Summary table Aggregation operators with given relation of voters power

104 L .A. Sholomov Mathematical Social Sciences 39 2000 81 –107 2 all factors having types a or g, the class Q is formed by all factors of types b or ˆ h, and all factors of types d 2 f , j produce the class Q. The classes do not contain 21 9 the factors r r of type c only. The result of operation q + q on elementary factors q i i i i i ˆ ˆ 9 9 9 and q is determined in the following way. If q [ Q or q [ Q then q + q 5 1. Now, let i i i i i 1 2 ˆ 9 9 q , q [ ⁄ Q. In this case, if q and q are contained in the same class Q or Q then i i i i 1 2 9 9 9 q + q 5 q ∧ q . If they belong to different classes Q and Q then q + q 5 1. If some i i i i i i 21 ˆ 9 9 9 of the factors q ,q coincides with r r and q , q [ ⁄ Q then the result of q + q is i i i i i i i i equal to the other of the factors. 9 9 For conjunctions K 5 q , . . . , q , K9 5 q , . . . , q and DNF’s c 5 K ∨ ? ? ? ∨ K , 1 n 1 n 1 s 9 9 c9 5 K ∨ ? ? ? ∨ K , the result of operation K + K9 and c + c9 are defined by 14 and 1 t 15. For the operators F 5 c and G 5 c9, we set F + G 5 c + c9 it can be proved that the result of composition operation F + G does not depend on chosen DNF’s c and c9. Any operator F satisfying the condition F + F 5 F is referred to as closed with respect to composition. The role of the composition operation is clarified by the following assertion: F [ F 7, 7 iff F is closed . In this way, the explicit description of all operators n 7 → 7, mentioned in the statement a, can be found.

12. Summary table

Recall previously introduced notations: J J ˆ ˆ ˆ LL , L9L 9, L L are a linear hierarchy generalized, a partial LH general- ized, a LH on the set J generalized, respectively—Section 8; ˆ TT is a partial transitive LH generalized—Section 11; ˆ QQ is a weighted majority operator generalized with right of veto—Section 10; 1 GG is any monotone operator; a 21 r a [ h1, 2 1j is r at a 5 1 and is r at a 5 2 1. n Now, we shall present the obtained results on explicit forms of operators 5 → 5 1 2 for all classes 5 , 5 of 3 provided 5 5 in Table 3. Rows and columns of this 1 2 1 2 table are associated with classes 5 and 5 , respectively. If condition 5 5 is false 1 2 1 2 the corresponding entry the square contains the line. In the case of monotone operators F, it is necessary to all entries of the table except Table 3 Domain Range + 6 3 7 ] a a a a a a a a i i i + r r r r r r , r r G s d i i i i i i i i i i i J ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ – L 9 L 9 L 9 L L , L L G s d i i i i i i a a a a i i ˆ 6 – – r r r r Q G i i i i i i a a a a i i – – – r r r r G i i i i i i a a a i i 3 – – – – r r r G i i i i i ˆ 7 – – – – – T – i i a – – – – – – r G i L .A. Sholomov Mathematical Social Sciences 39 2000 81 –107 105 a a i for the ones mentioned later the following replacements: r and r are to be replaced i i J ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ by r ; instead of generalized operators L, L , L 9, L , T , Q one has to use the suitable i i i i J operators L, L , L9, L , T , Q; an arbitrary operator G must be replaced by a monotone i i i 1 n n operator G . Exceptions are operators + → 7 of the second type, operators 0 → 3, ] n 21 operators 0 → 7 of the first type. First of them is equivalent to the operator r , i i 9 and other two are equivalent to L . i i

13. Aggregation operators with given relation of voters power

The idea to reduce problems for aggregation operators to similar problems for ordinal n relations on R turns out to be useful also for design of specific operators in practical social choice problems. In this section we consider an example of such a problem. Let N 5 h1, . . . , nj be the set of voters, and R be an irreflexive binary relation on N. The notation iRj is interpreted as ‘the voter i is stronger than j’, and R is called the relation of voters power . Subsets M N will be referred to as coalitions. A coalition M 1 is stronger than M , denoted by M RM , if there exists an injection j : M → M such 2 1 2 2 1 that jiRi for all i [ M . With a profile r 5 r , . . . , r and two alternatives x, y [ A 2 1 n we associate the coalition V r 5 hiuxr yj. An operator Fr is said to be compatible xy i with the relation R of voters power if V rRV r ⇒ xFry for all x, y, r. We will xy yx suppose that the operators also satisfy the normative constraints of binariness B, neutrality to alternatives N, non-imposition nI, and some rationality condition n 5 → 5 . 1 2 We will consider the case of 5 5 0, 5 5 3, R [ 3. The operator, satisfying 1 2 chosen conditions and compatible with R, is nonunique. The intersection of all such operators will be denoted by F . It is easy to see that F is the least with respect to R R inclusion operator which is compatible with R and satisfies the constraints B, N, nI, and n condition 0 →

3. Moreover, F automatically satisfies the condition M of mono-