THE KILAFAH IS COMING

Page 13 of 126 The use of knifes, motor vehicles, meat cleavers and other primitive forms of attacks has a long history and should not require further explanation 41 . It allows the attacker to adopt a quasi-high ground justifying the attack as part of at the Muslim outrange against the apostates and non- believers and not limited to the urban setting. Moreover, the line is thin of being a random act of violence of premeditated terror attack 42 . Examination of why the attack team ’s tracks were lost by the surveillance teams and why changes in the date of the attack were made by the terror cell is expected to emerge in due time 43 . The attack also shows the radical scene is becoming more clandestine in its planning and execution of actions, but these are detectable. This evolution is, however, not particularly new or unexpected. Actionable intelligence and police response has paid off to prevent large loss of life. Nevertheless, ISDaesh has publically displayed a somewhat limited but lethal capability, intent, and resources allowing the practitioner to draw observations for the near term future. The attack ’s intent to have propaganda value trying to copycat a large body count was not achieved either. We agree with a commentary by the Lowy Institute that Thursday’s attack was poorly organized, poorly executed, and poorly received by the people of Jakarta Croft- Cusworth 2016. To conclude, whereas the current tactical capability of Islamic State in Indonesia is limited, the more pressing undercurrents of the Khilafah movement, indoctrination of the young, and intersecting and competing interests with Jemaah Islamiyah and its factions, as well as the expansion of the Islamic State “near and far abroad” strategy is shifting the global threat. This is not the end of Islamic State in Indonesia or the end of radicalization of Indonesian society. CHAPTER I. STRATEGIC THREAT OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

1. THE KILAFAH IS COMING

Whereas the initial framework of this paper was designed to review the attack and its implication, the strategic implications of the current struggle between moderate pluralism and radical change in society receives not the attention it should deserve. The tactical examination is given ample focus by a large body of experts. Today, the ideological Khilafah narrative is part of the wider Islamic State struggle and a bigger threat to Indonesia than the struggle by arms. In our paper, besides reflecting on the tactical consideration, we focus on more concerning emerging trends: a the recruitment amongst the young, b the role of hate speeches in the rural areas, c the question if the Internet liberties are applicable in the Asian context and if more governance must be imposed. The struggle for re-establishing the Khilafah are not merely fancy posters and slogans but reflects a large group on the social media space. The Hizbut Tahrir spokesperson, Ismail 41 Bertrand Nzohabonayol attacked with a knife a small police station injuring three police officers on 20 December 2014 before being shot dead. His brother was on a terror watch list; see this ; 12 January 2015; On 21 December, car attack in Dijon injured 13; one of the victims 11-years old, see this ; 22 December 2015 42 The Graz car attack was executed by a 26-year- old, de a ged lo e assassi , killi g th ee, a o gst the a four-year old boy and injuring 34. The attacker was a devout Bosnian Muslim migrant, Alen ‘iz a o ić, who, at one point, stabbed an elderly couple. The attack was later determined to be premeditated and no mental illness was found as a cause; see this ; 22 June 2015 43 “o e e pe ts o BIN e p essed the ie the o ga izatio s fo e ell-known surveillance capability needs to be improved. Page 14 of 126 Yusanto, is quoted on the HTI website as, “publically rejecting the “existence of ISIS” as an “attitude derived from their Takfiri ideology”. He goes on, “Through their Takfiri ideology fell ow Muslims can be easily confused.” Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 2015. However, social media examination shows a glorification of HTI members killed in Syria blurring the lines since the HTI is calling for the establishment of the Khilafah. Examining the symbolic narrative and the global message, the strategic aim of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia HTI is not one of peace and democratic transformation but one of violence as part of the wider global struggle. Indonesia is called the strongest base for the HTI movement. Source: Piyungan Online, Melawan Media Fitnah Aulia 2015 Whereas Indonesia never banned the movement, in 2015, the Malaysian Selangor Fatwa committee declared Hizbut Tahrir a deviant group The Malay Mail 2015. Hizbut Tahrir was quick to distance itself from Islamic State repeatedly 5 Pillars 2014, Media 2015, Trianita 2015. It is yet to be seen if the Indonesian religious, political and security leadership recognizes the threat this group poses. Even seasoned academics refuse to classify HTI as part of the jihadi ideological political movement. The argument is since HTI has no violent history it does not qualify for classification under a terrorism legal regime. Richard Bulliet wrote, “A true caliph must be an Arab descended from the Quraysh tribe of the Prophet Muhammad. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi claims such descent, but the Saudis cannot. If King Salman were to fudge matters by assuming the title of Caliph now in response to ISIS, his subjects would see him as a hypocrite. The historic rivals of the Saud family, the Hashimis, were and are direct descendants of the Prophet and are still honored as such by pious Muslims, particularly those living around Mecca and Medina. ” Bulliet 2015 Although HTI rejects Islamic State, denying a critical examination of HTI fails to recognize the ideological battle waged within Islam that has expanded to Indonesia. By its definition, HTI dismisses ISISIS “because it not mastered one autonomous region, not under a state.” Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 2014. The existence of the state of Iraq and Syria poses the question: What if the states are defeated - does the Islamic State then gain legitimacy? The HTI leadership does not address that question Kompasiana 2015. Operating in Iraq and Syria is, according to the Indonesian HTI spokesperson, disqualifies Islamic State to be Page 15 of 126 declared an Islamic caliphate. It has not yet achieved the definition of a legitimacy Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 2014 44 . Viewed from the extremist’s perspectives, declaring a “province”, a Wilayah, would provide the legitimacy, in the eyes of the jihadists, to its cause. Its expansionist policy is on display in a map produced by the Washington Post in late 2015 Lazaro Gamio 2015. Source: Washington Post Lazaro Gamio 2015 By the end of 2015, Islamic State operated twenty 20 Wilayahs mainly focusing on Syria and Iraq. In November 2015, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced eight new Islamic State provinces in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Algeria. This was the first time Islamic State had formally claimed territory outside its domains. Of the eight new provinces, three in Libya are successfully controlled territories. In January 2015, Islamic State formed a new province on the Afghan-Pakistan border Roul 2015 that traditionally was the core of Al-Qaeda Lazaro Gamio, The Washington Post 2015. As a matter of organizational behavior, an expansion into Asia is a foregone conclusion. In February 2014, Islamic State announced the formation of a Wilayah in the South Asian region Rafiq 2015. Although seen at this time at the lower end of the threat spectrum, the Malaysian, Indonesian and Philippine groups do not have large affiliates but remain dangerous nonetheless J. Berger 2016. The regional expansion also surfaces in India with Islamic State creating “to have hatred for the kuffarkafir disbelievers. In this land you get to perform jihad”. An Indian identified as Abu Salman al-Hindi operates in the Syrian province of Homs Miglani 2016. The Islamic State claims to revenge the Babri mosque, violence against Hindus in a train attack in Gujarat, the home state of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and independence for Kashmir. However, the militant narrative and call for replacement capitalism at a conference in Jakarta in 2013 shows the political ambition of the movement of arguing economics, political system, and new governance under a Khilafah structure. The creation of a shadow agenda is not unlike the Marxist ambitions or the Aceh Freedom Movement GAM with its separatist ambitions. Hence, the line between the almost academic presentation of creating a new program of replacing capitalism with living under a new economic regime of the Khilafah, effectively replacing pluralistic order and the symbolic adaptation of the Shadada of Islamic State works 44 The website provides an overview how HTI Indonesia perceives the legitimacy issue surrounding the Islamic State. Page 16 of 126 as a powerful symbol that is very difficult for Muslims to oppose Al Jazeera 2014. The spread of the Khilafah through a structure like Hizbut Tahrir is, hence, difficult to differentiate since one takes power by perceived peaceful means compared to the other Islamic State through a conquest of arms. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia calls for a Jizya – also called Jizyah - a tax imposed on non-Muslims and Ghanimah, the spoils of war. Whereas largely dismissed by the Islamic communities, HTI, Islamic State and Taliban attempted to recreate the concept of Jizyah. One blog argues war with the people of Singapore and Australia classifies, notable not Malaysia, qualifies for Ghanimah with property and assets divided between those who fought and partly put into a state treasury Hizbut-Tahrir 2014. Source: author’s collection Enslavement of the defeated is not merely a concept but has been practiced in Syria by Islamic State and is promoted by HTI ideology in the Indonesian narrative. Although utopian in nature, many in the extremistsradical scene in Indonesia look with great interest to the exploits of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Whereas the tactical battle once unfolding is relatively quickly decided by the contest in arms, the strategic battle of establishing the Indonesian Caliphate Khilafah is ongoing. Although experienced academics studying the Indonesian radical scene, the grass root movement of recruiting the young, indoctrination in schools, kindergartens and Islamic organizations promoting the Khilafah ideology remains largely untouched, as the link to violent jihadist groups is lacking on the surface. Page 17 of 126 The role of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is somewhat minimized by academics since it does not engage in the use of arms but the widespread proselytization provides a platform for mobilization of a larger segments of Indonesian faithful to indoctrinate a wider audience to the Khilafah, and hence the jihadistIslamic State narrative. We provide some examples in this paper. 2. HATE SPEECH RADICALIZATION OF THE MASSES The phenomena of the attraction for Islamic State is being debated for some time now. Experts, since 911 and before, debated extremist motivation to ad nauseam. After each major terror attack, a large volume of academic, policy and media publications is being produced attempting to address this question. The Brookings Institute warned about western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq in November 2014 Shapiro 2014 and, hence, no surprise about the rise of Islamic State in Asia should be on display. The warning signs have been here for some time. Most of the studies are inconclusive about motivation and often come across as a search for the silver bullet to answer a multi-dimensional, cultural complex issue that increasingly points into the direction of economic wealth rather than an ideological base. In absence of economic wealth, extremism seems to rise. However, this does not eliminate jihadist extremism. Fareed Zakaria argued that many are radicalized first, before being Islamized Zakaria 2015. This further supports our view of an erosion of ideology being experienced in the ranks of most extremist groups attracting a broader spectrum of the population in comparison to the purist Jemaah Islamiyah. It explains the spectrum of radicalized Islamic State members arrested in Malaysia ranging from hairdressers to members of the armed forces. To belong to something that has a purpose has a greater appeal than the actual ideology. A commentator recently stated, “It would surprise Usama Bin Laden with joy seeing Islamic State driving captured US heavy weapons in Syria and Iraq”. How is this relevant for the Indonesian situation? During the field research for this paper, the question on radicalization of the public was apparent. In discussion with different segments in society, the radicalization through the mosque system was noted and events in Iraq and Syria are debated more frequently. The views are wide-ranging but continue to paint a picture of anger, which resonates with the Indonesian public. Comments suggested that most of the Friday prayers in mosques include a fifteen-minute segment on anti-foreigner rhetoric. Whereas this could be misconstrued as a nationalistic narrative, the delivery mechanism is distinctively radical oriented. Although one interviewee argued the national religious policy is pluralistic, which it is, the grass roots are firebrand radicals holds true – and similar examples exist in Christianity and other religions – the issue remains. If the Jokowi administration does not address the radicalization at the grass root level with deep-rooted ideological and political reform, the radicalization of the larger segments of society will escalate rapidly. Hence, the figure of 1 percent by the BNPT includes the sympathizers and potential radicals identified by an Indonesian intelligence survey conducted in 20122013 titled ‘Indonesia’s Security Index ’ Gindarsah 2014. Informed insiders suggest the figure today is higher. The figure, controversial as it may appear, should serve as a quantitative measurement on Indonesian radicalization per se and provides a gauge on the radicalization of society, but the Page 18 of 126 trend is of concern. With a population growth of five percent per annum, the potential for radicalization of this population remains a cause of worry. According to an Indonesian Institute of Sciences LIPI study, radical Islamic ideology has spread freely on secular university campuses across Indonesia, with students from science and engineering majors more susceptible to infiltration, researchers warned. LIPI senior researcher Anas Saidi said that while students who studied social and political sciences, humanities and philosophy were more resistant to radical beliefs, those who studied hard sciences were at greater risk of indoctrination. The researchers wrote, “...while terrorism was a significant threat for Indonesia, …..radicalism hidden within society was actually a greater problem for the nation in the long run, as its development was unseen and unpredictable. ” Sapiie 2016 In the context of social media field research, we agree with this assessment. 3. RECRUITMENT OF THE YOUNG In 2012, RSIS wrote, “...the Poor governance could render the people susceptible to radical ideas, which they see as a solution for their problems. Like a mutating organism, the terrorists always adjust to their circumstances and try to find the weakest parts of the society to exploit .” Priamarizki 2012 The recruitment of the young is another emerging trend. In the section Jihadi cubs, we address the appearance of proselytizing youth into the ranks of the Khilafah movement and hence producing the ideological factory for indoctrinated young at large scale. We agree with the Indonesian Institute of Sciences LIPI study that a lack of monitoring on the activities of Muslim student organizations may have resulted in the systematic dissemination of fundamentalist movements brought by hard-line Islamic communities such as Ikhwanul Muslimin IM and other transnational Islamic Wahhabi groups Wahyuni 2014. Whereas most of the research focuses on students in universities, examination of social media shows a much earlier evolutionary process of recruitment and indoctrination. A 2014 research by the Search for Common Ground suggests positive results on countering and preventing radicalization in Indonesian pesantren 45 but the evidence shows continuous work is needed to reform the schooling system and prevent early radicalization. De-radicalization projects targeted pesantren affiliated to the traditional Islam Nahdlatul Ulama NU, and at the same time, it empowered the mainstream moderate Islam that has been seen as ‘silent majority’ and was identified as a successful response. Subsequently, it provided a countermeasure against the ‘vocal minority’ extremists in the country 46 . However, more needs to be done. 4. IS ISLAMIC STATE IN ASIA GOING ASYMMETRIC?