Strategies to Obtain a Registration
5.3.2 Strategies to Obtain a Registration
If people change their practices in order to get registered, society reproduces the registration system and state thereby reproduces the practices of society. Some of the migrants plan to live in their relatives place or to buy a property in Osh, in order to get rid of the limitations of their rights. Therefore, the registration system still penetrates society since it has an effect on their life decisions.
5.3.2.1 Registration in Places of Relatives
As explained before, especially for tenants it’s highly difficult to register in their place of residence. Nevertheless, there were some tenants who were able to get a permanent or temporal registration in Osh. In all the encountered cases, this happened through the registration in places of relatives. As the researcher heard from the interviewed migrants, it seems to be the only way to get registered in Osh as a tenant. As showed above, this is also what the officials in the passport offices suggest to do, if someone is a tenant and unable to register: To find some relatives who are willing to give the permission to register in their place. The agents of the NGO’s also agreed that this would be the only way to get registered as a tenant. However, during the interviews the researcher encountered some migrants who didn’t want to ask their relatives to register them in order not to be a burden for them or cause problems to them . Others just didn’t have relatives in Osh who they could ask.
“I do not want to create additional problems and complication for my relatives, they would say like if I registered in the property, I should also pay for the garbage and other util ities” (Nargiza, Osh 201о)
On the other hand, there are people who don’t want to register their relatives in their house because of the utility costs which would increase with the amount of registered people in the house. According to FTI , sometimes even parents don’t register their children out of that reason.
Above the situation was already discussed in the context of the reproduction of the registration system through state by the suggestion to register in someone else’s places. The view of the internal migrants should emphasize the fact that for tenants without a tenancy agreement, which is the vast majority of tenants, registering in someone else’s places is the only possibility for them to register. It means that on one side they fulfil the law that they should register, but in the same time they don’t fully act according to the law as they don’t register in their actual address. This fact makes clear how state with its registration system and the requirements for tenants reproduce practices of society which undercut the registration system. In the same time, internal migrants want to fulfil the law and register as they break it in order to be able to register. Through the requirements of state, contradicting practices of society in relation to the registration system are reproduced.
From informal talks the researcher heard about cases in Bishkek where internal migrants got a fake registration, sometimes in an a ddress which doesn’t even exist. In Osh she didn’t came across such cases. None of the migrant told her about this strategy, and when she asked about it, they said that they never hea rd of it. Either it isn’t well-known in Osh, or the interviewed migrants where afraid to talk about it.
“No, never heard about this. And did not try to receive a false propiska. And even I didn’t hear that.” (Nargiza, Osh 201о)
5.3.2.2 Getting an Own Property
Most migrants without registration stated that having an own property is the only possibility to obtain a registration in Osh. When the researcher asked the interviewees who wanted to stay in Osh but didn’t have registration about their future plans, some of them answered that they want to purchase property in Osh, in order to be able to register there.
“So, for the future my plan is to get a property in Osh because only in this case you can receive the status of the citizen of Osh. So until that my dream is just to get this property.” (Nargiza, Osh 201о)
Another interviewed internal migrant had the strategy to register herself and her family in a village near from Osh. Her origin village is in Alai which is very far and thus expensive and time- consuming to t ravel there. She and her family live and work in Osh, but they couldn’t register in Osh because she didn’t even have some relatives there. So they decided to register in her relatives’ place which is in Kara-Suu rayon, in a village which is very near to Osh and cheap to reach by public transport. Their strategy was to register and to apply for land there, and one year ago they received that land. So they plan to build a house and live there, and because of the small distance, they still can work in Osh.
This is another situation where state is successfully penetrating society: The impossibility to register as a tenant due to the challenging requirements produce the aim of some internal migrants to purchase an own property. Through that produced aim, their practice to purchase a property is reproduced through the state practice to set high requirements to register. Through this practice of society again the registration system is reproduced: People purchase a property whereon they are able to register in that property. After that, they formally register and comply with the law to register in their place of residence, whereby they reproduce a working registration system. However, it must be considered that the registration in Osh might not be a main purpose to purchase an own property. As discussed above, it isn’t common and distinguished in Kyrgyzstan to
be a tenant for a long time – most people plan to purchase an own property for long-term.
5.3.2.3 Bribery to Get Registered
In every place where a document has to be collected and some difficulties occur, there is some space opening for bribery. The interviews provided evidence that in different instances on the way to get registered bribes were asked, if the person didn’t have all the required documents. If the person can’t or doesn’t want to pay that bribe, it is an obstacle to get registered.
“I go to different instances and ask for help but they all expect bribes from me. That is my huge problem.” (Chinara, Osh 201о)
Through the different stages to get registered, the interviewed migrants experienced most bribery in the Gos register. Interviewee Aziza even called it as a house of corruption: According to her, the registration of an ownership and the domovaya kniga usually cost approximately 1200 Som, but sometimes they even charge 6000 or 8000 Som.
As the researcher heard from one interviewee, the reasons for being asked for a bribe are not only that some documents are missing. It also depends on the literacy of law. If a person knows his rights, he can assess the situation and knows, if he has done everything according to the law, then there is no reason to ask for a bribe of him. So he can defend himself and say that he won’t pay. But if a person doesn’t know his laws, the official can frighten the person by telling that he only receive the documents if a bribe is paid, and if he doesn’t know it better, he will pay.
“For example when you come to some place, like a registration office or somewhere, they immediately know if I’m educated or not so. And if you don’t know anything and are not educated they may ask bribes, in order to finish quicker. But if you know everything, and even we knew more then they, sometimes [laugh], they cannot ask.” (Nilufar, Osh 2013)
Bribery indeed can be an obstacle on the way to get registered, but it can also be a way out if some important required documents are lacking. People also told that sometimes they just pay bribes in order to accelerate the procedure, to shorten the waiting times.
There were some situations told by the migrants where it was helpful to know a person who is working in a position where registration issues were handled. For example there was one interviewee, Nargiza, who needed to be registered in Osh for working in the university. Her temporal registration from the time when she studied was already expired. With the help of a familiar person in the registration office, she managed to register in Osh even she didn’t have an own property to register.
Bribery is a direct interaction between state and society (Gupta, 1995), more accurately between officials and internal migrants. If the latter pay bribes, the expectations of officials to receive bribes are growing, what reproduce bribery practices in the registration procedure. Often, internal migrants agree to pay bribes to shorten the complicated administrative procedures. Thus bribery is also reproduced through the complicated administration. Additionally, the low literacy of law contributes to the reproduction of bribery, as people who don’t know about their rights can’t defend themselves if officials ask for bribe. Since this low level of knowledge is partially reproduced through the lack of communication from state, the lack of communication either enforce bribery practices. Therefore state and society are both reproducing a corrupt registration system with their practices. Bribery in the registration procedure has two main implications on the practice of internal migrants in the context of the registration system. On the one hand, many people don’t register because they know that the procedure is very costly due to bribes. As their imagination of state is produced through their interactions with state (Gupta, 1995), their image of the state is formed by their experience with corruption. Internal migrants which experienced corruption see state as a corrupt actor. Especially for less wealthy people, this awareness about the corruption seems to discourage them to register. On the other hand, if people accept the fact that they have to pay bribes and are able to afford it , people might be able to register who wouldn’t be able to do so without bribery since they don’t fulfil the requirements. In that way, the requirements of the registration become undercut through bribery. Public-private boundaries become blurred as state actors don’t act according to the ideal of Weber (1968): They don’t act impersonally and according to their rules, but rather on the account of their own advantages. As this blurred state-society Bribery is a direct interaction between state and society (Gupta, 1995), more accurately between officials and internal migrants. If the latter pay bribes, the expectations of officials to receive bribes are growing, what reproduce bribery practices in the registration procedure. Often, internal migrants agree to pay bribes to shorten the complicated administrative procedures. Thus bribery is also reproduced through the complicated administration. Additionally, the low literacy of law contributes to the reproduction of bribery, as people who don’t know about their rights can’t defend themselves if officials ask for bribe. Since this low level of knowledge is partially reproduced through the lack of communication from state, the lack of communication either enforce bribery practices. Therefore state and society are both reproducing a corrupt registration system with their practices. Bribery in the registration procedure has two main implications on the practice of internal migrants in the context of the registration system. On the one hand, many people don’t register because they know that the procedure is very costly due to bribes. As their imagination of state is produced through their interactions with state (Gupta, 1995), their image of the state is formed by their experience with corruption. Internal migrants which experienced corruption see state as a corrupt actor. Especially for less wealthy people, this awareness about the corruption seems to discourage them to register. On the other hand, if people accept the fact that they have to pay bribes and are able to afford it , people might be able to register who wouldn’t be able to do so without bribery since they don’t fulfil the requirements. In that way, the requirements of the registration become undercut through bribery. Public-private boundaries become blurred as state actors don’t act according to the ideal of Weber (1968): They don’t act impersonally and according to their rules, but rather on the account of their own advantages. As this blurred state-society