F or a number of theorists in the past 10 to 15 years, the primary macro
F or a number of theorists in the past 10 to 15 years, the primary macro
analytic framework for television and other media has become global ization (Giddens, 1 99 1 ; Robertson, 1 990). However, that word has also become overextended as a term of analysis, covering a number of contra dictory analyses and points of view. I intend to talk about globalization primarily in the economic and technological areas where almost all analysts agree that it is fundamental. In this chapter, I talk about economic and political/institutional globalization and their impact on world television, especially after 1 990. In the next chapter (Chapter 5), I examine technolog ical globalization, along with its complexities and impacts.
Global forces have a powerful effect on communication, particularly television, by redefining many aspects of it at a systemic level. However, it is important to distinguish the dynamics of economic and technological forces, on the one hand, and cultural forces, per se, on the other. Appadurai ( 1 990) did this by distinguishing between substantially disjunct scapes of finance, technology, and so on, which are globalized in different ways. Ortiz ( 1 994,
2002) distinguished between globalization related to economic and tech nological changes and what he called mundializa(:aO or mundialization, "understood as the process where a process of world modernity is develop
ing, but articulated and differentiated according to the particular historical circumstances of each country" (Staid & Tufte, 2002, p. 4). This builds on recent French theoretical work (Darling-Wolf, 2006).
80 Chapter 4
Analysts are less agreed on the notion that globalization accurately describes the dominant forces directly acting within culture and on the specifically cultural contents of television. When globalization is the cover term for virtually everything international or transnational, how are phe nomena that are indeed heavily globalized distinguished from those that may
be less broadly encompassing? I believe that to define the overall tendency of television systems throughout the world as globalization gives global phenomena too much emphasis compared with phenomena that are more precisely transnational, geocultural, or cultural-linguistic-national, regional,
or even local. For example, media entrepreneur Rupert Murdoch casts a long shadow over the world in many ways, but in most specific places, he and his companies are far less important to what is on the television than national powers like Roberto Marinho, owner of TV Globo in Brazil, or the Chinese government in China, which has managed to constrain Murdoch's desire to enter the Chinese cultural space and market. So in this chapter, I discuss various aspects of what is considered global, distinguishing what is perhaps more accurately or precisely thought of as transnational, geocul tural, or cultural-linguistic.
Part of my uneasiness with globalization as a cover term is that some aspects of television are truly globalized and need to be highlighted, not lost in mixture with other, less globalized aspects. Discussing globalization, Castells (2005) noted that "in the strict sense, it is the process that results from the capacity of certain activities to function as a unit in real time on a planetary scale. " In certain economic areas such as finance, foreign direct investment, the commercialization of television systems and program formats, the marketing of U.S. feature films and series, and the licensing of television formats (such as Survivor), I argue that the emphasis on globalization is correct. Even in areas where global flows move quickly and with great effect, however, many crucial things are still decided and controlled at the national level in many, if not most countries. Nederveen Pieterse (1995) observed, "Globalization can mean the reinforcement of both supranational and sub-national regionalism" (p. 50). Although a key argument in this chapter is that the role of cultural-linguistic regions warrants greater attention, such an emphasis can be fit into the more
sophisticated interpretations of globalization that are emerging, such as this view of Nederveen Pieterse ( 1 995, 2004).
I argue, then, that global television is a complex system operating in different layers. One set of layers is cultural and geographic: global, trans national, cultural-linguistic spaces, geocultural regions, nations, global metrop olises, states/provinces, and localities. Another set is functional, rather like Appadurai's ( 1 990) notion of scapes (finance, technology, ideology, people/ migration, and ideology); these are disjunct and differentially globalized. The
Creating Global, U.S., and Transnational Television Spaces 81 two sets of layers are related. The most densely globalized parts are those
related to the effective global spread of the capitalist system, such as finance, the models for operating commercial networks and stations, and half a dozen truly global conglomerates with widespread ownership and influence. I argue that program models and genres circulate globally but are far more complex,
a topic I will discuss extensively in later chapters. I argue that in key regions (or cultural-linguistic spheres), national and local producers tend to make cul ture-specific adaptations of global genres and models, which are then fol
lowed by a number of other producers and networks within their regions, as in Asia (lwabuchi, 2002), the Arab world (Kraidy, in press), or Latin America
(Straubhaar, 1991; Straubhaar & Viscasillas, 199 1 ) .
For the balance of the chapter, I examine economic, political, and social aspects of globalization that affect television. I then compare those global
levels of analysis with transnational, cultural-linguistic, and geocultural levels of how television functions, not only as an economic system, but a cultural
and social one, as well. (The last chapter included a discussion of national and local production capabilities, which I will return to later, as I look at
program and genre production and flow. )