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5.5.3 Auditability
To determine whether the various energy saving instruments worked, we have to know whether energy savings were greater at companies that
used a particular instrument than at companies that did not use that instrument. Our survey was a snapshot. Differences it found between
companies that used a particular instrument and companies that did not cannot be put down simply to the use of that instrument. The differences
might be due to companies or industries that were already saving energy, or were intending to, using the policy instruments positive self-
selection. We therefore studied whether there were differences between users and non-users within the group of companies with a positive
corporate culture towards energy saving and within the group with a negative corporate culture.
5.5.4 Costs and benefits of tax schemes and grants
Do tax schemes and grants work? Companies that used a tax scheme or grant acquired energy efficient
technology for their production processes more often than companies that did not. At small companies, the use of such schemes also had a positive
impact on attitude and perceived feasibility. This is entirely in line with the governments intentions for these instruments although the
relationship for medium-sized companies is not significant. Corporate culture, however, seems to make a big difference.
Table 4. Acquisition of energy efficient technology: differences between users and non-users of financial schemes, broken down by corporate culture
Total Saving culture
Non-saving culture User
Non-user User
Non-user User
Non-user
Small acquired 70
45 77
67 63
37 Medium-sized
acquired 77
70 83
82 71
51 Large acquired
89 76
88 83
90 67
Source: Netherlands Court of Audit survey
Bold: Significant, less than 5 probability that the relationship is chance
Within the group of companies with a positive corporate culture towards energy saving, there is no significant difference. Companies that received
regarding the overall saving in the manufacturing sector has consequences for the remainder category, particularly the multiyear agreements. We accordingly consider the benefits of these
measures to be unknown and not as the difference between the uncertain total saving and the sum of the savings induced by other instruments.
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a grant did not score markedly higher than companies that did not receive a grant see table 4. This is probably an indication of a free rider
effect: this category of company would probably have acquired energy efficient technology or improved their production processes without a
grant. Within the group that does not have a positive corporate culture towards energy saving, grants have a perceptible effect: more small and
large companies in this group acquire energy efficient technology if they can benefit from a scheme than if they cannot.
Energy saving attributable to the EIA During the period audited, the EIA lowered investment costs by about
10-20. If we make the optimistic assumption that the long-term price elasticity is applicable -0.1 to
–0.2, such an investment grant over several years the depreciation term of the equipment and machinery
would produce an energy saving of between 1 and 4.
42
On 900 PJ in
2008, this is equal to between 9 and 36 PJ. A comparison with existing
data and studies suggests that the upper limit of this margin is the most likely, i.e. 36 PJ. This is related to the percentage of free riders see audit
methodology. We therefore estimate the energy saving attributable to the EIA from the beginning of 1997 to the end of 2008 to be 36 PJ.
Cost of the EIA The EIA cost the government €499 million in lost tax income in the period
from 1997 to 2008.
43
Given the percentage of free riders, some €350 million 70 of this cost may not have had an effect.
44
In total, €149 million of the EIAs cost to the government may have been effective, just
over €14 million per annum. The implementation costs borne by the government are so low as to be negligible.
Assuming that entrepreneurs generally act rationally, it could be said that they will usually not spend more than the benefit provided by the
investment allowance. For entrepreneurs, the EIA makes measures profitable up to a price of just over €0.80 per gigajoule saved.
45
If we
42
Price incentive times price elasticity, i.e. at least 10 times 0.1 and at m ost 20 times 0.2.
43
Calculated by CE Delft on the basis of an evaluation of the EIA by Aalbers et al. Aalbers et al., 2007 and data from SenterNovem SenterNovem, 2009 by applying the percentage of amounts
approved for all EIA applications to the percentage of applications in the manufacturing sector relating to energy efficiency. For a more detailed explanation, see the separate report to be issued
by CE Delft shortly after the publication of this report Davidson et al., 2011.
44
From a national perspective not only the government but the government, companies and individual citizens, this is not a cost: what the government spends is received by the companies.
45
The maximum benefit of the EIA is approximately 11 44 allowance on 25.5 corporation tax, which is roughly equal to an 11 increase in the price of energy. With a natural gas price of
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