Script-Based Theories

2.4 Script-Based Theories

As mentioned earlier, the semantic theories of humour do not seem to present a list of possible (isotopy) oppositions that can be exploited in producing h umour. Raskin’s Semantic Script Theory of Humour (SSTH) seeks to fill the gap in the understanding of the mechan ism(s) involved in humour creation. Hence, I summarise Raskin’s work in the first subsection below. This will be followed by an account of Attardo and Raskin’s subsequent revision of the SSTH, called the General Theory of Verbal Humour (GTHV) (Attardo and Raskin 1991; Attardo 1994, 1998, 2001). In the final As mentioned earlier, the semantic theories of humour do not seem to present a list of possible (isotopy) oppositions that can be exploited in producing h umour. Raskin’s Semantic Script Theory of Humour (SSTH) seeks to fill the gap in the understanding of the mechan ism(s) involved in humour creation. Hence, I summarise Raskin’s work in the first subsection below. This will be followed by an account of Attardo and Raskin’s subsequent revision of the SSTH, called the General Theory of Verbal Humour (GTHV) (Attardo and Raskin 1991; Attardo 1994, 1998, 2001). In the final

2.4.1 The Semantic Script Theory of Humour Raskin (1985: 41) claims that little has been done by humour theorists in explaining the structure of humour from a linguistic point of view. Hence, he proposes a script- based theory of verbal humour. Raskin concentrates on the linguistic analysis of “joke-carrying text”, although he points out that the theory can in principle handle texts that contain multiple jokes (ibid.45). He clearly states that his aim is to propose a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the text to be funny (ibid.57). In his view, jokes can be considered humorous if they satisfy two fundamental conditions:

1. The text is compatible, fully or in part, with two different scripts;

2. The two scripts with which the text is compatible are in opposition (ibid.99).

In order to understand Raskin’s statements and his theory’s practical application, I must first explai n the pivotal notion of ‘script’.

A ‘script’ is defined as “a large chunk of semantic information surrounding the word or evoked by it” (ibid.81). Attardo (1994: 199) adds: “It is a cognitive structure

internalized by the speaker which provides the speaker with information on how things are done, organized, etc.”

According to Raskin’s (1985) usage of the term, the notion of script does not seem to differ substantially from those of ‘isotopy’, ‘frame’ or ‘schema’ as adopted in Linguistics and Cognitive Linguistics. It originally derives from Schank and

Abelson’s (1977: 41) seminal work on Artificial Intelligence, which defines a script as “a structure that describes appropriate sequences of events in a particular context”. Raskin (1985: 81) also notices that in the literature the term ‘script’ has been sometimes used to refer to a temporal sequence of frames. However, it should be pointed out here that some scholars tend to use the terms ‘script’, ‘frame’ and ‘schema’ to refer to different types of background knowledge 1 . Nonetheless, Attardo (1994: 200) reports that many scholars agree with the idea that scripts contain “information which is typical, such as well-established routines and common ways to do things and to go about activities”. This further explanation seems a fair compromise and it is also accepted here.

To return to Raskin’s (1985) explanation, scripts can contain both lexical (linguistic) and non-lexical (encyclopaedic) information and they are connected to one another by virtue of semantic links (such as synonymy, hyponymy, antonymy and so

on). For example, the script SPOON can be connected to the script CUTLERY because the latter is its hyperonym, or superordinate. When we hear or read a sentence or text, its constituting elements evoke and combine scripts. The whole text thus becomes a ‘semantic network’ of scripts according to certain combinatorial rules. These rules shape not only the text, but also its coherent interpretation (ibid.80-86).

Raskin (ibid.104-114) points out that ambiguity in language is caused by the fact that a text can be fully or partially compatible with two or more scripts (e.g. the script BUYING CANDLES in a text can be associated with the scripts BIRTHDAY and GO TO CHURCH ; my example). However, this partial or full overlapping of two scripts is not

a sufficient condition for the creation of a humorous text. Raskin’s empirical investigation, carried out on a corpus of jokes, demonstrates that humour is created

1 Cf. For example Schank and Abelson (1977) for an in-depth discussion on the concept of ‘script’, Bartlett (1932) and Rumelhart (1980) for ‘schema’ and Goffman, E. (1974) and Minsky (1975) for

‘frame’.

when the scripts that are potentially evoked by these texts not only overlap but are also in opposition.

Raskin’s well-known example (ibid.100; 117-127) is used here to demonstrate the practical application of his theory:

[2.1 ]“Is the doctor at home?” the patient asked in his bronchial whisper. “No,” the doctor’s young and pretty wife whispered in reply. “Come right in.”

According to Raskin, in (2.1) the humour is caused by the fact that the text is partially compatible with both the DOCTOR (and HUSBAND ) and LOVER scripts, which “are perceived as opposite in a certain sense” (ibid.100). The former requires his physical presence in order to provide a medical service. His absence instead leads to the introduction of the opposing script LOVER (and ADULTERER ), which can also evoke a sex/no-sex opposition that explains the humour of the text.

As I said earlier, Manetti introduced the idea of a set of pre-existing isotopy oppositions but h e does not provide a list of possible oppositions. In contrast, Raskin’s SSHT fills this gap by proceeding as follows. Firstly, he analyses a corpus of jokes and for each of them he establishes the contextual (and essential) script opposition they evoke. In the example above, this contextual script opposition is doctor vs. lover (from this point onwards Raskin uses lower case for the sake of readability and I will do the same). Secondly, he explains that the opposition(s) in each joke he analyses can

be subsumed under three further levels of abstraction. I have summarised them in Table 2.2 below. These three levels comprise respectively one three and five types of script oppositions. In the left column I have included the general level with only one script opposition of what Raskin calls the ‘abstract’ level. In the middle column, I be subsumed under three further levels of abstraction. I have summarised them in Table 2.2 below. These three levels comprise respectively one three and five types of script oppositions. In the left column I have included the general level with only one script opposition of what Raskin calls the ‘abstract’ level. In the middle column, I

General Script Opposition

Three abstract types of Script

Five concrete types of Script

Oppositions

Oppositions

Good/Bad

Life/Death Real/Unreal

Actual/Non-actual

Normal/Abnormal

Obscene/Non-obscene

Possible/Impossible

Money/No-money High/low stature

Table 2.2: Summary of Script Oppositions postulated in Raskin (1985: 108-114; 127)

According to Raskin, each of the jokes he analyses “describes a certain ‘real’ situation and evokes another ‘unreal’ situation, which does not take place and which is fully or partly incompatible with the former” (ibid.108). For example, the joke in (2.1) above describes a situation in which “the patient comes to the doctor’s house to see the doctor” which is opposed to “the patient comes to the doctor’s house not to see the doctor” (ibid. 110; my emphasis). Furthermore, Raskin (ibid.111) points out that the jokes he analyses can fall into three different types of oppositions between the real and unreal situation that they describe or evoke, which are:

1) Actual situation vs. non-actual situation: there is an opposition between the actual setting of the joke and a non-existing situation which is incompatible with it. In Raskin ’s view, example (2.1) above can be classified as an instance of this actual/non- actual opposition because it is true that the patient went to see the doctor and it is false

that he did not go to see the doctor 2 .

2) Normal versus abnormal state of affair: there is an opposition between an expected and an unexpected state of affairs. For example, Raskin proposes the

2 It should be noted that Raskin’s explanation for the real/unreal SO and his definition of the actual/non-actual SO are not clear-cut. However, this does not cause major methodological problems to

my analysis as I will not be making use of the real/unreal SO.

following example: ‘“Who was that gentleman I saw you with last night?” “That was no gentleman. That was a senator”’ (Esar 1952, quoted in ibid.25). In Raskin’s view, the opposition is between the normal expectation for a senator to be a gentleman and the abnormal state of affair which the joke introduces (the senator is not a gentleman).

3) Possible versus impossible situation: there is an opposition between a plausible and an implausible situation. Raskin explain s that the joke: ‘Nurse: “That’s a pretty bad cold you have, sir. What are you taking for it?” Patient: “Make me an offer!”’ (Spalding 1976: 163, quoted in ibid.25) contrasts a possible and an impossible situation. It is possible to conceive a situation in which a nurse takes care of a patient and asks him/her what medication s/he is taking. However, a situation involving someone selling an illness can be said to be impossible.

As anticipated above, Raskin also proposes a set of more concrete oppositions. He explains that jokes can be categorised according to five binary categories that are “essential to human life” (ibid.113): good vs. bad, life vs. death, obscene vs. non- obscene, money vs. no-money, high vs. low stature (cf. right column in Table 2.2 above). In his view, some of these more concrete dichotomies can be found in the same joke. For example, a joke about old age can include both the good/bad and the life/death oppositions (ibid.114).

In his review of Raskin’s taxonomy, Attardo (1994: 204, 2001: 20) points out that the three abstract classes of oppositions above are more likely to be shared by many, if

not all cultures. By way of contrast, he observes that the five concrete oppositions tend to vary from culture to culture. For example, Attardo suggests that the five-fold taxonomy could include the excrement/non-excrement script opposition, which is often present in jokes and other types of humorous narratives. Interestingly, Attardo (2001: 20) also reports a recent further development suggested in Di Maio’s (2000) not all cultures. By way of contrast, he observes that the five concrete oppositions tend to vary from culture to culture. For example, Attardo suggests that the five-fold taxonomy could include the excrement/non-excrement script opposition, which is often present in jokes and other types of humorous narratives. Interestingly, Attardo (2001: 20) also reports a recent further development suggested in Di Maio’s (2000)

Both Raskin and Attardo explain that the number of script oppositions that can be found is virtually infinite and they can be identified according to the linguistic rules summarised above. However, I personally find that identifying them is, to some extent,

a matter of subjective judgement and interpretation (I will return to this point in Ch. 4, Subsection 4.4.3 and Ch. 8, Subsection 8.3.1). In addition, Raskin’s five-fold taxonomy seems questionable because some oppositions are very specific (i.e. life/death and money/no-money) while others are extremely general (good/bad, obscene/non-obscene and high/low stature). In addition, in my opinion the money/no- money opposition can be essential to human life in some cultures but not in others (e.g. the members of an African tribe may not consider money as essential to their lives). Furthermore, it could be argued that, even if humour based on the good/bad opposition is likely to be found in many if not all cultures, what counts as good and what counts as bad may differ. Finally, Raskin only mentions the high/low stature opposition in his discussion of the doctor joke (cf. example (2.2) above) but does not explain it clearly. As a consequence of this, it seems somehow difficult to categorise examples according to his taxonomy.

Despite the problems outlined above, I find Raskin’s general idea of classifying script oppositions according to different levels and Attardo’s and Di Maio’s further Despite the problems outlined above, I find Raskin’s general idea of classifying script oppositions according to different levels and Attardo’s and Di Maio’s further

Before moving to the discussion of Attardo and Raskin’s revision of the SSTH, it seems worth mentioning the relationship between jokes and Grice’s (1975) ‘Co- operative Principle ’ of communication. As Raskin (1985: 102-104) explains, Grice proposes a bona-fide mode of communication requiring the commitment of the speaker(s) to four maxims: quantity, give exactly as much information as required; quality , say only what you believe to be true; relation, be relevant; manner, be succinct.

However, several scholars such as Nash (1985:113-116), Raskin (1985) and Grice himself (1989, quoted in Attardo 1994: 272) have noticed that jokes (and humorous texts in general) tend to subvert the four maxims of the Co-operative Principle. A speaker who utters a joke cannot respect this bona-fide mode of communication and its maxims if s/he wants her/his joke to be effective. Humorous exchanges thus seem to be based on a paradox: they are successful communicative acts, while at the same time breaking or flouting the rules which are supposed to guarantee successful communication (Grice’s maxims).

Raskin’s (1985: 100-107) possible solution to this paradox is that the speaker and hearer commit to what he calls a non-bona-fide-communication mode. By doing so, “the hearer does not expect the speaker to tell the truth”. As Attardo (1994: 286-290) Raskin’s (1985: 100-107) possible solution to this paradox is that the speaker and hearer commit to what he calls a non-bona-fide-communication mode. By doing so, “the hearer does not expect the speaker to tell the truth”. As Attardo (1994: 286-290)

2.4.2 The General Theory of Verbal Humour At first in collaboration with Raskin himself (Attardo and Raskin 1991) and later independently, Attardo (1994, 2001) has developed a revision of the SSTH called the General Theory of Verbal Humour (GTVH). Attardo (1994) retains the main tenets of the SSTH but identifies two main problems in Raskin’s theory. On the one hand, its applicability seems to be limited to short humorous texts such as jokes, despite the fact that humour is also known to be present in longer texts (such as short stories, novels or, for the purpose of this study, television productions) (ibid.208). On the other hand, this theory seems to be unable to distinguish between verbal humour (based on language) and referential humour (based on content) (ibid.217-219; cf. also Vandaele 2002 for similar considerations).

Furthermore, Raskin considers his theory as a semantic theory of humour whose aim is to offer a linguistic analysis of “how the text is organised” (Aymone 2007: 219)

and adds: “Linguistics makes no psychological claim” (ibid.). In contrast, Attardo (1994: 143) sees the possibility of analysing the mechanism of humour creation and

perception according to the Incongruity-Resolution model developed in Psychology. According to this model, the interpretation of a joke involves two steps. At first, the receiver interprets the text according to the linguistic cues and the script they activate. The punch line forces the receiver to detect the incongruity and then reinterpret the linguistic cues in the text according to another script, which is in opposition to the one perception according to the Incongruity-Resolution model developed in Psychology. According to this model, the interpretation of a joke involves two steps. At first, the receiver interprets the text according to the linguistic cues and the script they activate. The punch line forces the receiver to detect the incongruity and then reinterpret the linguistic cues in the text according to another script, which is in opposition to the one

The GTVH is therefore designed to offer an analytical tool for the linguistic investigation of humour at large, thus accounting for both the verbal and referential levels of this phenomenon. In order to do this, Attardo (1994: 223-227) introduces five parameters, along with the already established notion of script opposition developed by Raskin. These parameters are called Knowledge Resources (KRs) and are requirements of a humorous text. The KRs are organised according to a hierarchical structure. At the top of this structure there is the script opposition (SO). This is followed by the logical mechanism (LM), which is the parameter that explains how the two scripts are brought together (i.e. by juxtaposition, ground reversal, etc.; cf. Attardo et al. 2002: 18 for a full list). According to the Incongruity-Resolution model mentioned above, the SO is the parameter that reveals the incongruity while the LM is the parameter that resolves it. The situation (SI) describes the context (objects, participants, activities, etc.) whil e the target (TA) defines “the ‘butt’ of the joke” (ibid.224). The narrative strategy (NS) is responsible for the organisation of the text (e.g. a dialogue, narrative, figure of speech, etc.). At the bottom, we find the KR called language (LA), which contains the information regarding the verbalisation of the text. I have reproduced the hierarchical organisation of the KRs in Figure 2.1 below for the sake of clarity:

SO  LM  SI

 TA  NS  LA

Figure 2.1: Reproduction of the hierarchical organisation of Knowledge Resources (Attardo 1994: 227)

The hierarchical organisation implies that, starting from the top and moving to the bottom, each knowledge resource influences and determines the following ones accordingly. While acknowledging the on-going development of this theory, Attardo points out its advantages. Firstly, it easily distinguishes between verbal and referential humour because it specifically differentiates language. Secondly, it allows the analysis of jokes in terms of their similarity (i.e. the higher the number of parameters shared, the greater the similarity between two or more jokes; cf. Ruch et al. 1993 for some empirical testing of the GTVH that confirms this claim). Thirdly, since it requires an investigation of the narrative strategy of the text under examination, it can be applied to various types of humorous texts (ibid.227-229).

In Attardo (1994: 254-270) a chapter is devoted to the application of the GTVH to texts other (and longer) than jokes. Attardo makes an interesting distinction between those texts that have a structural organisation similar to jokes (with a build-up and punch line) and those that do not (ibid.265). It goes without saying that the application of GTVH to the former is more feasible while Attardo advocates a future development of GTVH that will help it handle the latter. Attardo’s (1998, 2001, 2002b) subsequent efforts have therefore concentrated on this direction. In particular, Attardo (2001: 38) In Attardo (1994: 254-270) a chapter is devoted to the application of the GTVH to texts other (and longer) than jokes. Attardo makes an interesting distinction between those texts that have a structural organisation similar to jokes (with a build-up and punch line) and those that do not (ibid.265). It goes without saying that the application of GTVH to the former is more feasible while Attardo advocates a future development of GTVH that will help it handle the latter. Attardo’s (1998, 2001, 2002b) subsequent efforts have therefore concentrated on this direction. In particular, Attardo (2001: 38)

Hence, Attardo (ibid.82-90) introduces new tools that can handle texts longer than jokes and their complex humour. Firstly, he distinguishes between the well known punch lines (humorous triggers at the end of the text), and what he names as jab lines (humorous triggers that occur within the body of the text). Secondly, he extended the GTVH to include the following main categories:

 Strands, which are sets of thematically or formally connected jab or punch lines. At least three connected jab or punch lines are required to make a strand. Two could just be considered a coincidence.

 Stacks, which are sets of thematically or formally related strands.  Combs, which are strands of three or more jab or punch lines appearing in a

relatively limited part of the text.  Bridges, which are strands with two groups of jab or punch lines appearing at a relative distance within the text.  Serious relief, which is defined as that part of a humorous text that does not contain funny elements (for example the introduction). However, this part

has the important role of building up expectations in the receiver’s mind and increasing the effect of the punch line.

Attardo uses all these terms for what he terms ‘vector analysis’, which is based on the notation of segments of humorous texts (from a starting point determined by the

presence of a serious relief to the punch line). This allows a quantitative analysis of the text that aims at detecting and categorising its constituting elements, leading to the classification of the text as humorous or not. During my analysis I will specifically presence of a serious relief to the punch line). This allows a quantitative analysis of the text that aims at detecting and categorising its constituting elements, leading to the classification of the text as humorous or not. During my analysis I will specifically

This brief presentation of the GTVH is followed by some discussion regarding its applicability and criticism. However, I hope I have demonstrated t hat Raskin’s and Attardo’s theories can be included in the cluster of incongruity theories, as suggested above.

2.4.3 Application of the GTVH and Some Criticism Several scholars in different fields have applied the GTVH to various instances of humorous texts (e.g. Ritchie 2000, on computational humour; Archakis and Tsakona 2005, on humour and identity) but also (potentially humorous) non-linguistic data (cf. Attardo 2007: 226 for a summary). Some of these studies have focused on the distinction between jab and punch lines and their function within the text (cf. Tsakona 2007; Antonopoulou and Sifianou 2003). In particular, Tsakona’s (2003) empirical investigation of a corpus of 194 Greek and 59 English jokes demonstrates that jab lines do not disclose any information that can ruin the humour conveyed by the punch line. Jab lines usually establish the non-bona-fide mode of the text and its humorous tone , thus preparing the ground for the punch line, which offers the humorous climax (ibid.325-327).

Scholars interested in the translation of humour have also applied the GTVH metric in their investigations (cf. Attardo 2002a; Antonopoulou 2002, 2004; Zabalbeascoa 2005). However, I will discuss these studies in the next chapter, which contains two sections entirely devoted to the issues related to the translation of humour in general and the AVT of humour in particular.

However, the GTVH has also attracted some criticism. For instance, Ruch et al .’s (1993) empirical application of the GTVH to a corpus of jokes leads them to question the position of the logical mechanism within the GTVH metric. Raskin casts doubts on the significance and very existence of the LM (Aymone 2007: 223-224). Although

he acknowledges these problems, Attardo also points out the LM is optional like the resolution in the Incongruity-Resolution model. He explains that in some types of humour (e.g. nonsense humour), there is no resolution and consequently, there is no LM. However, this does not mean that this parameter has to be entirely rejected. This claim will be taken in particular consideration during the analysis of humorous metaphors (Ch.7 of this thesis), which involve a partial resolution of the incongruity they contain.

In his review, Cłopicki (2003: 157) confirms the GTVH’s validity for the study of humour in longer texts. Yet, he highlights the fact that this theory does not seem to