9
use or sell their excess emission allowances. This means there is less incentive to use energy as efficiently as possible, i.e. to save energy.
5
The energy saving policy of the fourth Balkenende government was inadequate to achieve the policy goals and bring the 2020 energy saving
targets within reach. The RutteVerhagen government said in the coalition agreement that it would continue and strengthen the approach to energy
saving. Since the government has set the same or even higher ambitions for energy saving, even more effective policy will probably be needed to
achieve them. The RutteVerhagen government has not set a national goal for CO
2
reduction but the European target still applies. It is unlikely that continuation of the Balkenende IV governments policy will achieve
the Netherlands CO
2
reduction target. More effective policy will therefore be necessary to reduce CO
2
emissions. We consider this main conclusion in more detail in the sections below and
make a number of recommendations to the ministers concerned at the end of this chapter.
2.2 Notes to the main conclusion
2.2.1 Use of policy instruments
In recent years, fewer and weaker policy instruments have been used than ex ante evaluations had found necessary.
The governments ambitions to improve energy efficiency varied from a 1.5 to a 2 energy saving per annum between 1995 and 2010. The
actual average energy saving between 2000 and 2007 was 1.1 per annum, including the autonomous saving that would have been achieved
without policy, for example on account of global oil prices and technological advances.
6
The Balkenende IV governments goal of a 2 per annum energy saving was technically and financially feasible only at very high national cost. In
2006, the ex ante calculation of the policy indicated that 2 would be barely feasible, if at all, if account was also taken of the impact of related
policy Daniëls et al., 2006, p. 40. A subsequent study concluded that a saving of 1.8 per annum could be achieved at relatively reasonable cost
5
There are several ways to overcome this negative interaction, see section 2.3.1.
6
It can be concluded from the literature that the autonomous sav ing lies between 0.8 and 1 for a summary, see Davidson et al., 2011.
10
provided there was sufficient flexibility Menkveld Wijngaart, 2007, p. 21. It was therefore clear that every effort would be needed to
achieve the target of 2 per annum. Most sectors, however, fell far short of this target.
Only the agriculture and horticulture sector achieved a substantial energy saving in recent years. Since this sector accounts for only a
modest share of total energy use, it has made only a limited contribution to energy saving.
The measures introduced for the manufacturing sector were not sufficiently binding. The saving induced by the policy was therefore
limited. In the built environment sector, savings were achieved chiefly on
account of the European minimum efficiency standards for domestic appliances and buildings.
Not enough instruments were used in the transport sector and virtually no saving was achieved.
The failure of the policy was predictable. It was clear in advance to successive governments that the energy saving ambitions were not
backed up by appropriate policy instruments. Every effort would have to be made to have a chance of achieving the targets. A number of
important policy instruments, however, were not included in the policies announced, or were introduced far later or in a weaker form than
foreseen. Studies carried out for the Ministries of VROM and EZ have consistently shown in recent years that the proposed policy measures
would not achieve the targets. The ministers concerned did not respond to these warnings and use them to strengthen policy or review the
targets. This lack of effectiveness can be explained in part by the absence of clear
agreements on the targets and responsibilities. In 2007, when the national energy saving goal was last revised, no specific agreements were
made on the secondary goals to be achieved in individual sectors or on the ministers who would be responsible for them. In the years that
followed, it was therefore uncertain who was responsible for taking additional policy measures to make up or any underachievement. In
consequence not all line ministers took decisive action when it became clear that the energy saving in their sectors was inadequate.
We consider the results of energy saving policy in more detail in chapters 2 and 3 of part II of this report.
