A W AY TO P EACE . N ATIONALISM

7. A W AY TO P EACE . N ATIONALISM

The starting point of Schlick’s utopian construction was the question of how to reduce the probability of wars between states. One of the main causes for con-

flicts and wars are quarrels and fights over territorial claims. If a state is not defined by a territory, territorial questions disappear.

It is worth considering an application of Schlick’s principle to calming or solving conflicts that take place between more or less hostile groups within a state. According to Schlick, such problems should not be treated by separating groups, with each group in its own closed territory. Rather, one should mix them. Here he offers a combination of practical and moral arguments:

(6) Again, the essential presupposition is that the members of the groups live inter- mingled, for as soon as there is a territorial separation, new interests and complications arise. (p. 103)

Attempts at secession and isolation prevent peace and the development of an interna- tional morality. Morality is always a product of living together. (p. 107)

It is interesting to note that already Voltaire, the great philosopher of Enlighten- ment, proposed while writing on religious tolerance, a multiplication of the number of groups, in order to eliminate or, at least, reduce aggression and intol- erance between hostile groups. In his famous “Philosophical Dictionary”, in the article on tolerance (in part I), he wrote: If you have two religions in your midst, they will cut each other’s throat; if you have thirty, they will live in peace (Voltaire 1972, p. 390). Voltaire’s favorite example was the peaceful develop- ment of Amsterdam, a city in which many different religions coexisted.

Schlick did not speak about nationalism. But one can ask if the same methods could be used to reduce hatred, aggression and nationalistic hysteria. It is really tempting to interpret Schlick’s ideas in this way, i.e. to take them as a suggestion for solving problems of nationalism. It is obvious that he would have rejected any kind of “ethnic cleansing”; I think he also must have been against what was going on after the First World War, namely the establishment of all the national states in Eastern Europe. Schlick saw the problems clearly:

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(7) Living together on the same territory, taken to be the principle of belonging together, gives rise to all such evils which dog our divided world the most. (p. 97)

Today, the most realistic examples of several groups living together on the same territory are those of areas with ethnically mixed populations. The world is full

of such places. Unfortunately, most of these examples do not serve to further Schlick’s ideals.

If we look at former Yugoslavia, we are presented with a shocking counter- example, which makes Schlick appear extremely naive. As he lived in Vienna, the former capital of the multi-ethnic Habsburg empire, Schlick must have known of enough discouraging examples of several nationalities living together within the same territory. In fact, this empire broke into pieces because of nationalistic problems. Schlick cannot have been so blind. The only way to peace

seems to be a complete separation of nationalities, a division of the countries into several ghettos, each surrounded by very high fences, like wild animals in a zoo. In the Middle East one can often hear the slogan “high fences make good neighbours”, but what is true is that they do not make neighbours at all. Schlick had quite a different view of politics.

(8) What is so unnatural about our states are their boundaries. Every borderline in space is unnatural, because there is never any plausible reason for calling something good which the other side calls bad. (p. 104)

And Schlick repeats that separation, secession, isolation make it impossible for any kind of international morality to materialize. Morality grows out of living together. The more removed you are from others, the higher the fences are, and the less you learn to think about the others’ feelings and problems and to show consideration for them.

There are a few examples more convincing than that of the Balkans. One could mention the island and state of Mauritius. As an island, it has no territorial problems with other states. And it is inhabited by a lot of different nationalities:

Hindu, Tamil, Creole, Black, Indian Muslim, Chinese. At least till now, it has been a peaceful state.

Another example, on a larger scale, can be taken from India. Here there are different religious groups living more or less within the same territory. But each group lives under its own specific laws, especially a personal law. Theoretically,

people can also change their religion and move from one group to another. There is, of course, the federal state of India, regulating conflicts between the groups, which is a difficult and complicated task. And it is not clear how stable or un- stable the whole construction is.

Over the last few years it has often been said that there will never be peace as long as each nationality claims its own territorial state. How many territorial states must be established until there is finally peace in the Balkans? It is well known that most governments are against secessionist movements. When this question arises, the international community of states shares the attitude of the

M ORITZ S CHLICK ’ S I DEA OF N ON-TERRITORIAL S TATES 57

Roman church towards divorce: it is of no importance whether partners love or hate each other; the only separation that is allowed is by death. Allen Buchanan, one of the prominent authors on secession, is not quite as rigorous, but he also insists that nations should have a right to self-determination only under very restricted conditions – e.g., if otherwise they really are in danger of being exter- minated. But “as such”, i.e. just because it is a nation, no nation should have the right to self-determination. (Buchanan 1996 p. 298)

8. T HE R IGHT TO S ELF-DETERMINATION Can we put aside the right of national self-determination, including the right to

secession, so easily? Is it not a fundamental human right? Does it not follow from the basic ideas of democracy? Who is entitled to tell nations what they have to do, and what they must not do? Who could call himself a good democrat, and yet object if the majority of a population in a plebiscite decides to secede from their present state and establish a new one, usually a smaller one? Yet the right to self-determination does not have a very good reputation. Even philosophers pre- fer to look at states as if states, once established, are eternally fixed.

But this contradicts the most basic principles of liberalism. It follows from these very principles that any group should be given the right to secede from a state if this group does not want to live in it any longer, and if it wants to es- tablish a new state. But even the most liberal writer (Beran, 1984) found it necessary to make some restrictions, saying that a group must be territorially concentrated if it is to be given the right to self-determination. Why? Because every secession causes territorial problems. Think, for example, of the USA: they could not easily be divided into a white state and a coloured state, because both groups would have to claim the whole territory and, as this author writes (Beran 1984, p. 24) “it is not practicable at present for two states to share legal sovereignty over the whole territory”. Nearly all arguments against a liberal interpretation of self-determination refer to territorial questions.

Schlick wanted to introduce his own ideas at exactly this point.

I think that Schlick would have agreed with all modern critics of an unre- stricted, unlimited, universal right to self-determination, as long as this right means what it usually means – namely, territorial secession, new borders etc. If two nationalities want to exterminate each other, and each wants to occupy the whole territory alone, then – according to Schlick – one should not separate them. Territorial separation is the favoured method of every nationalism, but if all possible conflicts were to be solved simply by separating the hostile parties, our globe would soon be too small. Besides, it would create endless territorial claims and wars. It is because of these bitter, practical experiences that today many political philosophers deny the right to separation and secession. (See e.g. Moore, 1998). The biblical procedure “if you go right, I shall go left, if you go

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left, I shall go right” is a negation of morality; but what is worse, it will not lead to peace, because to the left and to the right are already other people.

Moritz Schlick’s model offers quite a different solution. First, from a moral point of view the right to political self-determination should be granted to any nation. But Schlick’s perspective is much wider than that. To him, the right to self-determination should be acknowledged to any group, not only to those that define themselves as a nation. “What’s so special about nations?” , that they can ask for self-determination, asked Allen Buchanan (Buchanan, 1996) in a polemic argument. Schlick would agree, but draw a different conclusion. Schlick’s con- clusion would be that not only nations, but any group of adult human beings must be given the right to self-determination, including the right to secede from an existing state and try to create a new state.

Actually, history knows only few secessionist movements which were not nationalistic. But the first movement to have been called a “secession” was a social, not a national movement. Thrice (494, 449, 287 BC), so the story goes, did the Roman plebeians withdraw themselves from the city-state of Rome in

protest against the behaviour of the upper classes. This behavior received the Latin name of “secessio”. During the first secession, in 494 BC, the plebeians literally left the city and went to a hill called mons sacrum outside the urban territory.

In Schlick’s model, self-determination does not lead to chaos or war, because self-determination does not include an exclusive right over a certain territory. In contrast to territorial states, Schlick-states can be founded, changed or abolished

without disturbing peace and justice. All groups or Schlick-states must live on the same territory, and no Schlick-state is allowed to dominate another. Each group gets its own government, but no group has a territory of its own. Only

individuals, if anyone at all, are landowners. As no political group, no Schlick- state, governs a territory – they are all forced to live together on the same globe, or island, or continent. So they must find some sort of a modus vivendi.