I NASMUCH AS EPISTEMOLOGY ELUCIDATES CONCEPTS, THE CONNECTION

6. I NASMUCH AS EPISTEMOLOGY ELUCIDATES CONCEPTS, THE CONNECTION

BETWEEN THE CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS AND JUDGEMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE MEANS THAT THERE MUST ALSO BE A DIMENSION OF

COGNITIVE VALUE IN EPISTEMOLOGY.

In conclusion, let me return to the appreciation of epistemological considerations within the framework of a science-oriented philosophy as professed by Schlick.

Summing up our deliberations so far we arrive at the question of what this means for the question as to what extent epistemology (or philosophy as a whole) possesses a cognitive claim. The modification of Popper’s considerations on the criterion of demarcation allows a more precise determination of the pecu- liar characteristics of metaphysical judgements. To my mind, they also permit a critical investigation of the farther-reaching assertion that philosophical reflec- tion is nothing more than a mere analysis of concepts.

If we consider the epistemological problems that occupied Schlick from the beginning, we realize that they concern the philosophical elucidation and justifi- cation of the empirical sciences’ cognitive claim, especially the understanding of the conceptual apparatus we need for the description, elucidation and explanation

of all that can be termed knowledge or scientific cognition. 38 Along with the basic syntactic and semantic concepts of ‘meaning’, ‘reference’, ‘fulfilment’ and ‘truth’, these would include the conceptual instruments of epistemology like ‘existence’, ‘cognition’, ‘experience’ and ‘reality’ or the question as to the aim of knowledge. In his Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre Schlick still regarded the eluci- dation of problems related to epistemological realism as factually meaningful and important, questions which under the influence of Wittgenstein he later came to consider as questions of merely conceptual clarification to which no synthetic cognitive value is attached.

The connection between the extension and the mere clarification of knowl- edge as described above should have made it clear that it does not help if, in the treatment of philosophical problems, one withdraws to the position that the elucidation of epistemological questions is nothing more than an analysis of con- cepts. For analysis, as we were able to see, refers to previous synthetic acts of

B ETWEEN M EANING AND D EMARCATION 91

judgements except in the case of abbreviations introduced for the sake of econ- omy of language

If what Schlick says about concepts in general is also true for epistemological concepts, then definitions and judgements must in principle refer to each other in this field, too. This can only be avoided if we are willing to go as far as Wittgen- stein and deny that epistemological questions have any cognitive value. Then, as

a consequence, there can no longer be philosophical concepts or definitions thereof. Cognition must then really be replaced by pointing. Beyond verifica- tionism there is, however, no longer any need to do this, especially since this assumption about the nature of philosophical considerations is a presupposed metaphysical thesis. Hence those who are unwilling to banish philosophy com-

pletely to the silent world of pointing, and who concede to philosophy at least the status of concepts we must presuppose for the investigation of knowledge, we cannot avoid conceding a status of knowledge to them as well.

To my mind, the proposed improvement or modification of the basic concept of falsificationism gives us a good starting-point for the treatment of epistemo- logical considerations, especially since it is also an alternative to verificationism.

The latter should be acceptable to a scientific philosophy if one gives up Popper’s pretence to a methodology that aims to standardize scientific method in

a way that is probably incompatible with what we know about scientific pro- gress. Epistemological judgements and concepts can thus also be regarded as rich in content (factual), even though they are not empirically factual because they are not empirically falsifiable.

This, of course, raises the question as to whether we are not reanimating a synthetic apriori though this approach. As far as I can see, this cannot be claimed in the Kantian sense because, for him, a synthetic apriori would have to be an apodictic judgement that must necessarily be decidable by pure reason. Meta-

physical judgements as judgements which are not justifiable by experience but formulated with a cognitive claim can only be tested in view of their explanatory capacity as conditions of empirical knowledge in the light of alternatives and in view of their consistency with other philosophical considerations. Therefore, they are to be regarded as metaphysical hypotheses. An acceptable system of philosophical concepts can only be one that is as complete and coherent as possible and that also integrates all philosophical solutions to problems in a con- sistent manner.

92 H ANS J UERGEN W ENDEL