Registration Systems Restricting Internal Migration

2.1.6 Registration Systems Restricting Internal Migration

2.1.6.1 The Hukou System in China

The Hukou System denominates the household registration system in China. In difference to other registration system, it should not only record internal migration for statistical outcomes, but moreover control and restrict it, especially migration fluxes from rural to urban areas. Therefore it is a major tool of social control of the Chinese state over its population (Chan and Zhang, 1999, p.819). This system strongly limits the freedom of residence and movement of people in the Chinese Republic. The first measures which can be seen as a preparation for the Hukou system started 1949, where state begun to resettle huge numbers of people from urban to rural places. Shanghai for example urged millions of refugees and urban workers without employment to leave the city, and later other big cities followed this example. For most of the resettled people, the relocation was principally voluntary and financially supported. But the resettlements were also used to disclose criminals and class enemies whose relocation was compulsory. However, by that time, no barriers existed to return to the city again. In 1951 with the “Regulations governing the Urban population” the household registration system Hukou was introduced, which wasn’t binding for the whole Republic but only for the cities, and didn’t yet entirely restricted internal migration but rather recorded it. At the same time the state pursued an urban-centred policy where it mainly focusses on the development of a number of major cities while it strongly neglects the development of the countryside. Thus poverty was condemned from the major cities, but simultaneously increased in the countryside, accompanied with high unemployment. Therefore a high number of farmers emigrated from their villages in order to find work in the cities. (Cheng and Selden, 1994, pp.649-

51) The reaction of the state on this movements was a tightening of the administrative control of migration fluxes from rural to urban areas as well as intra-rural and intra-urban migration fluxes. Until 1955, the Hukou household registration system became expanded to the rural areas, while before it was only valid for cities. In this manner state became able to control and prevent unplanned migration, and to plan its economy and the allocation of human resources not only within companies and economic sectors, but also over geographical space (Liu, 2005, p.135).

According to Cheng and Selden (1994, p.664):

“China's hukou system of population registration has long been, and remains today, the central institutional mechanism defining the city countryside relationship and shaping important elements of state- society relations in the People's Republic.”

There are mainly three implications which are shaping those state-society relations: First, people are permanently confined to one place, men to their place of birth and women to their husband ’s residence place (Cheng and Selden, 1994, p.667). There are two types of Hukou: The rural and the urban Hukou, and everyone were required to register in one single place of residence. It was possible for people with a rural Hukou to obtain an urban Hukou only if there is a labour shortage and enterprises need to recruit more workers. Unfrequently it was also possible to convert the rural Hukou to an urban one by “acquiring a university degree, achieving stardom in sports or other disciplines, and demobilizati on from military service.” (Liu, 2005, p.136) Second, people living in the countryside became strongly separated from those living in the cities, especially in terms of There are mainly three implications which are shaping those state-society relations: First, people are permanently confined to one place, men to their place of birth and women to their husband ’s residence place (Cheng and Selden, 1994, p.667). There are two types of Hukou: The rural and the urban Hukou, and everyone were required to register in one single place of residence. It was possible for people with a rural Hukou to obtain an urban Hukou only if there is a labour shortage and enterprises need to recruit more workers. Unfrequently it was also possible to convert the rural Hukou to an urban one by “acquiring a university degree, achieving stardom in sports or other disciplines, and demobilizati on from military service.” (Liu, 2005, p.136) Second, people living in the countryside became strongly separated from those living in the cities, especially in terms of

However, there were still people migrating to the cities without any residence permission. If they did so, they were discriminated in several ways. It was widespread that they were disrespectfully called Mangliu, which is translated as blind migrant and has a negative meaning comparable to hooligan. (Cheng and Selden, 1994, p.654) They didn’t enjoy the same rights like citizens with Huko u as they don’t have access to formal employment, health care, housing and pension, and since the government adopted the food stamp system, the food rationing directly depended on Hukou, therefore illegal internal migrants faced big difficulties in obtaining food. (Wong, 2007, p.37)

In the course of the Post-Mao regime and the beginning of the marketization after 1980 the migration patterns within China begun to change: “the commune structure in the countryside was permitted to crumble, trading in the cities was legitimized, urban construction exploded, and as a function of all these shifts, a floating population was born ” (Solinger, 1999, p.463). Consequently 60-80 Millions of peasants migrated to the cities in order to find work. It was the first time after 20 years that they weren ’t bonded to their village anymore. (Solinger, 1999, p.464) In that time the Hukou system was adopted and became more flexible: The temporary residential permit and the so-called blue card were introduced (Liu, 2005, p.136). These were important changes for the freedom of movement and residence: The temporary residential permit allowed people who have a job or a business in the city to permanently move away from their place of residence without being obliged to change their Hukou (Shen, 2013, p.1). The blue card was especially issued to investors, buyers of property and professionals, who have to pay a one-time entry fee to get it. Holders of the blue card enjoy quite the same rights like regular Hukou holders and have the chance to obtain a regular urban Hukou after two to five years. After the late 1980s, some cities even began to sale the urban Hukou directly. (Liu, 2005, pp.136-37) The cities set different quotas for sold Hukou’s and the implementation more and more began to vary from place to place, even in the same provinces the regulations could differ (Chan and Zhang, 1999, p.838). Therefore the urban Hukou indeed became available for migrants, but mostly only in small towns but not in cities; in the latter, it was usually not allowed to officially purchase an urban Hukou (Wang and Zuo, 1999, p.279).

Despite those changes, the hierarchies between rural and urban which were established through the Hukou system still exist (Liu, 2005, p.137; Cheng and Selden, 1994, p.668; Wang and Zuo, 1999, p.279). People with a temporal residence permit are still discriminated because they don’t have a local Hukou (Shen, 2013, p.1), since only citizens with local Hukou are eligible to receive basic services, access to the labour market and social benefits (Wang and Zuo, 1999, p.279).

2.1.6.2 The Propiska System in USSR

The Hukou system of china goes back to the Soviet population registration system which was called Propiska (Hatcher, 2011, p.8). The Propiska system was adopted by Stalin on the 27 th of December

1932, in order to restrict the uncontrolled mass migration from rural to urban areas, which was the reaction on the widespread famine in the countryside and the industrial growth of the cities. It was first implemented in the metropolitan regions and then expanded gradually to other regions, until 1932 it also included the rural areas and finally encompassed the whole country (Schaible, 2001, p.348). With the Propiska system, people who migrated within the country were required to register in the place of destination (Höjdestrand, 2003, p.2). The Propiska was imprinted in a mandatory internal passport, which was introduced additionally to the external passport, in order to record the Propiska (Schaible, 2001, p.348). Consequently, this internal passport had to be changed after the migration according to the new address, while “Criminals, political suspects, and

a number of other undesired elements were denied Propiska and passport and had to leave these cities” (Höjdestrand, 2003, p.2). It was necessary to hold a Propiska for being eligible for most civil rights: Propiska was a precondition for “social benefits such as formal employment; access to housing; medical insurance; education; unemployment benefits; ration cards; the right to vote; even access to public libraries” (ibid.). If someone lived in a place without being registered, s(he) became deprived of his/her civic rights. Further s(he) violated the passport law and therefore became a criminal. Despite those restrictions, it is generally acknowledged that the state wasn’t able to entirely prevent uncontrolled migration since most of the bigger cities still grew, despite the population living there should be controlled through Propiska (Gang, 1999, p.119). It means that many people spontaneously migrated within the USSR without Propiska.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s institution was committed to the freedom of movement and – same as in most other former Soviet countries – the Propiska system was abandoned in 1993, and was replaced through the registration system called “registratsia na mesto zhitelstva ” (registration in the permanent place of living). Later, Russia became a member of the United Nations and the Council of Europe and therefore acknowledged international conventions like the Human Rights, which are containing the right to free movement. (Schaible, 2001, p.345) Through the new law, the registration system should be turned into a notification-based system, similar to those systems of Western European countries. In practise, these changes would mean that:

“citizens still would register with local officials upon moving into a new area, but the officials no longer should have discretion to accept or reject applications. Rather, the citizens simply would notify the government that they are moving to an area, and the government should register them accordingly. ” (Schaible, 2001, p.350)

However, it seems that those changes through the abandoning of Propiska were not much more than formal changes, while in practice the registration process basically didn’t change a lot. There is still a large amount of people who aren’t registered, only in Moscow there were about 3 Million people without registration in 2001 (Schaible, 2001, p.344). Since the eligibility for most social benefits still depends on the registration, they live in those places without access to many basic civic rights. Therefore, most people still use the old name Propiska for the new registration system. The continuing existence of these practices is possible because of a certain disjunction between the law and administrative practice. Thus practice and law contradict themselves in many ways. For example, a r egistration is no longer required for employment, but an employer can’t pay taxes for However, it seems that those changes through the abandoning of Propiska were not much more than formal changes, while in practice the registration process basically didn’t change a lot. There is still a large amount of people who aren’t registered, only in Moscow there were about 3 Million people without registration in 2001 (Schaible, 2001, p.344). Since the eligibility for most social benefits still depends on the registration, they live in those places without access to many basic civic rights. Therefore, most people still use the old name Propiska for the new registration system. The continuing existence of these practices is possible because of a certain disjunction between the law and administrative practice. Thus practice and law contradict themselves in many ways. For example, a r egistration is no longer required for employment, but an employer can’t pay taxes for

Furthermore, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some cities implemented “modifications of the Propiska system o n their own accord” (Höjdestrand, 2003, p.6). Especially Moscow still applied a very strict registration system. In fact it replaced the Propiska system in 1996 through a mandatory registration system, but the administrative requirements were as difficult to fulfil as it was before with the Propiska system. 1999 there were some additional changes towards a notification-based system, but the restrictions still remained high. A person who arrived in Moscow must register within 3 days, with the possibility to register permanently or temporally. In both, a confirmation of the place of residence would be required, though this might be difficult to get as most landlords don’t provide written tenancy agreements in order to avoid paying taxes for those incomes. Because of those unattainable tenancy agreements, it is rather difficult for arrived migrants to register, as the majority of them most likely rent an apartment and can’t afford to purchase an own property (Schaible, 2001, pp.352-53).