SUPERDELEGATES AND THE MICHIGAN AND FLORIDA PRIMARIES

SUPERDELEGATES AND THE MICHIGAN AND FLORIDA PRIMARIES

At the beginning of April 2008, the race for the Democratic nomi- nation remained very tight; neither Barack nor Hillary had enough del- egates to secure the nomination and it didn’t appear that either of them would be able to garner enough delegates in future primaries and cau- cuses to win the nomination prior to the convention in August 2008. Discussions in both camps and by the political pundits turned to the Su- perdelegates, those elected and party officials who may have the task of deciding the Democratic nominee at the convention. According to the New York Times, as of April 4, 2008, of the 714 Superdelegates, 220 sup- ported Barack, 257 supported Hillary, with the remaining 242 listed as

preferences unknown. 22 Since Super Tuesday (the February 5, 2008 pri- maries, collectively), 68 Superdelegates declared their support for Barack. According to figures from Barack’s campaign that Hillary’s aides had not disputed, Hillary had seen a net loss of two Superdelegates. At this point,

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Hillary trailed Barack by more than 160 pledged delegates, which are those chosen in state primaries or caucuses. Hillary was making a concerted ef- fort to persuade the still-uncommitted Superdelegates to back her and her campaign, or to continue not pledging support so that her campaign had

a chance to demonstrate momentum and superior electability in the up- coming primaries (Pennsylvania primary on April 22, through the Mon- tana and South Dakota primaries on June 3, 2008). 23

Another matter permeated the news during this time: whether the Michigan and Florida delegates would be seated at the Democratic Na- tional Convention to cast their state’s delegate votes. The Democratic Party had stripped Florida and Michigan of their delegates for violating Democratic Party rules by holding their primaries too early. Both Barack and Hillary had agreed not to campaign in either state. In Michigan, Barack had withdrawn his name from the ballot; Hillary’s name remained. Hillary did not campaign in Florida, but she did have fund-raising events there while Barack did not campaign or hold fund-raising events in the state. Since she won in both states, if the votes were counted, Hillary would increase her total number of delegates, bringing her closer to Barack’s total in both the popular vote and delegate count. Plus, she could claim she had won two more large, delegate-rich states and could also claim to voters and the Superdelegates that she had a better chance of beating the Republican nominee, John McCain, in the general election.

Both Hillary and her campaign were pushing for the votes to count and for the delegates to be seated at the convention. Barack wanted the delegation to be seated at the convention, however, he stated he would stand by the agreement he made with the Democratic Party not to cam- paign in either state, based on the state’s decision to violate the rules and hold early primaries. As of the beginning of April 2008, no decisions had been made as to what to do with the Florida and Michigan votes. It ap- peared that neither of the states would have another primary; nor would the votes cast be counted in either the popular vote total or in the number of delegates pledged to each candidate.

Hillary vowed to continue the race until the convention, despite some calls for her to end her campaign. She stated that she had won in states Democrats need in order to win the White House and that she didn’t believe the voters in all the primaries and caucuses to date would want her to drop out of the race. As of early April, there were more contests remaining and she wanted to take her campaign all the way to the Demo- cratic convention in Denver in August. In an early April telephone in- terview with Mark Halperin of Time magazine, he asked Hillary if she was comfortable with the fact that the only way she could win the nomination

127 is at the Democratic convention with the Superdelegates casting their

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votes and thereby electing the party’s nominee. She responded, “Neither of us will reach the number of delegates needed. And all delegates have to assess who they think will be the strongest nominee against [John] McCain and who they believe would do the best job. . . . From my per- spective, those are all very legitimate questions, and every delegate, with very few exceptions, is free to make up his or her mind . . . every delegate is expected to exercise independent judgment.” 24

Both Barack and Hillary continued to campaign and prepare for the primary and caucus contests in eight states and in Guam and Puerto Rico, for a total of 674 total delegates at stake. Just prior to the April 22 primary in Pennsylvania, with 188 delegates at stake, Hillary was maintaining a lead in the polls. According to Time magazine’s Web site thepage.com, on April 8, 2008, a Quinnipiac University poll conducted between April 3 and 6—noting a margin of error of 2.7 points—showed Hillary led Barack by 6 points. Both candidates were well aware that a win in Pennsylvania was crucial. For Barack, it would mean continued momentum and the possibility of additional Superdelegates pledging their support. It would also prove he is the best candidate to be the party’s nominee and the candidate who would win the general election against John McCain. For Hillary, it would mean she had momentum once again, that she could prove her electability and quiet the calls for her to quit the race, as well as gaining more support among Democrats and pledged Superdelegates.

Their reasons for continuing were very much the same, however a win in Pennsylvania was perhaps even more critical for Hillary. If she didn’t win by a substantial margin, would the calls for her to quit the race get louder? Would she eventually end her campaign or would she continue her vow to fight on until the August convention? A great deal was at stake in Pennsylvania on April 22, 2008. And after Pennsylvania there were still nine more contests, and most polls suggested very tight races. To win, could Barack count on the African American votes in states like North Caro- lina with 134 delegates, and in West Virginia with 39 delegates at stake? Could Hillary count on Indiana Senator Evan Bayh’s support and could she win in Indiana with their 84 delegates? Would voters in Montana and South Dakota—two states with primaries that, historically, hadn’t been very important—support Barack or Hillary? And in Kentucky and Oregon on May 20, where both candidates were campaigning, who would win the total of 110 delegates in such demographically different states?

Hillary was well aware of the contests that remained and the long odds she faced, especially if the votes cast in Michigan and Florida did not count. As the Democratic National Convention got closer, it remained

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to be seen if the continual bickering back and forth between the two candidates and their resulting increasingly negative images in the minds of the voters would hurt the eventual Democratic nominee in the general election against strong Republican candidate John McCain. The specula- tion would continue until at least the end of the primary season on June 3, 2008, if not until the Democratic National Convention in August.