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5. INDONESIAN EXTREMIST FRAGMENTATION: A MIRROR OF A MILLION
PIECES, SPLINTERING OR UNIFICATION? In Indonesia, a gaggle of pro-Islamic State groups has now emerged. A January presentation
by a leading regional research center, indicates approximately 22-28 different groups sympathetic or aligned to the Islamic State ideology
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. The number is expected to grow. The process is comparable with the brand corporation building on its extreme violent success in
Syria and Iraq. Since 2014, it pursues a globalization of its violent ideology as an export commodity.
However, in this attempt to unify the fast growing industrial sized radicalization, the interchangeable parts of Jemaah Islamiyah to Islamic State shows the ideological increasingly
the new normal. For example, in December 2015, a group arrested in Mojokerto planning to attack churches and security personnel during the Christmas celebration is believed to have
links to Jemaah Islamiyah rather than Islamic State Tomsa 2016. Dissatisfaction and squabbles within the groups are commonplace. The regional cooperation between jihadist
groups is less firm at this moment of time. The Islamic State brand aims to bridge these differences.
Jamaah Anshar Khilafah, JAK also called the Partisans of the Caliphate Tomsa 2016, is led by the imprisoned Aman Abdurrahman. The group is reported loosely aligned with Katibah
Masyaariq led by Abu Jandal, the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur MIT, also known as the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia in Poso, Central Sulawesi led by Santoso alias Abu Wardah
Conflict 2016 and the Katibah al-Iman led by Abu Husna. Abu Husna was the former leader of Jemmah Islamiyah. Abu Husna and the Katibah al-Iman who begun recruiting in Sumatra
in late 2015 will be addressed in the Sumatra portion of this report.
Source: ICPVTR 28 January 2016 presentation
The Katibah Nusantara first came under the radar of intelligence agencies two years ago when it was called Majmuah al Arkhabiliy Straits Times 2016.
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The number listed in a ICPVTR January 2016 presentation showed 22 different groups, however contacts within the BNPT estimate the number of groups and factions higher
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It is claimed MIT has an estimated combat strength of 40 combatants. Santoso alias Abu Wardah has received funding for weapons purchases from Bahrumsyah Abu Ibrahim
Conflict 2016 but the amount of weapon, type and details remains vague. Of concern will be
the return to strategic and tactical planning and the division of the logistic supply chain to mount a larger attack. At this time, the attack showed the weaknesses of Islamic State but we
should not ignore the three elements of intent, intelligence, and resources that are allocated to the struggle.
After an internal squabble with Abu Jandal, with allegations of corruptions made by Abu Ibrahim and after a bitter split, the Katibah Masyaariq moved to Homs about 488 km in the
south-east of Syria, 163 km north of Damascus and about 20 km to the Lebanese border Conflict 2016.
Today, the leadership role is generally defined as with Aman Abdurrahman
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, Bahrumsyah alias Abu Ibrahim Parameswaran 2016 commanding the Katibah Nusantara KN
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base in April 2015 in Ash Shaddadi Conflict 2016, a town about 120 km east from Ar-Raqqah
Raqqa in the eastern parts of Syria, Salim Mubarok Attamimi alias Abu Jandal commanding the Katibah Masyaariq
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. The Katibah Nusantara members were recruited from Surabaya, Lamongan, Malang, Solo and Bekasi. Bharun Naim is reported to have tried to stay neutral
Conflict 2016 between the two groups
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. Others like Muhammad
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, following the Jakarta incident, have emerged, while the size of the groups has remained somewhat vague.
6.
INDONESIAN JIHADIST FRAGMENTATION: JIHAD FOR ONE AND ALL
Links between the 2010 and 2015 bombings and the relationship between JAT and JI, despite Ba’asyir having sworn an oath of allegiance Akbar 2015 in 2015 he retracted his
affiliation
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, were mixed, confusing and contradicting. In the morass of colliding interests and new directions, frictions within the Jihadi scene and the alliances of the aging terror leader with
Islamic State are seen as attempts to remain relevant that continue to appear. However, the future is uncertain, as younger and more aggressive ideologues following the Islamic State,
have gotten the upper hand. Post-Sarinah reporting suggests a leadership struggle is underway, however, as examination showed, the leadership coordinated action from within prison walls.
However, historically, none of these evolutions is new or revolutionary but in line with any other terror group evolution and part of the escalation of violence to pursue a nihilistic
ideological goals. Islamic State in Indonesia and in the region is no exception. Recent reports also show a consistent collaboration between the fractions while in
Nusakambangan prison in Cilacap, Central Java and cross-pollination of groups, as most of the
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Founding the Takfiri fraction Tauhid Wal Jihad in 2003, Aman Abdurrahman never fought in the field although he was linked to suicide bombings at a mosque in Cirebon, West Java 2011 and killing of several
police officers in Banten 2013.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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ibid
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The four are leading different fractions from Syria with Santoso leading his group in Poso
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We consider this retraction as a legal strategy as the aging leader prison sentence was at the time of the attack under review.
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operational cells do not reach maturity, size, or logistics due to their clandestine nature. This may change if the state fails to arrest the development of IS and other splinters.
Whereas, early reports fortified the police belief that the action was under the command of the Syria-based Bahrun Naim and some other terrorist, analysts view the attack as being ordered
by Aman Abdurrahman, the leader of the Tauhid Wal Jihad TWJ. Post-attack analysis claims the Partisans of the Caliphate Jammah Anshar Khilafah or JAK executed the attack Conflict
2016. JAK is aligned with the Katibah Masyaariq Forces of the East or KM while the Katibah
Masyaariq is a splinter of the Katibah Nusantara KN
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. Althoug led by Abu Jandal, it is currently thought he has not played an active role. Surprised by the attack by KM, the Katibah
Nusantara ordered an attack but police arrested the would-be perpetators while others are at large.
Aman Abdurrahman, currently serving nine 9 years for financing the Aceh, Jalin Jantho training camp in 2009, is held in the same prison as
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. One of the attackers, Sunakim, met Aman at the Cipinang prison before being moved to Nusakambangan in 2012
Chan and Soeriaatmadja, Straits Times 2014. Both Afif and Sunakim were with 70 others attending the training camp in Aceh.
Source: The Daily Mail UK 13 August 2015
At the time, the emerging picture remained fragmented with the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid JAT forming on 11 August 2014 in Bekasi and the Tawhid wal Jihad, also referred as the
“Takfiri” group, who pledged their support for the IS. On 6 July 2014, the group managed to gather about 600 people at a ceremony in the Islamic
State University UIN Syarif Hidayatullah to pledge allegiance to IS Sugara 2014. At the
same time, Abdul “Lim” Rohin and Rosyid Ridho, the sons of Abu Bakar Ba’asy’ir, were expelled from JAT, and formed the Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah JAS to rival the JAT
recruitment. Calling for the full implementation of Sharia law in Java, JAS claims 2,000 members have joined Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium n.d.
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its factions.
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Under the command of Bahrumsyah.
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No date
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Observing these developments, it is said Jemaah Islamiyah is quietly redeveloping its military capacity siding with the Jabhat al-Nusra against Islamic State Jones, Institute For Policy
Analysis Of Conflict 2015. It is likely these developments will increase violence between jihadi groups and against public targets in the near future.
This fractionalization is not merely a difference over ideological execution of jihad but symptomatic of increasing attraction to a Khmer Rouge-type of ideology rearranging society.
A doctrine that is very much in line with the SyrianIraqi Islamic State philosophy considering most of the Islamic symbols are of pagan worship and replace the Saudi and Jordanian
dynasties. Disagreements within the jihadi community are not new and part of the evolutionary process of the struggle. The
Annajah
magazine, which promotes JI ideology, criticized Islamic State explicitly for their rejection of the current leadership of Al- Baghdadi Sugara 2014.
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir initially called Islamic State a conspiracy of Shiites and Jews
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and many scholars argued that Islamic State is no different from the Kharijites Mamouri 2015
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- i.e. “those who went outleft
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” - a heterodox group of early Islamic history known for its atrocities killing Muslims and non-believers under the allegations of committing
takfir
excommunications. The Khawarij were the source of insurrection for many decades against the Caliphate.
Whereas the strategic intent was relatively easy to answer, many questions remained unanswered at the time. Speculation in the days up to the January 2015 attack were rife, but
evidence was scarce. The battle within the jihadist groups and fractions in the region could see the emergence of a
new wave of suicide and other attacks not unlike the struggle between the Palestinian Fatah and Hamas fractions over political dominance. Once Hamas gained ground, Fatah created the
Martyr brigades to compete with Hamas of being more committed to the cause than Hamas.
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Ibid.
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Commentators note the close similarities between the Kharijites and Islamic states such as calling for quality and to end the separation between ruler and parish. Salafists for example resulted to pledge allegiance to Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi, who declared himself the caliph of all Muslims. Islamic State is considered even by al Qaeda fractions as the most dangerous jihadist movement with the Jabhat al-Nusra declaring war against the
Kha ijites i De e e
. The I do esia split is et to e see , ho e e , si ila ities su h as o de i g
other Muslims, killing of women and children and clashing with other Salafist jihadist groups to secure an exclusive power-on-power is yet to come.
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Othe i te p etatio s suggest a ea i g of: to go out , to alk out o to o e out ;
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7. THE KATIBAH NUSANTARA: NEW STRATEGIC ACTOR OR JUST ANOTHER
Kategori