is exempted from the influences of extremists’ doctrine Vanar 2016. Across the Straits of Malacca, the activities of Islamic State followers appear in the agricultural industry. Malaysian police arrested ex-FELDA officers in Johor and Selangor. Two of the five arrested were part of the defunct Imam Mahdi movement Hock-Tong 1994, one was a 40- year-old former FELDA senior officer and staff of the Health Ministry who voluntarily separated from FELDA only in August 2015. An Indonesian was detained at the same time. The ex-FELDA officer travelled to Turkey in 21 October 2015 with the aim to join Islamic State. His travel was arranged by a Somalian whom he met on Twitter, highlighting the importance of social media monitoring. A 30-year-old member of the Al-Ghuraba cell of Jemaah Islamiyah was also arrested 219 . One of the arrested of the dismantled Imam Mahdi group was willing to kill anyone, including family members who got in his way. This extreme departure from the respect for life is an increasing recurring account that is getting a hold in the overall narrative. Source: Online Weehingthong 2014 In late January 2016, additional suspects were arrested. One is believed to have received orders from the Syria-based Bahrun Naim and Muhammad Wanndy Mohamed Jedi who was identified in a video linked to beheadings in Syria Vice 2016. The suspects planned attacks on strategic locations in Malaysia. Those arrested include an assistant manager of a hotel in Nusajaya and a store caretaker in a factory, while two suspects were detained in Kedah. The Islamic State “lone wolf” arrested in the capital was a former insurance agent. He was armed with a knife at the time of his arrest in the Mass Transit station Arif 2016. The example provides a cross cut of the followers of the new narrative of jihadist ideology. Although official reports claim any terror cells have yet to be detected in Riau, the steady influx of reports and appearance of radicalized jihadist in Riau has steadily increased. On 27 November 2016, four men were stopped by Singaporean authorities who use Batam and Bintan as transit points Chan, Straits Times 2016. This is no longer a far-enemy sitting in the jungles of the Philippines or fighting in Syria. This is a cross-cut of average citizens fully engaged in jihadist activities within the reasonable range of stakeholder businesses in Malaysia, on the borders of Singapore and provinces in Indonesia. 219 Ibid. Page 111 of 126 Hence, the security posture will require a holistic overhaul of corporate security structures for the stakeholder considering a forward leaning, progressive position instead of reactive application of the usual, failed security narratives using the policemilitary model. It is notable that despite the Minister for Security’s claims that Lake Toba is safe for tourists, security measures were increased Margareth 2016. Targeting tourist destinations is part of the Islamic State strategy. The rise of Islamic State in the provinces of Sumatra and the encompassing of a new era of jihadi-inspired violence is in our view no longer limited to the traditional targets. We view the diversity of war-like terror attack and the willingness to commit extreme atrocities on the public as a clear signal for changes in the making. Although the immediate threat against business interests by the Islamic State is low at this moment of time, the IS itself, like any other terror organization, is undergoing an evolutionary process. A shift towards commercial targets is, in the case of Islamic State, not ruled out. The attacks, although currently a failure, serve as a learning exercise. A Malaysian police memo provides a glimpse on the collusion amongst jihadists. On 16 November 2015, Malaysian police reported of a meeting between the Abu Sayyaf Group ASG, Islamic State IS and the Moro National Liberation Front MNLF. Fourteen 14 leaders attended the meeting held on Sunday, from the 3 organizations and 50 members of the ASG. Source: The Coverage The Coverage 2016 In the meeting, the groups agreed to increase recruitment of new members and deploying Abu Sayyaf and Islamic State assets to the Malaysian capital and Sabah, the back door into Indonesia. Intelligence reports suggest the suicide bombers underwent military training in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. ASG and Islamic State allocated 18 suicide bombers to the capital and eight 8 to Sabah 220 . The figure of Abu Husna is worthwhile to be examined in its entirety. Sidney Jones wrote, Abdurrahim bin Toyib alias Abu Husna. One of the original JI members, Abu Husna had been arrested in Malaysia in January 2008, trying to get to Damascus on a false passport, long bef ore the Syrian conflict erupted. He was trying to flee the country after arrests of other top JI leaders in 2007. Abu Husna has a classic JI profile: he studied at 220 Ibid. Page 112 of 126 Ba’asyir’s pesantren in Ngruki, Solo, taught there for years, and took a four-month training co urse at JI’s Camp Hu-daibiyah in central Mindanao in 1999. He was never himself directly involved in violence. He was moved to Nusakambangan after being tried and sentenced to nine years in 2009 – and if standard remissions policies were followed which they will not be, given his behavior, this would make him eligible for conditional release this year. When Ba’asyir was moved to Pasir Putih in 2013, Abu Husna became his de facto personal adviser. If Abu Husna fit the profile of fellow JI leaders arrested around the same time, one would have expected him to be relatively cooperative with prison authorities and initially, he seemed to be heading in that direction. A series of incidents turned him instead into one of IS’s strongest supporters Jones, Understanding Conflict 2015. Abu Husna received small funding from an Indonesian migrant worker in Hong Kong Institute For Policy Analysis Of Conflict 2016. Abu Husna, for example, succeeded in bringing on board Abdul Karim alias Abu Karim Erviani 2015 alias Abu Jundi, a JAT sympathizer, and gave him the task of recruiting new members in Sumatra Jones, Academia 2016 221 . On 15 June 2016, two men were arrested in Lampung in a Detachment 88 raid. Dwiatmoko, 35, and Abu, residents of Bumiratu Nuban Sub-district were arrested 222 . On the same day, two more IS members were arrested on on the slopes of Mount Sumbing. M Taufik Ismail Salam, a resident of Sumur Benger, Batang District, Central Java, and Siwi Prastyorini, an inhabitant of Imogiri, Sleman District, Yogyakarta Province, attempted to plant an Islamic State flag on top of the mountain on 17 August 2016, the Indonesian Independence Day 223 . Groups are getting smaller, independent and mobile to avoid detection. On 11 March 2016, a four-men IS cell was arrested after the examination of cell phone information of Rizal Faisal, a sex offender, discovered chatter on Rasyidin alias Cut Din Portalsatu 2016 224 alias Abu Sumatra – ‘the father of Sumatra’. This evolution provides a potent point. In the case of Abu Sumatra and his affiliation with the Aceh independence movement, we see a similar conversion of a nationalist narrative adopting a new identity carrying the potential to build new relationships between different ideological motivated groups eroding the traditional boundaries between groups. Another example is the continuous radicalization of known activists identified in the orbit of the PRD today as members of the Front Pembela Islam FPI representing another loss of group cohesion. 221 page 8 222 http:www.antaranews.comennews106257counter-terrorism-squad-arrests-two-alleged-terrorists-in- lampung ; 16 August 2016 223 http:www.antaranews.comennews106285two-alleged-isis-sympathizers-arrested-in-wonosobo ; 17 August 2016 224 A u “u at a es aped f o p iso s i Lhokseumawe serving time for a narcotics offense. He was also involved in an arson case using Molotov cocktails threatening agency for not getting direct employment projects Proyek Pekerjaan LangsungPL. Police shot him in the leg on 6 September 2014. He escaped claiming leave on compassionate grounds. He is a member of the Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front Atjeh Meurdehka – Perwakilan Nanggroe Malaja PN ASNLF AM MALAJA. Page 113 of 126 The resurfacing of the separatist movement in Aceh is another worrying trend. On 20 March 2015, the ASNLF – AM Wilayah Batèë Iliëk announced a ‘reorganized the structural [organizational?] lineup for the struggle for independence’. The manifesto states further, “As we know, the work of the struggle of Acehs independence in this period and in the future will increase and more severe. ” Foundation 2015 Source: You Tube 1 May 2015 ASNLF 2015 The same applies to members of the HMI-MPO and Tim Hisbah, which started in 2010 as an anti-Vice group crossing over to extremism. The conversion from PRD activists joining the Front Pembela Indonesia is one of the physical conversion of a leftist radical to join the right wing Islamist and displays all the signs not unlike other radical developments. Source: Facebook Indragiri, Facebook 2015 225 Indragiri, Facebook 2015 This visual shift from one extreme to another is no longer driven by pure ideological motives by the individual but in the search of ideological satisfaction attaches himself to a cause befitting his belief system. The individual appeared in social media profiles of Thabrani Al-Indragiri who displays various jihadist affiliations, such as Abdullah Azzam alias Abullah Yusuf Azzam, also known as the “Father of Global Jihad”, the Islamic State images of the Islamic warrior on a white horse or display of weaponry. 225 Shiello Poernomo alias Abi Humeira appears in Front Pembela Islam FPI profile of Thabrani Al-Indragiri Page 114 of 126 Source: Facebook Indragiri 2015 226 Indragiri, Facebook n.d. Indragiri, Facebook 2015 Whether the AK-47 is an airsoft version or real is not determinable by examining social media and requires additional investigations. Source: Facebook Indragiri, Facebook 2011 However, the combination of this jihadist’s narratives, specific references to al Qaeda ideological leadership and the symbolic presentation of jihadist-inspired themes combined with the positive identification of PRD extremists appearing in the orbit of the political leadership responsible for the premeditated murder on 13 July 2011 provides compelling evidence, the individual is self-radicalizing and has found a new more extreme calling. It is unclear what is the size and level of radicalization of the Front Pembela Islam FPI in Riau. However, in the context of the PRD and HMI-MPO, we have compelling evidence that these relationships exist and were used in actions targeting RAPP throughout 2010-2013. However, following the Sarinah attacks, more radicalized individuals appeared. 8. THE “SLIPPERY” OF ENEMIES: COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AND SOPHISTICATION OF ISLAMIC STATE, JIHADISTS AND LEFTIST EXTREMISTS This paper was able to establish the evidence of an increasing sophistication of extremists, jihadists and extremists, in intelligence operations. In the Riau context, extremists display a mix of more information security awareness across the political spectrum. Symbolism and suggestive symbolism are entering the communications circuit and dominating forms of ideological alliance amongst the different activists. 226 Abdullah Azzam, the ideological father of Al Qaeda appears in profile of FPI activist Thabrani al-Indragiri; linked to Shiello Poernomo identified member of the PRD Riau in 2011 now participating in with Front Pembela Islam FPI Page 115 of 126 Many of the known activists hold secondary and more social media accounts, which require non-traditional methods to detect, monitor, exploit, and understand. Photos, slogans, posters, and “hints” are dominating the narrative space. The events in Jakarta on 14 January 2016 and the recent discovery of an Islamic State treasure cache of intelligence information about its membership has confirmed the increasing awareness of counter intelligence efforts by government security forces to battle extremism. Called by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir the “slippery of enemies” Conflict 2016 warned his followers of the infidels, apostates and hypocrites about the sophisticated and unsophisticated methods, overtly and covertly of the Indonesian state to target the army of Caliphate. Evidence of an increase in Indonesian jihadist intelligence sophistication can be found in the examination of Islamic State slides hacked by IS surfacing on Indonesian jihadi sites showcasing how the outside world views national terror developments. In the 2008 MIT presentation, the relationship between GAM and Jemaah Islamiyah forming a cooperative alliance appeared. In 2016, Abu Husna rekindled this relationship. Source: Anshor Khilafah Islamiyya Jihad 2015 The examination by the Anshor Khilafah Islamiyya also highlights Islamic State and jihadist groups monitor the U.S. Special Operations Command surveillance capability operating in Indonesia. Factual or not, the narrative displays some of the digital perceptions by Indonesian jihadists. Source: Anshor Khilafah Islamiyya Jihad 2015 Openly jihadist, HTI-orientated, the use of environmental narrative in the HTIjihadist is a dangerous evolution as the radicalization and use of extremist Islam ideologies in the remote Page 116 of 126 communities of Riau could trigger inter communal violence, recruitment for the HTIjihadi orientation and calling for the replacement of capitalism to live under the rule of the caliphate see poster page 41. Whereas these evolutions may be seen as new developments, we have warned of this evolutionary process within the extremist landscape as early as 2011. The localized radicalization is continuing as part of societal changes, which remains increasingly unchallenged by the government. For the stakeholders, the evidence confirms with compelling manner the radical orientation of known activists who are in the direct orbit of events that led up to the premeditated killing in 2011 and a series of arson attacks in the concessions are a painful reality to accept. As the evolutionary development is semi-concealed, hidden under layers of symbolic affiliations, hints, and narratives that easily could be ignored, the danger is not the actual act of terror, which is the tail end of the process. This report is only scratching the surface of the linkages and networks of new extremist actors. We estimate about 10-20 different known extremists remain committed to the extremist causes, either leftist revolutionary or jihadist. CHAPTER IV. IMPLICATIONS CONCLUSIONS 1. INTRODUCING: “TOT SIEGEN”, THE CHRONIC PROBLEM Rosenberg, Cooper and Kulish 2016 Despite reports after reports suggesting victory by security forces over Islamic State, we warn what the Germans during WW II coined, “ sich zu Tode siegen ” with the Germans propaganda announcing continuously one victory after the other with greater and greater numbers of enemies killed but in the process exhausting itself to death. A similar trend is observed in some of the reporting that covers the fight against the Islamic State across the global battle field Islamic Invitation Turkey 2013 Straits Times 2016 BBC 2016. Contemporary terrorist networks overwhelm national security bodies Desker 2016 as a combination of transnational movements, broad based social media networks, recruitment at an early stage and political sensitivities represent a multi-headed hydra battles civil rights of citizens and the need for the state to protect the state. A BBC headline in June 2015 read, “ Islamic State conflict: 10,000 militants killed in nine months- US” BBC 2015. Another read, “25,000 ISIS militants killed in US air campaigns” Straits Times 2016 . In December 2015, the total number of ISIL fighters in Iraq were estimated between 20,000 to 30,000 Mamanglu-Regala 2015. This would represent a kill ratio of 1,100 Islamic State fighters per month. Taken the figure of 15,000-30,000 Islamic State fighters are the accepted estimates, the Islamic State would only today only field between 5,000 to 20,000 fighters. Intelligence reports in late 2015 Tina Kaidanow 2015 suggested about 31,000 foreign fighters were recruited Jim Michaels 2015 in the past 18 months, which would offset some of the 10,000 losses suffered. However, the figures vary widely ranging from 9,000 to 13,000 depending on the source Gilsinan 2015. The discrepancy is likely the result of an underestimation of the size of Islamic Page 117 of 126 State. If true, a monthly intake of 2,000 joining Islamic State in Syria today this would represent a whopping 24,000 individuals joining Islamic State. I slamic State’s unprecedented ability to recruit and to radicalize followers over the Internet and on social media Schmitt and Sengupta 2015 is reflected by our concern on its capability to proliferate and recruit. Of an estimated 3,000 jihadi sites, 70 percent are located on servers in Indonesia. This is, in our view, a key element in the counter strategy narrative. A recent report released by the U.S. Homeland Security Committee Homeland Security Committee 2016 states nearly 40,000 Monaco 2016 foreign fighters travelled to Syria but only an estimated 700-1,000 Islamic State fighters are from Southeast Asia. Battlefield casualties also suggest that the Malaysians suffered approximately 15 killed in action Balakrishnan, Says 2015 227 and the Indonesian as high as 40 killed on the battle field. The Indonesians suffer almost 50 of combat losses. A significant number of losses that require replacement and it is to be seen if replacements join the ranks. U.S. military officials estimate that the group has lost as much as 40 percent of the territory held in Iraq and 20 percent in Syria. Revenue streams, such as oil sales, taxes on the population are impacted but not stopped. Some indicator of the effectiveness of the coalition efforts to erode Islamic State can be found in the recent Islamic State audio messages calling for attacks on the US The Guardian 2016 during the fasting month. This is in contrast to the teachings of Islam but also suggests Islamic State is expecting to lose control over Mosul, Raqqa, and Sirte in Libya, the mythological battle to signal the rise of the new Caliphate Straits Times 2016. Reporting suggests the U.S. air campaign targeting oil fields, refineries and tanker trucks has cut the Islamic State by a third Rosenberg, Cooper and Kulish 2016 228 . The recent offensive against al Qaeda in Yemen liberated the port city of Al Mukulla CBCRadio Canada 2016 with estimates of al Qaeda pocketing about 2 million USD per day Straits Times 2016 from customs revenues. The city fell to al Qaeda affiliates in early April 2015 Al-Batati and Fahim 2015. This would represent an estimated revenue stream to al Qaeda of 730,000,000 USD available to wage global war. Private donations have dropped significantly The Telegraph UK 2015 but these no longer play a role in the workings of Islamic State to wage war. Taking this amount and the war loot in Syria as a gauge, official concern about the financial prowess to fund Asian groups are well-founded. But, again, currently the money flows have not yet appeared in Indonesia or the Philippines. Although corruption within the ranks of Islamic State and a rise in deserters are reported, the spill over to Asia is only a question of time. Despite reports of Islamic State executing fighters suspected of desertion are some indicators the tides are changing on the battlefield, very little exploitation of these facts is undertaken in Asia. Reports also suggests Santoso is threatening his own followers with execution if they attempt to desert and at least one incident indicates one possible member of the Santoso group was executed while attempting to escape. 227 Some of the Malaysians killed in action include Saharani Mohamed Esa who was previously involved with the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia KMM as early as 2002. 228 The US air campaign titled Tidal Wave II commenced in October 2015 Page 118 of 126 The Washington Post in Star and Stripes wrote, “Analysts speculate that the problems have compelled the group to adopt new tactics, such as carrying out attacks abroad. That includes the Paris assaults in November that killed 130 people. Attacks abroad may be an attempt to sustain the groups narrative as always on the offense - which has been key for attracting potential militants. Even so, the Islamic States media narrative has shifted from a triumphant one to having to e xplain why it is losing so much”, quoting Nelly Lahoud from the International Institute for Strategic Studies Naylor 2016. However, despite the successes, critical reports argue that little has been achieved to stop the expansion of militants in Europe, North Africa, Afghanistan and the Philippines. Renewed caution of returning to the ‘Long War’ remains part of the “deep battle” narrative for years to come Rosenberg, Cooper and Kulish 2016. We concur with the view that with the defeat on the battlefield, regional terrorism will increase. Since the Sarinah attack, the rapid round-up of known terrorists triggered the successful raids and actions against Islamic State, however, the heavy lifting of de-radicalization or political statements by the administration and religious leadership applying equal sustainability is absent. Whereas the capability is lacking, the question of regional cross relationships and the role of the external branch of Islamic State reorganizes its operational priorities in Southeast Asia the security situation can change rapidly King 2016 229 . A split within the Islamic State leadership in the near future will determine if it decentralizes and initiates a global jihad or holds ground in Syria 230 . Holding ground in Syria will erode and decimate it whereas a coalition will bomb it State into oblivion in a strategy of attrition. We anticipate a break up and an increase in external actions by Islamic State but with it attempting to hold pockets of control. 2. INTERRUPTION OF THE NETWORK Whereas tactical responses interrupt operational network, the logistics capabilities, including financing, recruitment and ideological doctrine remains operational. Reports suggest groups like Jemaah Islamiyah are rebuilding their military wing, receiving financing and as identified in this report, popular mass movements are developing under the Khilafah movement. In 20142015 Pusat Pelaporan Dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan 2015 231 , the Indonesian PPATK reported 13 cases Soeriaatmadja, Straits Times 2015 of suspected terrorist funding Wartawan and Destryawan 2016 232 from different sources. PPATK reported fund transfers of 10 billion IDR SGD 1 million, and 6 billion IDR from Australia 233 . The transfer of 105,000 SGD 1 billion IDR from Syria to Hendro Fernando was designed to plan attacks in Bali, target 229 12:06 min 230 Ibid. 231 The report however does not only focus on terrorist financing but includes a wide range of general crimes, such as theft, prostitution, wildlife crime and narcotics. The report identifies 410 inquires being conducted by the PPATK, a slight drop from 490 inquiries in 2014. 232 Arif Hidayatullah was identified as a financial backer of Islamic State. 233 Funds include financing living costs for widows of martyrs, and families of slain jihadists, weapons purchase, fund paramilitary training and fund gatherings Page 119 of 126 an international school and Soekarno-Hatta international airport Chan and Soeriaatmadja, Straits Times 2016. In January 2015, cash transfers to fund terror activities were identified to have taken place in Jakarta, West Java, East Java, Central Java, Central Sulawesi, Banten, Yogyakarta, West Nusa Tenggara NTB and South Sulawesi. The transferred cash was also used to fund activities related to programs to maintain the existence of radical groups across the country. Saudi citizen Al Khelaiw Ali Abdullah Halim 2015 234 was firstly convicted and later acquitted Al Jazeera 2010 of helping finance the simultaneous terrorist attacks on the Ritz-Carlton and JW Marriott hotels in Jakarta in 2010. The plots of Indonesian groups increasingly gaining complexity involving not only Indonesian nationals. For example, Arif Hodayatullah alias Abu Mush’ab was arrested on 23 December 2015 in company of Alli The Wall Street Journal 2015, an Uighur national, who was made ready to execute a suicide mission at the end of 2015. Arif Hodyatullah was on the way to work at a car factory, held a list of Islamic State supporters and had a manual on explosives Benar News 2016. The targeting of Shia communities in Indonesia is furthermore a trend of concern. Reports, particularly in Riau, also showed “road trips” by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia to map out minorities in the province and their acceptance of Islam. Whereas these appear as innocent activities, we view these actions through the lens of radicalization. This report has extensively identified the wide variety of members of jihadist, Islamic State inspired attraction to extremism is no longer an individual small-factionalized membership but increasingly has attracted all walks of life. The narrative that radicalization and terrorism are linked to poverty may only hold partially true since, in particular, the examination of Malaysian arrests cross over the social spectrum. Although the Malaysian government has continued to take a hardline stance Straits Times 2015 against Islamic State, the counter narratives will require time, resources and political will across the Southeast Asian political spectrum. The Indonesian political attitudes are less consistent in delivering counter terror policies. Whereas Jemaah Islamiyah is fractionalized and constantly squabbles over power, organization was flexible, operating as a geographically diffused network of autonomous cells and was unable to gain a larger following by contrast, the Islamic State requires territory to remain legitimate, and a top-down structure to rule Wood 2015. Its division into civilian and military branches, territories, and provinces are indicators of an evolutionary process converting to a “4 th - Generation of jihadist”. This could be the game changer for the jihadists but also represents in our view a threat to jihadi ideology. Nevertheless, a protracted period of instability is likely. 234 Ali transferred money to Syaefudin Zuhri who was one of the masterminds of the twin hotel attacks. Zuhri was killed in October 2009 with his brother Muhamad Syahrir after throwing some homemade bombs against police. Both were suspects sought in their role with the JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton bombings. Syaifuddin alleging recruited the suicide bombers Dana Permana Putra and Nana Ichwan Maulana. Syahrir was also hiding Noordin Moh. Top see this Page 120 of 126

3. KILLING OR CAPTURING SANTOSO: A MUST FOR THE STATE