A NALYSED IN ITS DIMENSIONS, THE CRITERION OF DEMARCATION LENDS GREATER PRECISION TO KANT ’ S STATEMENT WITH REGARD TO THEIR

5. A NALYSED IN ITS DIMENSIONS, THE CRITERION OF DEMARCATION LENDS GREATER PRECISION TO KANT ’ S STATEMENT WITH REGARD TO THEIR

COGNITIVE VALUE AND THE FOUNDATION OF KNOWLEDGE.

If we consider both dimensions of demarcation separately, it follows that (a) with the logical aspect of falsifiability or, minimally, the logical possi- bility of refutation, Popper is basically giving us a reformulation (and in some respects a reformation) of the Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic

judgements, for the criterion of falsifiability in the general sense of refutability delimits empirical from non-empirical judgements – but only from those non- empirical judgements that are, in addition, analytic. So on closer examination it turns out to be rather a criterion of demarcation between analytic and synthetic

than between metaphysical and empirical judgements. 36 (b) Furthermore we find that the explication of experience as scientific, me-

thodically obtained knowledge (objective testability) is a reformulation of Kant’s distinction of the foundations of the validity of knowledge, the distinction between validity a priori and validity a posteriori – though (this being how it differs from Kant) not of experience in general but of scientific experience. However, only validity a priori is positively characterized in this way. Popper reconstructs validity by virtue of scientific experience with ‘the rules of the game

“empirical science”’as their internal ‘logic’ 37 .

B ETWEEN M EANING AND D EMARCATION 89

But even if falsifiability must be regarded as a – logical – property of synthetic judgements that results from their informative character – and Popper in the

main reformulates a criterion for synthetic, i.e. ampliative judgements – some- thing else becomes apparent that Kant had considered to be negligible. In making his distinction Kant was only looking at true judgements, whereas Popper takes

into account that when making judgements we never know whether they are true. By making falsifiability the criterion of demarcation, Popper therefore connects two insights:

(1) the distinction between informative and non-informative judgements and:

(2) the independence of informativity and truth. Therefore, all synthetic judgements as cognitive claims can also be false without

our being able to know it. Syntheticity – informational content – of judgements and their truth are thus independent properties. That is to say, informativity and possible falsity must be able to coincide. Hence, synthetic judgements are not

ipso facto extensions of knowledge as Kant assumes, but are only possible exten- sions of knowledge. A synthetic judgement is an extension of knowledge only in so far as it is true.

This property of being merely a possible extension of knowledge finds expression in the logical structure of synthetic judgements: Syntheticity – or informativity – always means: there exist logically possible classes of events that are incompatible with the assertion in question. With the insight that synthetic

judgements are always possible extensions of knowledge but that this is not guaranteed, synthetic character (informational content) and falsifiability coincide both for empirical and metaphysical statements.

As a result of the foregoing considerations, we can conclude that:

1. Meaning and factual demarcation do not contradict each other.

90 H ANS J UERGEN W ENDEL

2. The criterion of demarcation can well be interpreted as a criterion of meaning. There is no conflict here if one takes into account the connec- tion between meaning and cognition.

3. Clarifications of concepts originate in factual judgements (in cognitive claims).

4. Philosophical and especially epistemological concepts are therefore such that they are also based on cognitive (epistemic) claims, albeit not to

empirical knowledge.