INDICATORS: ISLAMIC STATE TERRORISM IS DETECTABLE

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CHAPTER II. MEASURING THE THREAT, BLACK SWANS NOT SO SURPRISES

1. INDICATORS: ISLAMIC STATE TERRORISM IS DETECTABLE

“si Jesús viviera, sería guerrillero” If Jesus were alive today, He would be a guerrillero Camilo Torres Restrepo 51 Increasingly, a number of historical similarities from other extreme brutal terror movements can be drawn that show a similar, if not identical, trajectory of Islamic State. For example, the internationalization of the struggle Islamic State and its expansionist policy of terror can be found in the Spanish civil war in the formation of the International Brigades, the Red Army Factions RAF, the extreme German Revolutionäre Zellen the Revolutionary Cells 52 , the ProvosIRA, FARC and many other known terror groups. At one time or another, terror groups go global. Recent references to the early Islamist extremists, the Khawarij The Humble I 2015 anglicized Kharijites 53 reflect on the historical truth that most – if not all – societies experienced some form of extremist nihilistic narrative in their past. Asia, in this context, is no exception. As early as mid-2014, discussions within the various security circles focusing on the rise of IS in Asia were lively and intensive. By the end of 2014, with the appearance of Southeast Asian fighters in Syria, YouTube videos of Islamic State on 25 December 2014 taking the fight to the Indonesian police and the army were dismissed by Indonesian security officials as “propaganda” Rochimawati 2014. At the time, factual evidence was limited. Evidence on capabilities, weapons and tactical skills, leadership, communications structures and group size were “rumortual” rather than “factual”. Source: Online screengrab 2016 ISIS Study Group n.d. 54 51 Camilo Torres Restrepo was a revolutionary member of the Columbian National Liberation Front attempted to conciliate Marxism with Catholicism. He was killed on his first combat patrol trying to ambush a Columbian army patrol. A similar attempt is being made by Indonesian leftist of the People s Democratic Party PRD, successor of the Indonesian Communist Party PKI 52 Who cooperated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – External Operations PFLP-EO 53 Also efe ed as Kha a ij those ho e t out ; Refuting ISIS: A Rebuttal of Its Religious and Ideological Foundations. Sacred Knowledge. pp. xvii –xviii. 54 no exact date Page 23 of 126 The Sarinah attack was part of a long series of plots, attempted failed attacks, and narrow escapes since 2014. Named as “Plan B”, after a series of arrests disrupted the terror plans for Christmas and New Year, more attacks were expected to come Jakarta Globe n.d. 55 . For a protracted period, the IS has dispatched teams to execute bombings or planned suicide missions in Indonesia and Malaysia. Not unlike swarming attacks, the repeated appearance of cells, groups, and a confusing array of attempted acts of terror – although failed – were an indication of things to come and is becoming the new normal. It can be argued that due to an increase of intervention in Syria by state-actors, the group is dispersing to bringing the fight to the soils of Europe and Asia and is an indication that Islamic State is, in fact, losing the battle in Syria. Even seasoned experts like Sidney Jones wrote in November 2015, “There is as yet no ISIS structure for Indonesia, and that pressure from some pro-ISIS quarters to form a unified organization has not yet succeeded ” Jones, The Interpreter 2015. A similar view was expressed by the Head of the National Intelligence Agency, BIN, who announced in early December 2015 that the “likelihood of attacks is low”. He argued that it was not the style of the terror group to warn their targets. “They would strike without talking,” he was quoted as saying Cleary 2015. A rethinking is clearly required and taking place with the Indonesian police and army offering to rescue ten seaman held hostage by the Abu Sayyaf Group ASG after its ship, the Anand12, was hijacked Chan and Dancel, The Straits Times 2016 by a cell led by Alhabsi Misaya Navy the Best 2014 56 . The use of the army units for counter terrorinsurgency operations is the domain of the army and in line with other countries. The politicization by human rights organizations and political commentators ’ attempts to undermine the need for a strong army counter-terror capability. However, new realities in the regional fight against terrorism will likely result in a greater role of the TNI engaging in bilateral counter terror operations Alim 2016 with the Chief of Kostrad, Edy Rahmayadi, proclaiming the Philippine armed forces are unable to handle the hostage crisis Sayyaf 2016. Taking the IRA as an example, however, announcing the intent is not uncommon within terror groups, and at the time of the statement, the State Intelligence Agency BIN was already on the lookout for planned terror plots since early November 2015 57 . All this indicates that things were changing. At the time, Khatib Nusantara KN was officially three-months old. ISISISISILDaesh, which was formed on 8 June 2013, was about shy of two years. On 29 June 2014, the ISILIS Sharia self-proclaimed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 58 as Caliph Ibrahim becoming its head of state 55 no date 56 Alhabsi Misaya is responsible for the beheading of Malaysian businessman Bernard Then in November 2015. The Malaysian was kidnapped from a resort in Sabay in May 2015. 57 Long-time experts in Indonesia have argued BIN capability needs to be improved with the IS threat operating beyond the borders of Indonesia. 58 Who is also k o as D I ahi , A u Du a. His offi ial aliphal a e is A u Bak Al-Baghdadi Al-Husseini Al- Quarishi after the first caliph living in Baghdad, al-Husseini claimed the Levant and al-Qureshi Page 24 of 126 and theocratic absolute monarch Barie 2015 59 . Choosing the nom de guerre, Caliph Ibrahim, is to instill Islamic legitimacy 60 . Although Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been around since 2003, he helped found the Jamaat Jaysh Ahl al-Sunnah wa-i-Jamaah JJASJ, while the appearance of the IndonesianMalaysian branch of IS was, in 2014, only a year old. The Bahasa Indonesia-speaking fighters located in Al Shadadi, Hassakeh, Syria with Naim were rumored to reside in Raqqa, the self-proclaimed IS capital. Whereas, in post-attack Sarinah, the media, public, and most security pundits flooded the public space, the early debates were inconclusive, spotty and mixed in intelligence value since the exact structures were not understood or seriously examined that allowed determining the threat of IS in the region. However, reviewing some of the recent court documents, a repeated appearance of known IS sympathizers with a long history in jihadist causes shows a greater analytical understanding of jihadist networks ’ movement and inter-group movements are needed. The constant inter-group movements and broadening of the IS hopefuls is changing the dynamics converting from a purist Jemaah Islamiyah organization to a cruder, but broader mobilization of the radical desiring to join the “jihadi action”. For example, Febriwansyah, now serving a five-year sentence, participated in March 2014 at a rally near Hotel Indonesia pledging alliance to the IS. Helmi Muhammad Alamudi alias Abu Roya, now serving 3.5 years for facilitating financing terrorism, raised 257 million IDR 26,500 SGD for smuggling 39 Indonesians to Syria joining the IS. He served as a guard at an IS camp in Syria. Reports suggest members of the IS visited Aceh province in 2013 to recruit former jihadists from Jemaah Islamiyah and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid JAT. For 20 million IDR approximately 2,000 USD Liow 2016, recruits were flown to Syria to receive real combat experience. Another jihadist, Ahmad Junaedi, now serving three-years, was a meatball seller Bakso. He participated in a firearms training but left Syria disgruntled after Abu Jandal cheated him out of a large sum of promised money 61 . This show the frictions within the terror group are not unlike any other known organization. Close relationship to others such as Ridwan Sungkar, Abdul Hakim Munabari, Aprimul Henry and Koswara Ibnu Abdullah, now serving five-years prison term and recruited Helmi, Ridwan Ahmad and Abdul Hakim Munabari Sarma 2016, is observed. The recent arrests of twenty-seven 27 Bangladeshi workers in Singapore Lee 2016 62 , the detection of multiple sets of plots to execute copycat operations in Indonesia and Malaysia and the continuous war in Iraq and Syria has shifted the terror threat picture towards internationalizing the IS. But prior to the arrests, Singapore was identified as a possible target for attack. M. Arifil Azim Putra Norja’i, a 20-year-old polytechnic student, made plans to assassinate President Tony Tan and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Long if he could not travel. He planned to use easily available knifes to carry out the attack in public places. His radicalization 59 slide 33 60 Ibid. slide 34 61 Indonesians jailed 3-5 years for ISIS support; The Strait Times, 10 February 2016, pg. A16 62 arrests were executed in December 2015; the group was building up since 2013 Page 25 of 126 commenced around 2013 but he is under detention since April 2015 Channel News Asia 2015. Another 17-year-old secondary-student was arrested in May 2015. In June 2015, Mustafa Sultan Ali 52 was detained under detention until 2017 Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore Government 2015 in Turkey trying to join the IS. Mustafa also said that he was prepared to carry out IS-directed terrorist attacks against Western establishments in Singapore. Muhammad Shamin Mohamed Sidek 29, a security guard Ho 2015, previously convicted for inciting religious violence through pro-IS postings on social media in May 2015, was in July 2015, arrested under the Internal Security Act. He planned to join the IS and defend the caliphate. Muhammad Harith Jailani 19 prepared himself to die as a martyr and tried to radicalize others to support the cause of IS in an attempt to join it Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore Government 2015. 2. THE BEGINNING: ISLAMIC STATE ’S RISE IN ASIA AND THE FIRST SET OF QUESTIONS “ISIS is everywhere nowhere” The Atlantic 2016 In 2014 and early 2015, a forum of corporate intelligence analysts monitoring the rise of IS and the emergence of Southeast Asians fighting in Syria posed two fundamental questions at the time: first, what are the capabilities of IS in Indonesia to mount a serious attack; and, secondly, what is the strength of IS in Indonesia? The lack of structural understanding of the Indonesians, Malaysians, and other Asians contributed to declare Attamimi as the Panglima – chief - of ISISISISIL Amamoto 2014. Salim Mubarok Attamimi 63 , alias Abu Jandal, who was believed to have travelled to Syria in March 2014, was identified as the individual on the video issuing a challenge. The 44-year-old honey seller from Malang East Java has been in the orbit of al Qaeda and IS for some time. In May 2014, he went to Syria along with his wife, and five children. In his video, he challenged the Indonesian army and the police. He said, “Because really, if you do not come to us, then we who will come upon you. ” Tokohpenemu.blogspot n.d. Today, it is the analysts’ view that Abu Jandal, Aman Abdurrahman and Bahrun Naim are the defacto leaders of the different splinters of the Indonesian Islamic State. Prior to Sarinah attack, the role were no longer clear cut. Source: Jakarta Post Witular 2016 63 Also spelled Salim Mubarak Attamimi; Strait Times 7 February 2016 Page 26 of 126 We need to stress the point that the term ‘special forces’ ‘Laskar Khos’, within the context of both, Jemaah Islamiyah and the New Leftist groups, appear in research. Thus, fractionalization of groups should be seen as an evolutionary process with smaller groups becoming more specialized in their battle against the slippery enemies of the caliphate and apostates. Largely ignored by the academia, like early research into jihadi evolution faces today the identical ignorance by the state, academia and policy officials. In exact, this vacuum of ignorance about extremist groups on either side of the political spectrum remains fester unchallenged. Mujahidin Kompak, in Poso, set up ‘special forces’, which Jemaah Islamiyah called the “Team of Ten” ‘Tim sepuluh’ but disbanded it in 2002 McRae 2013 64 . In 2011, the term ‘Tim S epuluh’ appeared within the radicalized People’s Democratic Party. Although no direct evidence has yet emerged linking the two diametrically opposed groups, the use of the terminology stands out. Both teams were seen as ‘special’ action units. Whereas the disbanded 15-men suicide strike brigade, Laskar Khos, Tan 2009 65 was dismantled, the concept of specializing action groups in both, jihadist and leftist groups, continues. Others, like the former police officer Syahputra alias Abu Azzyn Al Indunisiy Sofwan 2015 from Batang in Jambi, were reportedly killed in action in late June 2015 The Jambi Times 2015 Mujahidin-Distro n.d. in Tal Tamr, Syria, against the US-led coalition forces Kusumadewi 2015 and had transited through Riau to Malaysia Sofwan, CNN Indonesia 2015. Throughout 2014 and 2015, regional movement and intensive debates about IS were on going, warnings of a rise of terror actions continued to appear, but overall, the evidence on the extent of the threat was inconclusive. Towards the middle of 2015, the threat picture changed and the so called “chatter” increased. Source: Syahputra alias Abu Azzyn Al Indunisiy, CNN Indonesia Pratama and Agestu 2015 Movements of sympathizers joining ISIL in Syria, followed by the concern of trained fighters returning to Indonesia and Asia, were picked up by the security services but lacked convincing evidence about their capability. For example, the Santoso group in Poso, claimed to have received funding and new weapons, but they did not appear in wider circulation. Camps raided showed poorly equipped terrorists with firearms that were missing parts. At the same time, Fajar alias Chan was reported killed on 15 February 2016 in a raid in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara Jakarta Globe 2016. 64 page 165, referencing Karnavian et al 2009 ICG 2004a:18-19 65 page 111 Page 27 of 126 Source: Online Imgur n.d. 66 Gresnews 2015 Whereas the ISILIS cells in the Philippines and Thailand had tactical expertise and weaponry, the Indonesian cells appeared somewhat amateurish posing with flags Ngui 2016 and flip- flops. For example, of the six Indonesians arrested after the Sarinah attacks, police found additional nine 9 firearms but the ammunition was yet to be purchased 67 . Early January reports emerged that police had arrested Edo Aliando alias Hendro Fernando in his house with ammunition on the 15 January 2016 Klik Bekasi 2016. In contrast, insurgents associated with the Papua separatist movement, OPM 68 , appear to be better equipped. Source: OPM Indonesia 2015 The absence of ammunition for the Sarinah attack shows the limitation of its supply network. This may, however, change as recent post-Sarinah attacks suggests JIIS extremists reach out to the former Aceh Freedom Movement GAM to strike up alliances. We examined the claims large amounts of firearms are easily accessible to terror groups in Indonesia. These claims are not supported if critically examined. A report compiled by a private security company covering the 2012-2016 period reported a total of 7 Assault rifles, 125 Hand guns, 135 IEDs, 9 “Equipment”, and 7,374 rounds of Ammunition. Of the “hand-guns” 96 hand guns are listed as “fakes or gas pistols”. This represents 76.80 of a total of 125 hand guns. This averages 1.75 assault rifle, 31.25 hand gun, 33.75 IEDs, 2.25 “equipment’s” or 1,842.5 rounds of ammunition per annum. With 76.80 listed as gas pistols or fakes, this represents only seven 7 handguns per annum. For a population of 350 million citizens and about 1,000- 2,000 radicals, the evidence concerning firearms is not present. 66 no date 67 Indonesia arrests 6 over planned terror attack; Strait Times, quoting Indonesian police, 23 January 2016, page A8 68 Organisasi Papua Merdeka Papua Freedom Movement OPM Page 28 of 126 However, reports suggest Indonesian jihadist groups are attempting to re-establish new logistic channels to rearm the jihad or obtain sophisticated weapons surfacing in future attacks would indicate an acceleration and change. Hence, the use of non-sophisticated tools, such as IED’s, knife attacks or attacks to capture more weapons from police or army personnel to launch additional attacks, represent a higher likelihood. By March 2016, pictures emerged that provided some insight in the tactical equipment of the Santoso group. Santoso alias Abu Wardah alias Abu Musab al-Zarqawi al-Indonesi Sapiie, The Jakarta Post 2016 surfacing in late March 2016 provides some indication of the assorted weaponry. Source: Jakarta Post Sapiie, The Jakarta Post 2016 The assortment of weapons consists of a few M-16, Indonesian SS-1, a few revolvers, .45 Colt, and maybe some 40 mm grenades. The desert pattern of one of the IS members is an IraqiSyrian pattern not commonly available in Indonesia. The picture above depicts 30 members 69 . Taken reports at face value the group consisting between 30-45 members, the picture would represent between 67- percent of total strength Sangadj 2016 70 . This maybe an optimistic assessment as additional cells and factions should not be ruled out. Recent reports suggest the group has dispersed and some factions are cornered in Posos Napu Valley. However, troops in the field are foraying food from cassava plantation and shooting birds. This suggests poor field craft, operational inexperience, lack of operational security and supply problems. Like in the Philippines, the combat capabilities the Santoso group is not known and a deadly ambush with casualties on the side of the Indonesian security forces should come as no surprise. Following the Jakarta Sarinah attacks, police continue to round up IS members. Two additional cells were identified; one of the cells consisted of six incarcerated terrorists who coordinated communications between the operational cells on the outside. The command and control capability while in prison is a worrisome development and poses the question if an Islamic 69 Including the photographer 70 Agus Surianto, aka Farhan, and Fahrudin, aka Udin, Santosos couriers were killed after a deadly shootout with security officers in Sanginora village, South Poso Pesisir, on Feb. 14. Dodo, aka Fonda Amar Solihin, died in a shootout on Feb. 28; eight Chinese Uighur nationals who had joined the militant group, four had died; Faruk, aka Magalasi Bahtusan, Nuretin, aka Abdul, Joko Uigur, aka Turang Ismail, and Sobron, aka Son Haji. Two others, Kohar, aka Malik, and Abdul, are still on the run; Zaenal Effendi and Saad were arrested during security operations. Page 29 of 126 Statejihadists prison riot is within the realm of possibilities. Taking control over the prison Jones, Institute For Policy Analysis Of Conflict 2015 population would be consistent with any other mainstream terror group of the past. The radicalization of inmates is not unique to Indonesia Paton 2016 71 Temple-Raston 2016 McCoy 2014. A U.S. study argues that Federal prisons are “breeding ground” for terrorists Hickey 2016 with an estimated 100 imprisoned terrorists to be released within the next five years Bjelopera 2013, Bjelopera, Terror Inmates: Countering Violent Extremism in Prison and Beyond 2015, Bjelopera, The Domestic Terrorist Threat: Background and Issues for Congress 2013. In 2014, the largely unnoticed Alton Nolen incident beheading a coworker is attributed to the radicalization of the offender while in prison Hollie McKay 2015, Dunleavy 2011. As early as 2010, well before Islamic State was formed, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee identified 36 U.S. citizens who have converted to Islam while serving prison sentences and travelled to Yemen upon being released Kerry 2010. 3. POST-PARIS: THE SECOND SET OF QUESTIONS After the November 2015 Paris attacks, two more questions were posed by the security community; first, what is the response capability of the Indonesian and other ASEAN police forces; and, has Islamic State in the Southeast Asian region reached operational maturity ready to strike? Whereas the Indonesian counter terror unit Densus Detachment 88 has considerable success being a formidable force, the events in Nairobi, Paris and Sydney highlighted the changing tactics of multiple first shooter scenarios attacking simultaneously at different locations causing mass casualties that have not been experienced in Southeast Asia and could strain even the most experienced counter terror forces. In addition, the Sarinah attack was initially responded by regular police and not counter terror forces Abuza 2016. Good solid police response works. Although, the Indonesian Counter Terror units and the national police are often criticized for being the most corrupt institution in Indonesia, today, they are one of the most experienced counter terror units in the region. The program has produced not only the response units but also built a new generation of seasoned police officers leading police departments throughout the country triggering a mindset change that is enabled to deal with the complexity of jihadi- terror structures. In the last twelve years, 907 terror suspects were arrested with 644 being brought to trial Nowaczynski 2013. Three Bali bombers were executed in November 2008. In 2013, another 87 terrorists were arrested, about 103 were killed on site, while 13 others committed suicide prior to being arrested. In Malaysia, an equal aggressive counter terror campaign unfolded. More than 100 Islamic State supporters were arrested foiling attacks in Malaysia Singh 2015. A 2014 German Ministry of Home Affairs report reflects some of the complexities authorities face today. With the increase of interconnectivity of groups, online radicalization, connectivity 71 Bourhan Hraichie, an 18-year old IS sympathizer attacked his cellmate Page 30 of 126 between individuals and cells, common interests and association between single actors and small radical fractions, and constant crossovermergers, the detection and prevention of counter tactics are difficult to initiate, in particular, if the threshold of violence is not reached. This summary applies to the current situation in Indonesia Verfassungsschutz 2015 Verfassungsschutz, Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution n.d. 72 . After all, a Singapore study by the Rajaratnam School for International Study RSIS determined that Khatibah Nusantara captured five Kurd-held territories in April 2015 Gopinath 2015 73 , suggesting tactical operational experience is being obtained. Led by an Amir 74 , identified as Abu Ibrahim al-Indunisiy, the unit appears to be led mainly by Indonesians but Malaysians and Singaporeans are active within the group. In late December 2015, Malaysians attacked the 44 th Syrian Democratic Forces coalition. Reports suggests that 17 Malaysians were killed in 18 months of fighting. Malaysian Special branch 75 arrested over 100 radicals seeking to travel to join IS and reports suggest the group has about 50,000 sympathizers in Malaysia Brandon 2016 and anywhere from 300 to 700 militants in Indonesia Zenn 2016. This suggests the Indonesian-Malay speaking group has reached tactical capability and battlefield experience. The study further suggests, “…between 700 and 200 fighters from Indonesia and Malaysia respectively, and a smaller number from the Philippines and even Singapore, the Malay-speaking fighters are being organised for a number of reasons, including the fact that they emanate from Southeast Asia where a sizeable number of world’s Sunni Muslims reside. About 30 groups in Southeast Asia have already pledged allegiance to IS Singh, Katibah Nusantara: Islamic State’s Malay Archipelago Combat Unit 2015.” With the Sarinah attack, we are now able to measure the combat effectiveness, size, tactics, motivation, and command and control structure at this moment of time. Today, the tacticaloperational structure according to the Jamestown Foundation suggests Bahrun Naim is the Theatre commander for Southeast Asia as part of a shadowy wing of Islamic State called the Amn al-Kharji, responsible for selection, training of external operatives to plan attacks in areas outside the Islamic State ’s core territory. This research suggests Islamic State in Iraq is responsible for the Sarinah attacks in contradiction of the attack being organized in Indonesia. 72 Page 88 73 See this and this ; no date 74 Also spelled Ameer 75 On 16 January 2016, Malaysian police reported having arrested four IS members including a married couple Page 31 of 126 Source: Jamestown Foundation Daveed Gartenstein-Ross 2016 The lesson in the Sydney siege showed the zero-hostage death scenarios no longer be valid as the attackers do not seek concessions or attempt to negotiate freedom for a cause but create mass casualties 76 . A total disregard for the lives of the hostages are the new realities. The body count is part of the strategic equations by Islamic State attackers and part of the strategy suggested in publications such as the ‘ Management of Savagery Naji 2006 ’. Shopping centers, mass transportation and a combination of grenades and portable, smaller bombs aimed to cause destruction of property and random mass killings are the trends identified as early as 2009 by a small group of security experts studying the likelihood of an attack against the shopping mall industry Slideshare 2009. The attack pattern is in line with the jihadist strategy Naji 2006 to target the same location repeatedly, target tourism spots, and take hostages. Some reports suggest the group attacking in January was the result of police being less alert in the post-holiday period Ismail 2016. We disagree with this perspective, as since late 2015, the police were on high alert as intelligence suggested plots by the IS were underway. On 24 November 2015, using Telegram social messaging with Reuters, Naim proclaimed that enough IS supporters are read y “to carry out an action” in Indonesia Fabi 2016 with chatter suggesting multiple attacks. A few months later, on 15 January 2016, the Head of the State Intelligence Agency BIN stated those five 5 days before the bombings on 9 January 2016, security services had information the attack will take place. BIN and the national police were on alert as early as JulyAugust 2015. The threats were directed against high-level police officers Cleary, Daily Mail Australia 2015. Despite the pre- holiday hysteria often triggered by rumors within the foreign commercial and security 76 The e eptio to the ule as the e e t a ide tal kidnapping of Indonesian fishers who later released. Claims of a 2 million USD ransom being paid by the owners of the vessel were not confirmed. Page 32 of 126 “consultants” domains, the attack plans did not include Bali as the island is considered a “hardened” target by jihadists. However, Bali, a tourist center, remains a target and is part of the global Jihadi strategy. Shortly before Christmas 2015, police arrested Asep Urip, a 31-year old teacher at an Islamic boarding school pesantren and Zaenal, preventing an imminent attack on New Year’s Eve. 35-year-old Zaenal, the pupil of Asep Urip, was groomed to carry out a suicide bombing. The arrests also included Iwan, the bomb-maker, and a fifth man, leading to the discovery of a larger cell France-Presses 2015. In December 2015, a would-be suicide bomber, Zaenal, received 600 from his Hong-Kong foreign domestic worker wife Tasmina, a financial funder of Katibah Nusantara, to buy bomb-making material Kwok 2015. Police believe the Shiite attacks was perpetrated by Asep Urip planning to target Shiite communities using mobile phones to detonate bombs in Pekalongan, Bandung and Pekanbaru Erviani 2015. On 24 December 2015, following a crackdown that started on December 18, the Chinese Uighur ethnic minority suicide bomber Alli alias Abu Muzan, groomed to execute a suicide attack, was arrested 77 . The arrests foiled a plot to attack several cities in Java, Sumatra and Kalimantan. Of the six, two were part of the Bahrun Naim “Takfiri” group and four belonged to the Jemaah Islamiyah. The Chinese entered Indonesia via Batam. This was not the first time the Chinese-Uighur link appeared. In September 2014, police arrested four Uighurs attempting to meet Santoso alias Abu Wardahin in Poso. After the conviction, the four were repatriated to China for suspected of being a part of a group attacking a train station in Kunming The Jakarta Post 2015. Reports suggested a total of six Uighurs joined the Santoso group. In 2014, Indonesian police arrested Alphin Zubaidan 27, Atlinci Bayram alias Altinci Bayyram Soeriaatmadja, Straits Times 2016 29, Abdul Basyit 19 and Ahmed Bozoglan 28 China Daily 2014, Soeriaatmadja, Straits Times 2016 78 in Parigi Moutong regency in 2014 Ervianto 2016. A year later, in November 2015, police shot dead another Uighur named Farouk alias Magalasi Kwok 2015 when police attacked a camp of the Institute For Policy Analysis Of Conflict 2016 Mujahideen of Eastern Indonesia MIT. This is contradictory to reports that emerged on 15 March 2016 claiming Farouk alias Farok alias Magalasi Bahtusan Utami and Lesmana 2015 and Nuretin alias Abdul Malik were killed by a joint Indonesian and police operations only in March 2016 Radio Free Asia 2015 during Operation Tinombala. On the same day, another Uighur, Sobron alias Son Haji Sangadji 2016 alias Abu Sulaiman, Sangadji, The Jakarta Post 2016 was killed. MIT dumped the body in the river at Desa Lelo after he attempted to flee from MIT. The circumstances of his attempted escape are not clear. 77 Ibid. 78 The use of fake passports to enter Indonesia illegally through the Nonaka regency in North Kalimantan by boat from Malaysia were reported. Page 33 of 126 Source: Turantenews.com Tawang 2016 On 22 March 2016, Joko alias Turang Ismail was killed in Desa Rompo. During the raid, three live bombs were discovered. A local villager Tiger alias Anto Isaac was also killed Solopos 2016. Source: www.iberita.review Berita Indonesia 2016 Intelligence reports claim Santoso is increasingly frustrated feeling the pressure by the police hunt threatening anyone who wants to leave the group will be killed if they attempt to escape from the group Berita Indonesia 2016. Reports claim two Uighurs threatened by Santoso were identified as Abdul and Ibrohim Ervianto 2016. Source: Metro Sulawesi Wawan 2016 Page 34 of 126 Jilani alias Aziz Efendi alias Aziz Uighur Tawang 2016 from Bogor, West Java and Musa al-Qossam alias MAQ alias Saad alias Brotherasal, from Indramayu, Central Java, were captured by police after escaping from the Santoso group due to starving Berita Indonesia 2016. Reports suggest the group is living on wild animals in the Lore Lindu National Park. Couriers delivered food, such as corn, pumpkins, cabbage, and nuts from local residents. With the security operations underway, the access to stable food will be limited. The effectiveness of starving the group into submission was reaffirmed with the capture of Ibadurohman alias Ibad alias Amru from Bima, West Nusa Tenggara, and Muhammad Sulaeman alias Sul alias Ifan from Madura, East Java on 14 April 2016 Sangadji, The Jakarta Post 2016. Two more Uighurs, Kohar alias Mali, and Abdul, have left the group Sangadji 2016. Two other Uighurs, Ibrahim and Mustafa Genc alias Mus’ab, are at large at the time of this report. Source: Manjanik.com Manjanik 2015 The role of mobilizing the largest Muslim population for jihad receives attention by the media- savvy Islamic State propaganda machine. The simple, but effective, formula of seeking adventure, fighting for the IS cause, and sense of belonging is being applied with the Uighurs in an attempt to open up a second front in China. Source: Twitter Monitor 2016 Page 35 of 126 This followed the arrests of three 3 people with links to Islamic State who were planning to launch a bomb attack during the Indonesian Independence Day celebration on 17 August 2015. Police confiscated twenty-one 21 improvised explosives that intended to target several places of worships and police posts. The plots returned to mass-casualty attacks scenarios Andrew Zammit 2015. 4. INDONESIA: CREATING A TINY BUT DEADLY “DISTANT CALIPHATE” By the end of December 2015, the Australian Attorney General had warned Indonesia of ISIL ’s plans to create “distant caliphates” beyond the Middle East. Indonesia was named by ISIL as having “ambitions to become a provincial caliphate” Al-Alam 2015 and a hub for extremists. However, the first signs of the Islamic State ’s interest to expand to Southeast Asia was published in Dabiq 5 79 in November 2014 Zenn, The Jamestown Foundation 2016. However, size, group composition, splinters and cell structure, etc. remained a mixed bag of data. Figures ranged from 400 to 1,000. A recent study by the Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency suggests 1 percent of 2.7 million Indonesians are involved, directly or indirectly, in terror activities. The study suggests there are 10 to 12 terror networks developing in Indonesia. Whereas the number claimed to have risen from 60 in 2014 to about 1,000 today 80 , the statistics require additional research. In comparison, the 2014 German Ministry of Home Affairs reported about 43,890 people as “jihadist potential” individuals Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2014 but only 680 are known to have left for Syria and Iraq and of 230 returnees only fifty 50 been singled out as potential threats Nur Diyanah Binte Anwar 2015 81 . Indonesia qualifies for a similar number. About 1,000 Indonesians have gone to the Middle East; about fifty were killed in Action. German authorities reported about 130 Islamists from Germany were killed in action Heinke 2016. Saudi Arabia reported about 3,000 of its citizen joined militant groups abroad and more than 5,000 were jailed for terrorism charges Straits Times 2016. Some data from the German experience suggests two-thirds 225 individuals of the Islamists leaving have been subject of criminal investigations or tried for criminal offenses prior to their Islamist radicalization. Violent attacks assault, robbery, etc. and property crimes accounted for 29 each, followed by drug trafficking with 16. Politically motivated offenses played no significant role Heinke 2016. Following the Jakarta Sarinah attack, current thinking suggests that Muhammad Bahrun Naim Anggih Tamtomo aka Bahrun Naim from Solo is emerging as a possible leader to take control over the Caliphate in the East called Katibah Nusantara – the Katibah archipelago Singh, Katibah Nusantara: Islamic State’s Malay Archipelago Combat Unit 2015 Jakarta Globe 2016 82 – a reference also made by the al Qaeda leader on 13 January 2015, one day before the attack. The terrorist’s capability to connect across the Indonesian jihadist ideologues, militants 79 Dabiq is the Islamic StateAQ publication magazine 80 Strait Times, 22 Jakarta 2015; page A15 81 3-8 May 2015 82 Reports suggest the Katibah is also referred as the Malay Archipelago Combat Unit; RSIS named the group Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyah or the Malay Archipelago Unit for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria Page 36 of 126 and jihadi aspirants including the online jihadi community and outreach to the Mandarin Uighur speaking Muslims, positions him ideally to take leadership in Central Asia. Arrested in 2010 for ammunition possession, Bahrun Naim was charged in 2011 and found guilty serving a two-year and six months’ jail sentence by the court in Surakarta. After his release, he departed with his future wife, Siti Lestari, from Demak, Central Java, to Syria 83 . The attack in Jakarta carried out by, now d ubbed “Jakarta Four” - possibly more - was assigned to a fraction of the Katibah Nusantara led by Bahrum Naim, who is claimed to be the founding member of the group orchestrating the attacks from Syria. The four, Sunakim alias Afif, Muhammad Ali, Dian Joni Kurniadi and Ahmad Muhazin, were members of different extremist fractions in Indonesia consolidating under the Jemaah Anshar Khilafah JAK Chan and Soeriaatmadja, Straits Times 2016. Dian Joni Kurniadi tried to purchase firearms from the first cell which was led by Hendro Soeriaatmadja, Straits Times 2016. In Syria, his group is made up of Malaysians and Malay-speaking Indonesians. Initial interest in executing attacks in Pekanbaru, Sumatra are yet to be understood in their full implications. With Pekanbaru being an industrial center with oil and gas facilities and oil fields, palm oil and forestry industries, the interest of Islamic State of Riau raises the question if the targeting patterns are subject to change. On Thursday 14 January 2016, a day before the attacks, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the defacto leader of al Qaeda, released an audio message appealing to Muslims in the “archipelago”, particularly Indonesia, to attack the interests of the U.S. The audio intercepted by the BBC Monitoring service called for “the Rising sun will be the victory of the archipelago” should be seen as a message to commence action in Southeast Asia. This would suggest ISIL and al Qaeda are coordinating command and control messages to their audiences. Reports suggest whereas Islamic State has changed the power configuration of the jihadist struggle, al Qaeda is expected to redeem its lost reputation by repeating some spectacular attacks to offset some of the ground gained by Islamic State Verfassungsschutz 2015 84 . The proclamation of the successes by the Khilafah of the IS has triggered the “jihad travel wave”, which, if unchallenged, can affect the long-term security of ASEAN nations. We note the mention of a Khilafah also appears in the narrative of radical environmental groups in Indonesia suggesting that the Islamic State is pursuing a global agenda. According to BIN, ISIL has 423 Posmetro 2016 members who returned to Indonesia but are not monitored upon return. This is simply a resource issue. This is in contrast to the recent RSIS study ranking the number of fighters in Syria higher. 83 Ibid. 84 Page 87 Page 37 of 126

5. INDONESIAN EXTREMIST FRAGMENTATION: A MIRROR OF A MILLION