Cognitive Approach Approaches to Nominalization .1 Generative Approach

Figure 27. DP as the maximal projection of the determiner During the 1990s some cross-linguistic studies unearthed support for this view of heads in the Semitic, Scandinavian, Romance, and Germanic languages. Other studies have attempted to explain why the nominal expression is the projection Szabolcsi 1987, 1989, Stowell 1989, 1991. D is the element that: converts the nominal expression into a referential phrase, which can subsequently serve as an argument. In that way, it can be argued, that the D parallels the complementizer of sentential complements: each turns its complement NP and IP, respectively into an expression that is able to appear in an argument position, that is, to bear a  role. Szabolcsi 1987:175 This brief summary of generative approaches to nominalization establishes a background of research in one tradition that the present study will reflect upon but not mirror in its assumptions about the nature of phrase structure or its derivation.

4.2.2 Cognitive Approach

The cognitive approach represents a movement away from generative grammar’s Platonic traditions toward real world experience of categories and relations. The grammar of Langacker, though highly schematic, depicts grammatical relationships as relations between objects in space and time using a primitive set of concepts similar to a force-dynamic view of action and energy—a Newtonian experience of the world. Figure 28. An object viewed subjectively: circle or round Langacker 1987a, 1991b views semantic structures as predications, characterized relative to some cognitive domain. Nouns and verbs are both predications which differ, not in their intrinsic content, but in how the content is construed. Therefore, a perceiver or observer is always implied by a linguistic category. There is no abstract, transcendent category apart from human experience. For example, the experience of the object depicted in figure 28 can be described variously as ‘circle’ and ‘round’, or ‘explosion’ and ‘explode’ depending upon the perceptions of an observer. More than any other cognitive linguist Langacker has developed his own explicit formulation and schematic system for representation of linguistic relationships. He views major grammatical categories count and mass nouns, perfective and imperfective processes as all definable in the same notional or semantic terms. The difference between these categories is how the interconnections of the content are construed by the cognitivizer. A noun is defined by what it does, “a noun profiles i.e., designates a region in some domain, where a region is defined abstractly as a set of interconnected entities” Langacker 1991b:15. Any physical object qualifies as a noun because of the “extensionality” of its material substance continuously over a region. It should be noticed how different these categories are from those of most other types of grammar; they are perceptual, cognitive, construed, and “immanent” rather than transcendent, abstract notions. An object can be construed nominally or verbally, as in figure 28. Nouns and verbs are not fixed grammatical categories for a set of roots, but are mutably related to how a perceiver construes the event or scene. Thus, within a cognitive framework, the difference between a nominalization and a verbalization a predication is a matter of construal by an observer. The notion of syntactic derivation is entirely foreign. Nominal predications presuppose interconnections among a set of conceived entities and profile that cognitive region. Relational verbal predications, on the other hand, presuppose a set of entities and profile the interconnections among those entities. Figure 29 illustrates Langackerian profiles for the relationship between two terms ‘together’ and ‘group’. Figure 29. Together and group Langacker 1991a:75 One of the figures in figure 29 is the more verbal form while the other is the nominal of the same situation, each just construed differently. The entities labeled [e1], [e2], and [e3] symbolize three individuals whose togetherness or groupness is based on a similarity, such as spatial proximity, indicated by the interconnecting lines [e4–6]. Assuming the conceptual content is the same between the relational verbal predication ‘together’ and the nominal predication ‘group’ and that the major grammatical difference is that one is a noun and the other a relational predication, then the contrast between the various forms of the same set of data becomes manifest by means of profiling. Since the conceptual content of the two predications is the same, i.e., the same membership and same relations between members, then the profile for each is represented in figure 29. Conceptualization a represents the non-profiled assemblage of conceptual contents circles with relations between them lines. This represents a variety of predications possible or thought without profiling anyone content or relation itself. Where profiling occurs it is indicated by a bolded line. Configuration b represents the relational predication ‘together’ with the interconnections in bold, and c pictures a region where the entities are profiled as a ‘group’. The nominal notion is typically of a bounded set of some form. This type of formulation provides a systematic cognitive basis for the similarities and the differences, relations and entities posited between different types of grammatical categories. Langacker claims it has the great benefit of being “natural,” iconic, and intuitive and can be extended to the relations observed in other languages. These observations also extend to languages in which nominalization carries a heavy load. The role of the perceiver, the observer is stressed in this model. Terms are not fundamentally nominal or verbal, but are dependent upon construal for their grammatical categorization. Categorization itself is viewed as a cognitive by-product of perception, rather than an autonomous abstract entity. The cognitive approach views nominals in relation to their verbal counterpart as essentially the same construction, configuration, or representation but profiling different relations or entities. Since the definition of a nominal is some region in bounded space, a fairly simple cognitive operation of “bounding” can be hypothesized to account for these differences lexically. Sentential nominalization is essentially the same process as lexical nominalization, differing not in kind but in scope since a sentential nominal is presumed to bound more entities with greater complexity of relationships between entities than simple lexical nominalizations. 79 demonstrates an English example of the various types of nominals found in Burmese. The difference in complexity of the nominals 79b–e is one of scope between 79e and 79b, not of profile. 79 a. exist b. existence c. experience of existence d. the being-under-someone’s-hand-undergoing existence e. the experience of an existence of being under someone’s oppressive hand The cognitive view of nominalization according to Langacker’s model is that of merely changing profile of the same or similar semantic contents for the purpose of the cognitivizer. Nominalization involves a conceptual reification of experience. The characterization of this is explained with the same notions of definitions for noun and verb classes. Since— unlike in generative grammar—there is no distinction between lexicon and syntax, there is no problem of where derivation arises. This cognitive approach is closer in some respects to Asher’s 1993 view of immanence see section 4.2.3.4, to conceptual naturalness, and ontological immediacy. The ontological immediacy of conceptual transformations between verbal and nominal will be important to the study of nominalization in Burmese. While construal of the entities is manifest by the semantic role of the particle, the ontological result is always the same—the creation of a linguistic object with a sense of linguistic being. This ontological unit that results from the nominalization process establishes a grounded basis or a stage for further expansion of sentential or discourse units.

4.2.3 Philosophical—Creation of Ontological Objects