SIZE MAY NOT MATTER, BUT IT HELPS

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11. SIZE MAY NOT MATTER, BUT IT HELPS

Since the Jakarta attack, information about the structure, command and control, movement, group sizes and membership is emerging. In particular, the recent discovery of Islamic State ’s recruitment and security files, estimated to include 22,000 fighters Eyal 2016 - with the numbers widely subjective and inaccurate - shows the size of the groups, origins and global interconnectivity of Asian jihadists joining operations in the Middle East and Africa. A December 2015 report prepared by the Soufan Group suggests the U.S intelligence estimates put the number of foreign fighters in Syria upwards of 30,000 with 900 from Southeast Asia. However, reports suggest a considerable casualty count suffered by both, the Malaysians King 2016 124 and Indonesian fighters. Source: The Soufan Group Soufan 2015 However, like any large organization, the first cracks are appearing with defections and returning radicals beginning to show IS may suffer its first organizational defeat from within. However, it is too early to celebrate its demise and with the pressure by the coalition forces, the extremists are expected to disperse and splinter possibly returning to Asia. In November 2015, the Indonesian government issued a report estimating about 700 have joined IS. Some analysts believe the numbers are no more than 500 125 . By mid-February 2016, the National chief of police stated 392 Indonesians fighting for Islamic State in Syria with additional 50 or more thought to prepare to leave to join the country AFP, New Straits Times 2016. However, accurate figures remain elusive as membership, group alliances, and affiliation are in a constant flux to confuse authorities. What is important for this paper is to recognize that the evolutionary size of radical groups is growing in diversity, different membership, and affiliation of kinship, prison time and ideological orientation. For some time, we held the view that the ideological base between the factions is eroding Marre 2014 and radicalized followers adopt narratives to fulfil the individual need to be presented to the audience with a fashionable new fad. The lateral movements from radicalized individuals from the extreme opposite political spectrum reaching out and ‘touching’ other groups who are perceived to be more action 124 Of 100 Malaysian an estimated 12-13 or more being Killed in Action; Indonesian suffered about 40-50 Killed in Action representing roughly 15 of the MalayIndonesian fighters; 1:03:00; 125 Ibid. Page 56 of 126 oriented continue to emerge in the social media space with greater frequency 126 . The converging of regional autonomous movements such as Aceh, Thailand’s southern insurgency Rajakumar 2016 127 and the Philippines would represent the increase of threats to the region. With interchanging group sizes, conflicting numbers of in-bound jihadists, former prisoners, current prisoners, released ex-detainees and sympathizers, does size matter? Yes, and No. Whereas IS in Iraq and Syria creates the bulk of the new global jihadi army taking in a rage range of different nationalities, the Asian neo-jihadists are roughly a battalion-sized operation. Islamic State is extorting 10 percent justifying the high costs for bein g “a nation in time of war” estimated to have raised 1 billion USD from its various activities. The underlining long-term issues are population growth versus radicalization. Taking the BNPT figure as a rough estimate, the spread of radicalization within population segments present reasons for concern. Some intelligence reports suggest Medan could serve as a strategic base for Islamic State because of its close proximity to Malaysia 128 . The use of intermediate groups is seen to have expanded into small towns and villages in Sumatra, Sulawesi and the Indonesian part of Borneo 129 . 12. INTERNET: REACHING THE TIPPING POINT? With all the arrogance of 21 I replied: ‘A harmless lunatic with the gift of oratory.’ I can still hear his retort: ‘No lunatic with the gift of oratory is harmless.’” Daniel Binchy McDonald 2016 Source: USMC Academy Corps 2015 130 The use of the Internet for radicalization, recruitment, and communication is well documented, researched and commonly known. According to a statement by John Watts made to the Homeland Security Committee on 27 April 2016, approximately 3,000 jihadi websites are in 126 See Sumatra section of this paper 127 7 April 2016 128 http:www.straitstimes.comasiase-asiapolice-uncover-likely-new-terror-cell-in-sumatra ; 15 March 2016 129 Ibid. 130 slide 56 Page 57 of 126 Southeast Asia with 70 located in Indonesia King 2016 131 . In November 2015, Peter Bergen speaking at the Homeland Security Committee hearing, said, “Social pressure on social media companies is effective” Committee, The Rise of Radicalism: Growing Terrorist Sanctuaries and the Threat to the U.S. Homeland 2015 132 to prevent the violent jihadist content. The combination of oratory skills is amplified by the social media. No longer is the Internet a tool for only the inspired and connected but has become the platform for hate, revolutions, incitement of threatening social cohesion and recruitment for the apocalyptical visions of jihadistIslamic State of utopia. With relative high Internet penetration rates in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, fertile ground for the spread of Islamic State doctrine is present. Malaysia for example has a 67.5 percent Internet penetration rate Research 2016. In Indonesia the rates are higher. Reports show that 75 of Islamic State supporters were recruited through online ‘ribat’ 133 guarding the military frontiers. Moving from online collaboration to real-time militancy is only a small step away, coordinating actual travel, planning of attacks and coordinating of clandestine cells Jani 2016. Social media has not only broken down the virtual borders but contributes to the erosion of the state power. In a recent Microsoft report Microsoft 2015 134 , Pakistan, Indonesia, the Palestinian territories, Bangladesh, and Nepal attract the highest rates of attempted malware attacks. The report does indicate despite a high rate of detection and denial, Internet attacks in Indonesia showing a steady increase in 2015. The report does not articulate the landscape of the attackers, if the attacks are criminal or a result of terrorist attacks. However, the use of online attacks by militant action groups has been a long-standing tactic hence an Islamic State- inspired cyber-attack would be a logical evolution. Research shows the online influence has contributed to the building of an alternative ideological reality. How to dress, speak, think, and use social media like an extremist. In this research paper, we have seen evidence how the online jihadi community alerts each other and serves as a counter intelligence force 135 . Source: Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Microsoft 2015 131 09:22 minutes 132 2:56:55 onwards 133 http:www.straitstimes.comasiase-asiaurgent-need-to-counter-malaysias-cyber-isis ; 29 March 2016 134 Volume 19 | January through June, 2015 135 http:www.straitstimes.comasiase-asiaurgent-need-to-counter-malaysias-cyber-isis ; 29 March 2016 Page 58 of 126 However, with the counter intelligence efforts particularly in Indonesia being a perpetual struggle, the often unspoken question must be asked: Is the intelligence value harvested on the Internet outranking the propaganda to go unchallenged and uncontrolled? Has a tipping point been reached warranting action? Does this tipping point warranty the question if the state in cooperation with companies such as Facebook, Twitter, which after all, are privately held public-listed stock companies, need censure to counter the promotion of hate speech and proselytizing of radical ideology online? The Singaporean Foreign Minister correctly stated that, “…the Internet has helped Islamic State to strive. Religion and the use of violence are used to lever to divide societies and incite hatred ….” 136 In 2001, a NATO publication identified Information Technology as a weapon or target. The levels of cyber terror capability were identified as simple or unstructured, advanced or structured, or complex or coordinated Mates 2001 . The radicalization process in our view begins often with the symbolic association to the “cause”. This T-shirt, flag, finger waving, or raised fist narrative is in our view a strong indicator of an early process of radicalization in the making. This is not limited to Southeast Asia or Jihadists only. Although, as the example below shows, some comical outcomes with students grateful for the release of Indian nurses held in Iraq attempted to show their appreciation by donning ISIS gear which got the group in hot water with Indian security authorities Raghu 2014. Source: Nitin Sharma Sharma 2015 137 After some more investigation, Indian police arrested Abdul Rahman 24 and Rilvan the organizers of the photo session. Investigations revealed that the main accused were active supporters of the ISIS and allegedly trying to brainwash Muslim youths for Islamic State. Scott 2014 The detained organizer regularly travelled to Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong and Sri Lanka as part of his connection with the textile business. But, the symbolic communications of the political t-shirt culture across the political spectrum is often an indicator of underlining representations. 136 http:www.straitstimes.comsingaporetechnology-has-raised-extremist-threat ; 12 April 2016 137 slide 46; accessed on 19 April 2016 Page 59 of 126 Today, these predications hold very much true and present the implications for companies and public officials alike in particularly with the evidence of widespread recruitment throughout the public. Examining the arrests by Malaysian Special Branch, a change of the profile of Islamic State members emerges. Balancing the need for public safety stands in contrast of human rights and the expression of speech. However, companies such as Facebook or Twitter are legally liable for the content on their sites. It is to be questioned if the intelligence value outranks the threat to the public Nastiti 2015 138 . A 2014 European Union document titled Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU, Policies 2014 wrote, The use of new technologies for recruitment and propaganda is undeniable. However, their impact and their role should not be overestimated. Subversive or revolutionary movements pre-dated these new technologies, and British, German, and French workers have massively joined the fight in Spain during the civil war without YouTube or Facebook. Furthermore, the advent of new media has not, directly and in its own capacities, produced political or social upheavals. Social actors use the communication tools that are available to them - yesterday tracts and newspapers, today Internet, Tweeter, etc. Policies 2014 139 Of course, new information and communication Technologies ICTs have changed the ways in which activists communicate, collaborate and demonstrate. However, the critical role given to ICTs in strengthening political and activist engagement should be carefully assessed. Farish A. Noor posed an important question: Are we then the unwitting accomplices to urban violence, and have we contributed to the notoriety of such radical groups? 140 Without a doubt, the increasing high-interconnectivity is providing terrorists the media exposure desired. This is matched by the Islamic State Cyber army announcing that the next target is Australia to be hacked Memri Cyber Jihad Lab 2016. Source: MEMRI The Middle East Media Research Institute Memri Cyber Jihad Lab 2016 138 12 November 2015 139 p.16 140 http:www.straitstimes.comopinionurban-terror-in-the-new-media-age ; 26 January 2016 Page 60 of 126 The Sarinah attack was tactically a failure and it strategically backfired as the Indonesian counter terror campaign has increased in intensity and resources but it should be viewed as a prelude rather than a conclusion of a new wave of attacks in Southeast Asia. This includes cyber-attacks by Islamic State. However, we assess the extensive use of social media a copycat of social media activism applied in the western countries. The effective use of NGO tactics used extensively for mobilization of the masses reiterated the use of social media. Islamic State duplicates the social media for its ideological attraction, mobilization and proselytizing. Indonesia has ordered 11 radical websites and identified social media accounts on Twitter, Facebook, and Telegram being shut down Reuters 2016. However, this is not enough. It is believed the extensive use social media to share beliefs about IS and communication with contacts in Indonesia using blog posts and mobile messaging apps Costa 2016 contributes to the attraction of ISIL. We believe this is not sufficient. Intelligence experts say that, not long after that Telegram exchange, intelligence officials began to pick up talk in social messaging chatrooms that an attack on Indonesia was imminent. “Chatter among Islamists began to become more organized last month and there were discussions for the first time of a multiple attack,” said a Jakarta-based security adviser, who monitors radical group discussions on mobile messaging services for the government Kapoor and Fabi 2016 . Reports suggests, in 2015, about 300 extremist websites, forums and approximate 46,000 Twitter accounts were disseminating IS material. The use of bitcoin-transfer and moves towards changing signal intelligence is an emerging trend. Particularly, the bitcoin transfers of assets issue in the context of the chlorine bombings needs to be re-evaluated Gopinath 2015. The U.S. Marine Corps Academy presentation on IS beliefs Ask.FM or Kik are serving radical groups as a communications channel. Source: USMC Academy Corps 2015 141 The need to create an emotional appeal in the respective languages, Malay, Indonesian, and other dialect-based ones, provides the appeal for many to join and seek a new paradise Gopinath 2015. This applies for Play Station4 as well. 141 slide 71 Page 61 of 126 Source: Interior Ministry of Saudi Arabia 142 The popular gaming platform is used by IS to communicate due to the fact it is notoriously hard to monitor Corps 2015 143 . The technical capabilities and lack of swift reaction by authorities’ works in favor of the terror cells Noor 2016. A 2016 study by the George Washington University examining with empirical evidence the response to Twitter account closures argues that the “frequent pruning has hobbled terrorists’ ability to get their message out ”. Perez, The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter: How suspensions are limiting the social networks 2016. The study found some remarkable indicators. First, discoverable English-speaking ISIS supports on Twitter was found to be fewer than 1,000 accounts. Extended networks were fewer than 3,000 accounts at any given time during the survey. The survey did not extend to other language groups such as Arabic, Indonesian, or other Southeast Asian languages although the use of Indonesian was identified Perez, The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter: 00. The indicators of an aggressive counter social media are noteworthy to counter not only jihadi extremism but all forms of political violence. The study findings 144 included:  The average number of Twitter followers any given ISIS supporter could expect was 300 to 400. 142 https:www.moi.gov.sawpsportalHomesectorsmoidiwancontentsutpz0fY49C8IwFEX_SpeM5b20oX UtDvULRB2sWcKjLRJtEpsG8eeb7OJwh3O4XC5I6EBaeus7Be0sTZFvslK4FWLDRbFflWuBTXU-1cdDy7Eu4EIediD_l- KKfsyzbED2zobxE6DrnTFkhywlSe8mhj9kRp7hEiiY0YaFoXFaJRwTK17mWOYF8opUfPJ6ttcvEqqIsg ; accessed on: 22 May 2016 143 slide 73 144 Ibid. Page 62 of 126  Average follower counts were periodically reduced by aggressive waves of suspensions. However, under typical conditions the average remained flat, as seen over a 30-day period beginning in late August, during which relatively few suspensions took place.  Over time, individual users who repeatedly created new accounts after being suspended suffered devastating reductions in their follower counts.  Network and individual declines persisted even when suspension pressure eased, suggesting that suspensions diminish activity in ways that extend beyond the simple removal of accounts.  ISIS supporters have also explored the use of other social media platforms as a supplement to Twitter, but they feel that a robust presence on Twitter and Facebook is integral to their recruitment and propaganda efforts, and continue returning to those platforms despite challenges. A rudimentary test bed study was conducted during the formulation of this paper. We found of 55 Indonesian accounts, about 36 or twenty accounts were identified as high risk, openly supportive of Islamic State or some form of jihadist narrative. The 55 accounts generated 29,882 following and 1,800,910 followers. This cluster generated 244,467 tweets of all kinds. A filtering of what are the percentages of jihadist messages was not conducted at this juncture due to lack of resources allocated to this massive undertaking. This shows in comparison to a very narrow empirical snapshot the foreign language categories, such as Tagalog, Bahasa Indonesian, Chinese and Arabic require additional specific research to examine the size of the jihadist audience. We are, however, in agreement with the U.S study. Aggressive suspension after exploitation will have significant detrimental effect on the capability to mobilize, recruit and rebuild its audiences. But studies carried out b y the University of Southern California’s Centre on Public Diplomacy, argues the sheer volume of jihadist narratives are constantly re-establishing accounts as quickly as Twitter can block them. Over a four-month period, the centre tracked 3.4 million tweets referencing Islamic extremism, 3.3 million accounts and 1.8 million websites Hodge 2016. Whereas Nadthul Ulama are undertaking some efforts in support by some US foundation, these efforts lack scale in order to be effective. The use of social media is the identified preferred method to transport the jihadistIslamic State and Khilafah doctrine. Evidence as shown throughout the report indicates a strong erosion of societal cohesion, has generated a climate of distrust, hate and lack of public confidence and collides with norms of morality and common standards of any society in Southeast Asia. The policy question, if a tipping point has been reached will centre on a few markers. First, does maintaining the known internet accounts of extremists benefit the intelligence collection and exploitation process? Second, has a tipping point reached as seen in Malaysia that converted a small, isolationist terror movement into a broad based movement with a broader segment of society joining the apocalyptic doctrine of Islamic State or any of the regional jihadist narratives? Third, has the Khilafah movement of Hizbut Tahrir is reaching a political tipping point? And Forth, what will be the policy response if a social media specific incident against common norms of societal morality and standards creates a public outcry for immediate action? Page 63 of 126 A Lockerbie type of incident or the drowning of a Syrian toddler washed up in Turkey are some of the examples that triggered a massive public outcry demanding immediate policy action. An Islamic State, local action captured on social media and used for propaganda purposes that shocks the public could be one of the triggers for policy bodies implementing harsher regimes against the social media companies. Taking the first Bali bombing as an example, today such a terror incident would be amplified by millions of viewers on social media. A generic public movement would demand on click actions by the government. However, this applies in our view not only to terror incidents. A public incident generating an outcry could be used by the administrations in Indonesia to impose harsher business restrictions in a populist response. Following the Paris and Brussel attacks, the European Union Interior Ministers meeting the Prime Minister of United Kingdom pledged to legislate the Internet surveillance powers, allowing intelligence agencies to break into encrypted communications by suspected terrorists. The UK urged social media companies such as Twitter and Facebook to cooperate more closely with intelligence agencies Rights 2015. Any acts of terrorism will trigger a demand by Indonesian, Malaysian andor other ASEAN legislators. Although the focus is, on what threat does Islamic State pose to the public, business and the state, we hold the view that social media companies, mainly Facebook, Twitter, are the conveyor belt of propagating the Khilafah movement represents a greater threat to the national cohesion and political stability going forth. We hold the view whereas the Jokowi administration is unlikely to challenge the status quo, an incident demanding a policy reaction will result in a restrictive environment imposed on the social media companies. This provides, in our view, a business opportunity for the industry. Participating, identifying, collaborating and countering extremism will require a collective effort to combat the deep battle. Programs undertaken by DAfz or other academia will however help to scale up to identify networks, their actors and nodes and counter with a variety of techniques and methods to undermine the doctrine. Nahdlatul Ulama NU, the largest Muslim association in Indonesia with an estimated 40 million members, should be engaged to participate. Interviewing with NU staffers managing the program shows limitation in resources, direction and counter narratives. Its cyber ‘warrior’ program is in desperate need of support to its volunteers who often cover expenses out of their own pockets AFP, Straits Times 2016 Davis 2015. The importance of a counter narrative cannot be stressed enough. Radicals and extremist ideology depends on dominating the media space. Research suggests that 63 of Islamic State media output centres on pictures and only 20 from video messages Zelin 2015 145 . The combination of non-military content and military propaganda serves as a proxy for its wider capabilities and claim of general state of affairs. Research suggests in August 2015 a drop in categories of Islamic State Syria non-military photos, Islamic State non-military pictures and general Jihadology narratives Aaron Y Zelin 2015. 145 Vol.9, No. 4 2015 Page 64 of 126 This provides an opportunity for government, industry and wider society to counter any radicalized narratives. Ranging from extremist jihadist, Khilafah, to extremist leftist or anarchist narratives. The principles are the same so should be the response. CHAPTER III. THE BIG QUESTIONS: WHAT ’S NEXT FOR ASIA AND ISLAMIC STATE? Source: Twitter Hamizan 2013 146 and Internet depicting Paris attackers Koehli 2016 Taking the overwhelming data points as a rudimentary gauge, the security environment in Southeast Asia has shifted. Although it is important not to over-estimate the threat posed by factions of jihadists of different dominations and factions, the question is no longer, if an Islamic State or resurfacing of Jemaah Islamiyah is expected Danson Cheong 2016 to attack but when. On 8 June 2016, Detachment 88 arrested Priyo Hadi Purnomo alias Pur, 35, and a second suspect. Priyo Hadi Purnomo served an 18 months’ prison sentence for embezzlementfraud and had a prior narcotics conviction staying at his wife’s house in Makassar, South Sulawesi. He moved to Surabaya about a week ago staying in a rented room Post 2016. The pair also were in possession of two long-barrel guns, a pistol, mobile phones rewired as detonators and bomb parts Syarrafah 2016. Two other suspects were arrested on Wednesday, 8 June 2016 Xinhua 2016. This is not the first time jihadists attempted to attack Surabaya. On Thursday, 21 January 2014, anti-terror police arrested Isnaini Ramdhoni, 30 and Abdul Majid, 35, preventing an attack against nightclubs and police stations with bombs and machetes on Tuesday, 26 January 2014 Hanifah 2014 planning to bomb with four 4 Molotov Cocktailspipe bombs nightclubs 147 and a Police Sector office Polsek in Jalan Wonocolo Prapen, Surabaya Unknown n.d. 148 . Indonesia has a young population. Whereas almost 60 of the total population originates on the island of Java, about 20 resides on the island of Sumatra Indonesia-Investments n.d.. In 2010, about 37 was below twenty-years of age, and around 50 of the total population was below thirty years of age. The median age in 2015 was 28.4 years, by 2020 about 29.4 years of age Statista 2016. 27.3 of the population are between 0-14 years Indonesia- Investments n.d.. A similar trend can be observed in Malaysia with the median age being 27.9 years Indexmundi 2015. A National Counter Terror Agency study in 201213 attempted to establish a baseline data point combining intelligence from across the national security agencies Hamdi, Tempo 2016 146 The depicted jihadists Abu Ukasyah al malizi alias Mohammad Faris Anuar was identified in 2015 filming a beheading was killed in the Anbar province in Iraq on 23 November 2015 see this 147 G ala Ka aoke Bill a d , D Ma kets , gala Mall E o Café located in the Dolly red-light district in Surabaya 148 no date Page 65 of 126 to measure the size of radicalism and extremism in Indonesia. It estimated 2.7 million or 1.06, not included sympathizers are involved in terror attacks. Researchers estimate around 10-12 different terrorist networks are developing. The number of smaller cells are higher. With the population is estimated to grow by 5 annually, reaching 6 by 2020 and declining to 3 by 2035, the evolution of radicalization can be modelled Statistik 2014. Based on the BNPT model, Riau alone would account for 55,077 extremists in 2016, and by 2018 reach, if not challenged, about 60,723 extremists. This according to the BNPT would not include sympathizers, leftist extremists, anarchists, black bloc and other fringe extremist groups. FY Population 5 population growth estimates Estimated radicalized 1.06 2015 255,461,700.00 12,773,085.00 2,707,894.02 Riau 2016 5,196,000.00 259,800.00 55,077.60 Riau 2017 5,455,800.00 272,790.00 57,831.48 Riau 2018 5,728,590.00 286,429.50 60,723.05 Riau 2019 6,015,019.50 300,750.98 63,759.21 2020 6 271,066,400.00 13,553,320.00 2,873,303.84 Riau 2021 5,498,800.00 274,940.00 58,287.28 Riau 2022 5,773,740.00 288,687.00 61,201.64 Riau 2023 6,062,427.00 303,121.35 64,261.73 Riau 2024 6,365,548.35 318,277.42 67,474.81 2025 5 284,829,000.00 14,241,450.00 3,019,187.40 Indonesia Investments wrote, “Currently Indonesia is positioned somewhere in the middle stage of that first wave. Both child mortality and fertility are declining quickly and the working age population is growing at a relatively fast rate while the total population is growing at a relatively slow rate. This has resulted in a large population group around half of the total population, thus 120 million Indonesians that is below the age of thirty years old, which -potentially- is productive and therefore can function as the engine of the national economy. Robust domestic consumption has already had its impact on Indonesias continuously strong GDP performance as it forms one of the key drivers of this growth. The countrys reliance on domestic consumption was actually one of the reasons why Indonesia weathered the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 relatively smooth with an average GDP growth of 5.6 percent in the years 2008-2010. 149 “ The current split between the urban versus rural population has shown a steady decline since 1995. The rural population has declined at a steady pace from 64 1995 to 52 2010 and about 4647 2015. The World Bank estimates in 2050 the rural population will decline to 33 with a dramatic rise in the urban population reaching 67 2050 150 . At the current rate – if the population in the United States does not rise – Indonesia is set to become the third most populous country, after China and India by 2043 Shamim Adam 2014. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. Source: World Bank quoting UN reports Page 66 of 126 With the income divide expected to widen between the rural and urban classes, extreme ideologies fall onto fertile ground. The Jokowi, and preceding, administrations, were ignoring the emergency of the Khilafah narrative and the attraction to other radical ideologies that emerge. History of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia HTI draws its ideology strictly from a Middle Eastern source, and whose agenda is fundamentally transnational Osman, Reviving the Caliphate in the Nusantara: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia’s Mobilization Strategy and Its Impact in Indonesia 2009 calling for the establishment of a Caliphate by any means and following takfiri doctrine, the Islamic State is committed to purifying the world by killing vast numbers of people Wood 2015. Debates about Hizb ut-Tahrir expanding besides Indonesia to Malaysia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Thomas Quiggin, a Canadian intelligence expert wrote, “…Hizb ut-Tahrir, like many other Islamist groups, can be considered an extremist group as it openly advocates policies that run directly contrary to the Canadian Constitution and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is openly anti-democratic, anti- feminist and pro-Sharia ….It is unclear if the politicians involved are incredibility naive, simple minded or perhaps knowledgeable, but find it easier to go along with them and not rock the boat based on the mythical belief in “community balance.” T. Quiggin 2016 The debate of what is Islamic State, often a western narrative, shows the lack of strategic depth of the United States. Only recently, The Atlantic quoted, Major General Michael K. Nagata, Commander Special Operations for the United States in the Middle East, admitting that “he had hardly begun figuring out the Islamic State’s appeal”. He was quoted, “We have not defeated the idea. We don’t even understand the idea.” The lack of comprehension of causality continues to this date and debates about the lack of voice, strong views about social injustices T. Quiggin, Tom Quiggin: Terrorism Basics; Fear and Knowledge 2012 and a strong sense of belonging to a cause, even if wrong are comparable narratives we continuously see emerging in Indonesia in all of the extremist spectrum. This statement is of concern taken into account the institutional knowledge and historical references providing sufficient reference points to understand the ideologies and doctrinal questions of how to defeat Islamic State are either; ignored, lost in the realms of everyone has a good idea how to fight terrorism, and an academic zeal to overanalyzing the chronic problem of Islamic State. This causes societies to radicalize because of poor governance. Recent commentaries recognize the current U.S. policy is the idea of incrementalism of sounding a Band-Aid, to defeat Islamic State Lamothe 2016. The outcome is predictable. The wars in the Middle East continues and extremism will flow back spreading in Asia. The examination of the public record shows that despite a balanced view on the threats posed by Islamic State being understood by most of the regional policy makers, the response is different within the Southeast Asian context. We are involved in a multi-generation Committee, The Rise of Radicalism: Growing Terrorist Sanctuaries and the Threat to the U.S. Homeland 2015 151 and inter-faith struggle with violent Khajirites Clarionproject 2016 152 and their versions of apocalyptic Islam are in Southeast 151 2:59:40 152 Islamic State Dabiq issue no. 14 outlines the targeting of apostate Islamic Leaders Page 67 of 126 Asia, however the lack of political in-depth comprehension of violent political movement and the blatantly ignoring the doctrines and ideologies of the Khilafah movement including the role of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia are representing a greater threat to the social cohesion than the actual act of terror itself. 1. JIHADI “CUBS”: BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE KNIFE JIHAD “He alone, who owns the youth, gains the future.” Bryson 2016 The accumulation of recruiting efforts underway by Islamic State suggests the recruiting pipeline of ‘jihadi-cubs” is ongoing, very little focus is given on a key strategic tool in use by jihadist, the recruitment of woman and minors. Recruiting child soldiers involves explicit coercion such as kidnapping, armed force and the use of narcotics. In contrast, grooming for terrorist organizations usually appears to be a gradual process orchestrated to give the impression that the participation by children is, in fact, consensual Bloom 2015. Source: Twitter Cubskhilafah n.d. Although either Islamic State or Jemaah Islamiyah has not reached the momentum of mass mobilization, the broad mass based Khilafah movement should be seen as a strategic incubator recruiting for the Caliphate and its military forces Studies 2016. Although groundbreaking work has been present for some time Indonesian policy officials, religious leaders, the public is relatively blasé about the strategic threat Hizbut Tahrir poses Osman 2009. We provide in this chapter some indicators of the on-going incubation of Indonesian first graders and kindergarten-aged children, young woman and siblings Mia Bloom 2013 supporting our view of an emerging worrisome trend. A secondary emerging trend is the Middle Eastern Palestinian “knife jihad” emerging in the regional context. With the access to firearms still being relatively limited in the region, the less sophisticated attacks such as meat cleavers, knifes and other blunt weaponry will be the tool of the frustrated wannabe jihadist. For example, in January 2016, a “lone cub” attack using a knife in a shopping complex before he was apprehended by police G.C Tan 2016. The 16-year-old one cased the shopping mall for two days before attacking a shopkeeper before being arrested. The radicalized youth considered non-Muslim as kafir harbi those that can be justifiably killed. The youngster was radicalized through e-mail and social media. On 26 February 2016, a 15-year-old A-level female student, Safia S., stabbed a police officer injuring him seriously Schneider 2016 while being subjected to a routine police inspection Page 68 of 126 Lane 2016. This was a repeat of a similar attack in the Palestinian territories on 8 November 2015 153 . Source: Bild Germany Bild 2016 Radicalized since the age of seven, her younger brother, Saleh is currently in jail in Turkey for attempting to join Islamic State. The parents, a German convert and her Moroccan mother, were divorced. The teenager was brought up by the mother following a strict Islamic code Berliner-kurier 2016. The teenager was radicalized by online-chats Bild 2016 with a known terror suspect, Ablah A Morchner 2016. The 18-year old man was identified in attempting to plot a bomb attack against a soccer match in November 2015. The suspect was identified uploading videos with young men in Security vests entering the already empty stadium calling “pray for Raqqa”, the Islamic State capital. According to the exchanges with the 15-year old teenager, Ablah A., attempted to convince the student to conduct martyr operations 154 . The warning signs were present for some time with the grandparents and teachers notifying police as early as January 2016 suggesting the student was radicalized. In Singapore, two self-radicalized youths were arrested in April 2015 planning to carry out attacks in public places with knives Ong-Webb 2016. Muhammad Arifil Azim Putra Norjai Ying 2015 alias Arifil Affairs 2015 was detained in April 2015. A second minor, a post- secondary student at the time only seventeen-years-old, and hence unnamed, was arrested early May 2015. Cases like Muhammad Harith Jailani, 18, Muhammad Arifil Azim Putra NorjaI and others show the online radicalization using jihad by knife attack as the easiest form of waging jihad Liang 2015. But knife jihad is not limited to Southeast Asia. The hacking attacks in Bangladesh killing secular blogger Nazimuddin Samad in April this year Chaulia 2016 and the Xinjiang militants attack in Kunming on 3 March 2014 on waiting passengers at a train station, killing 29 people injuring 143 others The Economist 2014. Three of the attackers, Iskandar Ehet, Turgun Tohtunyaz and Hasayn Muhammad and a woman, Patigul Tohti Phillips 2014, stood trial. The three men were executed for the attack Newton 2015. Patigul Tothi was given a life sentence BBC 2014. The Kuming attack was the work of an eight-member terror cell based in Shadian, Yunnan province. 153 Ibid. 154 Ibid. Page 69 of 126 The group consisted of six men and two women. Israel has been dealing with a spate of attacks for a long time Goldberg 2015, which observers have described as the knife intifada Solomon 2015. Hence, the evidence of a knife jihad in Asia is not new but again, an evolutionary process. Source: MEMRI the Middle East Media Research Institute MEMRI n.d. 155 Twitter “abu Hamza alindunisy” alindunisy 2014 156 Jihad by every means is quantitatively and qualitatively different from groups such as Al-Qaeda Ong-Webb 2016 but has gained greater attraction. Despite Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia being commonly perceived as a non-violent, international, pan-Islamic political organization with its aim to re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate Khilafah movement as a state, the narrative must be viewed critically since it focuses on recruiting the youth as part of its family program. Since the black banner is flown as a symbol of the al-Raya – i.e. the ‘battle flag – the oversimplification of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia as non-associated or aligned with jihadist ideology is a threat to the state. However, the recruitment of jihadi cubs crosses over routinely to other groups such as mainstream of the Khilafah movement. The example below shows the Khilafatul Muslimin in Bandar Lampung surfaces in an Islamic State twitter profile of “Abu Hafiz”. Examining the profile shows a linkage between the Khilafah members meeting Indonesian police officers, promoting the war in Syria and links to the “cubs of the Khilafah”. 155 no date; original print, see this 156 accessed on 12 March 2016 Page 70 of 126 Source: Twitter Hafiz 2016 As earlier identified, the penetration of security forces is one of the three pillars of the jihadi strategy and linkages between Islamic State in Syria, the Khilafah movement and the cooperation with the police are symbolic markets of showing the Khilafah movement is supported by the police to legitimize the movement. In the same links, we find the cross over to communist narratives surfacing. The symbolic affiliation ranges from resistance to the Marxist narrative to joining forces with the ‘suppressed brothers’ to oppose the apostate forces. Source: Twitter BerGerilya 2016 Its long history in being engaged in a ‘politics of hatred’ and intolerance which is a precursor of violence or calling suicide bombers Shaheed –are extremist ideological orientation. Military expansion or use of violence are not opposed but only until the “Khilafah” has been established. Therefore, the establishing of a Wilayah a province is a political step to justify waging jihad and calling for the Ummah in the political-sense to support the unification under Islamic State narrative. Page 71 of 126 Source: Terror Monitor screenshot Monitor, Twitter 2016 Ziauddin Sardar calls Hizb ut-Tahrir as escapist fascism questioning the fundamentals of the worldview held over the non-violent nature of Hizb ut-Tahrir and its satellite organization in Southeast Asia Sardar 2005. One leaflet reads, “Your forefathers destroyed the first crusader campaigns. Should you not proceed like them and destroy the new crusaders?” Harper 2007 In August 2006, Ata Abu Rishta, the global leader of Hizb ut Tahrir said, The Caliphate global Islamic government will liberate the countries and the people from the influence of the Kafer non-believer and its allies and the tyranny of its men and followers, 157 . He later spoke at the annual conference of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia calling for a war on Jews 158 . The message is generally one of Muslims being under the attack by the West. A Pakistani HT member interviewed on Pakistani TV echoed a more defined position stating, “The idea of compromise does not exist in Islam” 159 making the group dangerous and warranting detailed examination of its actions in the context of its ideology on Indonesian society. We are concerned about increasing child radicalization in Indonesia and Malaysia not unique to the above displayed example in Syria with promoting the ideas of the Khilafah in Indonesia. It represents the decade-old problem of viewing terrorism as a strategic problem rather than a tactical response. Source: Daily Mail UK Akbar 2015 Columbian army Rivaz 2013 157 Ibid. 158 Ibid. Note: in the same speech Saleem Atchia, senior member of Hizb ut Tahrir UK appeared. 159 Ibid. Page 72 of 126 Recruiting of minors and small kids is not a new development. Many terror organizations in the developing world recruited or forced small kids and teenagers to submit to an intensive indoctrination program. In South America, as recently as July 2015, Shining Path, identically as extreme and nihilistic as Islamic State, conducted a terrorist “breeding” program Press 2015 impregnating Ashaninka indigenous woman after kidnapping villagers for decades to produce child soldiers and working in ‘production camps’. The oldest victim was 70 years old, the youngest, one year Watts 2015. Increasingly the recruitment of youngsters to fraternize with Islamic State ideology is not uniquely an Indonesian phenomenon. In recent recoveries from the Maute group Zambrano 2016 raid shows recruits as 12 to 14 years old. Source: Social media Zambrano, Twitter 2016 In 2013, the Unit for Justice and Peace in Columbia released a 60-page report stating that of the 5,075 child soldiers who demobilized from illegal organizations between 1992 and 2012, 59 percent belonged to FARC Rivaz 2013. It is worthwhile to note that recruiting children under the age of 15 to “participate actively in hostile activities” is a war crime according to the International Criminal Court ICC, while the United Nations sets 18 as the minimum recruitment age for participation in an armed conflict. The FARC Commander, Jacobo Arenas – who was the FARC’s main political ideologue until his death in 1990 – wrote, “children from 10 years old can do useful jobs, like organizing young revolutionaries. An educated kid in the school of the armed revolutionary struggle is almost always a good guerrilla.” Similar tactics appear in Peru Valenzuela 2009 Bacovic 2015, in Ireland Lowe 2009, or in Afghanistan converting eight-year-olds to become suicide bombers Murfitt 2013. The Guardian reported in 2000 how the IRA recruited boys for paramilitary training Wilson 2000. The rise of child bombers committed by Islamist groups in Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad has increased. In West Africa, one out of every five Searcey 2016 suicide bomber is a child. In 2015 alone, Boko Haram used 44 children in suicide attacks. The youngest was 8 years old UNICEF 2016. Page 73 of 126 Although we have no immediate indication of children being used in Asia at this time, the copycat operations by youngsters should not be ruled out in the mid-term future. With jihadi brides increasing in presence and reference, the deep battle over jihadiIslamic State doctrine using children and women is expected to emerge The Anti- Shi’a Movement In Indonesia 2016. In Africa, the change in tactic reflected the loss of territory in Nigeria by Boko Haram BBC 2016. This would be supporting our view that tactics that are more aggressive are an indicator of a decline of Islamic State proxies. The statistics, relevant for the Indonesian policy and counter terror officials, are grim. The Brookings Institute wrote in 2005, The soft security issue of children has become one of the grimmest aspects of the hard issue of terrorism. Despite global consensus against sending children into battle, there are 300,000 children under 18 boys and girls serving as combatants in almost 75 per cent of the worlds conflicts; in 80 per cent of these, there are child fighters under 15, and in 18 per cent, fighters of less than 12 years old. It is no surprise therefore that, as on the worlds battlefields, children are increasingly present in terrorist groups. Children offer terrorist group leaders cheap and easy recruits who provide new options to strike at their foes. Singer 2005 Source: Living Peru picture 200708 Peru This Week 2010 Source: Daily Mail UK Akbar 2015 The same principle educated in the school of jihadist struggle makes good jihadists. In March 2015, a You Tube video brought attention of the Cubs of the Caliphate Jihadology 2015 saying they are not afraid to face the enemies of God and promise to become mujahedeen - or soldiers of God to the surface Akbar 2015. In the context of Indonesia, out of 215 Indonesians deported from Turkey before they could travel to Syria, 60 per cent were women or children aged 15 or younger Teoh 2016. It is estimated of a known 400 Indonesians who have joined ISIS, 45 per cent or about 180 are women and children. 160 The account from “ abu hamza alindunisy ” displays beside extreme graphic Islamic State images, the indoctrination of toddlers under the banner of Islamic State alindunisy 2014 161 . 160 Ibid. 161 the account is graphic Page 74 of 126 Source: Twitter alindunisy 2014 162 However, the recruitment closer to this region should be give greater reason of concern. The links to the Khilafah movement from the ground up represents in our view a medium and strategic issue with an uncertain outcome. Largely unchallenged, the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia narrative appears in social media on a daily basis. HTI attempts to cross over to mainstream, environmental and links to Indonesian Marxists emerging in the radical landscape. Source: Facebook Pekanbaru 2013 The promotion of the Khilafah narrative is embedded in the Islamic kindergarten. The examples of the research show a submergence of narratives as early as preschoolers and toddlers. Similar narratives emerge in Malaysia S. Times 2016. Both examples are not the exception but represent in our view a growing number of educational entities promoting Khilafah as part of the mainstream having departed from the pesantren. Jihadi ideology is becoming an integral part of the local fabric. The pursuit of the Khilafah is the new norm. In the examples below, we can see some of the anecdotal linkages to the call for unification of Indonesia and Malaysia under the Khilafah. Banned by the Malaysian government, the HTI Malaysia narrative is however well alive on the social media space. Recycling old messages, the unification under the Daulah Khilafah – the ‘state’’dynasty’ -, i.e. the Caliphate state resurfaces on 22 April 2016 on Indonesian sites. 162 accessed on 8 May 2016 Page 75 of 126 Source: Facebook Kurniawan 2016 In the context of Riau, the linkages between transnational NGOs like Greenpeace and the affiliation with identified Hizbut Tahrir Muhammad P. Azzam as well as the left, the proselytizing is another example. Whether the relationship is accidental or deliberate, requires additional examination. Source: Social media The example shows the adaptation of common causes – i.e. the haze or environmental destruction – links by affiliation activists from the left. Page 76 of 126 Source: Social media A similar trend is already visible in the Philippines. Reports identified in this study show a continuous recruitment, alliances and growing of Islamic State inspired operational cells, groups and fractionalization of local group who increasingly operate in cross border fashion. In a January 15, 2016 television report, the presence of minors is clearly seen in the oath swearing ceremony by the Ansar al-Shariah Battalion in the Philippines swearing the oath of allegiance to Islamic State. Source: ABS-CBN News channel News 2016 use of minors 5 th from front Tactical success by counter-terror operations aside, Indonesia and others in the region are facing with the long-term threat of Islamic State. 2. REGIONAL REACTION: MEASURING THE RADICAL SCENE SOME IMPACTS Measuring risk in regards to Islamic State remains a constant balancing act. The threat should not be understated but also not overestimated. Governments in the region have managed for the most part the threats posted by the various jihadist groups Liow, Brookings 2016. But, whereas the focus is on Islamic State, the “Daesh-isation” attempts to engage in conventional warfare J. S. Jani, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies RSIS 2016. Militant forces Page 77 of 126 in the Philippines and Thailand are battle hardened and proven guerrilla groups including Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, Abu Sayyaf Group, the Mujahideen Indonesia Timur MIT and Jemaah Islamiyah, and as evidence suggests are regrouping. Recent inroads made in Thailand, and Aceh, the cooperation agreement between Philippine, Indonesian and Malaysian elements shows a consistent trend of a unification and broadening the struggle. Factions like the Jund al-Tawhid in the Philippines produced a video of the Mujahidin Serumpun Melayu MSM, the Mujahidin of the Malay Family J. S. Jani, Straits Times 2016. With large Malay speaking groups in Aceh, Sumatra, Riau and the Riau Island as well the border areas between Malaysia and the Philippines, will shift the threat of transnational jihadists filtering into Indonesia. No longer is Islamic State an Iraq or Syrian focused movement but propagates its messages to the audiences through Southeast Asian languages such as Bahasa Indonesia, Chinese and Tagalog. We have identified an identical narrative produced by HTI in Riau with a simple message to the Indonesian public: “The Khilafah is coming”. However, the broader jihadist’s political structures such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia HTI and others serve as an ideological incubator to promote jihad and the establishment of the Khilafah, the Caliphate. Whereas previously Asians joining jihadist groups were excluded from serious combat training by late 2015 prior to the first wave of Asian attempts of attacks and the Sarinah attack combat arms training for snipers and demolitions surfaced Zolkepli 2015. However, recent research on the reach of the Islamic State shows an attempt to unify different factions under one unified Islamic State Wilayah structure. A recent study by Anthony Cordesman quoting a US DO D assessment Islamic State as a “transitional threat” Cordesman 2016 163 . Whereas Asia has not been yet declared as a province of the Khilafah of Islamic State, the grandeur desires of Islamic State matches the narrative of that of other Caliphate seeking organizations such as Hizbut Tahrir. Bruce Hoffman, the renowned terror academic, foresees a merging of Al Qaeda and Islamic State and warned about the impending merger of IS and al-Qaeda Hoffman 2016. This would escalate the threat of militancy, considering that many Malaysian and Indonesian militants, especially the veteran jihadists, are hesitant to hop on the IS bandwagon because of the al- Qaeda-IS split Altaf Deviyati and Nicholas Chan 2016. 163 slide 24 Page 78 of 126 Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies 164 Islamic State will require a combination of direct action, political will, deterrence, and counter- ideological policies. At this moment of time Islamic States regional ambition is to create its religious and political legitimacy in the jihadist environment, and although the ambitions are not yet successful, viewing the development of recruitment, indoctrination and absorbing of other jihadi factions are indicators of the direction Islamic State is developing. Taking the timelines prior to the Sarinah attack and since then into consideration, the regional escalation of pro-Islamic State has clearly shown a sharp increase in action and responses. In Bangladesh and Singapore, the Islamic State and its pro-jihadists factions have waged a war against opposition activists, Gay and Lesbian activists, on-line bloggers. Nevertheless, targets include all levels of government officials and political leaders Hussain, Straits Times 2016. The “disbelievers” are in our view the softer targets. Hence, whereas traditional terrorism studies often identify the motivation of why individuals join terror groups, we hold the more contemporary perspective of the motivation for a broader base of recruits from Karaoke hostesses, to assistant hotel managers to the average Malaysian seeking the “Jannah” of religious enlightenment even it is in the front of the gun. In 2002, Albert Bandura Bandura 2002 argued that terrorism thrives in a sociopolitical environment that is conducive Bandura, Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency 2002 allowing to grow and expand without or little interference by societal forces. He argued, “…In this process of moral justification, pernicious conduct is made personally and socially acceptable by portraying it as serving socially worthy or moral purposes …”, he continues, “Rapid radical shifts in destructive behavior through moral justification are most strikingly revealed in military pursuits. The conversion of socialized people into dedicated fighters is achieved not by altering their personality structures, aggressive drives or moral standards. ”, and, “Through moral justification of violent means, people see themselves as fighting ruthless oppressors, protecting their cherished values, preserving world peace, saving humanity from subjugation or honoring their country’s commitments.” 165 Cottee 2015 164 Ibid. slide 16 165 Ibid. Page 79 of 126 By August 2005, one home-grown Islamist group, Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh JMB, had set off hundreds of bombs around the country. Complicating the situation is the regional expansion of the Islamic State groups in contest for power with Al-Qaeda. The recent machete attacks are inspired by the transnational movement of Islamic State than the home-grown groups like Ansarullah Bangla Team ABT or the Ansar al-Islam Ramakrishna 2016. What has greatly complicated the situation now is the aforementioned Al-Qaeda versus ISIS contest. Thus, the recent spate of deadly machete attacks on secular and liberal bloggers, academics and activists have been carried out apparently by newer transnationally linked rather than locally focused outfits linked to AQIS, such as the Ansarullah Bangla Team ABT and its successor Ansar al-Islam group. In Malaysia, the sharp rise of Islamic State sympathizers, cells and factions surfaced in full force as part of a regionalization of the Islamic State. Individually the rise of Islamic State in Malaysia, Bangladesh and even Myanmar is in our view not accidental. For example, the Malaysian, Mohammad Amin Baco, 31, from Tawau is claimed to lead the Sulu faction of the Abu Sayyaf Group ASG Altaf Deviyati and Nicholas Chan 2016. Baco and another Sabah Darul Islam militant Jeknal Adil, 30, were identified as the bomb makers using the Abu Sayyaf hideouts in Basilan and Jolo islands as a base for Islamic State operatives in Southeast Asia Balakrishnan 2016. Dr. Mahmud Ahmad, 36, a Universiti Malaya professor alias Abu Handzalah Balakrishnan 2016, and Mohammad Najib Hussein, 37 166 , are said to be hiding out with the ASG in Sulu Katharason 2014 who became prominent part of the Islamic State Black Flag cell which is also known as Khilafah Islamic Movement KIM 167 . Mohd. Najib Hussein, who is an electrical engineering graduate used to run a Photostat and stationary shop at Universiti Malaya is held responsible for aiding the escape of four Malaysian militants to Syria. Mohd Najib Hussein alias Abu Anas al Muhajir was reportedly killed in action with Philippine military units on 15 December 2015 Balakrishnan 2016. Another Malaysian, Muahmmad Joraimee, 39, a council worker from Selayang, fled Malaysia and several other Malaysians are de facto resident jihadists in the Philippines. Amin Baco alias Abu Jihad, was also a member of Jemaah Islamiyah, showing again the cross pollination of jihadists within the network. The planned attacks against Kuala Lumpur included an instruction to a 2728-year-old former insurance agent to carry out the attack on entertainment outlets and “vice dens” The Star 2016 in the capital. The suspect was responsible for putting up Islamic State flags in Terengganu, Perak, Selangor, and Johor. He was arrested by the E8CK Special Branch at the Light Rapid Transit LRT carrying a knife Insider 2016. Another suspect is a store caretaker in a factory; a 50-year old-suspect is a cendol seller local dessert and his 28-year-old assistant from Terengganu, and a security guard from Gombak Selangor. Seized items in Malaysia included 30 rounds of ammunition of different calibers and Islamic State propaganda material Network 2016. 166 Ibid. 167 The Ansar Khilafah in South Cotabato and Sarangani provinces is led by Abu Sharifah see this : 12 January 2016; the Katibat Marakah al Ansar is led by Abu Ammar. See this : 16 February 2016 Page 80 of 126 During the May 2016 arrests, one of the suspects included a karaoke lounge hostess who worked as a high class escort. She joined Islamic State to repent for her sins. The age group like the earlier arrested members of Islamic State range from the ages 22 to 49 and included four 4 women - including the lounge hostess and a housewife Au 2016- a police officer, a mosque cleric, a student Press, The Guardian 2016, a mechanic, an aircraft technician, a laboratory assistant, and laborers. Two of the suspects owned their own businesses. During the March 2016 arrests, the suspects were caught in Perlis, Kedah, Penang, Perak, Selangor, Terengganu, and Kuala Lumpur. All of the suspects received instructions from Muhammad Wanndy Mohamed Jedi to launch the attacks in Malaysia Au 2016. The arrests were made between 17 and 20 May 2016 in the capital, Johor, Selangor, Perak, Kedah and Perlis Zolkepli, The Star 2016. Eight of the fourteen arrested were responsible for channeling funds to Islamic State and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines. The older brother of Muhammad Wandy Mohamad Jedi alias Abu Hamzah used his private account to send funds to Islamic State Zolkepli, The Star 2016. But this trend was first identified in 2014 and throughout 2015. In April 2015, brothers, Mohammad Anwar Azmi, 33, and Mohammad Nurkamal Azmi, 30, both general workers, Izwan Shameer Suzaimi, 26, a trader, and Muhammad Luqman Hakim Abdul Aziz, were arrested while mixing explosives planning to attack government buildings, entertainment places and nightclubs. The group was arrested near the Gunung Nuang in Hulut Langat. In early May 2016, the quartet received jail sentences between 20 to 25 years. A seventeen-year-old also arrested on 25 May 2016 Free Malaysia Today 2016. In August 2014, the Islamic State plotted to target discos, pubs in the capital and the Danish beer-maker Carlsberg ’s factory The Malay Mail 2015 in Petaling Jaya. This shows a consistent pattern of targeting by Malaysian Islamic State cells. By late October 2015, reports of arrests from within the armed forces emerged. Two commandos, 168 Mohd Zuraidi Shafiq Zulkeflee, 27, and Muhammad Adibzakir Zahri, 28, from the Grup Gerak Khas in Mersing, Johor Straits Times 2015, Corporal Mohd Azidi Said, 28, at the Armed Forces College in Port Dickson, Private Mohd. Rosdan Mohammad Khir Kumaran 2015 169 , 24, from the army and Zakariya Ahmad, 27 Metro Vaartha 2015, of the Royal Malaysian Navy, were charged with Islamic State affiliation Balakrishnan, Says 2015 . In September 2015, a kindergarten teacher, Azlee Md Salleh, 30, a former interior designer, Ahmad Kamil Ghazali, 24, a radiographer at the Tuanku Fauziah hospital and Poziah Harun, 42, Statistics Department officer woman were charged in Sungai Petani for harboring known terrorists and arrested by Special Branch 170 . Fauzee Ahmad, 48, an artist returning from Syria was given a 12-year sentence. The Malaysian court issued this harsh sentence as the militant was seen to provide propaganda value for the Islamic State 171 . 168 Ex-Malaysian commando Muhammad Adibzakir Zahri was charged in September 2014 169 The private was in possession of Jihadi material such as: Daulatul Isla Baa i ah , Te te a Fisa illiah a gkitlah ahai u at Isla , Be de a Hita Lailahaillah E d The Wo d Of Allah Is The Highest , Aj ad As- “ a s a d Keep Cal a d “uppo t Jihad see this 15 September 2015 170 http:www.thestar.com.mynewsnation20150916woman-among-four-in-court-on-terror-charges ; 16 September 2015 171 http:www.thestar.com.mynewsnation20160614artis-turned-militant-jailed-12-years-for-supporting- terror-activities ; 14 June 2016 Page 81 of 126 In 2014, news of a number of Malaysian women joining Islamic State to provide sexual favors to boost the morale of Islamic State soldiers surfaced 172 as part of the Jihad Al-Nikah concept. Islamic State passed a decree in June 2015 to conscript wome n for “sexual jihad”. Source: says.com Ram 2014 By January 2016, Malaysian authorities adopted a more aggressive stance. The attempted attacks were an evolution of Islamic State cells in Malaysia starting to break up into smaller groups dividing the actions into East, South and Central zones The Star 2016. This indicates a unified leadership structure with one of the January 2016 arrested members of Islamic State receiving orders from Bahrun Naim and Muhammad Wanndy Mohamed Jedi Network 2016 alias Abu Hamzah Straits Times 2016. One of the issues Malaysians are grappling with is the lack of firm national policy and the current lack of trustworthiness in the political leadership. This has, in turn, created a political vacuum exploited by the Islamic State and forces within the elite in Malaysia pushing for the creation of a Malaysian caliphate. Again, whereas the Sarinah attack was significant in methodology and strategic intent, it was a tactical failure. Indonesia – and most ASEAN countries – have become more resilient reacting less severe than, for example, political changes. The Jakarta stock price index IHSG dropped only by 1.12 points to 4,483 Antara 2016 and re-bounced the next day. 172 Ibid. Page 82 of 126 Source: Daily Mail UK Akbar 2015 Intelligence continues a constant struggle in identifying newly emerging terror cells and actors forming. For example, police investigators required three months to identify Chakib Akrouh, the 25-year-old Moroccan born in Belgium, who detonated an explosive vest in the apartment in Saint Denis after being surrounded by the police France 24 2016. Hence, mapping of the new and old actors remains a key objective in designing an appropriate response. Understanding the radicalization in prisons, in our view, is a repeat of other terror organizations, but the capability to recruit across the social spectrum is, in our view, a more important aspect to consider. Whereas the monitoring of ISILISIS, which changed the name to Islamic StateIS in June 2014 to lift the geographical limitations Dummer 2014, is ongoing, a concise strategy to erode IS was lacking. As long as the problem was in Syria, the political unwillingness to recognize the emerging threat gave rise to the attraction to join IS in Syria. Europeans security experts consistently warned of a new period of terror emerging 173 for a protracted period. As stated in our report, analyst figures suggest there are at least 1,000 Islamic StateISIL sympathizers in Indonesia Reuters 2016. The State Intelligence Agency ranks the list at 453 returning fighters. The U.S. Marine Corps Academy lists the number of Asian IS fighters at 911, Australian and Pacific at 256. In contrast to the European, African, and Middle Eastern IS fighters, the Asian number is relatively small for the moment. Nevertheless, this number is expected to grow, if the leadership of Khatib NusantaraIslamic State remains beyond the reach of counter terror forces. In initial reactions towards Islamic State, some of the commentators call the group the “Jihad Wannabes”, “the Walter Mitty radicals” or “jang bangers” – where jihad meets “gang bangers”. The “cool factor” provides the new fad for the disillusioned and represents a dangerous cultural manifestation of bored sociopaths living an alternative fantasy life. In some circles, waving the flag of militant Islam has become the latest expression of countercultural subversion Nomani 2010. Whereas the attack in Jakarta was amateurish, ISISIL, like any other militant terror group, are learning organizations, hence Sarinah 2.0 is, in our view, only a question of time and the result of an evolutionary process. 173 Ibid. Page 83 of 126 Within the Asian region, the influx of Islamic Statejihadists are not only visible in Indonesia. Singaporeans, Malaysians and Filipinos have joined the Islamic State. The Maldives is a transit stage for jihadists and serves as a recruitment center. About 200 have travelled to Iraq and Syria to join the ranks of the Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State. Maldives today holds the largest number of jihadists Ramachandran 2016 per capita of Asians in the ranks of Islamic States. Source: Twitter Monitor, Twitter 2016 The pattern is identical: demands for strict enforcement of Sharia law, destruction of Buddhist statues aimed to eliminate the pre-Islamic period, building of mobs – i.e. “the peoples power” narrative- and creation of hardline Wahhabi and Salafi beliefs and political and religious intolerance Ramachandran 2016. The regional expansion of Asian jihadists has accelerated. In 2007, we saw the first terror bombing attack in Male, in 2009, and later, an al Qaeda suicide bomber from Maldives attacked the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency headquarters in Lahore, Pakistan. The Malaysians were quick to point out that ISIL represents a threat to maritime security Muhamading 2016 but again, speculation is rife and evidence scarce. Taking the recent announcement by the Malaysian Islamic State members into consideration, the operational range will expand and change the counter-terror landscape for some time to come Straits Times 2016. Again, critical examination is missing. Whereas maritime ambitions to repeat a USS Cole type of attack, all jihadi groups with the exceptions of Philippines-based terror groups, have no, or little, maritime experience and remain, like attacks against Bali, jihadist ambitions. But, the emergence of the merging of national issues to an overarching Islamic State agenda as recently seen in the Southern provinces in Thailand highlights the point of a possible merging of national agendas to achieve strength by numbers. The recent kidnappings of Indonesian and Malaysians by the ASG factions and reports emerging of an alignment and appearance of new Islamic State aligned factions in Thailand called the Bangsamelayu Nagarafathoni Merdeka BNM suggests an increase in tactical capabilities. Page 84 of 126 Source: RSIS Rajakumar 2016 The links to the Runda Kumpulan Kecil RKK was identified by recent research 174 and again historically resurfaces in the research in Syria and the Southeast Asian region. We continue to hold the view that as long as the insurgency remains localized with a focus on the Southern autonomy issue, the more experienced PULO will restrict violence to a national struggle. With the appearance of Islamic State in Pattani, the political dynamic and, hence, operational tactics and their goals will expand beyond the southern provinces. An escalation in Malaysia and Thailand with the potential to hit the tourism industry in a repeat of the Bali attacks on the tourist spots in Phuket and Samui Yee, Straits Times 2016 or Pattaya should not be ruled out. Thai officials confirmed intelligence report consisting of Uighurs, named Ali Yalcin Egin and Hidayet Dorsun Bernama 2016 having left Thailand possibly heading for Singapore. We hold the view they are heading for Indonesia unless their mission is targeting Singapore specifically Straits Times 2016 whereas Thai intelligence officials warn of possible attacks during the Songkran festival. In December 2015, Russian intelligence warned the Thai services of up to ten 10 Syrian members of Islamic State having entered Thailand to attack Russian interests 175 . Thailand, Myanmar, Cam bodia and even Vietnam are facing transnational terrorism as a ‘realpolitik’ emerging issue. 174 Ibid. 175 Ibid. Page 85 of 126

3. THE PUBLIC AND THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSES