C ONSEQUENCES ON THE B A C K G R O U N D OF E INSTEIN’S D ISTINCTION B ETWEEN C ONSTRUCTIVE T HEORIES AND P RINCIPLE T HEORIES

3. C ONSEQUENCES ON THE B A C K G R O U N D OF E INSTEIN’S D ISTINCTION B ETWEEN C ONSTRUCTIVE T HEORIES AND P RINCIPLE T HEORIES

3.1 Einstein’s Distinction

In answering the question posed above, we may profit from a distinction drawn by Einstein, who distinguished between “constructive theories” and “principle theories”.

The aim of constructive theories is to provide a comprehensive understand- ing of a certain class of phenomena. To achieve this aim, constructive theories state hypothetical, conjectural principles providing unifying explanations. You take a small quantity of laws or principles and a small quantity of different enti- ties, and build up a rich variety of phenomena which at first glance do not seem to be theoretically connectable. Einstein classified the kinetic theory of gases as a constructive theory – it reduces mechanical, thermal, and diffusional processes to movements of molecules. It uses the hypothesis of molecular motions to build up this variety of phenomena. Another example would be the theory of evolution. According to Einstein, the advantages of constructive theories are completeness, adaptability, and clearness.

T HE N EUTRALITY OF M ETA- E THICS R EVISITED 317

Principle theories, on the other hand, do not start with hypothetically con- structed principles. They start with empirically discovered characteristics of natural processes and search for a mathematically specified theoretical represen- tation of them. This representation can then be used to stipulate precise con- ditions for the development of the processes in question. We may therefore say that the aim of principle theories is not explanatory, but rather predictive. If a

principle theory succeeds, it succeeds in predicting and governing certain phenomena. Einstein classified the theory of relativity as a principle theory. According to Einstein, the advantages of principle theories are logical perfection and the security of the foundation.

3.2 Einstein’s Distinction Applied to Ethics What happens if we apply Einstein’s distinction to Vienna Circle and logical

empiricist moral philosophy? (1) I think that one can see immediately that the meta-ethical theory of non-

cognitivism has to be classified as a constructive theory of morals. It is a theory that states one principle we should rely on when trying to provide a comprehensive understanding of morals. This principle is to be conceived of as hypothetical and conjectural, and it states that there are no objective values at the basis of our moral behaviour. We may use this principle to con- struct a unifying explanation of the phenomenology of morals.

(2) The enterprise of normative ethics would lead to a principle theory of morals. This theory would be aimed at developing a theoretical represen-

tation of morals on the basis of the observable moral life. The principles governing this representation could then be used to classify real-life phenomena into morally acceptable and morally unacceptable ones. If some- one operating on the meta-ethical level asserts the doctrine of output NOM, we may reconstruct this false assumption as being due to the premises that a) practical implications may only result from a principle theory of morals, and

b) constructive theories have no implications for principle theories. After having classified noncognitivism and normative ethics in the described

way, we face a requirement and a prospect:

3.3 The Requirement

Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricist moral philosophy amounts largely to the proposition that there can be no principle theory of morals (that is, that there can

be no normative ethics). This proposition is justified by giving a certain con- structive theory of morals, namely noncognitivism. But this is not enough. There is no sharp boundary to be drawn between constructive theories and principle

U WE C ZANIERA

ones. The doctrine of output NOM is presumably false. It is therefore not suffi- cient to merely give a constructive theory that says why there can be no principle theory. The constructive theory must also say why it does not matter if there is no principle theory. Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricist moral philosophy imply the question: “What is the cement of morality if it does not consist of values?” Philosophers like Schlick, Carnap and Menger seem to have supposed this, but they did not deal with the question in an explicit and systematic way.

I think that we find the most promising theories concerning the cement of morality along the line of a tradition that leads from David Hume to John Leslie Mackie. These theories try to show – very broadly speaking – why it is in our own self-interest to behave morally. They see widespread preferences of the members of a certain species inhabiting a certain world as underlying morality. If such theories succeed, they have provided a theory of allegedly objective values that is itself devoid of the highly problematical assumption of objective values.

3.4 The Prospect

If we find a satisfactory noncognitivist theory of the foundations of morality, we have a constructive theory of morals that provides the main principles underlying our moral behaviour. There is no apparent reason why we should not make use of them when facing moral problems. It seems not to be a bad idea to consult the principles of our usual moral thinking when working out strategies to deal with new moral challenges. And since it is the task of a constructive theory of morals to spell out these principles in detail, we may say that the constructive theory of morals can provide reasonable moral advice. The constructive theory does inform us about the commands that would apply in a certain situation if we were willing to stick to our ordinary morality. This is, of course, a highly pragmatic approach. There is no compelling reason to proceed this way. Given an interest in the welfare of people, it might be a rational route to take, but there is no force of whatever nature – ethical, physical, or epistemological – that compels us to take this route. Nevertheless, if we do, there may result improvements in working out moral principles and perhaps even a principle theory of morals – on the basis of the constructive theory. In that case, we would have overcome a ban on norma- tive ethics without giving up its basic premise – noncognitivism.