know if this is important‘, ‗oh, by the way‘, and so on. In that case, sentence b flouts the maxim.
4 Maxim of Manner
To be clear by avoiding obscurity of expression and ambiguity, brief and orderly is a must to be taken into account when the speaker considers this
maxim. Example:
a When I was 7, I vividly remembered the way I fell down from the
stairs. I was spinning so hard so I felt every single cold and hard stair. I had acrophobia since then.
b This may be a bit confusing to me, but I remembered being in
stairs‘ accident. The context above is clearly described that there is a person that tries
to tell how he fell down from the stairs when he was a kid. However, the utterance a is the only one that fulfils the maxim of manner. In utterance b,
he tries to remember the event but it becomes more awkward since he himself cannot actually remember what happened to him when he was a kid.
c. Implicature
Levinson 1983:97 states that implicature stands as a paradigmatic example of the nature and power of pragmatic explanations of linguistic phenomena. It can
be shown in the organisation of language, some general priciples for co-operative interaction, and yet these principles have a pervasive effect upon the structure of
language. Thus, implicature seems to offer some significant functional explanations of linguistic facts. It also provides some explicit account on how it is
possible to mean more than what is actually said than what is literally expressed by the conventional sense of linguistic expressions uttered.
Grice in Levinson 1983:100 also asserts that the kind of inferences that are called implicatures are always of this special intended kind, and the theory of
implicature sketches one away in which such inferences, of a non-conversational sort, can be conveyed while meeting the criterion of communicated messages
sketched in G rice‘s theory of meaning.
In addition, Grice in Levinson 1983:103-128 divides implicature into two classifications. Those are as follows:
1 Conversational Implicature
It is defined as inferences arise to preserve the assumption of co- operation; it is only by making the assumption contrary to superficial
indications that the in ferences arise in the first place. So, Grice‘s point is not
that we always adhere to the maxims superficially but rather that, wherever possible, people will interpret what we say as conforming to the maxims on at
least some level. The broader analysis of conversational implicature is coined by Grice as follows:
a Generalised Conversational Implicature
When no special knowledge is required in the context to calculate the additional conveyed meaning, it is called a generalised
conversational implicature Yule, 1996:41. Example:
Reny : I know you bought me the pizza and the salad. Sinyo : Ouch, I bought you the pizza.
After hearing what Sinyo said, Reny has to assume that Sinyo is cooperating and not totally unaware of the maxim of quantity. Sinyo
must intend that Reny infers that what is not mentioned was not
bought. That means, Sinyo has conveyed a generalised conversational implicature without specific knowledge to be calculated.
b Particularised Conversational Implicature
Yule 1996:42 defines it as the implicatures that take place in very specific contexts in which they are locally recognised. Such
inferences are assumed and required to work out the conveyed meanings.
Example: Toni : Hey, will you join us tonight?
Mary : My faraway parents will come after 5 years abroad.
In order to make Mary‘s response relevant, Toni has to assume the knowledge that Mary is waiting for her parents for so long that she
cannot miss the arrival for her parents, yet Toni has to understand that mary will not be able to join him and his friends. In this sense, because
they are by far the most common, particularised conversational implicatures are just called implicatures.
2 Conventional Implicature
Grice in Levinson 1983: 127-128 defines conventional implicatures as non-truth-conditional interferences that are not derived from superordinate
pragmatic principles like the maxims, but are simply attached by convention to particular lexial items or expressions. Furthermore, Yule 1996:45 explains
how conventional implicatures do not have to occur in conversation, and do not depend on special contexts for their interpretation. They are associated
with specific words and result in additional conveyed meanings when those words are used. The examples of English words that have conventional
implicatures are ‗but‘, ‗and‘, ‗even‘, ‗yet‘, and ‗therefore‘. All these words have implicatures that vary from their language use.
3 Presupposition
Yule 1996:25 defines presupposition as something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to making an utterance. It is the speakers, not
sentences, that have presupposition. Givon in Yule and Brown 1988:29 is also in line in defining presupposition as defined in terms of assumptions the
speaker makes about what the hearer is likely to accept without challenge. Example:
Harri has come back from the city.
In producing the above utterance, the speaker will normally be expected to have presuppositions that a person named Harri exists and that he is
somewhere in the city. The speaker may have more specific presupposition that Harri is rich after coming back. All the presuppositions above may be
wrong, though. That is why it needs entailment. It is something that logically follows from what is asserted in the utterance. Sentences, not the speakers,
have entailments. Example:
Manna‟s cat is furry. Interestingly, we have a presupposition that Manna has a cat. In addition,
presuppositions do not change u nder the negation as in ‗Manna‘s cat is not
furry.‘, the presupposition will still be the same. This is called constancy under negation.
3. Speech Acts
